[Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'
HENRY SHONERD
hshonerd@gmail.com
Sun Apr 23 21:34:56 PDT 2017
David,
My mother in law is 89 years old and has a gentleman friend four years older who is quite deaf now. He has kept his marbles though, and can be the life of the party. His favorite pragmatic move to engage discourse he can manage is to say, “Ya wanna know something?” (He’s Jewish from New York, so you can imagine exactly how he says it.) That’s seems analogous to “Guess what…” This might seem a trivial response you this thread, but it made me realize just how much I was getting from reading it. I know you are one to appreciate real data, so I thought it relevant, at least.
Henry
‘
> On Apr 23, 2017, at 5:23 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> To recap. Mike asked why I chose the word "wording" when Vygotsky clearly
> uses "word meaning". I could have said that it's a better translation,
> because as Mike points out the word "znachenie slova" can be translated as
> "the Word" in the sense of "In the beginning was the Word", that is,
> metonymically. For that matter, "znachenie" can ALSO be translated as
> "value", so you COULD argue that "signification" is really exchange value
> (because it is self-similar, and relationally defined, context free) while
> "sense" is use value (because it is constantly in flux, contextually
> defined, and situationally bound).
>
> But I think all that's misleading; it implies that all we need is better
> translations for better understandings, and that really does give too much
> emphasis to Vygotsky's signification and not enough to his sense.The main
> reason I chose "wording" is that I have to analyse data, developmentally.
> My latest study showed that Korean kids telling stories do change the words
> they use as they go from first to sixth grade--but the variation within
> groups is way more than the variation between groups, and it's not at all
> in the direction of "scientific" words as you might expect; it's not
> systematically away from pure Korean words and towards Sino-Korean calques.
> What really does change is the wording--that is, the lexicogrammar.
>
> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09500782.2017.1306074
>
> But what is NOT true of words really IS true of wording. Ways of wording
> and ways of meaning are changing together; yea, a change in the way of
> wording enables a change in the way of meaning, and that in turn allows new
> possibilities for wording. I tried to use Vygotsky and Schif's example
> sentence "A planned economy is possible in the USSR because all of the
> factories, farms and means of production are owned by the workers and
> peasants" to give an extended example of "grammatical metaphor": the way in
> which wording might change as the child develops, becoming more compact
> and less explicit. I thought this might show how this might fit with
> Vygotsky's explanation of the "Great Globe" of concepts in Chapter Six of
> Thinking and Speech.
>
> Obviously, I was wrong. Instead, Wolff-Michael suggested that we should
> read Ricoeur. At first I was a little annoyed with this, because Ricoeur is
> choosing a vocabulary that is leading inexorably in the direction of speech
> act theory and away from wording. A lot of the vocabulary he uses is by way
> of producing a forced, manufactured clarity: first presenting an obvious
> point in obscure language and then in very concrete form (e.g. "judicative"
> and then "grasping together"). But as Mike points out, we all have our
> favorite authors, and since I have read quite a bit of Ricoeur, I thought I
> could probably make the same kind of point using Wolff-Michael's example
> that I had so obviously failed to make with my own.
>
> It's not just that the child's horizons expand to include different words.
> It's that there are different ways of making meaning, which we can trace in
> the different ways of wording. In this way we can solve the problem which
> Ruqaiya attributed (apparently incorrectly) to Cole and Gay and then to
> Cole and Scribner; that is, we CAN show that different ways of wording DO
> realize and also enable different ways of thinking. And what better place
> to start than at the very beginning, with the child's ability to
> distinguish between the interpersonal metafunction (the pragmatic) and the
> ideational one (the mathetic)? When the child learns to do these things
> together, the child realizes and enables new ways of meaning and new ways
> of thinking (viz. narratives).
