[Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce

Andy Blunden andyb@marxists.org
Fri Mar 15 02:29:50 PDT 2019


I am not a fan of Saussure myself, Arturo, partly because he 
established such a very un-Hegelian dichotomy with his 
Signifier and Signified. Such a view is fundamentally 
incompatible with Hegel's approach. However, you are correct 
that as early as 1817 Hegel supported the thesis of the 
arbitrariness of the sign, and he regarded sign-systems 
which included remnants of representation as underdeveloped, 
kind of 'second-rate'.

Apart from that, what Hegel has to say about speech is 
mainly in the Subjective Spirit, as I am sure you know. but 
it is a pity that Hegel never developed his ideas about 
communication in general and speech and writing in 
particular into any kind of finished theory.

Andy

------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
On 15/03/2019 6:27 pm, Arturo Escandon wrote:
> Hi everyone.
>
> I just happen to read this old thread.
>
> It is my impression when I was doing my PhD and tried to 
> get around the notion of language and more into the notion 
> of speaking (or communication if you will) that De 
> Saussure actually was inspired in many ways by Hegel's 
> theory of systems when producing his categories of 
> langage/langue/parole. Furthermore, it seems than Hegel 
> anticipated many Saussurian ideas on the arbitrariness of 
> the linguistic sign, its relationship with concepts, and 
> writing systems in general.
>
> As you can clearly see when translating Vygotsky's Thought 
> and language/Thinking and speaking we struggle with 
> Saussurean terminology to convey what that "language" is.
>
> There are many passages of the Cours that match Hegel's 
> Encyclopedia.
>
> I could not address all these issues in my thesis and I 
> opted for deploying the notion of discourse instead of 
> speech. In that way I got rid of the notion of language as 
> system comprising all utterances (much or less as all 
> commodities form the market). However, I did not solve the 
> underlying issue of how abbreviation works in discourse 
> (or language).
>
> There are also many ontological problems with Vygotsky's 
> notion of interiorization and inner speech if we get rid 
> of a Saussurean understanding of language as system or 
> what linguists call a segregationist view of language 
> (language as a reified object that only makes sense within 
> an objectified system).
>
> Best,
>
> Arturo
>
>
> On Thu, 3 Jan 2019 at 02:04, James Ma 
> <jamesma320@gmail.com <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     Andy, this sounds rather unwise - I'm afraid your line
>     of argument is not entirely tenable.
>     I'll get back to you again when I have more time.
>     James
>
>     */_______________________________________________________/*
>
>     /*James Ma *Independent Scholar
>     //https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa
>     /
>
>
>     On Tue, 1 Jan 2019 at 22:54, Andy Blunden
>     <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>
>         It is clearly wrong to say that we can't study
>         language objectively because we exist and think in
>         it - in speech and writing, language is objective
>         and actual, so we can also observe it. But to
>         study language objectively, from "outside,"
>         requires the student to acquire a certain distance
>         from it. Teaching grammar is one way of achieving
>         that, even writing too, I guess, and anyone who
>         learns a second language has a point from which to
>         view their first language. Thus we can learn that
>         "Je ne sais pas" is not necessarily a double
>         negative. But is the interviewer who asks an
>         artist to explain their painting failing to stand
>         outside language to see that there is something
>         else. Like the psychologists who ask subjects
>         questions and take the answer to be what the
>         person "really" thought. It's the old problem of
>         Kant's supposed "thing-in-itself" beyond
>         experience which (in my opinion) Hegel so
>         thoroughly debunked
>
>         Andy
>
>         ------------------------------------------------------------
>         Andy Blunden
>         http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>         On 2/01/2019 7:46 am, David Kellogg wrote:
>>         Happy new year to all, especially to all us happy
>>         pigs born in a pig year.
>>
>>         Yes, "absurd" is too strong: it is possible to
>>         construct a context in which "I think" isn't a
>>         grammatical metaphor for "may", "should", or "it
>>         is possible". But of course the whole post was a
>>         semantic metaphor for James' statement that you
>>         cannot study language objectively and use it at
>>         the same time.
