[Xmca-l] Re: Do we find Inequalities in wild life system?

Tue Jan 29 16:50:25 PST 2019

Yes, it struck me after hitting send that of course Taylor also wrote a huge book (and then a little one) on Hegel. 

Sounds like Paul Redding has been talking to your spellchecker.  :)

The power of mediators, and what makes them easy to forget, is that they become invisible in action. Language seems like a window on another person’s consciousness; the plough is simply handy when the soil needs turning. The government is just those idiots in Washington (or Canberra?)… When we notice the myriad of mediators, they seem like simple links between us and whatever we’re interacting with, when in fact neither would exist without them. Without language, ploughs, and governments life would be brutish and short. 

Martin

> On Jan 29, 2019, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
> 
> I'm sure you're right, Martin. We are after all both defending the same view.
> 
> "Intersubjectivity" is a slippery and changing word. I thought it was Karl Popper who introduced the word in his 1945 "Open Society," but his meaning has been supplanted by others much later. I think he used the term to mean something "in between" objective truth (things fall when you drop them) and subjective truth (heights are scary), which is culturally produced (falling is due to gravity, acrophobia is a panic disorder).
> There was a whole movement of Hegel interpreters who began to use "intersubjectivity" as a means of "operationalising" a "nonmetaphysical reading" of Hegel, in the 1980s I think, and 1990s. Charles Taylor was ahead of that curve, I would agree, but       I don't think he took the spirit-is-human-activity reading down to the detailed level that this later intersubjective reading did. I agree with Charles Taylor - his work was pioneering.
> 
> I don't know about this view of intersubjectivity as a "merging of subjectivities" unless we mean some New Age kind of thing, or crowd behaviour, etc. (BTW, my spellchecker keeps telling me there's no such word as "intersubjectivity.")
> 
> I had a long and fruitless email conversation with Paul Redding (usually recognised as the "senior" Australian Hegelian) on the question of how he understood me telling him "It's raining here" (he's in Sydney). I wanted him to see that our interaction was mediated by 2 computers and the internet and by the English language, but he utterly rejected this, insisting that the only sense in which our communication of mediated was that in Sydney as well as in Melbourne, it rains, and so we both had experience of rain. We never got past that point. The concept of artefact-mediation was utterly impenetrable for him. He's a supporter of Robert Brandom, BTW.
> Andy
> Andy Blunden
> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm <http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
> On 30/01/2019 10:55 am, Martin Packer wrote:
>> I feel we’re still talking past each other, Andy. You seem to be attributing to me the view that I am attributing to James, and questioning: namely that ‘intersubjectivity’ is two (or more) subjectivities somehow meeting in interaction.
>> 
>> I am trying to argue that to talk only of subjects and objects, or only of subjectivity and objectivity, will never be sufficient, because it neglects a third phenomenon which is primary: the shared, public practices (involving artifacts) in which people are always involved, and into which they are born. I think you hold the same opinion!
>> 
>> One reason for the confusion is a terminological one. Some of us here are using ‘intersubjectivity’ to refer to some kind of fusing of subjectivities. That is a real phenomenon, I concur. I still remember many years ago finding the perfect partner for mixed badminton: it was though we played as one! And also those rare occasions dancing salsa with the right partner.
>> 
>> But I want to use the term ‘intersubjectivity’ the way Charles Taylor used it in his article "Interpretation and The Sciences of Man" (1971). (Taylor is not the last word on the phenomena of intersubjectivity, but he was one of the first.) Taylor wanted to draw to our attention “the social matrix in which individuals find themselves and act,” “the background to social action,” including “a common language” which “is constitutive of… institutions and practices.” He insisted that it is not simply consensus among individuals.
>> 
>> But I don’t feel dogmatic about the terminology. We could call them intersujectivity-1 and intersubjectivity-2. Or find a new word for what Taylor was talking about. What’s important is the observation that there are phenomena that cannot be reduced to subjects and objects. 
>> 
>> Obviously these practices and institutions will involve material artifacts; they couldn’t function otherwise. But these artifacts will be defined within the practices. The fact that the US government cannot get rid of guns is not due to their number, it is due to the fact that the *right* to own a gun is (on one interpretation) defined by the texts and practices of government as one that cannot be legally infringed. The government is perfectly within *its* rights to destroy a gun that has no owner. I would want, then, to avoid trying to draw a distinction between an artifact and its meaning: what *counts as* a gun is (again) a legal matter, not something that individuals negotiate. 
>> 
>> Martin
