[Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed

[Edward Wall]

       I, for various and sundry reasons, became interested in the very thought of teaching mathematics and came to UM a few years after Martin had left. Talking with some of those who probably were among Martin’s students and some of his teaching colleagues, I was left with the impression that ‘research methods’ happened in a very different atmosphere than what I then felt around me. I took this two semester course Martin speaks about. I almost left UM after the first quantitative semester (I have a very, very strong theoretical background in probability and statistics) as I couldn’t figure out why somebody would engage in such things and, although the second qualitative semester made a little more sense (and there actually was one interesting use of mathematics), I began seriously wondering why I was there. It took a former colleague of Martin’s to first introduce me to Vygotsky and later to Gadamer (who sort of introduced me to Heidegger) before I thought there might be something interesting to think about as regards the teaching of mathematics. However, they and I were definitely in a small minority.
       
      So, Martin thank you for that course. Although I never was exposed to it, I was exposed to several who were influenced by it and was exposed to teaching colleagues of yours who shared some of your thinking at that time.

Ed

> On Dec 20, 2017, at  4:21 PM, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote:
> 
> I too have co-taught a research methods class - a two-semester course, at U Mich School of Education. A description of the course has been sitting for almost 20 years on an abandoned web page. It focuses largely on what was my responsibility, the interpretive component (less prestigious for sure, but more intriguing for some students), but contains quite a lot of detail and supporting materials (syllabi and handouts). I’m sure it’s now somewhat out of date, but perhaps it may be of some use to someone?
> 
> <http://www.mathcs.duq.edu/~packer/IR/IRlogic.html>
> 
> And thanks, David, for your kind comments.  :)
> 
> Martin
> 
> On Dec 20, 2017, at 4:27 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com<mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> I was teaching a course in research methods back in 2012, and as a way of
> trying to keep inter-necine tension over who would supervise whom to a
> minimum, I did propose that one professor would teach and then
> supervise the more prestigious quantitative studies and I would teach and
> supervise the less prestigious qualitative studies (this worked out about
> as well as you can imagine....). While I was trying to make this solution
> work, I got Martin's book on qualitative research and read it, but what
> Martin says about it is quite correct: it's not a "how to" book. Compare
> with Keith Richards, "Qualitative Inquiry in TESOL" (Palgrave Macmillan) or
> Johnny Saldana "Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers" (Sage). Richards
> begins his collection of piecemeal accounts with horrifying "how not to"
> vignettes of how he victimized his students for "misapplying" Conversation
> Analysis: this is how not to teach ideas to students. Saldana is a little
> better, but the closest he gets to good examples of how to be continent,
> object-specific, and concrete is advice like "reflect on analytic codings".
> Show me, Professor!
> 
> Martin's article isn't a demonstration of qualitative methods: it's on a
> level of philosophical abstraction and historical specificity that a lot of
> my (ex-)students would find hard to follow (e.g. the foray into the
> difference between Bekhterev and Dilthey, mechanists and Deborinites). I
> once tried rewriting it, using Vygotsky's five stages to describe the
> expansion of the ZPD into a "bull frog that would be as big as a bull".
> That didn't work either--students are an endless treasure trove of
> misconceptions and misunderstandings. But Martin's article does have the
> opposition between vulgar materialism and "interpretative" psychology we
> are talking about. And it has more.
> 
> It's a pre-emptive reply to the "Revisionist Revolution". At the beginning
> of 2016, I wrote a something I now regret a little about van der Veer and
> Yasinitsky's "Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky Studies", in which I tried
> to summarize the book as seven things you always thought about Vygotsky
> which turn out to be true after all. I think my posting captured the
> sensationalist tone of the "Revisionists", but it missed something much
> more important--what Sasha refers to as the right-Vygotskyan attempt to
> rescue Vygotsky from Marx. Martin really manages to rescue Vygotsky from
> the rescuers.
> 
> I don't know if I would try to reduce Vygotsky's "methods" to three as
> Martin does. I know that Vygotsky himself does this in various places, but
> he keeps coming up with three different methods. In Chapter Two of Pedology