>>
>>         And semantics is the weak point of Saussure. The
>>         problem is that there isn't anything "arbitraire"
>>         or conventional about semantics: to say that
>>         semantics is arbitrary is essentially to say that
>>         thinking is arbitrary: that there is no rational
>>         reason why we think of time as tense and entity
>>         as number. It's not just that we can't think any
>>         other way; it's that we have to grow crops and
>>         teach children in real time, and we have
>>         to gather food and cook it in real numbers.
>>
>>         Language is arbitrary (i.e. "subjective") at only
>>         one point: phonetics. But even with phonetics
>>         (paradoxically the easiest to measure
>>         objectively) you have to deal with the fact that
>>         humans make a finite number of sounds, and  only
>>         a small subset of these are maximally
>>         distinguishable at a distance. That's why
>>         (another paradox) at the very time that Saussure
>>         was developing a purely idealist, subjectivist
>>         study of language, teachers were creating the
>>         international phonetic alphabet we still use
>>         today. It's a menu, and menus suggest some
>>         element of choice. But choices can be
>>         constrained, and contraints are always motivated.
>>
>>         Having twelve months and three hundred and sixty
>>         five days a year only seems "arbitrary" when you
>>         are not a farmer.If you were born in the pig year
>>         (as I was) this is a particularly auspicious
>>         year, particularly if you are completing your
>>         fifth complete cycle of twelve years (as I am).
>>         But the reason why five cycles of twelve years is
>>         considered particularly auspicious is no
>>         more arbitrary than the choice of the pig to name
>>         the year: it's a likespan of sixty years, which
>>         in Confucian times was considered just about ideal.
>>
>>         David Kellogg
>>         Sangmyung University
>>
>>         New in /Language and Literature/, co-authored
>>         with Fang Li:
>>         Mountains in labour: Eliot’s ‘Atrocities’ and
>>         Woolf’s alternatives
>>         Show all authors
>>
>>         https://doi.org/10.1177/0963947018805660
>>         <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0963947018805660>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>         On Tue, Jan 1, 2019 at 2:45 PM Rein Raud
>>         <rein.raud@tlu.ee <mailto:rein.raud@tlu.ee>> wrote:
>>
>>             Happy New Year, David,
>>
>>             Why do you say that (a) is absurd? Let us
>>             assume that this is what a scholar tells
>>             herself after a long internal thought-chain,
>>             weighing the pros and cons of a certain
>>             argument about how to study the human body,
>>             finally arriving at an unexpected conclusion,
>>             perhaps persuaded by someone else’s work. And
>>             at this point she says to herself “Hey, come
>>             on, I don't really think we can study the
>>             human body objectively, do I?”
>>
>>             “Thinking something” (endorsing a particular
>>             claim) and “thinking” (entertaining certain
>>             mental processes) are not the same thing,
>>             even though conflated in the English word
>>             “think”. But in the first case you can
>>             substitute it with some synonyms (“reckon”,
>>             for example), while in others you cannot. You
>>             ask “can you write "I don't think" without
>>             thinking?” but you probably wouldn’t ask “can
>>             you write "I don't reckon" without reckoning?”
>>
>>             Best wishes for 2019 to the whole community,
>>
>>             Rein
>>
>>             **********************************************
>>             Rein Raud
>>             Professor of Asian and Cultural
>>             Studies, Tallinn University
>>             Uus-Sadama 5, Tallinn 10120 Estonia
>>             www.reinraud.com <http://www.reinraud.com>
>>
>>
>>             “Meaning in Action: Outline of an
>>             Integral Theory of Culture”(Polity 2016)
>>             <http://politybooks.com/a-new-look-at-culture-as-such/>
>>             “Practices of Selfhood” (with Zygmunt Bauman,
>>             Polity 2015)
>>             <http://politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9780745690162>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>             On 1 Jan 2019, at 07:29, David Kellogg
>>>             <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>             <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>>             Suppose I say something like this:
>>>
>>>             "I don't think we can study the human body
>>>             objectively because we are already users of
>>>             bodies when studying them, i.e. we must
>>>             remain insiders of our bodies in order to
>>>             study them, plus the fact that we have the
>>>             will to embodiment, so to speak."
