[Xmca-l] Re: thoughts on Mathematics of Mathematics by Wolff-Michael Roth

[Wolff-Michael Roth]

Huw,

I can't see how the radical constructivist position (e..g von Glasersfeld)
has anything in common with a radically social take, here I do not mean the
"social constructivist" version, which is just adding external relations
between elemental individuals (see, e.g., how Glaserfeld makes the "other"
a construction of the Self, which externalizes itself as a model on which
the notion of the other is based).
In a vast part of the philosophical (and poetic) literature, coming from
very different traditions, the Self is another (Soi-même comme un autre, as
Ricœur says, or Rimbaud's famous aphorism, "Je est un autre" etc. etc)

I am trying to understand where to place myself so that these differences
become the same (like in physics, where the simultaneity is a question of
position).

But my hunch is that the ontology is object-oriented, and that the
presuppositions are Newtonian-Cartesian-Kantian.

Michael


On Thu, Apr 12, 2018 at 8:59 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Bill, Michael, and others
>
> The problem with these pithy statements is that they do not define their
> terms. For Vygotsky's "general genetic law" one needs to know what is meant
> by a function, process, etc, and also an appreciation for different forms
> of "internal": the internal of operationalisation, in which there is an
> atrophy of supporting external signs that are replaced by internal signs,
> contrasted with the internal dialogue often entailed in thought (though
> granted internal dialogue may have its own externalised progenitors). For
> Bruner's (Kay's summative) "doing with images makes symbols", one needs to
> know what is meant by the full connotations of symbol. One might argue that
> neither Vygotsky nor Bruner really knew with clarity what they respectively
> meant by function and symbol (distinct from sign) -- it was part of their
> exploration.
>
> It is not that the "genetic law" is wrong per se, in my view, rather that
> care needs to be taken in differentiating exactly what is being referred
> to. In this view I see no contradiction between this law and the principles
> of radical constructivism (which, to me, are rather obvious). The
> clarification of inner dialogue, for instance, may be exemplified as a
> dialogue between two perspectives that is no different (logically) between
> a dialogue between two individuals, as exemplified by Pask's p-individual.
> Hence in the realm of invention Vygotsky's genetic law may apply equally to
> the "external" social plane as to the "internal" one. One needs to be clear
> about what one means by internal-external and to heed the functional
> possibilities from bootstrapping. This leads to a rejection of a naive
> application of "all new psychological processes originating from outside",
> but not from a sophisticated application.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
> On 12 April 2018 at 07:25, Bill Kerr <billkerr@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > ps. Addition to this comment from me above:
> > Papert's framing of the turtle as an "object to think with" and
> > incidentally also Bruner's similar conception of "doing with images makes
> > symbols" do represent a learning theory which combines the kinesthenic
> with
> > the visual with the symbolic. Does that gel with your learning theory?
> From
> > my reading it does partly but you would be chary about the symbolic part,
> > I'm not sure.
> >
> > On page 49, FN 31 Michael cites 2 papers about the emergence of signs
> from
> > hands on science. This seems to me to be compatible with Bruner's
> approach
> > which he summed up with the slogan "doing with images makes symbols" and
> > also with Seymour's "object to think with" even though he didn't spell
> out
> > the signs when he said that.
> >
> > My speculation here (to be shot down probably); Michael Roth's theory and
> > Papert / Bruner theory cover the same ground and reach similar
> conclusions
> > but they have different names
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Apr 12, 2018 at 11:12 AM, Bill Kerr <billkerr@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > hi Michael,
> > >
> > > > not so much "socially constructed."
> > >
> > > ok, sorry for incorrect summary of your ideas, I guess the construction
> > is
> > > so hard wired into me that I didn't notice the misrepresentation
> > >
> > > > before there was culture, before we used tools, where
> > > were those tools for constructing anything of the likes that
> > > constructivists say that we use to construct?
> > >
> > > Well, the hand is a tool and Engels essay "The part played by labour in
> > > the transition from ape to man" is one you would know about.
> > >
> > > > eclecticism
