[Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
Andy Blunden
ablunden@mira.net
Sat Jan 7 15:07:23 PST 2017
David: "Are words really units?"
Well, firstly, "units" is a *relative* term. That is, the
question is: are words units of something, some complex
process subject to analysis. And which?
Secondly, according to Vygotsky, "no." The concept Vygotsky
proposes as a unit is "word meaning" which he says is a
unity of sound and meaning. The sound is an artefact, which,
detached from its meaningful utterance in a transactional
context is just a thing, viz., a word. Whereas "word
meaning" is an arrtefact-mediated action, a unit of human
social activity.
It is true that words can be countable or mass according to
context, but I wasn't talking about words was I? I was
talking about word meaning.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy
http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
On 8/01/2017 7:59 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
> Are words really units? When we look at their ideational meaning (that is,
> their logical and experiential content--their capacity for representing and
> linking together human experiences) they seem to fall into two very
> different categories: lexical words like "perezhivanie" or "sense" or
> "personality" of "individual" and grammatical words like "of", or "might",
> or "is". The lexical words seem to behave like units--they are bounded,
> discrete, and, as Andy would say, "countable" (the problem is that almost
> all nouns are both countable and uncountable depending on the context you
> put them in, so this distinction is really not as essential as Andy seems
> to assume). But the more grammatical words seem to be elements of some
> larger unit, which we can call wording.
>
> Veresov and Fleer come up against this problem with "edintsvo" and
> "edintsa". Of course, as they say, the two words are distinct. But this
> doesn't necessarily mean that the former always corresponds to "unity" in
> English and the latter is always "unit". If you look at the paragraph they
> translate on 330, you can see that Vygotsky starts with an idea that is
> quite "synoptic" and is well expressed by "unit". But in the last sentence
> there is a sense that "perezhivanie" is a meta-stable unit--one that
> remains self-similar only through a process of thorough change, like a
> bicycle whose every part is replaced--and in English is it is better to
> express this idea with "unity". The problem is that the differences between
> "edintsvo" and "edintsva" in Russian is a matter of gender (I think) and
> not simply abstractness, and as a result the English version, which cannot
> use the resource of gender,has to rely on abstractness, so the words
> "unity" and "unit" are somewhat more distinct and less linked than
> "edintsvo" and "edintsva".
>
> There are other problems that are similar. When Gonzalez Rey uses the word
> "final moment" to refer to the final period of Vygotsky's thinking, he
> leaves the anglophone reader the impression that he is referring to
> Vygotsky's deathbed thoughts. On the other hand, when Veresov and Fleer use
> "factor" to translate the same Russian word that Gonzalez Rey is using,
> they are giving us something more quantitative than Vygotsky intended, and
> their translation of "dalee nerazloshim'im chastyami etava edinstva"
> into "vital and further indivisible part of the whole" is quite opaque in
> English (notice that here Veresov and Fleer use "whole" to translate
> "edinstva" rather than "unit"!) At some point you have to accept that you
> can change Russian words into English words as if you were exchanging
> rubles for dollars, but you still won't be able to buy a samovar at Walmart.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 8, 2017 at 5:21 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>
> wrote:
>
>> Larry, all,
>>
>> our arguments in the 2014 address a science education literature in which
>> the constructivist perspective is the leading perspective; We note that the
>> assertion that people learn from experience is everywhere taken for granted
>> but nowhere accounted for. We resort to pragmatist and phenomenological
>> literature along with Vygotsky's insights to point out the need to account
>> for learning as something that cannot be the result of an individual's
>> construction; in experience there is always something in excess of what you
>> intended, and this is a basic feature of doing, of performing. I take that
>> to be your "trans" in the trans/zhivanie word, Larry, which already is
>> denoted in the word PERezhivanie.
>>
>> But I do not wish to move our discussion too far away from Marc's paper
>> and the Perezhivanie special issue. We also risk disengaging many that have
>> not have the privilege we've had to have the time to read so many articles
>> in just few days into the new year. I think we are a point in the
>> discussion where a pretty clear point of agreement/disagreement, and
>> therefore of possibility for growth, has been reached with regard to the
>> view of perezhivanie as "an experience" and as the "working over it". I
>> think that to allow as many as possible to follow, and hopefully also
>> engage, I think it will be helpful to bring the diverse perspectives and
>> theoretical accounts to matter in accounting for some actual material. And
>> there are a number of cases described in the articles, including Marc's
>> case of a teacher, as well as everyday facts, such as those brought by
>> Beth, and in Beth's article...
