[Xmca-l] Re: thoughts on Mathematics of Mathematics by Wolff-Michael Roth

[Edward Wall]

Bill

     The book "The Ethnomethodological Foundations of Mathematics” - an ‘interesting' take on Godel’s First Incompleteness Theorem - is just a nice typeset copy of his dissertation (he may have a few extra things; I think I looked at it once and didn’t see much different but perhaps Michael thinks otherwise) which you can get from ProQuest for about $35 or whatever the going price is now. There are also a few articles which are reasonably available and, as MIchael, mentioned "Ethnographies of Reason.” If you like this sort of things, I would recommend The Ethics of Geometry by Lachterman and perhaps The Origin of the Logic of Symbolic Mathematics which takes on Husserl and Klein. There is, of course, a long list of other people who have interesting takes on some of this. 

Ed Wall
 
"The opposite of a correct statement is a false statement. The opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth" - Niels Bohr




> On Apr 11, 2018, at  9:40 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth <wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Bill, the book that I really found good (I have read all of his) is
> "Ethnographies of Reason". Lots of good materials for helping readers
> understand. Michael
> 
> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 7:08 PM, Bill Kerr <billkerr@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Michael wrote:
>> the critique that E. Livingston articulates concerning
>> social constructionism, which takes the social in a WEAK sense; and the
>> social in the strong sense is not a construction.
>> 
>> I looked up Eric Livingston, The Ethnomethodological Foundations of
>> Mathematics, referenced on p. 56 of your book. The price was $202, ouch!
>> Publishers put marxist ideas from academics out of the reach of the poor.
>> Can this problem be solved or mitigated under capitalism?
>> 
>> On Thu, Apr 12, 2018 at 12:36 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth <
>> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Andy, to construct is a transitive verb, we construct something. It is
>> not
>>> well suited to describe the emergence (morphogenesis) of something new.
>>> This is why Richard Rorty (1989) rejects it, using the craftsperson as a
>>> counter example to the poet in the larger sense, the maker of new things.
>>> He writes that poets know what they have done only afterward, when,
>>> together with the new thing they have found themselves speaking a new
>>> language that also provides a reason for this language.
>>> 
>>> I also direct you to the critique that E. Livingston articulates
>> concerning
>>> social constructionism, which takes the social in a WEAK sense; and the
>>> social in the strong sense is not a construction.
>>> 
>>> Also interesting in this is the question of origins, and there the French
>>> philosophers (Derrida and others) have had a lot of discussion. Mead's
>>> fundamental point is that "before the emergent has occurred, and at the
>>> moment of its occurrence, it does not follow from the past" (1932, xvii).
>>> 
>>> And concerning relations, Marx/Engels write (German Ideology) that the
>>> animal does not relate at all, for it, the relationship does not exist as
>>> relationship
>>> 
>>> m
>>> 
>>> Rorty, R 1989, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, CUP
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 7:29 AM, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org>
>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Well, I can see that as an argument, Michael. My response:
>>>> 
>>>> The thing is, to interpret "construction" in an intellectual
>>>> way, leads to the conclusion that to give construction a
>>>> fundamental place in human evolution is "intellectualism,"
>>>> and actually, interpreted that way, would be utterly absurd.
>>>> But the fact is that all human actions are teleological,
>>>> that is, oriented to a goal. Of course!! no hominid ever
>>>> said to herself: "I think I will now take another step to
>>>> evolving homo sapiens." AN Leontyev does exactly the same
>>>> move in his criticism of Vygotsky.
>>>> 
>>>> Actually, I don't know just how the formation of social
>>>> customs, speech and tool-making interacted in the earliest
>>>> stages of phylogenesis, ... and nor do you. We do know that
>>>> all three are intimately interconnected from the earliest
>>>> times we have any real knowledge of, though.
>>>> 
>>>> As to "emergence," in my opinion "emergence" is the modern
>>>> word for God. I don't know how this happens, so it must be
>>>> Emergence.
>>>> 
>>>> Andy
>>>> 
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>> ttp://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>> On 12/04/2018 12:18 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>> Andy, there is nothing of construction. Construction may be an effect
