[Xmca-l] Re: Don't do it

[Alfredo Jornet Gil]

thanks for sharing David,
A
________________________________________
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
Sent: 13 March 2017 23:43
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Don't do it

Alfredo:

Here's an early draft I uploaded to Academia.edu:

https://www.academia.edu/31850352/Thinking_of_Feeling_Hasans_Complaints_Vygotskys_Late_Lectures_and_the_Development_of_Narrative_in_Children

Sometimes I prefer this version to the one that got accepted: it's a lot
chattier and less IMRADish (I mean, less
IntroMethodResultandDiscussion-ish). But the reviewers didn't like it and I
can see their point too: part of the meaning of an academic is sounding
like an academic, just as part of the meaning of a Frenchman is sounding
like a Frenchman.

This is relevant to another point: ideology and ideation, prescriptive vs
transformative, and more generally perjorative vs. descriptive use of
language. But that's another thread.

David Kellogg
Macquarie University

On Tue, Mar 14, 2017 at 3:14 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>
wrote:

> David, make sure you share the link with us again once your article in
> Language and Education on meta function comes online. I tried the DOI you
> gave us but it does not work. I am looking forward to read it!
>
> Alfredo
> ________________________________________
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> on behalf of David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> Sent: 13 March 2017 08:37
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Don't do it
>
> In my own (unpublished) study, it was the interpersonal metafunction which
> emerged first, not the ideational one. That is, children grasped the idea
> of giving and getting goods and services before they had the idea that
> experience could be encoded in language and shared with somebody who didn't
> actually have it. (This study just confirmed work by Clare Painter, Jane
> Torr, and Halliday himself.)
>
> However, I think that Rein is right in one sense: there is some larger
> whole from which BOTH the interpersonal and the ideational must be
> co-differentiated. I don't think this differentiation is what happens in
> development, though: it's an artefact of analysis. I don't think that this
> larger whole exists in infants, or even in early childhood; to use the
> Pepperian idea in Karimi-Aghdam article, it's a kind of artefact that
> arises post hoc, from looking at contextualism (which is dispersive) and
> organicism (which is integrative) together. By looking at an integrated
> whole and by thinking about it as development-in-context, we infer it, but
> to assume that it actually happens, that all word meanings are "given" to
> children, is to commit the Augustinian fallacy (that Wittgenstein
> criticizes at the beginning of Philosophical Investigations)
>
> Halliday's got a name for this larger whole, at least once it arises in
> actual speech. It's the TEXTUAL metafunction, that is, the textual devices
> that we use to integrate interpersonal functions and ideational ones into a
> single clause. To return to the example I gave earlier:
>
> a) Don't do it. (interpersonal proposal, ideational material process, "you"
> and "it" are Actor and Goal, textually unmarked)
> b) It's not necessary (interpersonal proposition, ideational relational
> process "it" and "necessary" are Carrier and Attribute, textually unmarked)
> c) Don't do it, because it's not necessary. ("because" is a conjunctive
> adjunct which integrates the two propositions--it has neither interpersonal
> nor ideational function, but is a purely textual element).
>
> (I've got a study on how this metafunction arises in Korean kids--it seems
> to me that it's not explicit until quite late, in sixth grade, in my data.
> This one will actually be PUBLISHED...in Language and Education! (DOI:
> 10.1080/09500782.2017.1306074)
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
> On Sun, Mar 12, 2017 at 7:51 AM, Rein Raud <rein.raud@tlu.ee> wrote:
>
> > Yes, this I can agree with - especially as this is fairly close to my own
> > theory of meaning ("Meaning in Action", Polity 2016, ch.2), except that
> in
> > my opinion the ideational is already given to us interpersonally (as when
> > someone explains to us what a word means), while there is also an
> > "experiential" meaning with which this ideational claims identity. But
> what
> > you say makes sense. Best, Rein
> >
> > On Mar 11, 2017, at 22:41 , Martin John Packer wrote:
> >
> > > Rein,
> > >
> > > David is building here on Halliday’s analysis of the two fundamental
> > ‘functions’ of language, the ideational and the interpersonal. It is when
> > the child becomes able to combine the two in the same utterance that
> > grammar emerges. (That was not David’s point; I just find it a very
> > interesting idea!)