>>
>> I take the task for myself too, but Saturday morning need to attend to
>> other things!
>> A
>>
>>
>>
>> ________________________________________
>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> Sent: 07 January 2017 18:26
>> To: Andy Blunden; Peter Smagorinsky; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity;
>> Larry Purss
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
>>
>> Andy, Peter, i hope the intention to move beyond politeness to struggle
>> with this topic materializes.
>> In this vein i want to introduce exploration of the ‘excess’ of actual
>> over intended meaning as he sketched his introduction to ‘experience’.
>>
>> Citing Dewey, Alfredo says that this excess of actual learning over
>> intended learning INCLUDES what Dewey refers to as ‘attitudes’ and these
>> ‘attitudes’ are FUNDAMENTALLY what count in the future.
>> Alfredo and Roth then add this summary statement :
>>
>> There is therefore, a need to theorize experience in terms that do not
>> assume control and rationality as the sine qua non of learning. It also
>> implies a need to develop analytical accounts that retain the ‘uncertainty’
>> that is an ‘integral part’ of human experience.
>>
>> Where are Alfredo and Roth leading us with this sketch of experience? To
>> highlight ‘attitudes’ that occur in the excess of actual over intended
>> learning? The word ‘attitudes’ generates images of (atmosphere) and (moods)
>> that ‘flow’ like cascading waterfalls that can be imaged as (force) or as
>> (receptive). Attitudes that flow to places where they are received within a
>> certain attitude of care and concern. Not as forceful an image as moving
>> only with control and rationality. Describing ‘weaker’ thought that
>> remains uncertain but that also opens us to the other’s peril and plight.
>> Possibly a post-analytic motion that exceeds the intended by living-through
>> the actual that develops ‘attitudes’ that are fundamentally what count for
>> the future.
>>
>>
>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>>
>> From: Andy Blunden
>> Sent: January 7, 2017 5:00 AM
>> To: Peter Smagorinsky; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
>>
>> OK Peter, what you say is all very true I am sure, but it
>> entails conflating activity and action (as mass nouns) and
>> context and mediation, and makes the required distinction
>> much like one could find multiple meanings for the word
>> "and" by listing the different phrases and clauses which can
>> be linked by "and."
>>
>> Andy
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> Andy Blunden
>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
>>
>> On 7/01/2017 11:42 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote:
>>> Let me try to illustrate.
>>>
>>> Reading as mediated action: The cultural-historical
>>> context of reading mediates how one’s attention and
>>> response are channeled in socially constructed ways. So,
>>> in one setting, say at home or reading in the company of
>>> friends, a novel might bring a reader to tears, or invite
>>> readers to share personal stories that parallel those of
>>> the plot lines, or laugh out loud. But another setting, a
>>> formal school or university class, would have historical
>>> values and practices that mute emotional and personal
>>> responses, and promote a more sober, analytic way of
>>> reading and talking that fits with specific historical
>>> critical conventions and genres, and discourages others.
>>>
>>> Reading as mediating action: The act of reading can be
>>> transformational. In reading about an talking about a
>>> character’s actions, a reader might reconsider a value
>>> system, become more sympathetic to real people who
>>> resemble oppressed characters, etc. In other words,
>>> reading a text may serve a mediational process in which
>>> textual ideas and exemplars enable a reader to think
>>> differently.
>>>
>>> *From:*Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
>>> *Sent:* Saturday, January 7, 2017 6:28 AM
>>> *To:* Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu>; eXtended Mind,
>>> Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
>>>
>>> Can you explain in a paragraph or two,. Peter, rather than
>>> asking us all to read 10,000 words to extract an answer?
>>>
>>> Andy
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> Andy Blunden
>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/01/2017 11:23 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote:
>>>
>>> Andy and others, I tried to work out the mediated/mediating question
>> in the area of reading....see if this helps.