>>> of
>>>>> mind, but mind did not emerge as a construction. It is a
>> manifestation
>>>> of a
>>>>> relationship.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Emergence means that what comes after cannot be predicted on the
>> basis
>>> of
>>>>> what comes before. The construction metaphor implies that (e.g., the
>>>>> craftsman in the Marx/Engels case who is superior to the bee, an
>>> example
>>>>> that Vygotsky takes up).
>>>>> 
>>>>> Construction smacks of intellectualism, precisely the intellectualism
>>>> that
>>>>> Vygotsky made some moves to overcome at the end of his life
>>>>> 
>>>>> m
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 7:09 AM, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> All of those quotes make my point, Michael, in ever so
>>>>>> slightly different words.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> a
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>> ttp://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>>>> On 12/04/2018 12:02 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>> I do not think mind is a construction,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Vygotsky (1989) writes: "Any higher psychological function ... was
>>> the
>>>>>>> social relation between two people" (p.56)
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> And Mikhailov (2001) suggests: "the very existence of the
>>>>>>> mind is possible only at the borderline where there is a continual
>>>>>>> coming and going of one into the other, at their dynamic interface,
>>>>>>> as it were—an interface that is defined ... by the single process
>> of
>>>>>> their
>>>>>>> [self and other] mutual generation and mutual determination"
>>> (pp.20-21)
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Bateson (1979): Mind is an effect of relations, an aggregate
>> effect,
>>>> like
>>>>>>> stereo (spatial) vision
>>>>>>> is the emergent effect of two eyes with planar images.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Mead (1932): "the appearance of mind is only the culmination of
>> that
>>>>>>> sociality which is found throughout the universe" (p.86).
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Nobody says anything about construction. The to eyes don't
>> construct
>>>>>>> stereovision and space. It is an emergent phenomenon,
>>>>>>> an ensemble effect deriving from relations.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> m
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 6:47 AM, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> I always thought that the mind was a construction of human
>>>>>>>> culture. But of course, that was not what Spinoza thought.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>> ttp://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>>>>>> On 11/04/2018 11:44 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>> No, I am not saying that there were human beings. Anthropogenesis
>>> and
>>>>>>>>> generalized (societal) action *come* together. But we have to
>>> explain
>>>>>>>>> culture and cognition as emergent phenomena not as
>> *constructions*
>>> of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> mind. m
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 6:15 AM, Andy Blunden <
>> andyb@marxists.org>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> So, Michael, you are saying that there were human beings
>>>>>>>>>> before there was culture. And I gather you do not count
>>>>>>>>>> tools as units of culture.
>>>>>>>>>> Do we have to await a Psychologist to invent the word
>>>>>>>>>> "meaning" before we can poke a stick into an ant-hill?
>>>>>>>>>> Creationism makes more sense, Michael, at least it offers
>>>>>>>>>> /some/ explanation for the existence of human life.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>> ttp://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>>>>>>>> On 11/04/2018 9:57 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Bill,
>>>>>>>>>>> it is not so much "socially constructed." My key point in the
>>> book
>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>> it is social BEFORE there can be any construction. It is
>> social,
>>>> and
>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>> is where I refer to a Vygotsky that has not been taken up,
>>> because
>>>>>>>> "every
>>>>>>>>>>> higher psychological function ... was a social relation between
>>> two
>>>>>>>>>>> people." That is, in this specific case, mathematics is social,
>>> was
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> relation between two people before you see it in individuals...
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> I think the construction metaphor breaks down when you look at
