[Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: What is science?: Where to start doctoral students?

[Haydi Zulfei]

 Hi Andy,
Thank you for the reply!
When I gave you the best of Marx for Hegel in full clarity, it seems so superfluous to repeatedly rely on greatness of the "powerful thinker" or he being partially the modeled and the followed.  
Discussions and debates are very fruitful and now that you say "he went on to make some "crucially important criticisms of Hegel in that same passage ("the real subject ..." etc)" rather than "I think Marx agreed with Hegel's reduction of Ontology to Logic particularly in the "Method of Political Economy", getting support from sources other than Marx's himself , one gets satisfied and indebted to a thinker's legitimate and timely flexibility and sense of justice . 
And I'm not in a position , or anyone's for that matter as you say , to futilely and absurdly claim for some Prophecy or fortune-telling or Orthodoxy whether in background or apprentice-hood. If I say I have my foot on giants' shoulders , that will not mean I'm in servitude and unfettered submission. 
Thanks and happy dear Greg's re-arrival!
Haydi 
P.S. And one might please say why I lose the prior posts when I press "all" , thanks!      On Thursday, November 8, 2018, 7:21:49 AM GMT+3:30, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:  
 
 WhewMike
On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 6:43 PM Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:

  
er: "determinant of value"
 
   Andy Blunden
 http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm  On 8/11/2018 1:18 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
  
 
See https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/property.htm#PRn62
 
Hegel sees need (i.e., use-value) as the determinant of need. Although later he says that a commodity cannot have value unless it is the product of labour, he never suggests that the quantity of labour needed for its production determines value. Thus Hegel accepts the common sense view of things, that the value of a thing is determined by how useful it is. He did not see the contradiction in this claim.
 
Andy
 
   Andy Blunden
 http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm  On 8/11/2018 8:55 AM, Greg Thompson wrote:
  
  Andy,  I'm interested in the conversation but have very little time to read or dig or do anything other than quickly skim. I was just wondering if you could provide a little bit of the explanation/background for this argument (of yours): "Marx's theory of value is sharply at odds with Hegel's (as elaborated in the Philosophy of Right)" It sounds interesting but it also sounds different from what I would have thought/said about it. So I suspect that I have something to learn... If you have no time either, no worries, I'll leave it be.  -greg 
   
  On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 5:14 AM Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
  
  
Haydi, you must agree with me that the content, the real significance, of what people say often differs from what they say of themselves and their protagonists. I am a Marxist, and have been since my first reading of Marx in 1967. But you are justified in examining what I do and say, rather than taking me at my word. Everyone knows that Marx made the well-known criticisms of Hegel that you mention. We also know that he praised Hegel and made criticisms of "the materialists." But the point is to examine the content of his action and in particular his scientific writing.
 
"Capital" (particularly its early sections) is modelled on Hegel's Logic. Marx tells us this in the famous passage (Method of Political Economy) where he gives the best explanation of the Logic that I know of. As you point out, he went on to make some crucially important criticisms of Hegel in that same passage ("the real subject ..." etc). Obviously Marx is not = Hegel. 
 
 
There are elements of Marx's approach which he takes from Hegel and elements which are in opposition to Hegel's approach. I tried to make this crystal clear in my little article https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/Hegel-idealist.pdf .
 
The ontology of "Capital" is sharply at odds with materialist ontology as it would have been known in the 1860s and equally at odds with the ontology of positivism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries which arose from the crisis of natural science at that time which put an end to naive realism. Marx's theory of value is sharply at odds with Hegel's (as elaborated in the Philosophy of Right) and methodologically also at odds with Hegel in that it was not speculative but had a significant streak of empiricism in it. (I describe this in https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/Goethe-Hegel-Marx_public.pdf ).
 
If you look at the MIA Library https://www.marxists.org/archive/index.htm and run your eye down the first 80% of so of the writers listed there. Almost all of these writers declared themselves "Marxists" (not the last 20% or so) and yet you will see a very wide spectrum of views here. No-one has the last word here. My conviction that Marxists have  much to learn from Hegel was not lightly arrived at.
 
