[Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively

[WEBSTER, DAVID S.]

The problem here is that you feel the need to put selects in scare quotes. I am all for Dewey but I am not sure you are right about Gibson not being transactional  but where Gibson had got to when he died was already a hard enough sell. A good topic to pursue through

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth
Sent: 31 January 2018 15:26
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively

But Gibson is not transactional in the way Bateson is. For Bateson (or Dewey or others), there is no "natural" affordance. In other words, the human also would be the affordance to the door knob, not merely the door knob an affordance to humans. The door knob "selects" humans over other animals... The environment "samples" the individual as much as the individual "samples" the environment...


On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:14 AM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. <d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk
> wrote:

> The perception-action cycle has been a topic of debate in the 
> Gibsonian literature since the early -mid  1980s i.e. just after 
> Gibson died in 1979
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ 
> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer
> Sent: 31 January 2018 14:56
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively
>
> I’m struck by the similarity between Bateson’s description and the 
> notion floating around in neuroscience of a “perception-action cycle,” 
> in which brain, body, and environment are each components in a circular process.
>
> The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of 
> information processing between the organism and its environment in a 
> sequence of goal-directed actions. An action of the organism causes an 
> environmental change that will be processed by sensory systems, which 
> will produce signals to inform the next action, and so on. The 
> perception-action cycle is of prime importance for the adaptive 
> success of a temporally extended gestalt of behavior, where each 
> action is contingent on the effects of the previous one. The 
> perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the central nervous 
> system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed behaviors engage only 
> the lower levels of the perception-action cycle, whereas, for 
> sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs through the spinal cord and subcortical structures.
>
> To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of the 
> cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator of 
> action can be hard to resist. But it’s just the walnut on the cupcake.
>
> Here’s a diagram, though it’ll be probably be removed, so here’s the 
> link too…
>
> <http://willcov.com/bio-consciousness/sidebars/Perception--Action%20Cy
> cle_
> files/image295.jpg>
>
>
>
> Martin
>
>
>
>
> > On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >
> > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing.
> > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.*
> >
> > mike
> > --------------\
> >
> > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies 
> > through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in 
> > the side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set of 
> > phenomena, we shall be concerned with differences in the cut face of 
> > the tree, differences in the retina of the man, differences in the 
> > central nervous system, differences in his different neural 
> > messages, differences in the behaviour of his muscles, difference in 
> > how the axe flies, to the differences which the axe then makes on 
> > the face of the tree. Our explanation will go round and round that 
> > circuit. If you want to explain or understand anything in human 
> > behaviour, you are
> always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits.
> > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433)
> >
> >
> >
> > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt 
> > this
> > epistemology:
> >
> >
> >
> > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this 
> > matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ‘Gregory 
> > Bateson’ is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ‘Myself’
> > is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from the 
> > rest of what I have been calling ‘mind’.
> >
> >
> >
> > The step to realizing – to making habitual – the other way of 
> > thinking – so that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches 
> > out for a glass of water or cuts down a tree – that step is not an easy one.
> >
> >
> > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally changes.
> > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and 
> > secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying.
>
>
>