>>> our
>>>>>>>>>> species
>>>>>>>>>>> becoming human. So before there was culture, before we used
>>> tools,
>>>>>>>> where
>>>>>>>>>>> were those tools for constructing anything of the likes that
>>>>>>>>>>> constructivists say that we use to construct? How can a hominid
>>>>>>>> construct
>>>>>>>>>>> "meaning" of the branch as tool to start digging for roots or
>>>> fishing
>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>> termites? And how do they construct meaning of the first
>>>> sound-words
>>>>>>>> when
>>>>>>>>>>> they do not have a system that would serve as material and tool
>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>> building anything like "meaning?"
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> So yes, a learning theory has to be able to explain learning
>> from
>>>>>>>> before
>>>>>>>>>>> culture (phylogenesis), before language and meaning
>>> (ontogenesis).
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> And about eclecticism---I think we would be a step further if
>> we
>>>>>>>> listened
>>>>>>>>>>> to and pondered A.N. Leont'ev's complaint about the "eclectic
>>> soup
>>>>>>>>>>> [eklekticheskoj pokhlebke] ... each to his own recipe" that
>>>>>>>> psychologists
>>>>>>>>>>> are trying to cook (in his foreword to *Activity.
>> Consciousness.
>>>>>>>>>>> Personality*).
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Bill Kerr <billkerr@gmail.com
>>> 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> One interpretation of Vygotsky (Wolff-Michael Roth) argues
>> that
>>>> all
>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is socially constructed and that ethnomethodology,
>>>> paying
>>>>>>>>>>>> detailed attention in the now, is the best or only way of
>>>> detecting
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluating what is going on . Human activity can’t be reduced
>> to
>>>>>>>>>> individual
>>>>>>>>>>>> actions. Anything individual originates in the social, be it
>>>> words,
>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematics or by implication computer science (mentioned not
>> in
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> original but because it is a current interest of mine).
>> Moreover
>>>>>>>>>> internal
>>>>>>>>>>>> representations or schemas seem to be denied because that
>> would
>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>> capitulation to dualism, emphasising brain / mind activity
>>> whereas
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> real
>>>>>>>>>>>> deal is an integrated thinking body.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> This world view is critical of other learning theories be they
>>>>>>>>>>>> behaviourist, cognitivist, enactivist or constructivist.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> The question that I want to explore here is the pragmatic one
>> of
>>>>>>>> whether
>>>>>>>>>>>> and how learning theory (an abstraction) makes a difference in
>>>>>>>> practice,
>>>>>>>>>>>> for busy, hard working (usually overworked) teachers. An
>>>> alternative
>>>>>>>>>>>> epistemology/ies which might appeal more in practice to real
>>>>>> teachers
>>>>>>>>>> under
>>>>>>>>>>>> pressure is an eclectic one centred around the issue of “what
>>>>>> works”.
>>>>>>>>>>>> I believe I am better read on learning theory than most
>>> teachers.
>>>>>> See
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://learningevolves.wikispaces.com/learning%20theories
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Up until now I've developed an eclectic / pragmatic approach
>> to
>>>>>>>> putting
>>>>>>>>>>>> learning theory into practice. Take something from Seymour
>>>> Papert's
>>>>>>>>>>>> constructionism, something from Dan Willingham's cognitivism,
>>>>>>>> something
>>>>>>>>>>>> from Dan Dennett's behaviourism, something from Andy Clarke’s
>>>>>>>> enactivism
>>>>>>>>>>>> and roll them altogether in an eclectic mix. The authors in
>> this
>>>>>> list
>>>>>>>>>> could
>>>>>>>>>>>> be multiplied. My underlying belief was that it was not
>> possible
>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> develop
>>>>>>>>>>>> a unified learning theory, that human learning was too complex
>>> for
>>>>>>>>>> that. As
>>>>>>>>>>>> Marvin Minsky once said in 'Society of Mind', "the trick is
>>> there
>>>> is
>>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>>>>>> trick", I think meaning no overarching way in which human's
>>> learn.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> One big surprise in reading Wolff-Michael Roth is his serious
>>>>>> attempt
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>> put an end to such eclectism and develop what appears to be a
>>>> unfied
>>>>>>>>>>>> learning theory.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>>