> of the Adolescent. Vygotsky first says that pedology borrows methods from
> other, neighboring sciences, but transforms these by giving them a new
> holistic object of study: not the child, but the age period of the child.
> 
> He lists:
> 
> A) Observation in a naturalistic setting (e.g. by parents and by teachers).
> This has been widely used in the USSR by Molozhavy and by Basov (2-47).
> Vygotsky points out that this method is more objective and more reliable
> than unscientific reminiscences or imaginary reconstructions of childhood
> (2-46). But unlike reminiscences and reconstructions, “vital facts” cannot
> be produced on demand: the naturalism of the observation prevents the
> researcher from inducing them.
> 
> B) Experiments (e.g. the Vygotsky blocks test). Since previous
> psychological experimentation depended on self-observation, it had been
> considered that experiments were not applicable to children. But Vygotsky
> points out that well designed experiments (e.g. the functional method of
> dual stimulation) do not require self-observation and allow researchers to
> observe stages that simply disappear in naturalistic behaviour (e.g. the
> formation of the choice reaction) (2-50~2-51).
> 
> C) Natural Experiments (e.g. experimental homework, experimental household
> tasks). This is a synthesis of A) and B), something which is an experiment
> for the researcher but not for the research subject (2-52~2-54).
> 
> D) Clinical Examinations and Tests (e.g. Piaget’s system of one on one
> interviews to determine the child’s conception of reality, IQ testing,
> etc.). This is widely used in defectology (2-55~2-59).
> 
> E) Testing (e.g. Cattell, Wechsler, and Binet’s “personality tests”).
> Vygotsky points out three different purposes for mass testing (mental
> giftedness, monitoring development, and school achievement) and two
> different types of result (numerical and qualitative). (2-60~2-64)
> 
> F) Methode d’inquete (surveying). This is the use of questionnaires
> (2-65~2-66).
> 
> H) Anthropometrics, the mass examination of a whole population (2-67).
> 
> G) Somatoscopy, the clinical examination of single individuals over time
> (2-67)
> 
> H) Study of the Social Environment, the study of the socio-economic status,
> the class environment, and the living conditions of children favoured by
> A.B. Zalkind (2-68~2-69).
> 
> I) Document Collection, amassing a data base of child artworks, diary
> entries, and other documents. (2-69).
> 
> J) Upbringing and Teaching Studies, presumably the kind of pencil-and-paper
> studies that the Sterns did on their three children, or the kind of
> classroom studies used in Chapter Six of Thinking and Speech. (2-70).
> Then Vygotsky lists three methods which are really specific to pedology:
> genetic, comparative, and "synthetic" method. In HDHMF, on the other hand,
> he has a chapter on "Research Methods" which he then differentiates into
> THREE chapters ("analysis", "genesis" and "structure"). And then the
> analysis chapter speaks of conditional-genetic analysis
> and experimental-genetic and even causal-dynamic  analysis (and criticizes,
> phenomenology--something that Martin doesn't quite agree with). But the
> main thing Vygotsky does in this chapter is warn against:
> 
> a) trying to distinguish analyzing a thing and analyzing a process
> b) trying to distinguish description and explanation
> c) beginning an analysis of a process with the product rather than with
> the prehistory
> 
> I guess I think of the genetic, comparative, and synthetic method as three
> ways rescuing ourselves from these. Genesis analyzes things as if they were
> processes and processes as if they were things without ever forgetting that
> neither is reducible to the other. Comparison is a way of arriving a
> description that explains and explanation that describes. And what Vygotsky
> really means by the "synthetic" method is what we now call triangulation,
> but what Marx called the anatomy of the ape:description and explanation of
> both process and product with the prehistory firmly in mind, but also with
> a clear sense that the present only feels pre-determined: it's really just
> as much the outcome of free will and chance as the future still is.
> David Kellogg
> 
> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric,
> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on “Neoformation: A
> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change”'
> 
> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at
> 
> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full
> 
> 
> On Wed, Dec 20, 2017 at 10:31 PM, James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Thank you so much, Martin.
> 
> 
> On 19 December 2017 at 21:15, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> wrote:
> 
> On Dec 19, 2017, at 5:09 AM, James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi Michael,
> 
> I'd like to ask you a question alongside Greg's: What is Vygotsky's
> path
> to
