[Xmca-l] Re: language and music
robsub@ariadne.org.uk
robsub@ariadne.org.uk
Fri Dec 14 02:51:21 PST 2018
I'm not sure how relevant this is, but I just thought I'd throw it into
the mix. I remember when my daughter was learning to speak that I
realised that I had not noticed when she started using words. Her
communication with gesture and tone of vocalisation was already so
vibrant and so complete that words seemed almost superfluous. So how
much of the thing we call language is in the words, and how much in
other stuff like musical tone?
Rob
On 14/12/2018 00:09, Adam Poole (16517826) wrote:
>
>
> Hi Julian,
>
>
> Thanks for the post - it certainly has got me thinking. This won't be
> a theoretical response - just my ideas as a music fan and someone who
> dabbles in guitar, bass anddrums.
>
>
> I think it depends on which came first, the music or the lyrics.
> Taking the Beatles as an example, if you took away the music to say
> 'She Loves You', the lyrics wouldn't have a chance of standing on
> their own (they don't even with the music, but the music and the
> melody carry the lyrics). A point of note, however, is the use of
> 'she' rather than 'I' which for the Beatles at that time was a bit of
> a creative revolution (reporting a conversation rather than telling it
> directly).
>
>
> However, a song like 'Across the Universe', whose lyric I believe was
> written before the music, can stand on its own, and also has many
> features (such as simile, metaphor, etc) associated with poetry.
>
>
> In some instances, the lyrics inspire the music. A case in point, 'In
> my Life' by the Beatles again (sorry, they are my favourite band!)
> which deals with memory as embodied in people and places. There is a
> lyric that goes 'all my life, though some have changed'. The chords
> change from a D to a D minor on the word 'life', which to me suggests
> the ambivalence of memory and nostalgia. In this instance, music does
> not demean the lyrics but provides an additional modality of meaning
> that enhances them. Music is another form of language.
>
>
> This also raises an issue about the status of poetry and lyrics, but
> that is something that we might explore if this conversation takes off.
>
>
> Anyway, just some ideas as I sit at my desk on a Friday morning.
>
>
> Best,
>
>
> Adam Poole
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Julian Williams
> <julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk>
> *Sent:* 14 December 2018 05:55:22
> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: language and music
>
> David et al
>
> I don’t want to distract you too much, but there was a really
> interesting programme on BBC radio 4 today about the
> relation/distinction between ‘song’ and ‘poetry’, and some discourses
> about nobel lauriat Bob Dylan, … or Leonard Cohen’s poetry (it seems
> he has a book of ‘poetry’ that didn’t get to music…, etc.
>
> What would their songs consist of if you took out the music … ?
>
> It was suggested that poems have an ‘internal music’ that means they
> don’t need to be put to song … but that popular culture is demeaned by
> the music, so that it becomes accessible …
>
> Sorry this may not be helpful: I just caught the edge of this
> programme but thought it might be of interest…
>
> Julian
>
> *From: *<xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of David Kellogg
> <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> *Reply-To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Date: *Tuesday, 11 December 2018 at 23:46
> *To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: language and music
>
> (I wrote this a week ago and didn't post it--we've been having the
> Moscow Summer School down here in Sydney, where the summers come
> around Christmastime and you can lecture in your bare feet....there is
> a little post scriptum to try to make it relevant to what Andy's
> thinking. But right now it seems to me the most pressing issue is to
> come back to music....)
>
> Hallidayans would say that "interpretant" is as good as a Subject,
> because we don't really distinguish between reception and production
> of signs. (The model has to be kept neutral, in order to be
> parsimonious.) Is that Peircean, or Saussurean?
>
> Peirce says that a pencil line is an icon (because it is a sign
> without an object, since Euclidean lines that have no width and
> infinite extension do not actually exist). Then he says that a bullet
> hole in piece of moulding (he has in mind the sort of thing you see on
> nineteenth century buildings) is an index (because it is a sign
> without an interpretant).
>
> I guess that means that music is icon, and not index?
>
>
> David Kellogg
>
> Sangmyung University
>
> PS: One difference between scientific concepts and everyday ones is
> that the former develop through differentiation rather than just
> adding once generalized representation to another through experience.
