[Xmca-l] Re: Intrinsic / Extrinsic Motivation

[Haydi Zulfei]

 Hi Andy,What do you mean by saying " And yet the distinction is intrinsic to A N Leontyev's Activity Theory." You mean A.N. exposes this distinction or you mean he is on the side of the intrinsic option to the exclusion of the extrinsic option?
I had to consult the text :
[Even in the 1930s S. L. Rubinshtein18 indicated the important theoretical significance for psychology of the thinking of Marx about the fact
that in ordinary material work we have before us an open book of human
essential strengths, and that a psychology for which this book remains
closed cannot become a substantial and real science: Psychology cannot
ignore the riches of human activity.
In addition, in his subsequent publications, S. L. Rubinshtein stressed
that although practical activity by means of which people change nature
and society *also enters into the sphere of psychology*, the object of psychological study “is only their specifically psychological content, their
motivation and regulation, by means of which actions are brought into
conformity with reflected sensations, perceptions, and consciousness by
the objective conditions in which they are performed. 19
*Thus practical activity, according to the author, is a subject of study
for psychology, but only that specific content that appears in the form of
sensation, perception, thinking, and in general in the form of internal
psychic processes and conditions of the subject. But this conviction is, to
some degree, one sided inasmuch as it is abstracted from the major fact
that activity – in one form or another – is part of the very process of psychic reflection, part of the content of this process, and its beginning.*
Let us consider the most simple case: the process of perceiving the
resilience of an object. This is an external motor process by means of
which the subject makes a practical contact, a practical connection with
an external object; the process may be directed toward accomplishing
even a non-cognitive but very practical task, for example, the deformation of the object. The subjective image that arises here is, of course,
psychic and, correspondingly, indisputably a subject for psychological
study. In order to understand the nature of the given image, however, I
must study the process that gives rise to it, and this, in the case under
consideration, **is an external practical process.** – **Whether I want this or
not, whether it agrees with my theoretical views or not, I am all the same
obliged to include in the subject of my psychological investigation the
external, objective action of the subject.**
This means that it is incorrect to think that although the external, objective activity presents itself for psychological investigation, it does so
only to the extent that it includes internal psychic processes and that psychological investigation advances without studying external activity itself
or its structure.
One may agree with this only if one can accept a one-sided dependence of external activity on a psychic image representation of goals or a
mental plan directing the activity. ***But this is not so.*** Activity necessarily
enters into practical contact with objects that confront man, that divert it,
change it, or enrich it. In other words, especially in external activity there
occurs an opening up of the circle of external psychic processes as if to
meet the objective object world imperiously intruding into this circle.
Thus activity enters into the subject matter of psychology, not in its
own special ‘place’ or ‘element’ but through its special function. This is
the function of entrusting the subject to an objective reality and transforming this reality into a form of subjectivity.
Let us return, however, to the case of initiating psychic reflection of
an elementary property of a material object under conditions of practical
contact with it. This case was cited only as an illustrative, much oversimplified example. It has, however, a real genetic sense. It is hardly necessary now to prove that at initial stages of its development, activity
necessarily has the form of external processes and that, correspondingly,
the psychic image is a product of these processes connecting the subject
in a practical way with objective reality. It is evident that at various genetic stages the scientific explanation of the nature and specific features of
psychic reflection is impossible except on the basis of the study of these
external processes. At the same time this does not mean replacing the
study of the psyche with the study of behavior but only a demystification
of the nature of the psyche. Otherwise we will be left with nothing more
than having to acknowledge the existence of a secret “psychic faculty,”
which consists in this: that under the influence of external stimuli falling
on the receptors of the subject, in his brain – in the order of a phenomenon parallel to physiological processes – there arises some kind of internal light that illuminates the world for man, that something like an
irradiation of images takes place that subsequently is localized or “objectivised” by the subject in the surrounding space.] 

Haydi
    On Sunday, August 25, 2019, 06:01:23 PM GMT+4:30, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:  
 
  
For some reason which I have never understood many CHAT people seem to be set against this distinction. And yet the distinction is intrinsic to A N Leontyev's Activity Theory. In addition, Alasdair MacIntyre uses it to, in my opinion to great effect, such that I cannot imagine a theory of motivation that lacked this distinction.
 
What is the problem?
 
Andy
 
   Andy Blunden
 https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm  On 25/08/2019 1:00 pm, David H Kirshner wrote:
  
 
 
I’m reading a behaviorally oriented account of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation by authoritative authors Ryan and Deci (2000):
 
“The most basic distinction is between intrinsic motivation, which refers to doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable, and extrinsic motivation, which refers to doing something because it leads to a separable outcome [one undertaken for instrumental reasons]” (p. 55). 
 
  
 
This seems to me an impoverished account for a variety of reasons, most pressingly because it attempts to naturalize what is pleasurable or intrinsically motivating as inherent to the organism, without respect to individuals as people, engaged in socioculturally constituted life histories. 
 
  
 
Does the construct of intrinsic / extrinsic motivation surface anywhere in sociocultural theory?
 
Alternatively, can anyone point me toward a sociocultural critique of the intrinsic / extrinsic construct?
 
  
 
David
 
  
 
Ryan R. M., & Deci E. L. (2000). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations: Classic definitions and new directions. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 25, 54–67. https://doi.org/10.1006/ceps.1999.1020 
 
  
 
  
    
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