>>> Smagorinsky, P., & O'Donnell-Allen, C. (1998). Reading as mediated
>> and mediating action: Composing meaning for literature through multimedia
>> interpretive texts. Reading Research Quarterly, 33, 198-226. Available
>> athttp://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/RRQ/RRQ1998.pdf
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>
>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@
>> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>>> Sent: Friday, January 6, 2017 7:12 PM
>>>
>>> To:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
>>>
>>> I have never understood this supposed distinction, Alfredo, between
>> "mediated activity" and "mediating activity" given that all activity is
>> mediated and all activity mediates.
>>> Also, could you spell out what you mean by the "tension"
>>>
>>> between perezhivanie as meaning and perezhivanie as struggle.
>>>
>>> Andy
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> Andy Blunden
>>>
>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
>>>
>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
>> decision-making
>>> On 5/01/2017 6:26 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
>>>
>>> Thanks Marc for your careful response.
>>>
>>> I am familiar to Vygotsky's notion of cultural mediation and I
>> am aware and acknowledge that it was elaborated as a means to overcome
>> dualism, and that it is not analog to a computational approach.
>>> When I brought the computing analogy, I did so with regard not
>> to the concept of cultural mediation in general, but to the way it can be
>> (and is) deployed analytically. I react to what it seems to me a dichotomy
>> between a "meaning" as something that is static (thereby a form of
>> "representation" or reflection of the relation with the environment instead
>> ofrefraction) and the experiencing-as-struggling, which is described
>> astransformation or change. If so, mediation here would seem to be part of
>> a methodological device that first dissects "a type of meaning" from "a
>> type of activity" (or a given state from the process that changes that
>> state), and then unites it by adding the term "mediation." And this may be
>> my misreading, but in that (mis)reading (which perhaps is mostly due to the
>> fact that in your empirical illustration only the initial and end product,
>> i.e., perezhivanie, are described, but not the experiencing-as-struggle,
>> that is, the moving between the two), mediation here seems to do as
>> analytical concept precisely what you were afraid our monism was doing:
>> explaining nothing. Only the end products but not the process of producing
>> perezhivanie are revealed. This may be problematic if one attends to what
>> Veresov argues in the paper I shared yesterday, where he defends the notion
>> of mediation but also specifies that Vygotsky speaks of *mediating
>> activity* (as opposed to *mediated* activity). That is, not mediation by
>> signs as products, but mediating activity as the activity of producing
>> signs (which again is an activity of producing social relations, perhaps
>> what you refer as "holistic meanings"?). What do you think?
>>> I did not think you were trying to deny the influence of
>> Spinoza, and I do not think we ever said that Perezhivanie was primarily a
>> move from Cartesian Dualism to Monism, as you suggest in your post. I copy
>> and paste from my prior post: "The fact is that Vygotsky was building a
>> theory on the unity of the affect and the intellect that was to be grounded
>> on Spinoza, and what we try to do is to explore how perezhivanie, as a
>> concept being developed during the same period (but not finalised or
>> totally settled!), could be seen from the perspective of the Spinozist
>> Vygotsky."
>>> I totally believe that bringing the distinction between
>> perezhivanie as meaning, and perezhivanie as struggle, is totally relevant,
>> and Beth Ferholt's vignettes of Where the Wild Things Are do indeed
>> illustrate this. We really need to address this tension, which as Beth's
>> examples and as our own everyday experience shows, is a tension that
>> matters not just to books and to theories but to living persons (children,
>> teachers), a tension that moreover is present and mentioned in all the
>> articles of the symposium. The papers offer different proposals, and I
>> think is so great we have the chance to discuss them! I too, as you, am
>> very interesting in hearing others about the questions you had concerning
>> sense and meaning.
>>> Alfredo
>>>
>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>
>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Marc
>> Clarà
>>> <marc.clara@gmail.com> <mailto:marc.clara@gmail.com>
>>>
>>> Sent: 04 January 2017 22:31
>>>
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
>>>
>>> Thank you very much, Alfredo, for sharing this excellent paper by
>>>
>>> Veresov, and thanks also for your responses, which really helped
>> me to
>>> better understand your points. My main doubt about your proposal
>>>
>>> was/is caused by the statement that the idea of cultural
>>>
>>> mediation/mediator implies a cartesian dualism. This shocks me
>>>
>>> because, to me, the idea of cultural mediation is absolutely
>> crucial
>>> (in fact, the keystone) for the construction of a monist (and
>>>
>>> scientific) psychology that does not forget mind –that is, a
>> cultural
>>> psychology. From your response, however, I realized that we may
>> be
>>> approaching the idea of mediation in different ways. I talk of
>>>
>>> mediation and mediators in a quite restricted way. The starting
>> point
>>> of my understanding of mediation is a dialectical relationship
>>>
>>> (organic, transactional) between the subject and the world
>> (Vygotsky departs from the scheme stimulus-response, from reflexology).