> I don't think it's an absolute difference: I think that
> differentiation is often a product of reflection (refraction,
> perezhivanie, rising to the concrete) and that is, after all, one kind
> of representation and one kind of experience, but it's a special kind.
>
> Differentiation is finding differences that make a difference
> (Bateson). Both Vygotsky and Peirce differentiate signs, but in
> somewhat different ways, and it seems to me that it's a difference
> that makes a difference.
>
> Vygotsky differentiates signs into signals (the red leaves are a
> signal of winter) and symbols (the red light is a traffic light
> symbol). The difference is whether consciousness is involved or not. I
> think that Vygotsky would reject the idea that consciousness can be
> reduced to a "second signal system": that was a tactical maneuver to
> try to make his work compatible with vulgar behaviorism in the
> fifties. Note that even the idea that consciousness is a "reaction to
> a reaction" or a "perezhivanie of a perezhivanie" is not reducible to
> a "second signal system" so long as you understand that signals do not
> involve consciousness.
>
> Peirce differentiates signs into firstness, secondness, and thirdness:
> icons (where no object is required), indexes (where no interpretant is
> required) and symbols (where alll three are present and accounted for
> in the meaning). I think this is a logical rather than a psychological
> distinction, and it needs to be interpreted psychologically before we
> can talk about language. But there are a lot of linguists who would
> disagree with that, because there is a strong desire to abolish
> psychology in linguistics (c.f. Jim Martin).
>
> Music education has struggled with this for a long time: is music
> icon, index, or symbol? Orff (the Nazi) believed it was an icon, and
> you teach children to imagine their bodies as a drum. Suzuki believed
> it was an index, and you teach it as result of a practice which can be
> interpersonal or individual. Only Kodaly treats music as language and
> taught us to teach music as a literacy. But of course then music is
> meaning, not sounding.
>
> dk
>
> On Mon, Dec 3, 2018 at 12:14 PM Greg Thompson
> <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> (and, to be sure, on this listserve I'm really the one playing the
> "different" game/tune)
>
> On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 7:44 PM Greg Thompson
> <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> Not "behind" Andy - you're playing a different game!
>
> (And it happens to be one in which I am terribly "behind"!)
>
> And I generally agree with your appraisal, but it makes me
> wonder what you've concluded with regard to Colapietro's
> characterization of Peirce's notion of the self? I believe you
> were the one who shared it with me but from your tone here I
> assume that you feel that it falls short in theorizing a
> "subject"/self. Care to expand on that any? Particularly with
> regard to the shortcomings of the theory?
>
> -greg
>
> [p.s. And perhaps instead of "playing games" we might turn the
> metaphor back to the original thread by noting(!) that we are
> simply "playing different tunes"?
>
> Often discordant but occasionally resonant...]
>
> On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 6:16 PM Andy Blunden
> <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>
> Thanks Greg. It's good to hear that I am thoroughly behind
> the game! :) Thank you.
>
> I think Peirce's semiotics has the great advantage in that
> it does /not / include the category of Subject in its
> triads (e.g. sign | interpretant | object). This means
> that it can be used for the analysis of /objective/
> processes. When used in this way it does not imply
> "thinking" at all. That virtue of Peirce's semiotics was
> the basis of my objection to James's observation. Speech
> and gesture has a subject.
>
> The other minor point I would make about your very erudite
> response is that I think we should not be too apologetic
> about using the concept of "mind." True, mind is not a
> sensible entity, but in all human interactions we deduce
> the state of minds from the observable behaviour, and in
> fact (scientific or everyday) human behaviour is
> incomprehensible without the presumption that it is
> mindful to this or that extent. Otherwise, we become
> Behaviourists, and Chomsky would murder us! :)
>
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Andy Blunden
> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>
> On 3/12/2018 11:53 am, Greg Thompson wrote:
>
> Andy,
>
> My short response would depend on whether you'd prefer
> to be critical or charitable toward linguistic
> anthropologists.
>
> The critical approach would say that with a few
> exceptions (e.g., Elinor Ochs, Paul Kockelman,
> Elizabeth Mertz, John Lucy, among others), you are right.
>
> The charitable approach would say that linguistic
> anthropologists are in fact dealing with precisely the
> things that you are talking about. Most of the ones
> that I know are anti-Chomskyian, to say the least.