> > >
> > > Thanks for the Leontev reference. I have read a bit and will read some
> > > more before commenting.
> > >
> > > The reason I'm eclectic is because I read the various learning theories
> > > and find some bits are useful for my teaching practice while other bits
> > are
> > > not. I'm very impressed by your book in its effort to develop what I
> > call a
> > > unified learning theory but it doesn't cover all the bases for me to be
> > > fully persuaded.
> > >
> > > Also some of the critiques you make, eg. of constructivism, don't match
> > my
> > > understanding of what they stand for. The critiques in your book are
> > > directed at radical constructivism (von Glasersfeld) and Piaget /
> > > Inhelder. When I read pp 51-53 of your book it didn't sound like the
> > Piaget
> > > that has circulated in and out of Australian schools in the 1980s when
> > > Piaget became the preferred flavour of the decade and science curricula
> > > were developed around his ideas.
> > >
> > > Specifically you say that constructivists argue that: (I've *bolded*
> the
> > > bits where your understanding of Piaget is different to mine)
> > > "the individual mind is ... *informationally closed* to the surrounding
> > > world" (51)
> > > "In a constructivist account, she (Melissa) might be said to
> *incorrectly
> > > 'interpret'* the object ..." (51)
> > > "As Piaget, modern day constructivists often characterize children's
> > > knowing *negatively: as lack, deficit ... or deviance* ..." (52)
> > > "In the constructivist literature , we can frequently read that
> > *misconceptions
> > > ... have to be eradicated* (53)
> > >
> > > Piaget's best known observation were about conservation, the tall and
> > wide
> > > glasses, and I've never heard children's responses described as
> > incorrect,
> > > deficit or misconception but always as a stage that children have to
> pass
> > > through. It always seemed me that Piaget respected and understood the
> > > child's different view of the world.
> > >
> > > The version of constructivism that I am most familiar with was called
> > > constructionism by Seymour Papert, which combines the internal
> > > constructivism with an external construction. (Papert did spend some
> time
> > > working with Piaget). This had real life application in the development
> > of
> > > logo-LEGO which evolved into Mindstorms LEGO. The idea was that kids
> > would
> > > build things out there and make those things do stuff with the logo
> > > programming language and this would change/develop their minds inside.
> > >
> > > I'm not saying that Papert's constructionism was without difficulty due
> > to
> > > the fundamental idealist nature of constructivism but nevertheless I
> have
> > > found it very useful in thinking about how kids learn.
> > >
> > > Papert described the logo turtle as "an object to think with" and
> tapped
> > > into Freud's idea of body syntonic to describe the process. eg. how do
> > you
> > > draw a square? The teacher pretends to be a robot and asks the students
> > to
> > > direct him / her to draw a square.
> > > Student: "walk forward"
> > > Teacher: robot doesn't understand walk but he does understand forward
> > > Student: forward
> > > Teacher: How far?
> > > Student: forward 50
> > > etc. etc.
> > > This leads to development of concepts of directed motion, angles (right
> > > 90) and iteration. Once the square is drawn the teacher goes back and
> > asks
> > > students to identify which parts are repeated, and the code eventually
> > > becomes repeat 4[fd 50 rt 90]
> > >
> > > Papert's framing of the turtle as an "object to think with" and
> > > incidentally also Bruner's similar conception of "doing with images
> makes
> > > symbols" do represent a learning theory which combines the kinesthenic
> > with
> > > the visual with the symbolic. Does that gel with your learning theory?
> > From
> > > my reading it does partly but you would be chary about the symbolic
> part,
> > > I'm not sure.
> > >
> > > (my initial comment did mention what I see as a tendency to deny the
> > > internal and I intend to post more later on that issue. Repeating what
> I
> > > said then "Moreover internal representations or schemas seem to be
> denied
> > > because that would be a capitulation to dualism, emphasising brain /
> mind
> > > activity whereas the real deal is an integrated thinking body")
> > >
> > >  It was because of the idealist nature of constructivism /
> > constructionism
> > > that I became more critical of it over time and delved more into other
> > > learning theories. I wrote about this back in 2008 when there was some
> > > discussion about constructivism in the one laptop per child movement.
> > I'll
> > > put some links here for completion and my own convenience
> > > https://billkerr2.blogspot.com.au/2008/08/towards-