>>> This relationship, that Vygotsky calls primitive psychological
>>>
>>> functions, would be basically biological. However, in human
>> beings
>>> this relationship is mediated by cultural means: signs and
>> tools; or
>>> primary, secondary and terciary artifacts. These cultural means
>>>
>>> reorganize the primitive functions (dialectic S-O relationship),
>> which
>>> become then higher psychological functions (S-M-O) (see for
>> example,
>>> The problem of the cultural development of the child, in The
>> Vygotsky
>>> Reader). Now, the subject, the cultural mediators, and the
>> object form
>>> an inseparable dialectical unit, so that the subject acts on
>>>
>>> (transforms) the object through the prism of the cultural
>> mediators,
>>> the object acts on (transforms) the subject also through the
>> prism of
>>> the cultural mediators, and the cultural means are themselves
>> also
>>> transformed as a consequence of their mediation in this
>> continuous
>>> dynamic dialectical tension. Here, for me, it is important the
>> idea
>>> that the cultural means are as material (if we assume a
>> materialist
>>> monism) as all the rest of the world; in fact, are parts of the
>>>
>>> material world which become signs or tools (and can be therefore
>>>
>>> socially distributed). This permits the introduction of the
>> scientific
>>> study of mind-consciousness (as mediating systems of signs),
>> because
>>> mind is not anymore something immaterial and unobservable, but
>> it is
>>> as material and observable as the rest of the natural world. It
>> is
>>> from this view that, for me, the idea of cultural mediation is
>> the
>>> keystone of a monist psychology that includes mind. Thus, when I
>> speak
>>> of mediators, I refer to the cultural means which mediate in the
>> S-O
>>> dialectics; I am especially interested in signs/secondary
>> artifacts.
>>> Here, it is perhaps necessary to insist that when I talk of
>> studying
>>> mediators (and their semantic structure), this doesn't mean that
>> they
>>> are taken out from the activity (the flux of live) in which they
>>>
>>> mediate (since out of activity they are not signs anymore);
>> here, I
>>> think Vygotsky tries again to overcome another old dichotomy, the
>>>
>>> functionalism-structuralism one. I hope that all this makes also
>> clear the difference between this view and that of computational
>> psychologies (which in general are profoundly and explicitly dualist and
>> not dialectic).
>>> Back to perezhivanie, I'm not obviously trying to deny the
>> influence
>>> of Spinoza on Vygotsky's thinking (this is explicit in Vygotsky's
>>>
>>> writings, especially in “The teaching about emotions”, in the
>> Vol.6 of
>>> the Collected Works). But I have doubts that Vygotsky's
>> introduction
>>> of the concept of perezhivanie is to be regarded primarily as a
>>>
>>> movement towards monism (from a previous cartesian dualism), and
>> that
>>> this movement questions the concept of cultural mediation.
>> Instead,
>>> and I think that this is in line with some of González-Rey
>>>
>>> observations in his paper, my impression is that the
>> introduction of
>>> the concept of perezhivanie responds more to a movement (a
>> further
>>> step) towards holism (something that, in my understanding, can
>> also be
>>> found in Spinoza). Thus, I think that the word meaning is still
>> the
>>> unit of analysis in the last Vygotsky -and therefore, the idea of
>>>
>>> cultural mediation is still crucial (in fact, in The problem of
>> the
>>> environment, he connects the concept of perezhivanie, which has
>> just
>>> introduced, to the development of word meaning [p.345-346, also
>> cited
>>> in my paper]). However, in my view, in the last Vygotsky the
>> focus is
>>> not anymore primarily on the word-meaning as formed for things
>> (or
>>> collections of things, as in the ontogenetic research with
>> Sakharov), but the focus is now in the formation of meaning for holistic
>> situations.
>>> Best regards,
>>>
>>> Marc.