> Most of them are grappling with issues of practice,
> not just studying formal structures that exist in
> someplace called "the mind" (where is that exactly?).
> In fact, one of the greatest insults to the linguistic
> anthropologists that I know is to call them a
> "butterfly collector" - that is to say, a mere
> documenter of language variation across the globe.
> Most of the ones I know are in fact very mindful of
> understanding the practical consequences of semiotic
> forms. In his book Talking Heads Benjamin Lee makes
> precisely the point that you are making through his
> deployment of Peirce to Critique Saussure. Peirce
> offers a means of grasping semiosis as a lived
> practice rather than one that exists only in the
> "mind" (as Saussure's approach to semiotics would
> suggest).
>
> The critical approach is nice because you can just
> dispense with linguistic anthropology and all their
> gobbly-gook jargon as irrelevant. The charitable
> approach might suggest that we should at least
> acknowledge their project. That's all I was hoping to
> do. I figured that there might be a few who are
> interested, but most on the listserve will find that
> it wasn't worth investing the time - and I don't blame
> them! (as someone in this goofy world of academia, I'm
> very sensitive to the fact that learning the language
> of an entirely new system is a major time commitment
> and only worth it in rare cases).
>
> I think things get a bit more complicated when we get
> to the issue of the semiosis of non-human agents that
> you seemed to be poking at (e.g., Eduardo Kohn's book
> How Forests Think). I understand that you are very
> much a humanist and don't like this approach for some
> very fundamental reasons. I'm not entirely committed
> to this position (Kohn's) and so I'm not the best
> person to make the case for this position - unless you
> are really genuinely interested. And besides, I'm
> already well beyond your one screen rule!
>
> Cheers,
>
> greg
>
> On Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 5:28 PM Andy Blunden
> <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>
> So I gather confirmation from your message, Greg:
> "most of the anthropologists I know, linguistic or
> otherwise, don't have much interest in talking
> about such things as psychological functioning"
> and therefore, it seems to me, little interest in
> what people do as well as what they think. In
> other words, the turn to seeing language as a
> system of Peircean signs is an entirely *formal*
> project. Yes, the babbling of a brook or the
> babbling of a band of monkeys can be formally
> analysed with the same set of concepts as the
> babbling of a group of humans in conversation. But
> this is purely formal, superficial and obscures
> what is expressed and transacted in the human babble.
>
> I can understand the fascination in such formal
> disciplines, I accept that Peircean Semiotics can
> be a tool of analysis, and often insights come out
> from such formal disciplines relevant to the real
> world (mathematics being the supreme example), but
> ....! One really has to keep in mind that words
> are not Peircean signs. To answer the question of
> how it is that humans alone have language by
> saying that everything has language, even
> inanimate processes (and this is how I interpret
> the equation of language with Peircean signs), is
> somewhat more than missing the point.
>
> As an example of how such formal processes lead to
> grave errors is the Language Acquisition Device
> "proved" to exist by Chomsky's formal analysis of
> language. And yet to hold that an actual
> biological, neuronal formation as a LAD exists in
> all human beings in quite inconsistent with the
> foundations of biology, i.e., Darwinian evolution.
> Either Darwin or Chomsky, but not both. Which
> tells me that there is a problem with this formal
> analysis, even though I gasp in wonder every time
> Google manages to correctly parse an ordinary
> language question I ask it and deliver very
> relevant answers.
>
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Andy Blunden
> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>
> On 2/12/2018 2:51 am, Greg Thompson wrote:
>
> [I hesitate to send a post like this to this
> group for precisely the reasons Helena
> mentioned previously (the proliferation of
> technical languages in different fields and
> the time-intensive labor of translating
> terms/meanings of entire systems of thinking
> from one of these fields to the next). Add the
> fact that there are few who have much interest
> in one of the field of linguistic anthropology
> (and esp. how ling anthro has taken up Peicean
> semiotics - a tangle of words in its own
> right), and this means the following post will
> likely remain an orphan (not at all because of
> anyone's ill intentions but simply because
> this is an impossible situation for anyone to
> commit to learning an entirely new language
> for talking about language!).]