> > > fingernail-definition-of.html
> > >
> > > The funny thing was that each new learning theory I looked at offered
> > > something useful to me as a practicing teacher. I won't go into more
> > detail
> > > at this point, there is enough here already for discussion.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 9:27 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth <
> > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >> Hi Bill,
> > >> it is not so much "socially constructed." My key point in the book is
> > that
> > >> it is social BEFORE there can be any construction. It is social, and
> > this
> > >> is where I refer to a Vygotsky that has not been taken up, because
> > "every
> > >> higher psychological function ... was a social relation between two
> > >> people." That is, in this specific case, mathematics is social, was
> the
> > >> relation between two people before you see it in individuals...
> > >>
> > >> I think the construction metaphor breaks down when you look at our
> > species
> > >> becoming human. So before there was culture, before we used tools,
> where
> > >> were those tools for constructing anything of the likes that
> > >> constructivists say that we use to construct? How can a hominid
> > construct
> > >> "meaning" of the branch as tool to start digging for roots or fishing
> > for
> > >> termites? And how do they construct meaning of the first sound-words
> > when
> > >> they do not have a system that would serve as material and tool for
> > >> building anything like "meaning?"
> > >>
> > >> So yes, a learning theory has to be able to explain learning from
> before
> > >> culture (phylogenesis), before language and meaning (ontogenesis).
> > >>
> > >> And about eclecticism---I think we would be a step further if we
> > listened
> > >> to and pondered A.N. Leont'ev's complaint about the "eclectic soup
> > >> [eklekticheskoj pokhlebke] ... each to his own recipe" that
> > psychologists
> > >> are trying to cook (in his foreword to *Activity. Consciousness.
> > >> Personality*).
> > >>
> > >> Cheers,
> > >> Michael
> > >>
> > >> On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Bill Kerr <billkerr@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> > One interpretation of Vygotsky (Wolff-Michael Roth) argues that all
> > >> > knowledge is socially constructed and that ethnomethodology, paying
> > >> > detailed attention in the now, is the best or only way of detecting
> > and
> > >> > evaluating what is going on . Human activity can’t be reduced to
> > >> individual
> > >> > actions. Anything individual originates in the social, be it words,
> > >> > mathematics or by implication computer science (mentioned not in the
> > >> > original but because it is a current interest of mine). Moreover
> > >> internal
> > >> > representations or schemas seem to be denied because that would be a
> > >> > capitulation to dualism, emphasising brain / mind activity whereas
> the
> > >> real
> > >> > deal is an integrated thinking body.
> > >> >
> > >> > This world view is critical of other learning theories be they
> > >> > behaviourist, cognitivist, enactivist or constructivist.
> > >> >
> > >> > The question that I want to explore here is the pragmatic one of
> > whether
> > >> > and how learning theory (an abstraction) makes a difference in
> > practice,
> > >> > for busy, hard working (usually overworked) teachers. An alternative
> > >> > epistemology/ies which might appeal more in practice to real
> teachers
> > >> under
> > >> > pressure is an eclectic one centred around the issue of “what
> works”.
> > >> >
> > >> > I believe I am better read on learning theory than most teachers.
> See
> > >> > http://learningevolves.wikispaces.com/learning%20theories
> > >> >
> > >> > Up until now I've developed an eclectic / pragmatic approach to
> > putting
> > >> > learning theory into practice. Take something from Seymour Papert's
> > >> > constructionism, something from Dan Willingham's cognitivism,
> > something
> > >> > from Dan Dennett's behaviourism, something from Andy Clarke’s
> > enactivism
> > >> > and roll them altogether in an eclectic mix. The authors in this
> list
> > >> could
> > >> > be multiplied. My underlying belief was that it was not possible to
> > >> develop
> > >> > a unified learning theory, that human learning was too complex for
> > >> that. As
> > >> > Marvin Minsky once said in 'Society of Mind', "the trick is there is
> > no
> > >> > trick", I think meaning no overarching way in which human's learn.
> > >> >
> > >> > One big surprise in reading Wolff-Michael Roth is his serious
> attempt
> > to
> > >> > put an end to such eclectism and develop what appears to be a unfied
> > >> > learning theory.
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >
> > >
> >
>