>>>
>>> 2017-01-03 19:16 GMT+01:00 Alfredo Jornet Gil<
>> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no> <mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>:
>>> Hi Marc, all,
>>>
>>> thanks for joining and for your interesting work, which I
>> follow
>>> since I became aware of it. I appreciate the way in your
>> paper you
>>> show careful and honest attention to the texts of the authors
>>>
>>> involved, but perhaps most of all I appreciate that the
>> paper makes
>>> the transformational dimension related to struggle and change
>>>
>>> salient, a dimension all papers deemed central to
>> perezhivanie. And I
>>> have learned more about Vasilyuk by reading your paper. But
>> I also
>>> see that we have approached the question of perezhivanie
>> differently
>>> and I think that addressing the questions that you raise
>> concerning
>>> our article may be a good way to both respond and discuss
>> your paper.
>>> I am aware that our use of the term monism may be
>> problematic to
>>> some, and N. Veresov, who has recently written about this
>> (see
>>> attached article), warns against the dangers of simply
>> moving from
>>> dualism into an undifferentiating monism that relativizes
>> everything,
>>> making development un-studiable. This seems to be the way in
>> which
>>> you have understood our argument, and of course this is not
>> what we are or want to be doing.
>>> Probably many will think that *dialectical materialism*
>> rather than
>>> monism is the proper term, and I could agree with them; we
>> do in fact
>>> use dialectical materialism there and elsewhere. Yet, we
>> wanted to
>>> emphasise the Spinozist influence (an influence that also
>> runs
>>> through Marx) and so we found it appropriate to use the term
>> monism,
>>> a term that Vygotsky uses before arguing that Spinoza
>> "develops an essentially materialistic view"
>>> (Collected Works, Vol. 6, p. 124). For us, the aim is
>> working out
>>> ways to empirically examine and formulate problems in ways
>> that do
>>> not reify a mind-body dualism.
>>>
>>> Although overcoming dualism is foundational to the CHAT
>> paradigm, I
>>> would however not say that Vygotsky did get to solve all of
>> the
>>> problems that Cartesian dualism had created for psychology,
>> even
>>> though he recognised those problems brilliantly as early as
>> in the
>>> "Crisis". It should suffice to cite Vygotsky's own remarks,
>> which we quote in the paper (and which A.N.
>>> Leont'ev mentions in the introduction to the collected
>> works), where
>>> Vygotsky explicitly critiques some of his own prior ideas
>> for failing
>>> to overcome dualism. We agree with those who, like F. G.
>> Rey, see
>>> Vygotsky's project as a developing rather than as a
>> finalised one.
>>> The fact is that Vygotsky was building a theory on the unity
>> of the
>>> affect and the intellect that was to be grounded on Spinoza,
>> and what
>>> we try to do is to explore how perezhivanie, as a concept
>> being
>>> developed during the same period (but not finalised or
>> totally
>>> settled!), could be seen from the perspective of the
>> Spinozist Vygotsky.
>>> As you note, in our article we argue that, if one takes the
>> Spinozist
>>> one-substance approach, classical concepts used in
>> non-classical
>>> psychology, at least in the way they are commonly used in
>> the current
>>> literature, should be revised. One such concept is
>> mediation. And I
>>> personally do not have much of a problem when mediation is
>> used to
>>> denote the fundamental fact that every thing exists always
>> through
>>> *another*, never in and of itself. But I do think that it is
>>>
>>> problematic to identify MEDIATORS, such as "a meaning", as a
>> means to
>>> account for or explain developmental processes and learning
>> events,
>>> precisely because it is there, at least in my view, that
>> dualism creeps in.
>>> For example, I find it paradoxical that you are concerned
>> that our
>>> monist approach risks turning perezhivanie into a useless
>> category
>>> because it may be used to explain everything and nothing,
>> and yet you
>>> do not seem to have a problem using the term mediation to
>> account for
>>> the transformation of perezhivanie without clearly
>> elaborating on how
>>> mediation does change anything or what it looks like as a
>> real
>>> process. How is it different saying that a perezhivanie
>> mediates the
>>> experiencing-as-struggle from simply saying that it
>> "affects" or
>>> "determines" it? Indeed, if perezhivanie mediates
>>>
>>> experiencing-as-struggle, does not experiencing-as-struglgle
>> too
>>> mediate perezhivanie? And do not both may be said to mediate
>> development, or development mediate them? Is not this explaining everything
>> and nothing?