>>>
>>>             I might be comfortable with a statement like
>>>             this if I read through it quickly and I
>>>             don't think about it for too long, provided
>>>             I am in good health and don't require a
>>>             doctor (If I fall seriously ill and I go to
>>>             a doctor, and receive a statement like this,
>>>             I will probably want a second opinion).
>>>
>>>             But alas, I am arrested by the first three
>>>             words. What does it mean to say "I don't
>>>             think"? Can you write "I don't think"
>>>             without thinking? Is this an instance of
>>>             aphophasis, like "not to mention"?
>>>
>>>             Because  I do study language--and study it
>>>             objectively--I know that "i don't think" is
>>>             an interpersonal metaphor: it's a modal, a
>>>             statement of probability, like the
>>>             expression "cannot" (which is also a
>>>             contradiction, when you think about it,
>>>             because there isn't any such thing
>>>             as negative probability).
>>>
>>>             This is easy to prove. You just add a tag:
>>>
>>>             a) "I don't think we can study the human
>>>             body objectively, do I?"
>>>             b) "I don't think we can study the human
>>>             body objectively, can we?"
>>>
>>>             It should be obvious that a) is absurd, and
>>>             b) is what is meant. But isn't that an
>>>             objective test? Or do you just mean that the
>>>             phenomena of language don't appear under a
>>>             microscope?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             David Kellogg
>>>             Sangmyung University
>>>
>>>             New in /Language and Literature/,
>>>             co-authored with Fang Li:
>>>             Mountains in labour: Eliot’s ‘Atrocities’
>>>             and Woolf’s alternatives
>>>             Show all authors
>>>
>>>             https://doi.org/10.1177/0963947018805660
>>>             <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0963947018805660>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             On Tue, Jan 1, 2019 at 4:52 AM James Ma
>>>             <jamesma320@gmail.com
>>>             <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>>                 Andy, here're my thoughts with respect
>>>                 to your message:
>>>
>>>                 I think "default", as a state of the
>>>                 human mind, is intuitive and /a
>>>                 posteriori/ rather than of something we
>>>                 get hung up on deliberately or
>>>                 voluntarily. This state of mind is also
>>>                 multifaceted, depending on the context
>>>                 in which we find ourselves. Perhaps
>>>                 there might be a prototype of default
>>>                 that is somehow intrinsic, but I'm not
>>>                 sure about that.
>>>
>>>                 Yes, Saussure's structuralism is
>>>                 profoundly influential, without which
>>>                 post-Saussurean thought, including
>>>                 post-structuralism, wouldn't have
>>>                 existed. Seemingly, none of these
>>>                 theorists could have worked out their
>>>                 ideas without the inspiration and
>>>                 challenge of Saussure. Take for example
>>>                 the Russian linguist Jakobson, which I
>>>                 think would suffice (never mind those
>>>                 Francophone geniuses you might have
>>>                 referred to!). Jakobson extended and
>>>                 modified Saussure's signs, using
>>>                 communicative functions as the object of
>>>                 linguistic studies (instead of
>>>                 standardised rules of a given language,
>>>                 i.e. /langue/ in Saussure's terms). He
>>>                 replaced langue with "code" to denote
>>>                 the goal-directedness of communicative
>>>                 functions. Each of the codes was thus
>>>                 associated with its own langue as a
>>>                 larger system.