>
> Yes James, as a Peircean, I assume that you
> would point to (!) the indexical and iconic
> potentials of SPOKEN language while noting
> that this flattens the oft-made distinction
> between gesture and the spoken word? Our
> dominant ideology of language tends to assume
> that spoken language is (only?) symbolic and
> gesture is only indexical and iconic. Peirce's
> notion of indexical and iconic functions
> offers us a way into seeing how spoken
> language is also indexical and iconic (as
> opposed to Saussure who dismissed them out of
> hand - e.g., in the Course he dismisses
> onomatopoeia (iconic) and "shifters"
> (indexical) as irrelevant to his project).
>
> Following Peirce's vision, Roman Jakobson was
> one of the first to point to the problem of
> this dominant ideology of language, and
> Michael Silverstein has made a rather
> substantial career off of this simple point,
> first elaborated in his famous 1976 paper on
> "shifters" and since then in numerous other
> works. Many others working in linguistic
> anthropology have spent the last 40 years
> expanding on this project by exploring the
> indexical and iconic nature of spoken language
> in the concepts of "indexicality" and
> "iconization". More recently linguistic
> anthropologists have considered the processes
> by which sign-functions can shift from one
> function to another - e.g., rhematization -
> from indexical or symbolic to iconic (see
> Susan Gal and Judy Irvine's work), and
> iconization - from symbolic or iconic to
> indexical (see Webb Keane's and Chris Ball's
> work). And others have looked at more basic
> features of sign-functioning such as the
> realization of qualia (see Lily Chumley and
> Nicholas Harkness' special issue in Anthro
> theory).
>
> The relevance of all this for the present list
> serve is that the processes being described by
> these linguistic anthropologists are
> fundamental to understanding human
> psychological functioning and yet most of the
> anthropologists I know, linguistic or
> otherwise, don't have much interest in talking
> about such things as psychological functioning
> (one exception here is Paul Kockelman, e.g.,
> in his book Person, Agent, Subject, Self -
> although beware that his writing is just as
> dense as Peirce's!). Anyway, I suspect that
> this could be a particularly productive
> intersection for development.
>
> Cheers,
>
> -greg
>
> On Fri, Nov 30, 2018 at 8:40 AM HENRY SHONERD
> <hshonerd@gmail.com
> <mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> Right on, James!
>
>
>
> On Nov 30, 2018, at 12:16 AM, James Ma
> <jamesma320@gmail.com
> <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> Henry, personally I prefer Xmca-I
> discussion to be exploratory and free
> style, allowing for the coexistence of
> subjectness and subjectless. When it
> comes to scholarly writing, we know we
> will switch the code.
>
> James
>
> HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com
> <mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>> 于
> 2018年11月29日周四 18:58写道：
>
> James,
>
> This conversation has been so
> satisfying I don’t want to let go
> of it, so I hope I am not tiring
> you or others with all the
> connections I find. But, in the
> spirit of Alfredo’s post, I’ll
> just keep on talking and remark on
> how the duck tail hair cut is a
> rich gesture, an important concept
> in this subject line. Gesture is
> an aspect of communication present
> in many species. Hence, the
> importance of gesture as a
> rudimentary form of language with
> evolutionary results in human
> language. Maybe this is a reach,
> but I see the business of quotes
> in the subject line now taking
> place (Anna Stetsenko and
> Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont,
> contributing right now) on the
> last chapter of Vygotsky’s Speech
> and Language as an issue of
> gesture. Language, written
> language in this case, is limited
> in its ability to provide nuance.
> Writing without quotes “gestured”,
> pointed to to author sources
> familar in the day that Vygotsky
> wrote, such that quotes were not
> necessary. Dan Slobin,
> psycholinguist at Univ of Calf,
> wrote that two charges of language
> where in “tension”: 1) make
> yourself clear and 2) get it said
> before losing the thread of
> thinking and talking. Gesture, I
> would like to argue, is an aspect
> of discourse that helps to address
> this tension. A turn (in
> discourse) is a gesture, with
> temporal constraints that belie
> the idea that a single turn can
> ever be totally clear in and of
> itself. Writing, as we are doing
> now, is always dialogic, even a
> whole book, is a turn in
> discourse. And we keep on posting
> our turns.
>
> Henry
>
>
>
> On Nov 29, 2018, at 8:56 AM,
> James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com
> <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>>
> wrote:
>
> Henry, Elvis Presley is spot
> on for this subject line!