>
> In the case of "Guess what!" we have a good example of the
> pragmatic/interpersonal predominating. In the case of "I found Grandpa's
> book!" we have an example of the mathetic/ideational predominating. When a
> child produces the first true wording, it differs from "mama" in that it is
> able to act pragmatically and mathetically (ideationally and
> interpersonally) at one and the same time. But as Vygotsky says, this isn't
> the end of the story. It's much more like the very beginning.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
> On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 8:40 AM, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
>> wrote:
>
>> Not sure if you’re agreeing or disagreeing with me, David. Or how it links
>> to Mike and Sylvia, or to Wolff-Michael. Anyhow:
>>
>> In “Phase II” of Nigel’s language [around 18 months], “The need for a
>> grammar arises out of the pragmatic and mathetic functions… The
>> introduction of grammatical structure makes it possible… to combine both
>> functions in one utterance” (Halliday, 1975, p. 241).
>>
>> Martin
>>
>>> On Apr 23, 2017, at 4:17 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Thanks, Mike. Ruqaiya also says that on p. 26 you and Sylvia wrote "the
>>> basic difference is in the material for thought". That does bring us
>> back,
>>> of all places, to Wolff-Michael's obscure quote from Ricoeur, and also to
>>> Martin Packer's remark that Halliday sees the child's first true wordings
>>> not as names but rather as the moment where the function of enacting
>> speech
>>> roles (THAT I am saying) can be fused with the function of conveying the
>>> material of thought (WHAT I am saying).
>>>
>>> This seems like a strange place to locate a key epiphany. It would be
>> more
>>> dramatic to have some flash of light, some burst of thunder, some road to
>>> Damascus moment, not least because Halliday's insight suggests that
>>> learning how to mean is a process of learning how to word that takes
>> years,
>>> and that sounds hard to study.
>>>
>>> But of course that WAS the key difference that separated Vygotsky's view
>>> from Stern's: Vygotsky said that there was no single moment, and Stern
>> said
>>> there was. And for those like me who consider that real authority is a
>>> matter of data and not name recognition, you can confirm Vygotsky's
>>> rectitude in the matter pretty easily by just counting the number of
>> times
>>> a seven year old "prefaces" a remark with some non-statement command or
>>> question like "Guess what!" or "Know what?" rather than simply using a
>>> declarative wording that can preface THAT and dive into WHAT at one and
>> the
>>> same moment.
>>>
>>> Why "wording"? Well, Vygotsky often talks about a "new approach" to
>>> linguistics that begins in 1928. He mentions that it has something to do
>>> with phonemes, which he says are seamless fusions of sound and meaning.
>> But
>>> today the year 1928 means nothing in particular (Saussure's book came out
>>> in 1916, three years after his death in 1913), and the phoneme means even
>>> less (it is a "bundle of distinctive features" which only "means" in the
>>> context of minimal pairings like "bin/pin" or "bin/ban" or "bin/bit" that
>>> rarely if ever occur in speech). What gives?
>>>
>>> In 1928 Trubetskoy (who was probably LSV's old phonetics prof) and
>> Jakobson
>>> (who was certainly LSV's classmate) moved the Moscow Linguistic Circle to
>>> Prague. They were both anti-Bolshevik, or anyway anti-Bukharin/Stalin,
>>> which explains why LSV is not more explicit about his sources. In Prague,
>>> they laid the foundation for the view of language that Ruqaiya and
>> Halliday
>>> built: language is a three layered construct of semantics, lexicogrammar
>> (a
>>> single stratum for both vocabulary and grammar), and phonology/phonetics.
>>> The reason I use "wording" for lexicogrammar is that most people find it
>>> hard, after a whole century of "rules and words" models, to see
>>> lexicogrammar as a single continuum, from "open class" nouns and
>> adjectives
>>> to "closed class" articles, prepositions, and modal auxiliaries.
>>>
>>> But everybody can see that "Know what?" has one function and "That's
>> what!"
>>> has another, and the difference is not just "material for thought" but
>> the
>>> form that thought takes. It's not just the words; it's the wordings.