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Jan 29, 2019, at 5:26 PM, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Martin, I distinguish between intersubjectivity and the CHAT standpoint because the literature I have seen which tries to build a social theory on the basis of subject-subject interactions, ignores the artefacts being used, and in particular, the pre-existence of these artefacts relative to the interactions, and their materiality. (I admit that I have come to this conclusion from my study of Hegel interpretations, which is a limited domain. But I do also see it in strands of social theory as such.) This is achieved by either subsuming the mediating artefact into the subject itself (e.g. my voice is a part of me, the subject, as is my hand) or taking the mediator as the object rather than a means. Such interpretations fail to explain why today can be any different from yesterday, etc.
>>> 
>>> We cold say that mediated interactions are still intersubjective, we just use things for our interactions with other subjects, but I see CHAT as a further really existing step beyond the step which the intersubjective turn made relative to methodological individualism and abstract social theory.
>>> 
>>> Ontologically, the distinction is this: the meaning of an artefact is established intersubjectively, so to speak, but the artefact itself is still material and objective, and this constrains the meanings which can be attached to it. For example, the sheer existence of 400 million guns in the USA is a social problem over and above the place of guns in the thinking and behaviour of so many Americans. A government simply cannot get rid of them. For example, the propensity of people in some countries to suffer in natural disasters is not just due to the poor preparedness of their people and governments, but the objective vulnerability of people due to the state of infrastructure. There is a limit on how good your education system will be if you have no teachers, no books and no schools. Of course the simple objective existence of the relevant things is not the whole business, but it is something else. And the nature of the constellation of existing artefacts is something else, over and above their existence. EG all the school books are written in a foreign language, etc. The material artefacts is a product of past history, you could say, which was intersubjective, but intersubjectivity ends as soon as the interaction ends, but the artefact often lives on.
>>> I think CHAT has something important to contribute here.
>>> 
>>> Andy
>>> Andy Blunden
>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm <http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
>>> On 30/01/2019 2:17 am, Martin Packer wrote:
>>>> Well, I was going to add that culture would be generally considered an intersubjective phenomenon, rather than subjective or objective. So it could be said that what this discussion group is about — the C in XMCA — is intersubjectivity.
>>>> 
>>>> Should intersubjectivity be transcended? I think, Andy, that you may be reading the word as some kind of merging or sharing of subjectivities. Which is indeed how the word has been used here not long ago. But Charles Taylor, for example, defined intersubjectivity as meanings and norms that exist in practices, not in individuals' minds. The materiality of culture — material artefacts — seems to me to be a very good example of this.
>>>> 
>>>> Martin
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> On Jan 29, 2019, at 9:51 AM, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> It's my view, Martin, that in making actions, including intersubjective actions, essentially artefact-mediated, Vygotsky transcended "intersubjectivity." His citing of Marx citing Hegel on the "cunning of reason" is no accident. 
>>>>> Hegel has what he calls (in typical Hegel style) the "syllogism of action." This is the culminating concept of the Logic making the transition to the Absolute Idea and Nature. Hegel points out, and Marx picks up on this, that this means that every action is mediated by material culture. Hegel says "the plough is more honourable than anything produced by its means." For Marx, this is about the importance of ownership of the means of production. For Vygotsky, it is what makes Cultural Psychology what it is.
>>>>> Emphasising the culture in the middle in no way minimises the constructive role of language use, but it means that the language itself plays, maybe. the more "honourable" role. :)
>>>>> andy
>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm <http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
>>>>> On 30/01/2019 1:41 am, Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>>> There was a general recognition in the social sciences (including philosophy) some time ago that it is crucial to recognize the existence and importance of “intersubjective” phenomena.  Language, for example, is not subjective, it is intersubjective. As Andy notes, subjectivity and even objectivity (think Latour’s analysis of science in Laboratory Life) arise from and are dependent upon intersubjective phenomena.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Jan 29, 2019, at 12:15 AM, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> When you get the electric chair for murdering someone that is not a linguistic construct.
>>>>>>> andy
>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm <http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
>>>>>>> On 29/01/2019 2:49 pm, Adam Poole (16517826) wrote:
>>>>>>>> Perhaps it may be more appropriate to use the term 'quasi-objective form', as the medium through which concepts like inequality and injustice are made objective, language, is itself inherently subjective. For example, justice can be given objective form in law, but the law itself is comprised of language, customs, traditions, beliefs, etc. The manifestation of an objective form is                                                 not universal, but will differ depending on cultural context. Hence quasi-objective. Concepts like inequality are given objective form, but it doesn't mean that they are objective in nature, due to the mediating role of language. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Adam