>
> The ducktail hairstyle is
> fabulous. Funnily
> enough, it is what my brother
> would always like his
> 9-year-old son to have because
> he has much thicker hair than
> most boys. Unfortunately last
> year the boy had
> a one-day show off in the
> classroom and was ticked off
> by the school authority (in
> China). However, my brother
> has managed to
> restore the ducktail twice a
> year during the boy's long
> school holiday in winter and
> summer!
>
> I suppose the outlines of
> conversation are predictable
> due to participants'
> intersubjective awareness of
> the subject. Yet, the nuances
> of conversation (just like
> each individual's ducktail
> unique to himself) are
> unpredictable because of the
> waywardness of our mind.
> What's more,
> such nuances create the
> fluidity of conversation which
> makes it difficult (or
> even unnecessary)
> to predict what comes next -
> this is perhaps the whole
> point that keeps us talking,
> as Alfredo pointed out earlier.
>
> James
>
> On Wed, 28 Nov 2018 at 22:19,
> HENRY SHONERD
> <hshonerd@gmail.com
> <mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
> wrote:
>
> Back at you, James. The
> images of the mandarin
> drake reminded me of a
> hair style popularin the
> late 50s when I was in
> high school (grades 9-12):
> ducktail haircuts images
> <https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=ducktail+haircuts+images&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8>.
> One of the photos in the
> link is of Elvis Presley,
> an alpha male high school
> boys sought to emulate.
> Note that some of the
> photos are of women,
> interesting in light of
> issues of gender fluidity
> these days. I don’t
> remember when women
> started taking on the hair
> style. Since I mentioned
> Elvis Presley, this post
> counts as relevant to the
> subject line! Ha!
>
> Henry
>
>
>
> On Nov 28, 2018, at
> 7:39 AM, James Ma
> <jamesma320@gmail.com
> <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>>
> wrote:
>
> Thank you Henry.
>
> More on mandarin duck,
> just thought you might
> like to see:
>
> https://www.livingwithbirds.com/tweetapedia/21-facts-on-mandarin-duck
>
> HENRY SHONERD
> <hshonerd@gmail.com
> <mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
> 于 2018年11月27日周二
> 19:30写道：
>
> What a beautiful
> photo, James, and
> providing it is a
> move on this
> subject line that
> instantiates
> nicely Gee’s
> conception of
> discourse. Thanks
> for your
> thoughtful and
> helpful response.
>
> Henry
>
>
>
> On Nov 27,
> 2018, at 11:11
> AM, James Ma
> <jamesma320@gmail.com
> <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>>
> wrote:
>
> Henry, thanks
> for the info
> on Derek
> Bickerton. One
> of the
> interesting
> things is his
> conception of
> displacement
> as the
> hallmark of
> language,
> whether
> iconic,
> indexical or
> symbolic. In
> the case of
> Chinese
> language, the
> sounds are
> decontextualised
> or sublimated
> over time to
> become
> something more
> integrated
> into the words
> themselves as
> ideographs.
> Some of
> Bickerton's
> ideas are
> suggestive of
> the study of
> protolanguage
> as an /a
> priori
> /process,
> involving
> scrupulous
> deduction.
> This reminds
> me of methods
> used in
> diachronic
> linguistics,
> which I felt
> are relevant
> to CHAT just
> as much as
> those used in
> synchronic
> linguistics.
>
> Regarding
> "intermental"
> and
> "intramental",
> I can see your
> point. In fact
> I don't take
> Vygotsky's
> "interpsychological"
> and
> "intrapsychological"
> categories to
> be dichotomies
> or binary
> opposites.
> Whenever it
> comes to their
> relationship,
> I tend to have
> a
> post-structuralism
> imagery
> present in my
> mind,
> particularly
> related to a
> Derridean
> stance for the
> conception of
> ideas (i.e.
> any idea is
> not entirely
> distinct from
> other ideas in
> terms of the
> "thing
> itself";
> rather, it
> entails a
> supplement of
> the other idea
> which
> is already
> embedded in
> the self).