>>>
>>>                 It seems to me that Saussure's semiology
>>>                 is not simply dualistic. There's more to
>>>                 it, e.g. the system of signification
>>>                 bridging between a concept (signified)
>>>                 and a sound image (signifier). Strictly
>>>                 speaking, the system of signification is
>>>                 not concerned with language but
>>>                 linguistics within which language lends
>>>                 itself to scrutiny and related
>>>                 concepts become valid. From Jakobson's
>>>                 viewpoint, this system is more than a
>>>                 normalised collective norm; it contains
>>>                 personal meanings not necessarily
>>>                 compatible with that norm. Saussure
>>>                 would say this norm is the /parole/ that
>>>                 involves an individual's preference and
>>>                 creativity. I find Jakobson's code quite
>>>                 liberating - it helps explain the
>>>                 workings of Chinese dialects (different
>>>                 to dialects within the British English),
>>>                 e.g. the grammatical structure of
>>>                 Shanghainese, which is in many aspects
>>>                 at variance with Mandarin (the official
>>>                 language or predominant dialect).
>>>
>>>                 By the way, I don't think we can study a
>>>                 language objectively because we are
>>>                 already users of that language when
>>>                 studying it, i.e. we must remain
>>>                 insiders of that language in order to
>>>                 study it, plus the fact that we have the
>>>                 will to meaning, so to speak.
>>>
>>>                 James
>>>                 */_______________________________________________________/*
>>>
>>>                 /*James Ma *Independent Scholar
>>>                 //https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa
>>>                 /
>>>
>>>
>>>                 On Fri, 21 Dec 2018 at 03:03, Andy
>>>                 Blunden <andyb@marxists.org
>>>                 <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>>>
>>>                     Getting to your first topic, now,
>>>                     James ...
>>>
>>>                     I think it is inescapable for any of
>>>                     us, in everyday interactions, to
>>>                     "default" to the Saussurian way of
>>>                     seeing things, that is to say, signs
>>>                     as pointing to objects, in a
>>>                     structure of differences, abstracted
>>>                     from historical development. The
>>>                     structural view always gives us
>>>                     certain insights which can be
>>>                     invisible otherwise. But like a lot
>>>                     of things, in making this point,
>>>                     Saussure set up this dichotomy with
>>>                     himself on one side and condemned
>>>                     half a century of his followers in
>>>                     Structuralism to a one-sided view of
>>>                     the world ... which made the
>>>                     poststructuralists look like
>>>                     geniuses of course, when they
>>>                     stepped outside this cage
>>>
>>>                     What do you  think?
>>>
>>>                     Andy
>>>
>>>                     ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>                     Andy Blunden
>>>                     http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>
>>>                     On 21/12/2018 7:56 am, James Ma wrote:
>>>>
>>>>                     Andy, thank you for your message.
>>>>                     Just to make a few brief points,
>>>>                     linking with some of your comments:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>                     First, I have a default sense of
>>>>                     signs based on Saussurean
>>>>                     linguistics (semiology); however, I
>>>>                     don't think I "strangely leap from
>>>>                     Peirce's semiotics to Saussure's
>>>>                     semiology". When I read Peirce and
>>>>                     Vygotsky on signs, I often have a
>>>>                     Saussurean imagery present in my
>>>>                     mind.  As I see it, Saussurean
>>>>                     semiology is foundational to all
>>>>                     language studies, such as the
>>>>                     evolution of language in terms of
>>>>                     e.g. semantic drift and narrowing.
>>>>                     Speaking more broadly, in my view,
>>>>                     both synchronic and diachronic
>>>>                     approach to language have relevance
>>>>                     for CHAT.  Above all, /a priori
>>>>                     /hermeneutic methodology can
>>>>                     benefit further development of
>>>>                     semiotic methodology within CHAT,
>>>>                     helping us to come to grips with
>>>>                     what Max Fisch, the key Peircean
>>>>                     exponent, referred to as "the most
>>>>                     essential point", i.e. the
>>>>                     tripartite of thought as semiosis,
>>>>                     namely sign-interpretation or sign
>>>>                     action.  For example, how sign
>>>>                     action might be implicated in
>>>>                     culture and consciousness.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>
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