>>> I do believe you can argue that there is a difference between
>>>
>>> mediation and classical psychology's cause-effect relations,
>> but to
>>> show this you need to dig into the dialectical underpinnings
>> of the
>>> theory. In your paper, you offer a nice analysis of a lovely
>> case of
>>> a teacher who, in dealing with a challenge with one of her
>> students,
>>> changes her perezhivanie. I think you can rightly argue that
>> there is
>>> a semiotic transformation, and I fully support your
>> statement that by
>>> studying discourse we can empirically approach questions of
>>>
>>> psychological development. The contradictions you show as
>> being
>>> involved and resolved resonate really well with what I
>> experience as
>>> a parent or as a teacher in the classroom. Yet, without
>> unpacking
>>> what this "mediation" taking place between one perezhivanie
>> and the
>>> next one means as a concrete and real, the same analysis
>> could be done taking an information processing approach:
>>> there is an situation that is processed (represented?) in
>> one way,
>>> which then leads to a (cognitive) dissonance, and then there
>> is a
>>> cognitive resolution by means of which the situation is
>> presented
>>> differently in consciousness (indeed, when seen in this way,
>> the term
>>> perezhivanie and the term "representation" become almost
>>>
>>> indistinguishable). How is mediation, as an analytical
>> concept,
>>> helping here? And most importantly to the question of
>> perezhivanie,
>>> how is this analysis going to show the internal connection
>> between
>>> intellect and affect that Vygotsky formulates as
>> constitutive of the notion of perezhivanie?
>>> I believe that the key lies in understanding what Vygotsky
>> means when
>>> he says that perezhivanie is a unit of analysis. I will not
>> repeat
>>> here what already is written in at least a couple of the
>> articles in
>>> the special issue (Blunden, ours), that is the difference
>> between
>>> analysis by elements and unit analysis (Vygotsky 1987). A
>> unit
>>> analysis approach is consistent with Spinoza, for whom
>> cause-effect
>>> explanations were not adequate, requiring instead an
>> understanding of
>>> self-development, perezhivanie as a kernel cell for the
>> development
>>> of personality. And I think you may be after this in your
>> article in
>>> suggesting a form of continuous movement from perezhivanie to
>>>
>>> experiencing-as-struggle. But perhaps the major difficulty I
>> find is that, in positing Vygotsky's perezhivanie as "a type of meaning"
>>> and Vasilyuk's perezhivanie (or experiencing-as-struggle) as
>> a "type
>>> of activity," it is difficult not to see here a division
>> between
>>> product and process, a division that then is analytically
>> bridged by
>>> the addition of a third term, mediation, that should bring
>> back the
>>> real movement between the product and the process.
>>>
>>> A different approach involves considering the concrete
>> extension of
>>> actual living and lived social relations, and look at them as
>>>
>>> generative phenomena. What is there in the encounter between
>> Carla
>>> and the child that leads to change? For it is not inside the
>> mind,
>>> but in real life, in consciousness as the real relation
>> between people, that Carla is changed.
>>> How is the semantic structure that you nicely present and
>> attribute
>>> to Carla a product of the social relation between her and
>> the child?
>>> I think that to rightfully situate perezhivanie as a concept
>> in a
>>> Vygotskian framework, we ought to address its relation to
>> the genetic
>>> law of development.
>>>
>>> There is much more to disentangle, but this is long enough.
>> I hope I
>>> have succeeded in making clear these ideas. Thanks so much
>> for
>>> engaging in the discussion!
>>>
>>> Alfredo
>>>
>>> ________________________________________
>>>
>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>
>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Marc
>> Clarà
>>> <marc.clara@gmail.com>
>>> <mailto:marc.clara@gmail.com>
>>>
>>> Sent: 02 January 2017 22:14
>>>
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
>>>
>>> Hi, all, and thank you so much, Alfredo, for your kind
>> invitation to
>>> participate in this discussion. My paper in the MCA special
>> issue
>>> focuses on a distinction between a type of activity, which I
>> argue
>>> that is what Vasilyuk called *perezhivanie* (experiencing)
>> and a type
>>> of semiotic mediator, which I argue that is what Vygotsky,
>> in The
>>> Problem of the Environment, called *perezhivanie.* I argue,
>> following
>>> Vasilyuk, that in experiencing activities (Vasilyuk's
>> perezhivanie),
>>> this type of mediator is profoundly transformed – in fact,
>> that
>>> experiencing activities consist of the semiotic
>> transformation of this type of mediator.