>>>
>>> I suppose ONE way to express this difference would be to say that the
>>> grammatical, closed class end of "wording" has more "use value", because
>> it
>>> is valuable in situ, while the lexical end has more "exchange value"
>>> because it is more decontexualizable. But all words are really more like
>>> love than money: the more you give away, the more you have.
>>>
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>>
>>> On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 2:52 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi David et al --
>>>>
>>>> Found my copy of Cole and Scribner! To my relief, it appears that
>> somewhere
>>>> along the way there was a misattribution of that quote you posted that
>>>> Hasan criticized and that I wanted to disavow (but there it was in black
>>>> and white!).
>>>>
>>>> So, apropos, we have a problem of context here. If you look at p. 25 of
>>>> Scribner and Cole, you will find that the quotation was in a paper by
>> Cole
>>>> and Gay (1972) (A paper on culture and memory in the American
>>>> Anthropologist I had did not recall the date of. If you go just one
>>>> sentence above the quotation you find the following:
>>>>
>>>> *For instance, one anthropologist commented, upon hearing about the
>> results
>>>> of our first research in this area (Gay and Cole 1967): The reasoning
>> and
>>>> thinking processes of different people in different cultures don't
>> differ .
>>>> . . just their values, beliefs, and ways of classifying differ [personal
>>>> correspondence ].*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We were *contesting *this statement which was the anthropological
>> consensus
>>>> at the time. For those interested in our own views at the time,
>>>>
>>>> it is best to consult Chapter 8 of that book by Cole and Scribner on
>>>> *Culture
>>>> and Thought. *(Its all antiquarian stuff anyway. Its now 50 years since
>> the
>>>> first publication of that line of work! References more than 10 years
>> old
>>>> are anethema to HIGH IMPACT journals! :-) and :-(
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> mike
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Which takes the discussion back to the discussion of wording, stating,
>> and
>>>> uttering.
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 1:39 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth <
>>>> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Julian,
>>>>> I suggest reading Rossi-Landi, and Italian Marxist scholar, where I
>> have
>>>>> taken this:
>>>>>
>>>>> Like other products of labor, signs, words, expressions,
>>>>> and messages have use value in communication and are subject to
>> exchange,
>>>>> distribution, and consumption; the markets within which these
>>>>> products circulate as commodities are linguistic communities (Rossi-
>>>>> Landi 1983).
>>>>>
>>>>> An appreciation of his contributions by Cianca Bianchi states: "Through
>>>> his
>>>>> "homological schema",
>>>>> material and linguistic production are conceived to be the result of a
>>>>> single process
>>>>> that is particular to human beings and that can best be understood in
>>>> terms
>>>>> of work
>>>>> and trade. "
>>>>>
>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> --------------------
>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor
>>>>> Applied Cognitive Science
>>>>> MacLaurin Building A567
>>>>> University of Victoria
>>>>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2
>>>>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
>>>>>
>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
>>>>> directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the-
>>>>> mathematics-of-mathematics/>*
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 12:09 PM, Julian Williams <
>>>>> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As you were - so we are entirely in disagreement, then.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For me the E-V and U-V of a dialogic exchange has nothing essentially
>>>> to
>>>>>> do with the sensual and super sensual moments of the 'word' as per
>>>>>> Vygotsky. And I don't see at all how these really confer 'value' in
>> any
>>>>>> Marxist sense of the term on speech/utterance (etc etc).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am guessing that we are back with analogy of 'commodity' and 'word'
>>>> in
>>>>>> dialogue, rather than a holistic understanding of discourse in the
>>>>>> totality of social-economic relations, and so we have made no progress
>>>>>> here.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can take this up another time perhaps.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Julian
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 22/04/2017 19:47, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
>>>>>> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Julian,
>>>>>>> E-V and U-V, but not of the kind that you are talking about, the
>>>>> abstract
>>>>>>> .