> knowledge, in particular, knowledge about the constantly unfolding,
> evolving social world?
> 
> Thank you.
> 
> James
> 
> Hi James,
> 
> Much has been said about this question in this discussion group over the
> years! Here are some notes I made some time ago. I am sure that others
> will
> jump in!  :)
> 
> Vygotsky viewed methodology as central to the kind of psychology he
> wanted
> to create: “the methodology,” he wrote, “will be the first step forward"
> (2004 [1926-7], p. 242). And “Anyone who attempts to skip this problem,
> to
> jump over methodology in order to build some special psychological
> science
> right away, will inevitably jump over his horse while trying to sit on
> it.”
> 
> There were three central aspects to the methodology that Vygotsky
> envisioned for his “general psychology”: analysis, genetic inquiry, and
> experimentation. They amount to a conception of qualitative research that
> is significantly different from much of what goes by that name today. One
> reason for this is that methodology for Vygotsky was not merely technique
> but “the theory of scientific method” in which “practice and philosophy
> are
> united.” In other words it was a logic of inquiry, a paradigm which
> involved assumptions about what exists (ontology) and how we can know
> (epistemology).
> 
> The “analytical method” was of central importance to Vygotsky, and he
> rescued it from phenomenology and from so-called Marxist psychologies of
> his time. It is the study of the internal relations of a complex whole.
> For
> example, water should not be analyzed into its elements but studied as a
> molecule in its qualitatively different forms: ice, liquid, vapor, etc.
> (1987/1934). Analysis is “the highest form of induction.” It requires no
> repetition, for it is the study of a particular case for the general
> properties which are realized in it. Analysis is to “perceive the general
> in the particular;” the particular phenomenon is maximally abstracted
> from
> its specific conditions. For example, Pavlov’s study of salivation in
> dogs
> was an analysis of reflexes in general, in animals in general. Vygotsky’s
> model here was Marx’s analysis of the commodity, a form with internal
> contradictions, through the selection of a unit of analysis, a “cell”:
> the
> commodity. Analysis requires the partition of a complex whole into its
> aspects. In other words analysis is a form of case study, idiographic and
> holistic. Its aim is to discern general laws; objective tendencies which
> underlie the manifold appearances. Its products are not essences but
> “generalizations which have boundaries and degrees.”
> 
> The second aspect is genetic inquiry. Vygotsky wrote that he agreed with
> Marx that “the only science is history.” History meant “two things: a
> general dialectical approach to things; in this sense, everything has its
> history,” and, second, human history: “the uniqueness of the human mind
> lies in the fact that history and evolution are united (synthesis) in it”
> (1986). Genetic inquiry requires tracing the history of the development
> of
> a phenomenon, the path it has followed, to identify its underlying
> objective tendencies. It attends to the process of sublation in which
> earlier forms are both overcome and preserved. Furthermore, it is an
> inquiry that is oriented by practical concerns, concerned to facilitate
> the
> leap from necessity to freedom by mastery of the tendencies that are
> identified. A genetic account is a description, but also provides an
> explanation. It weaves together ontogenesis (the process of
> “individualization”), history (cultural evolution),  phylogenesis
> (biological evolution), and microgenesis (experiment).
> 
> Indeed, Vygotsky's methodology includes a central place for
> experimentation: what he called “Traps for Nature.” But this was not
> experimentation in the sense of manipulation of variables,
> standardization
> of procedure, with the researcher as detached observer. On the contrary,
> for Vygotsky an experiment was a collaboration between researcher and
> participant as they together established the conditions for the
> possibility
> of the phenomenon of interest (e.g. the famous blocks task). An
> experiment
> is a form of analysis, it is “an analysis in action, as each analysis is
> an
> experiment in thought” (2004/1926-7). The unusual character of this view
> of
> experimentation is revealed by Vygotsky's statement that “every lyrical
> poem is an experiment.” In Vygotsky’s view the artificiality of an
> experiment is a merit, not a weakness. It allows us to reveal a
> historical
> process in abstracted form. Furthermore, an experiment provides a
> historical analysis, through the opportunity to study the microgenesis
> of a
> phenomenon.  For Vygotsky, historical methods and logical analysis (the
> logic of an experimental design) are not opposed, because logic is
> sedimented history.
> 
> Martin
> 
> 
> 
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