>>> As Veresov and Fleer argue in their commentary, perezhivanie
>> (as a
>>> type of
>>>
>>> mediator) is for me a psychological phenomenon, one which is
>> of
>>> course conceptualized from a specific theoretical framework.
>> But the
>>> phenomenon is also visible from other theoretical frameworks
>> as well,
>>> as I mention in the paper. This phenomenon is my main
>> interest, and
>>> it is from this interest that I arrived at the concept of
>> perezhivanie (not the other way around).
>>> Now, the phenomenon is that at least emotion, reasoning, and
>> volition
>>> (formation of conscious purposes) seem to be decisively
>> mediated by
>>> holistic situational meaning. My current research concern is
>> trying
>>> to find ways to study and understand how this mediation
>> occurs and
>>> how these semiotic mediators are transformed and
>> distributed. From
>>> this view, I think that experiencing activities (Vasilyuk's
>>>
>>> perezhivanie) may provide a good terrain to study these
>> issues
>>> (especially regarding the mediation of emotion), as I tried
>> to exemplify in the paper.
>>> Studying semiotic mediation, however, is of course not easy.
>>>
>>> Following Vygotsky, I assume that extended discourse is the
>>>
>>> manifestation of thinking within certain psychological
>> conditions
>>> (Vygotsky's Thinking and Speech, chapter 7), and I also
>> assume the
>>> Vygotsky's law of the unity of the structure and function of
>> thinking
>>> (Vygotsky's Thinking and Speech, chapter 6). From these two
>>>
>>> assumptions, I propose that meaning (and its functions in
>> human
>>> activity) can be scientifically studied by structurally
>> analyzing the
>>> narratives generated by subjects, considering that the
>> discourse
>>> produced in the narrative is the point of departure of this
>> study,
>>> but that considerable analytical work must be done to move
>> from this
>>> discourse to the full characterization of meaning. It is in
>> that
>>> point where I find useful the work developed by Greimas, the
>> usefulness of which I only suggest in the paper.
>>> >From this background, I found many interesting ideas and
>> questions
>>> in the
>>>
>>> other papers of the special issue. In this first post I will
>> propose
>>> two of them for possible discussion. The first one was
>> raised by
>>> González-Rey, when he introduces, in connection with
>> perezhivanie,
>>> the concepts of personality, and especially, of sense. So,
>> which is
>>> the conceptual (and-or
>>>
>>> phenomenal) relation between perezhivanie and sense?
>> González-Rey
>>> suggests that both concepts are somewhat similar (and
>> overcome by the
>>> concept of “subjective sense”); my opinion, partly expressed
>> in my
>>> commentary, is that perezhivanie is a type of meaning, which
>> includes
>>> different levels of depth, and that sense corresponds to the
>> deepest
>>> level of meaning (which can be characterized as a system of
>> semic
>>> oppositions). Therefore, sense wouldn't be in opposition to
>> meaning
>>> (as “a microcosm of human consciousness”, as Kozulin
>> remembers in his
>>> commentary), although it would be in opposition to
>> manifested meaning (the surface level of meaning).
>>> The second issue was raised by Roth and Jornet, and I think
>> it goes
>>> beyond the issue of perezhivanie itself. If I understand
>> them well,
>>> they argue that Vygotsky's core proposal of cultural
>> mediation is
>>> influenced by the Cartesian dualism (mind-matter), and that a
>>>
>>> promising approach to Cultural Psychology would be a
>> Spinozist
>>> monism. I am actually very interested on the issue of which
>>>
>>> epistemological position can best substantiate the
>> construction of a
>>> cultural psychology, and that's why I feel inclined to take
>> the
>>> opportunity to ask for your opinions about that. About the
>> proposal
>>> of Roth and Jornet, I have some doubts. First, I don't see
>> why
>>> Vygotsky's proposals can be seen as dualist (in the
>> Cartesian sense)
>>> -I suspect that it is because of the analytical
>> distinctions?.
>>> Anyway, in my understanding, Vygotsky explicitly assumes a
>>>
>>> materialist monism (for example in The Crisis), and in fact
>> he constructs his proposal on mediation upon reflexology, which also
>> explicitly assumed a materialist monism (e.g.