>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>
>>>>>>>> Sent: 29 January 2019 08:16:35
>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Do we find Inequalities in wild life system?
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> Mmm, "subjective" is a polysemous word, Huw. It is not a matter of precision but of relativity. "Inequality" is a famously contested concept, as is "injustice," but its contestation is necessarily in a social context and with social content. Justice and equality are given objective form in law and social policy in definite, really-existing states or organisations challenging for state power, not the opinion of individuals.
>>>>>>>> andy
>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm <http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
>>>>>>>> On 29/01/2019 1:50 am, Huw Lloyd wrote:
>>>>>>>>> It isn't "subjective", Andy. Rather it is limited to a certain construal. One can be quite precise and objective about that                                                 construal.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Mon, 28 Jan 2019 at 14:14, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> I can't agree that with your suggestion, Huw, that inequality (in the meaning with which Harshad used it) is something subjective, in the eye of the beholder. Such a view would be very pernicious politically. The fact is that states have emerged and developed over many centuries so as to makes objective certain concepts of justice, among which are various qualified and nuances notions of equality. This is not  figment of my imagination.
>>>>>>>>> andy
>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm <http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
>>>>>>>>> On 29/01/2019 12:59 am, Huw Lloyd wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> We find "wild life" systems that are imbalanced and subject to radical changes.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Inequality is a perceptual/cognitive construct and predicated on an ontological scope. We find the condition of inequality (or comparison) in our thinking and behaviour. Every living thing "finds" inequalities. We do not find inequality, we find the awareness of inequality.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, 28 Jan 2019 at 08:17, James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Should you find inequality within a wildlife system, that must be a political, ideological precept!
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> James
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, 28 Jan 2019 at 07:56, James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Not only is it meaningless but also preposterous. To maintain that all members of the same species are equal, as Anne Moir and David Jessel put it, is to "build a society based on a biological and scientific lie".
>>>>>>>>>> James
>>>>>>>>>> PS: I'm apolitical - anything political, ideological just doesn't speak to me!
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> James Ma  Independent Scholar https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa <https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa>   
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, 28 Jan 2019 at 05:27, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Harshad,
>>>>>>>>>> "Inequality" is a meaningless concept when referred to Nature. Likewise "Injustice." 
>>>>>>>>>> Justice and equality are relevant only to the extent that the subjects are living in an 'artificial' world, out of Nature. Natural disasters and the plenitude of Nature have these dimensions only to the extent they are imposed on or made available to different classes of people by the social system. 
>>>>>>>>>> Hope that helps.
>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm <http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
>>>>>>>>>> On 28/01/2019 4:00 pm, Harshad Dave wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> I am working on one article. I want to know your views on following query.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> "Do we find Inequalities exists in wild life system?"
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Your views will help me in my work.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Harshad Dave
>>>>>>>>>>> Email: hhdave15@gmail.com <mailto:hhdave15@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> This message and any attachment are intended solely for the addressee and may contain confidential information. If you have received this message in error, please send it back to me, and immediately delete it. Please do not use, copy or disclose the information contained in this message or in any attachment. Any views or opinions expressed by the author of this email do not necessarily reflect the views of The University of Nottingham Ningbo China. This message has been checked for viruses but the contents of an attachment may still contain software viruses which could damage your computer system: you are advised to perform your own checks. Email communications with The University of Nottingham Ningbo China may be monitored as permitted by UK and Chinese legislation.
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Martin
>>>> 
>>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself” (Malinowski, 1930)
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>> 

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