> > >
> > > Martin
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Mar 11, 2017, at 3:27 PM, Rein Raud <rein.raud@tlu.ee<mailto:rein.
> > raud@tlu.ee>> wrote:
> > >
> > > David, I was only reacting to what you wrote:
> > >
> > > I shall call this form of meaning--for meaning it is--"interpersonal"
> > > meaning, in order to distinguish it from "ideational" meaning. I think
> > that
> > > interpersonal meaning is meaning, but it is meaning which is directed
> > > towards organizing an interaction as the giving or getting of
> information
> > > or goods and services. Ideational meaning is meaning too, but it is
> > > directed towards the representation (hence, "indication") of human
> > > experience and logic. They're equally meaningful, but they are filled
> > with
> > > different kinds of meanings.
> > >
> > > "Ideational" here seems to be what Austin calls "locutionary".
> > "Interpersonal", in turn, seems to be what Austin called "performative"
> (in
> > the illocutionary and perlocutionary varieties) and indeed you define it
> > as  "directed towards organizing an interaction". Thus I don't think your
> > counter-argument here is wholly legitimate, or perhaps I've missed the
> > point.
> > >
> > > Best,
> > >
> > > Rein
> > >
> > > On Mar 11, 2017, at 22:09 , David Kellogg wrote:
> > >
> > > Here I'm talking about the difference between:
> > >
> > > a) Don't do it.
> > > b) You are doing it.
> > > c) Are you doing it?
> > >
> > > This is not a difference between locutionary, illocutionary, and
> > > perlocutionary force--Austin would say that all of these are
> locutionary
> > in
> > > their force, because the pragmatic purpose and the resulting event,
> which
> > > is the giving of linguistic examples and their reception, is the same.
> > And
> > > yet they are different. How so?
> > >
> > > They are different in the nature of the commodity which is put at risk.
> > In
> > > a) that commodity is goods and services, while in b) and c) that
> > commodity
> > > is information. This means that in a) language is ancillary--we can
> often
> > > perform the same "speech act" (to use the behavioristic terminology of
> > > Austin, Searle, and their disciples in pragmatics) using gesticulation,
> > > gesture, "eye language", or just intonation. But in b) and c) the use
> of
> > > lexicogrammar is central--we cannot successfully exchange propositions
> > > without encoding them lexicogrammatically.
> > >
> > > This is not the same difference that Austin is discussing. Austin is
> not
> > a
> > > linguist, so he wants to transfer meaning from language to context: to
> > > speech roles, to social recognition and to social outcomes. That's
> simply
> > > not possible in this situation: the meaning of b) and c) lies in the
> > > lexico-grammar and nowhere else. Speech act theory is to linguistics
> what
> > > behaviorism is to psychology.
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Macquarie University
> > >
> > >
> > > On Sun, Mar 12, 2017 at 6:33 AM, Rein Raud <rein.raud@tlu.ee<mailto:
> > rein.raud@tlu.ee>> wrote:
> > >
> > > These differences have been discussed quite some time ago in
> J.L.Austin's
> > > "How to Do Things with Words" (1962), from which speech act theory
> > > originated. Austin distinguishes between locutionary (primary
> semantical)
> > > meaning, illocutionary meaning (what is being meant) and perlocutionary
> > > meaning (any event is being produced by the utterance). Thus when you
> say
> > > "Do you have some time?" you might mean "Can you spare some time for
> me?"
> > > and the perlocutionary result of this is that you will actually help me
> > > (because you are in a position where you cannot say "no" to me, f.ex.
> > > because I am your boss). A lot of speech act theory has evolved from
> > this,
> > > notably in the work of Searle. Best to all, Rein Raud
> > >
> > > On Mar 11, 2017, at 21:18 , David Kellogg wrote:
> > >
> > > Ulvi, Mike...
> > >
> > > We started this thread with Ulvi's important remark that there is a
> > > difference between:
> > >
> > > "Don't do it."
> > >
> > > and
> > >
> > > "it is not necessary."
> > >
> > > Ulvi said that the difference does not lie in their polarity--they are
> > > both
> > > negative. Nor does it lie in their representational (referential, or
> > > "ideational" meaning). They both refer to "it" and to the advisability
> of
> > > "it".  Ulvi said that the first was imperative, and the second was not
> > > (the
> > > technical term for the non-imperative form of the second is
> > > "indicative-declarative", as opposed to "indicative-interrogative"
> which
> > > would be a question).
> > >
> > > I shall call this form of meaning--for meaning it is--"interpersonal"
> > > meaning, in order to distinguish it from "ideational" meaning. I think
> > > that
> > > interpersonal meaning is meaning, but it is meaning which is directed