> Vygotsky's two
> categories are
> relational
> (dialectical);
> they are
> somehow like a
> pair of
> mandarin ducks
> (see attached
> image). I also
> like to think
> that each of
> these
> categories is
> both
> "discourse-in-context"
> and
> "context-for-discourse"
> (here
> discourse is
> in tune with
> James Gee's
> conception of
> discourse as a
> patchwork of
> actions,
> interactions,
> thoughts,
> feelings etc).
> I recall
> Barbara Rogoff
> talking about
> there being no
> boundary
> between the
> external and
> the internal
> or the
> boundary being
> blurred
> (during her
> seminar in the
> Graduate
> School of
> Education at
> Bristol in
> 2001 while I
> was doing my PhD).
>
> James
>
> On Wed, 21 Nov
> 2018 at 23:14,
> HENRY SHONERD
> <hshonerd@gmail.com
> <mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
> wrote:
>
> James,
>
> I think it
> was Derek
> Bickerton
> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derek_Bickerton)
> who argued
> that
> “formal
> syntax”
> developed
> from
> stringing
> together
> turns in
> verbal
> interaction.
> The wiki
> on
> Bickerton
> I have
> linked is
> short and
> raises
> issues
> discussed
> in this
> subject
> line and
> in the
> subject
> line on
> Corballis.
> Bickerton
> brings me
> back to
> the
> circularity
> of
> discourse
> and the
> development
> of
> discourse
> competence.
> Usage-based
> grammar.
> Bickerton’s
> idea that
> complex
> grammar
> developed
> out of the
> pidgins of
> our
> ancestors
> is
> interesting.
> Do I see a
> chicken/egg
> problem
> that for
> Vygotsky,
> “…the
> intramental
> forms of
> semiotic
> mediation
> is better
> understood
> by
> examining
> the types
> of
> intermental
> processes”?
> I don’t
> know.
> Could one
> say that
> inner
> speech is
> the
> vehicle
> for
> turning
> discourse
> into
> grammar?
> Bickerton
> claimed a
> strong
> biological
> component
> to human
> language,
> though I
> don’t
> remember
> if he was
> a
> Chomskian.
> I hope
> this is
> coherent
> thinking
> in the
> context of
> our
> conversation.
> All that jazz.
>
> Henry
>
>
>
> On Nov
> 21,
> 2018,
> at
> 3:22
> PM,
> James
> Ma
> <jamesma320@gmail.com
> <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>>
> wrote:
>
> Alfredo,
> I'd
> agree
> with
> Greg -
> intersubjectivity
> is
> relevant
> and
> pertinent
> here.
>
> As I
> see
> it,
> intersubjectivity
> transcends
> "outlines" or
> perhaps
> sublimates
> the
> "muddledness"
> and
> "unpredictability"
> of a
> conversation
> (as in
> Bateson's
> metalogue)
> into
> what
> Rommetveit
> termed the
> "draft
> of a
> contract".
> This
> is
> because
> shared
> understanding makes
> explicit
> and
> external
> what
> would
> otherwise
> remain
> implicit
> and
> internal.
> Rommetveit
> argues
> that private
> worlds
> can
> only
> be
> transcended
> up to
> a
> certain
> level
> and
> interlocutors
> need
> to
> agree
> upon the draft
> of a
> contract
> with
> which
> the
> communication
> can be
> initiated.
> In the
> spirit
> of
> Vygotsky,
> he
> uses a
> "pluralistic"
> and
> "social-cognitive"
> approach
> to
> human
> communication
> - and
> especially
> to the
> problem
> of
> linguistic
> mediation
> and
> regulation
> in
> interpsychological
> functioning,
> with
> reference
> to
> semantics,
> syntactics
> and
> pragmatics. For
> him,
> the intramental
> forms
> of
> semiotic
> mediation is
> better
> understood by
> examining
> the
> types
> of
> intermental
> processes.
>
>
> I
> think these
> intermental
> processes
> (just like
> intramental
> ones)
> can be
> boiled
> down
> or
> distilled to
> signs
> and
> symbols
> with
> which
> interlocutors
> are in
> harmony
> during a
> conversation
> or any
> other
> joint
> activities.
