[Xmca-l] Re: Continue with Hegle, and the Social through Greg

[James Ma]

For me, semiosis has both an a-priori and an a-posteriori root, whereas
sociality has an a-posteriori root only.

James

*_____________________________________*

*James Ma*  *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa
<https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa>*



On 2 July 2017 at 03:04, <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:

> David,
> Lovely quote from Hasan. She really nailed it.
> But I'm still unclear how your whale example makes the case that semiosis
> and sociality have different genetic roots. Perhaps you could explain a bit
> more for a dull skull like me?
> Greg
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> > On Jul 1, 2017, at 6:13 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Larry:
> >
> > I'm afraid I sometimes lose the practical thread in my own predilection
> for
> > decorating. I was trying to make the case that semiosis and sociality
> have
> > different genetic roots. This is really just a way of saying that speech
> > and (practical) thinking have different genetic roots.
> >
> > So in Antarctica, whales socialize for a definite purpose, and that
> purpose
> > determines the size of the social group (around twelve whales). But when
> > they migrate past our shores, they are very far from that purpose. They
> are
> > not feeding, they are not mating, but they are communicating: this is
> where
> > we find "songs" as distinct from echo-locating clicks. It is also where
> we
> > find dyads and triads--apparently for engaging in dialogues and
> trialogues.
> > This is not simply sociality for the sake of reproducing the material
> > conditions of life; it is an exuberant semiosis for the sheer hell of it.
> > Admittedly, ALL sociality and ALL semiosis among humans is a mixture of
> the
> > transactional and the expressive, but the arc of most conversation, if
> not
> > of history itself, seems to bend inevitably from the former to the
> latter.
> >
> > Heidegger's idea that there is an "ur-Life" which has to assent to every
> > instant of living seems to me precisely ass-backwards (as Vygotsky likes
> to
> > say). It is like the ridiculous notion that in order to create language
> > people called a kind of global congress in which the precise terms of the
> > language contract were hammered out, without, of course, using any
> language
> > at all.
> >
> > Take (please!) the various accounts that we humans create of the end of
> the
> > world by flooding. They go all the way back to the Epic of Gilgamesh,
> where
> > the gods basically turned the taps on mankind because they were making
> too
> > much noise down there. Then, in Revelation, there is more emphasis on sea
> > monsters; by the time we get to the Middle Ages, the world is going to
> end
> > in water-born plagues. But it's only since 1945 that there has been an
> > emphasis on volitional apocalypse--that is, the flooding of the earth by
> > humans themselves (Kevin Costner and "Waterworld" and its various
> > derivatives).
> >
> > It's possible, I suppose, to see this as a Hegelian philosophy of
> history.
> > You know, man unconscious of his ability to end the world as we know it,
> > first ascribing it to arbitrary whims of the gods, then to nature, then
> to
> > human diseases and sin and only in our own time a "true concept" of
> global
> > warming. But it is also possible to see the development of concept as the
> > outcome of human practices such as flood-based agriculture, living in
> > proximity to Nile crocodiles, the medieval scourges of the black death,
> and
> > the premeditated design and thoughtless use of nuclear weapons in World
> War
> > II. The latter possibility has the advantage of including more tangible
> > data if not always ocular proof.
> >
> > Ruqaiya Hasan says:
> >
> > "Design is not an expression of field alone (that is, it is not simply an
> > expression of "what is going on"--DK). It is associated with the social
> > process as a whole *i.e. as a contextual configuration of the values
> > pertaining to field, tenor ("who is taking part"--DK) and mode ("how is
> > language brought in?"--DK) and is independent of any one individual's
> > desires, intentions, and/or decisions, having been negotiated between at
> > least two interactants. These designs have come about because through the
> > long history of the communal living of life, in every culture there have
> > evolved recognizable ways of being, doing and saying that are communally
> > deemed relevant to those occasions where social subjects have co-acted.
> The
> > design of a social practice is nothing other than a near ritualization of
> > ways of doing something with others by using such semiotic systems as are
> > at the community's disposal: the more culturally significant a social
> > process, the more ritualized it gets. It is in this sense that specific
> > social processes have become the raison d'etre of specific designs."
> >
> > --
> > David Kellogg
> > Macquarie University
> >
> > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit:
> > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with
> > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare"
> >
> > Free Chapters Downloadable at:
> >
> > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-
> globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf
> >
> > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some
> Ruminations
> > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children
> >
> > Free E-print Downloadable at:
> >
> > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >> On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 1:23 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> David opened with exploration of whales and how they learn to