> > > towards organizing an interaction as the giving or getting of
> information
> > > or goods and services. Ideational meaning is meaning too, but it is
> > > directed towards the representation (hence, "indication") of human
> > > experience and logic. They're equally meaningful, but they are filled
> > > with
> > > different kinds of meanings.
> > >
> > > The difference is qualitative, and that is another way of saying that
> it
> > > is
> > > "revolutionary" (because revolution originally meant turning around
> axis;
> > > the first political "revolution" was the rather pathetic "turning" of
> > > Latin-speaking civilization from a republican to an imperial form under
> > > Augustus). The difference is between making a proposal and offering a
> > > proposition--i.e. between realizing a potential state and simply
> > > discussing
> > > an actual one.
> > >
> > > One of the interesting aspects of Professor Jang's paper is that it is
> > > about adolescents who are in the process of forming concepts, but who
> are
> > > not there yet. And one way in which an adolescent forms a concept about
> > > the
> > > difficult concept of a social contract, of citizenship, of nationality
> is
> > > pseudoconceptual: it is based on discussing "actual" perceptual
> > > differences
> > > between races. This might seem irrelevant to current political
> discourse.
> > > Unfortunately, it isn't.
> > >
> > > What does a teacher say to kids who are thinking this way? Do we say
> > > "Don't
> > > do it"? Or is it better to show them that it is not necessary?
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Macquarie University
> > >
> > >
> > > On Sat, Mar 11, 2017 at 7:58 PM, Ulvi İçil <ulvi.icil@gmail.com
> <mailto:
> > ulvi.icil@gmail.com>> wrote:
> > >
> > > Mike, please corrct me if i wrongly take this meaning that revolutions
> > > causes big numbers of death, death in masses, so we would not prefer
> > > them.
> > >
> > > But, what if we sum up all the deaths because of occupatinal murders in
> > > workplaces, deaths from drugs, murders of women and early death because
> > > of
> > > lack of sufficient health care and all the deaths due to the bad
> > > orgsanisation of society under capitalism  and what is more turning of
> > > tens
> > > of millions of children into ignorant and fanatic human beings who are
> > > brought up able to kill anyone on the street etc
> > >
> > > Is it not more rational to put en end to this state of human society
> > > rather
> > > than to perpetruate it, allow it to exist.
> > >
> > > Unemployment itself 20 % in Turkey.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > 11 Mar 2017 03:14 tarihinde "mike cole" <mcole@ucsd.edu<mailto:mcole@
> > ucsd.edu>> yazdı:
> > >
> > > From my personal web page, Ulvi:
> > >
> > > *Apropos Thoughts on Revolutions and Their Causes*
> > >
> > > (From C. Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*, Ch 15)
> > >
> > > Along the Paris streets, the death carts rumble, hollow and harsh.
> > >
> > > Six tumbrels carry the day's wine to La Guillotine. All the devouring
> > > and
> > > insatiate monsters imagined since imagination could record itself, are
> > > fused in the one realization, Guillotine. And yet there is not in
> > > France,
> > > with its rich variety of soil and climate, a blade, a leaf, a root, a
> > > sprig, a peppercorn, which will grow to maturity under conditions more
> > > certain than those that have produced this horror. Crush human humanity
> > > out
> > > of shape once more, under similar hammers, and it will twist itself
> > > into
> > > the same tortured forms. Sow the same seed of rapacious license and
> > > oppression over again, and it will surely yield the same fruit,
> > > according
> > > to its kind.
> > >
> > > It is the nature of the fruits sewn by the French Revolution that give
> > > pause for thought. And perhaps accounts for the lack of reply to your
> > > articulately formulated note.
> > >
> > > mike
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 1:32 PM, Ulvi İçil <ulvi.icil@gmail.com<mailto:
> ul
> > vi.icil@gmail.com>> wrote:
> > >
> > > If I say
> > >
> > > don't do it, it is imperative.
> > >
> > > But if I say,
> > >
> > > It is not realistic and you do not need it.
> > >
> > > It is affirmative and even  though negative, it is again affirmative,
> > > to
> > > demobilize you.
> > >
> > > What I mean is Revolution.
> > >
> > > Addressed to a married couple with two children.
> > >
> > > With 3 thousand Turkish liras in Istanbul in a  rented home of at
> > > least
> > > 1000 tl for rent.
> > >
> > > 1 usd = 4 Turkish liras
> > >
> > > Survival economics.
> > >
> > > Any prospect?
> > >
> > > No.
> > >
> > > That simple.
> > >
> > > What is socialist revolution?
> > >
> > > It is neither an intention nor a wish.
> > >
> > > It is simple necessity.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
>