>
> James
>
> */________________________________________________/*
>
> */James
> Ma
> /*/Independent
> Scholar
> https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa
> /
>
> On
> Wed,
> 21 Nov
> 2018
> at
> 08:09,
> Alfredo
> Jornet
> Gil
> <a.j.gil@ils.uio.no
> <mailto:a.j.gil@ils.uio.no>>
> wrote:
>
> Henry's
> remarks
> about
> no
> directors
> and
> symphonic
> potential of
> conversation reminded
> me of
> G. Bateson's
> metalogue
> "why
> do
> things
> have
> outlines"
> (attached). Implicitly,
> it
> raises
> the
> question
> of
> units
> and
> elements,
> of
> how
> a
> song,
> a
> dance, a
> poem,
> a
> conversation,
> to
> make
> sense,
> they
> must
> have
> a
> recognizable
> outline,
> even
> in
> improvisation;
> they
> must
> be
> wholes,
> or
> suggest
> wholes.
> That
> makes
> them
> "predictable". And
> yet,
> when
> you
> are
> immersed
> in
> a
> conversation,
> the
> fact
> that
> you
> can
> never exactly predict
> what
> comes
> next
> is
> the
> whole
> point
> that keep
> us talking,
> dancing,
> drawing,
> etc!
>
> Alfredo
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> *From:*
> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
> on
> behalf
> of
> HENRY
> SHONERD
> <hshonerd@gmail.com
> <mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
> *Sent:*
> 21
> November
> 2018
> 06:22
> *To:*
> eXtended
> Mind,
> Culture,
> Activity
> *Subject:*
> [Xmca-l]
> Re:
> language
> and
> music
>
> I’d
> like
> to
> add
> to
> the
> call
> and
> response
> conversation
> that
> discourse,
> this
> conversation
> itself,
> is
> staged.
> There
> are
> performers
> and
> and
> an
> audience
> made
> up
> partly
> of
> performers
> themselves.
> How
> many
> are
> lurkers,
> as
> I
> am
> usually?
> This
> conversation
> has
> no
> director,
> but
> there
> are
> leaders.
> There
> is
> symphonic
> potential.
> And
> even
> gestural
> potential,
> making
> the
> chat
> a
> dance.
> All
> on
> line.:)
>
>
> Henry
>
>
>
> On
> Nov
> 20,
> 2018,
> at
> 9:05
> PM,
> mike
> cole
> <mcole@ucsd.edu
> <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>>
> wrote:
>
> For
> many
> years
> I
> used
> the
> work
> of
> Ellen
> Dissenyake
> to
> teach
> comm
> classes
> about
> language/music/development.
> She
> is
> quite
> unusual
> in
> ways
> that
> might
> find
> interest
> here.
>
> https://ellendissanayake.com/
>
> mike
>
> On
> Sat,
> Nov
> 17,
> 2018
> at
> 2:16
> PM
> James
> Ma
> <jamesma320@gmail.com
> <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>>
> wrote:
>
> Hello
> Simangele,
>
> In
> semiotic
> terms,
> whatever
> each
> of
> the
> participants
> has
> constructed
> internally
> is
> the
> signified,
> i.e.
> his
> or
> her
> understanding
> and
> interpretation.
> When
> it
> is
> vocalised
> (spoken
> out),
> it
> becomes
> the
> signifier
> to
> the
> listener.
> What's
> more,
> when
> the
> participants
> work
> together
> to
> compose
> a
> story
> impromptu,
> each
> of
> their
> signifiers
> turns
> into
> a
> new
> signified
> –
> a
> shared,
> newly-established
> understanding,
> woven
> into
> the
> fabric
> of
> meaning
> making.
>
>
> By
> the
> way,
> in
> Chinese
> language,
> words
> for
> singing
> and
> dancing
> have
> long
> been
> used
> inseparably.
> As
> I
> see
> it, they
> are
> semiotically
> indexed
> to,
> or
> adjusted
> to
> allow
> for,
> the
> feelings,
> emotions,
> actions
> and
> interactions
> of
> a
> consciousness
> who
> is
> experiencing
> the
> singing
> and
> dancing.
> Here
> are
> some
> idioms:
>
> 酣歌醉舞-
> singing
> and
> dancing
> rapturously
>
> 村歌社舞-
> dancing
> village
> and
> singing
> club
>
> 燕歌赵舞-
> citizens
> of
> ancient
>
>
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