> co-ordinate
> >> their movements in order to herd schools of fish into a shape that
> assists
> >> setting the "table" before feasting..  David mentioned in passing that
> >> whales must *learn* to create this shared small group working in
> 'concert"
> >> and added that this learning takes 27 years to develop.
> >> I will not add to this line of inquiry [whales and semiosis]  but I hope
> >> what I add will at some point return to [semiosis and whales] and this
> >> theme will be revived, after my multiple detours.
> >>
> >> My particular swerve follows  through Greg Thompson and his posting the
> >> Notre Dame Philosophical Review [NDPR} book review of the  edited book
> Andy
> >> is reading.. [and this 2nd text  includes a 1983 essay by Charles
> Taylor on
> >> the basic premise of Hegel's Philosophy].
> >>
> >> So my comments will be focused upon this Notre Dame text written in the
> >> format of a book review that explores  two intersecting TEXTS written 27
> >> years between their writings]
> >>
> >> [Taylor wrote the 1983 essay & also was the editor of the 1st text]  &
> >> [the 2nd text is the  2010 edited text which republishes Taylor's 1983
> text
> >> as the introductory essay.
> >>
> >> Now to focus attention specifically on the NDPR  book review and what
> this
> >> 3rd text is contributing to the 1st and 2nd text. My comments are now
> >> echoing the "insights" of the book review by highlighting what caught my
> >> attention.  I will list some *insights* in point form. [note the symbol
> *
> >> can be read AS -insight- or -point of view -]
> >>
> >> * For Taylor - Hegel's concept of action is approached  through a
> >> particular and specific  hermeneutical lens [or lenses] and Taylor is
> >> producing or projecting a particular [paradigm or model] through which
> to
> >> *read* Hegel's Theory of Action. Taylor writes that through this
> >> hermeneutical lens that it becomes possible to *open up* Hegel's SYSTEM
> of
> >> philosophy. In particular Hegel's "architecture" and Hegel's concepts
> can
> >> be *revealed* within Taylor's hermeneutical movements. This specific
> >> movement/orientation/approach can be considered a [discipline] in its
> own
> >> right through textual analysis.
> >>
> >> *The "basic" or "grounding" aspect of Hegel's [system] is *logic*.  The
> >> logic articulates [as text] the patterns showing up in the other
> >> philosophical "sciences":
> >> 1) philosophy of Nature 2) Philosophy of Religion. Essays in the 1983
> text
> >> also covered 3) theory of Poltical Action and 4) Theory of Ethical Life.
> >> This "insight" [point of view] outlines the 1983 texts's "intent" [its
> >> materiality and its "spirit/meaning"
> >>
> >> * the 2nd text [2010 text] is both narrower in scope and wider in scope.
> >> The 2010 text is narrower in the sense that this text focuses on Hegel's
> >> "Philosophy of Right" and the intended "[revealing / unearthing /
> >> extracting"] Hegel's insights on:  - freedom, agency, imputability, and
> >> responsibility - This intent of the text is outlined in 8 essays. In
> this
> >> narrowed scope there is NO essays on Hegel's "Logic*  / the basic
> grounding
> >> text  from Taylor's hermeneutical approach &  movement] .What else is
> >> "excluded" [concealed] is the text exploring the Philosophy of Religion
> and
> >> meta-physical themes. In the 2010 narrowed scope the focus of attention
> >> remains reading texts on *action* WITHIN the broad WORLD / framework of
> a
> >> particular discipline - Anthroplogy -
> >> AS a discipline. Notice that this narrowing focus is now concentrating
> in
> >> 2010 on one particular [disciplinary practice] and is "bounded" by this
> >> limitation in 2010.
> >> What is still included within this narrowed disciplinary focus is
> ABSTRACT
> >> explorations of: - right, morality, ethical life in groups,-  read
> WITHIN
> >> this disciplinary WORLD /framework.
> >> Notice this narrowed focus is occurring within textual materiality &
> >> spirituality narrowed to a specific discipline.
> >>
> >> * At the same time as this narrowing in the sense above , this  2010 2nd
> >> text has a "wider" focus" than Taylor's 1983 intention.
> >> The 2010 edited book of "essays" is Promoting or Projecting a focus *on*
> >> disciplinary anthropological action exploration  WITHIN  discourse /
> >> communication  [discourse as face to face dialogue & discourse as
> textual
> >> readings]  This 2010 edited text is encouraging both aspects of
> discourse
> >> [disciplinary face to face dialogicality] &  [reading textual "workings"
> >> within the anthropological  disciplinary focus].
> >> The particular aspect of anthropology is the sub-discipline of
> [Philosophy
> >> of Action].
> >>
> >> * So to weave together the above insights from the NDPR "text" :
> >> The 1st volume supports Taylor's hermeneutical claim that for Hegel the
> >> "qualitative" theory of action is BOTH 'basic" and "pervasive" and that
> the
> >> basic disciplinary focus is "LOGIC" o f Hegel's "SYSTEM" as a particular
> >> and specific "discipline". This basic discipline then articulates
> "other"
> >> philosophical "systems" [i.e philosophy of Nature / philosophy of
> Spirit]
> >> that are dependent upon Hegel successfully unfolding the more "basic"
> and
> >> "pervasive" qualitative theory of action.
> >> NOTE: This focus of Taylor's 1983 text is not the intended focus of the
> >> 2010 edited text. Therefore the *insights* generated will be altered
> when
> >> the intent becomes both narrowed and widened in the ways summarized
> above.
> >>
> >> This leaves open a further line of inquiry: The difference between
> >> *situations* and *worlds* of being. Paul Ricouer has something to tell
> us
> >> in this regard
> >>
>
>