>>> Sechenov). Would a Spinozist monism be a better point of
>> departure? I
>>> don't know, in my understanding it is a more idealist
>> monism, and I
>>> don't clearly see what could be gained. In my opinion, a
>> scientific
>>> psychology which includes the study of mind is only possible
>> if any
>>> type of monism is assumed. However, in my view, for a
>> scientific
>>> psychology, the ontological nature of the world is perhaps
>> less
>>> important (it is an issue for metaphysics?), and I am
>> inclined to assume a neutral monism (e.g. Russell).
>>> So from this view, a materialist monism and a Spinozist
>> monism
>>> wouldn't be so different, so from both views it could be
>> assumed that
>>> all is of the same nature and all is similarly knowable
>> (including
>>> mind) [which is the ontological nature of the world and to
>> what
>>> degree it is knowable are issues that can be left to
>> philosophy].
>>> However, in my opinion, this does not mean that, while
>> assuming a
>>> monism, analytical distinctions cannot be done when studying
>> the
>>> world. In that sense, I had the impression that Roth and
>> Jornet
>>> tended to dilute analytical distinctions in the name of
>> monism; I
>>> repeat that I don't know if I understood them well, but if
>> this was
>>> the case, in my opinion, analysis would be impossible within
>> the new
>>> psychology suggested by Roth and Jornet, and, regarding
>> perezhivanie,
>>> there would be the danger, noted by Vygotsky in The Crisis
>> and
>>> cautioned by Kozulin in his commentary, that by meaning
>> everything, perezhivanie ends by meaning nothing.
>>> Best regards and happy new year,
>>>
>>> Marc.
>>>
>>> 2017-01-02 9:12 GMT+01:00 Alfredo Jornet Gil<
>> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no> <mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>:
>>> Dear all,
>>>
>>> I would like to join David, Luisa, Ana, Henry and the
>> others to wish
>>> you all a Happy New Year! May it be full of joy, peace,
>> and opportunity.
>>> I also would like to begin the year announcing our first
>> ?MCA
>>> article discussion, ?although in fact corresponds to the
>> last issue
>>> of the year
>>>
>>> we
>>>
>>> just passed, Issue 4 on Perezhivanie. This is a very
>> special
>>> *special* issue, not only because its topic has raised
>> lots of
>>> interest lately in
>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>> CHAT community but also because, greatly coordinated by
>> Andy Blunden
>>> and the rest of the editorial team, the issue takes the
>> form of a
>>> symposium where authors get the chance to present and
>> respond to
>>> each others' ideas on the subject. In my view, this
>> allows having a
>>> rich and
>>>
>>> multidimensional
>>>
>>> approach to a subject as important as perezhivanie.
>>>
>>> Following with the dialogical spirit in which the
>> special issue was
>>> assembled, we will focus on one lead article, but hoping
>> to also
>>> engage ideas and insights present in or relevant to other
>>>
>>> contributions in the issue. ?Marc Clarà's "Vygotsky and
>> Vasilyuk on
>>> Perezhivanie: Two Notions and One Word" will be our
>> focus. The
>>> article very nicely engages the lead work of Vygotsky,
>> but also the
>>> less known ??(?in educational literature) but totally
>> relevant works
>>> of psychologist ?F. Vasilyuk and semiotician
>>>
>>> A.
>>>
>>> J. Greimas, mobilising a number of key concepts
>> including those of
>>> semiotic
>>>
>>> mediation and transformation.
>>>
>>> ?In addition to Marc, who will soon join us, I have
>> encouraged some
>>> of
>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>> other authors in the special issue to also join as
>> "relevant
>>> others," if time and circumstances allow them. Let's
>> hope that this
>>> will help keeping the symposium spirit up.
>>>
>>> Marc's article is attached to this e-mail and will be
>> made open
>>> access at the T&F pages as soon as people is back from
>> the holidays.
>>> The T&F link
>>>
>>> is
>>>
>>> this:
>>>
>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10749039.
>> 2016.1186194
>>> The link to the MCA Forum pages, where we announce our
>> discussions
>>> and other xmca things, is here:http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/
>>>
>>> I wish us all a very productive and interesting
>> discussion.
>>> Alfredo
>>>
>>
>
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