Andy
 
   Andy Blunden
 http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm  On 7/11/2018 10:22 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:
  
  Nice !! Not to get Marx involved in the discussion!This is the whole thing! Because if Marx is involved in his original writing and making the last quote easier: 
  Concepts need Conceptioners and conceptioners are , as said here also , [Material] Human Beings living and Acting in their respective Material Surrounding out of which process Social Relations arise which in their turn , give birth to Thoughts and Ideas , concepts and categories , ideas of the Idea , Logic and the Absolute , cultures (in Bibler's terminology) which make Real?? Cosmologies (of  course as META-physics beyond Physical Natural Hard sciences as these latter sciences deal also with atoms , electrons neutrons , positrons , quarks , galaxies , planets , etc. in their abstract or Hegelian (concrete as Concept) ontological/existential?? dependencies (the World which is outside Mind through Lenin's quote by some esteemed scholars and the World/s which need a Mind  to claim existence) which is O.K. and in full respect.) 
  This is what Marx meant in the last word of the last quote by "**[[Hence, in
 the theoretical method, too, the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as
 the presupposition.]]**" 
  Neither the Social Relations have independent Being nor the sciences which arise from them.  
  Every body has the right to think that "phenomena" of Mind/Thinking have the same Ontology as the Ontology of the Substantial/Material/Corporeal Universe does but ascribing this to Marx would be problematic. This was the beginning of the worry! 
  In the same vein , no problem with "Any Category" first , but no imposition on Marx the more so that one might keep people in waiting for just a single evidence to one's Big Claim :-)). 
  Marx is quite Robust in his Materialism and towards Hegel in full clarity and stance with quite indubious remarks: 
  The best of the very Marx for Hegel: 
   
FROM CAPITAL VOLUME ONE:
 
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel,
 the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the
 Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the [[real]] world, and the
 real world is only the external, [[phenomenal form]] of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the
 ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the [[human mind]], and translated into
 forms of thought.
 The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was
 still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of “Das Kapital,” it was the good
 pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Επιγονοι [Epigones – Büchner, Dühring and others]
 who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses
 Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I [[therefore]] openly avowed
 myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of
 value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic
 suffers in [[Hegel’s hands]], by no means prevents him from being [[the first to present its general
 15 Afterword to the Second German Edition (1873)
 form of working]] in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It
 must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical
 shell.
 
    
FROM GRUDERISSE WHICH INCLUDES ALSO THE METHOD OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
 
But do not these simpler categories also have an independent historical or
 natural existence pre-dating the more concrete ones? That depends. Hegel,  for
 example, correctly begins the Philosophy of Right with possession, this being
 the subject’s simplest juridical relation. But there is no possession preceding
 the family or master-servant relations, which are far more concrete relations.
 
  
  
  It follows then naturally, too, that all the relationships of men can be derived from the concept of man, man as conceived, the essence of man, Man. This has been done by the speculative philosophers. Hegel himself confesses at the end of the Geschichtsphilosophie that he "has considered the progress of the concept only"  and has represented in history the "true theodicy". (p.446.) Now one can go back again to the producers of the "concept", to the theorists, ideologists and philosophers, and one comes then to the conclusion that the philosophers, the thinkers as such, have at all times been dominant in history: a conclusion, as we see, already expressed by Hegel. The whole trick of proving the hegemony of the spirit in history (hierarchy Stirner calls it) is thus confirmed to the following three efforts. 
   
Critique: "humans create themselves out of nothing" Far from it being true that "out of nothing"  I make myself, for example, a "[public] speaker", the nothing which forms the basis here is a very manifold something, the real individual, his speech organs, a definite stage of physical development, an existing language and dialects, ears capable of hearing and a human environment from which it is possible to hear something, etc., etc.  therefore, in the development of a property something is created by something out of something, and by no means comes, as in Hegel's Logic , from nothing, through nothing to nothing. [Th. I. Abt. 2 of Hegel]  p. 162
 Best Haydi     
  
      On Wednesday, November 7, 2018, 5:05:58 AM GMT+3:30, Adam Poole (16517826) <Adam.Poole@nottingham.edu.cn> wrote:  
  
      

 
 
An interesting point to add to the discussion is the role that ontology plays as a tacit form of gatekeeping in many disciplines and journals (though thankfully, from my experience, not MCA). I have started to find this out as I have been publishing papers on International education from my doctorate (which I am going to defend in December). As part of this experience, I have found that:
 

 
 
The journal article form does not lend itself to prolonged discussion of ontology due to length restrictions.  So much of what is fundamental to research is left unsaid, but really needs to be said! Qualitative researchers need to justify themselves more substantially than quantitive researchers because notions of positivism (validity, generalizability, etc) are normalized and therefore do not require explication. However, your typically journal article does not provide enough room for qualitative researches to justify themselves. 
 

 
 
Reviewers and journals function as gatekeepers (just like funding agencies) so it is sometimes  necessary to conform to a certain 'house ontology' in order to get the work out there. An issue I have found is that reviewer's can impose their ontology onto the writer - that  is, their implicit assumptions about reality function as a framework for understanding and most significantly evaluating the work before them. If the work does not conform to their framework - if there is ontological dissonance - the work is likely to be rejected or heavily critiqued, leading to substantial rewrites that change the essential nature of the paper. On the other side, writers also impose their ontology onto the reader.  
 

 
 
This is all a roundabout way to say that ontology is also inextricably linked to power, and takes on dialogic and discursive dimensions. Essentially,  ontology can be invoked by either side as a way to demonize or legitimize research, depending on where you stand. Ideally, it would be possible to transcend dualism, but practically speaking dualism functions  as a convenient mechanism for gatekeeping and control. 
 

 
 
So whilst I agree completely with Martin (whose book I started to read yesterday and really like) that it is imperative to develop ontologies that do not split researchers into partisan camps, actually  making this happen is problematic, not least of all because the journal article itself (which I would argue is the paradigmatic academic form these days) does not lend itself to this endeavor. The issue is also an economic one: paywalls, limited space in journals, pressure to publish, and suddenly ontological idealism  is compromised. I do think a new form of academic paper needs to be developed that can support greater reflexivity in order to bring out our ontological and epistemological assumptions. The standard  6000ish words, intro methods, findings, discussion, conclusion structure leaves little space for reflective/reflexive writing.  
 

 
 
Anyway, just a doctoral student's take on ontology in relation to publishing.
 

 
 
Adam 
 

 
 

 
 

 
    From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Martin Packer <mpacker@cantab.net>
 Sent: 07 November 2018 04:11:34
 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: What is science?: Where to start doctoral students?     Well Huw I’ll take a shot! I’ve never thought that xmca-ers worry too much about overcomplicating a thread!  :) 
  Quantitative research (and I’m talking about the way this is construed in the social  sciences, not in physics, for example) is generally taught as experimental design and hypothesis testing, which is largely the model the logical positivists laid out a hundred years ago. They considered ontological (metaphysical) claims to be untestable, and so unscientific.  Consequently, courses in quantitative research pay little or no attention to ontology. The result is that the researcher’s ontological assumptions are tacitly imposed on the phenomenon.  After all, quantitative researchers believe (as the logical positivists taught them) that they can  ‘operationally define’ their variables. That’s to say, *they* get to decide what is intelligence, or poverty, or a student, or a woman… 
  The result is something that Alfred Schutz complained about: "this type of social  science does not deal directly and immediately with the social life-world common to us all, but with skillfully and expediently chosen idealizations and formalizations of the social world.” The result is "a fictional nonexisting world constructed by the scientific observer.” 
  Harold Garfinkel made a similar point: he rejected "the worldwide social science movement” with its “ubiquitous commitments to the policies and methods of formal analysis and general representational theorizing.” He saw that the statistical and formal  models built by formal analysis “lose the very phenomenon that they profess.” 
  I’ve tried to attach an article by Spencer (1982) that is, in my view, making essentially the same point, but the listserv rejects it: 
   Spencer, M. E. (1982). The ontologies of social science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 12(2), 121-141.  
   Typically, social scientists are completely caught up in the ontology of their  discipline, and completely ignore the ontology of the phenomenon they are studying - that’s to say, its  constitution: what its constituents are and how they are assembled. 
  On the other hand, the issue of the implicit ontology of qualitative research is the central theme of my book. I argue there that by and large Qual has bought into the ontological  dualism of mind-matter, so that researches assume that the natural sciences study matter (objectivity), and so qualitative research must study mind (subjectivity). 
  The book develops an argument for escaping from this dualistic ontology, and actually paying attention to human being - a kind of research that Foucault called ‘a historical ontology  of ourselves.’ Along the way I try to do justice to what has been called the ‘ontological turn’ in anthropology, the argument that different cultures have distinct cosmologies, rather than  distinct cosmovisions - that’s to say, they have different ontologies; they live in distinct realities; they don’t simply have different ways of conceptualizing a single underlying  reality. Latour’s most recent work is making a similar argument about the different institutions in which all of us live - that each institution has its distinct mode of existence (its  distinct way of being; its distinct ontology).  
  So if I had my way, or my ideal winter holiday gift, it would be that qualitative research provides a way for psychology (and perhaps the other social sciences) to move beyond  dualism and embrace multiple ontologies. 
  Martin 
  "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself” (Malinowski, 1930) 
     
   
 
 On Nov 6, 2018, at 11:22 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote: 
  Best to leave that for the time being, no point overcomplicating the thread. 
  Huw  
  On Tue, 6 Nov 2018 at 15:02, Martin Packer <mpacker@cantab.net> wrote:
  
 And what do you take their implicit ontology to be, Huw? 
  Martin 
  
  
  
 
 On Nov 5, 2018, at 6:33 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote: 
 The problem that I was responding to before regarding "qualitative and  quantitative" labels is that the adoption of these labels (and their implicit ontology)... 
  
   
   
  
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