>>>>>>> . . You can look at it like LSV, who emphasizes that the word has a
>>>>>>> sensible (material) part and a supersensual (ideal) part, not in the
>>>>>>> abstract, but concretely realized in every exchange. Michael
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -----------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> ---------------
>>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor
>>>>>>> Applied Cognitive Science
>>>>>>> MacLaurin Building A567
>>>>>>> University of Victoria
>>>>>>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2
>>>>>>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
>>>>>> directions-in-mat
>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 11:38 AM, Julian Williams <
>>>>>>> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> M.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Um, hang on a minute - I agree with everything you said here (I
>>>>>>>> think..).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So I suppose this means you agree(d) with me; een though I thought I
>>>>> was
>>>>>>>> challenging your view. I thought you were trying to find E-V and U-V
>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> the dialogue-in-itself, where I think it's value has to be
>>>> understood
>>>>> by
>>>>>>>> the way it is mediated through the wider field of discourse/practice
>>>>>>>> (i.e.
>>>>>>>> In its meaning/sense in terms of the real exchanges taking place in
>>>>>>>> practice).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So the point is that one can only understand the exchanges taking
>>>>> place
>>>>>>>> within the wider context- the worker exchanges 10 hours of labour
>>>> for
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> commodities required to keep themselves alive for a day … but this
>>>> has
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> be understood within the system that allows the capitalist to
>>>> exploit
>>>>>>>> those 10 hours for a profit, and pay wages that do not allow the
>>>>> worker
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> purchase the goods they this produce (or their equivalent)…. There
>>>> are
>>>>>>>> obvious analogies in discourse too.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Julian
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ps I see I have raised 'mediation' now - oops.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 22/04/2017 19:15, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
>>>>>>>> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Julian,
>>>>>>>>> My sense is that you are referring to macro-issues, you need to
>>>> stand
>>>>>>>>> back,
>>>>>>>>> abstract, and look from the outside at a system, let it unfold in
>>>>>>>> front of
>>>>>>>>> your eyes.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I am concerned with the actual constitution of society in
>>>> individual
>>>>>>>>> exchanges, actual relations between two or more people, the
>>>>> "ensemble"
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> which constitutes society (Marx, Vygotsky, Leont'ev). I am thus
>>>>>>>> concerned
>>>>>>>>> with actual exchange relations, the kind Marx refers to in the
>>>> first
>>>>>>>> 100
>>>>>>>>> pages of das Kapital, where he has the tailor exchange a coat with
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> weaver receiving two yards of cloth . . . The tailor exchanges
>>>>> his/her
>>>>>>>>> cloth with others, like the farmer, for 40 bushels of grain . . .
>>>> In
>>>>>>>> my
>>>>>>>>> work, I am following them around, concerned not with "meaning" or
>>>>>>>> "ideal"
>>>>>>>>> in the abstract but as realized in every THIS occasion of a social
>>>>>>>>> relation.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> My sense is that the differences you point out (attempt to) lie
>>>>>>>>> there---perhaps.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> -----------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> ---------------
>>>>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor
>>>>>>>>> Applied Cognitive Science
>>>>>>>>> MacLaurin Building A567
>>>>>>>>> University of Victoria
>>>>>>>>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2
>>>>>>>>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/
>>>> faculty/mroth/>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>>>>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
>>>>>>>> directions-in-mat
>>>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>*
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 10:24 AM, Julian Williams <
>>>>>>>>> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Going back many, many posts now: almost 24 hours worth, I think.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When I wrote this:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 'Thus, I suggest, the 'exchange/use value' of an
>>>> utterance/dialogic
>>>>>>>>>> exchange maybe ought to be examined in the ideological context of
>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>> relationship with the 'whole' of social re/production where class
>>>>>>>> power
>>>>>>>>>> becomes visible. I don't know how to do this, but the argument is
>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>> Bourdieu: the power relations between people are part of the
>>>>>>>>>> capital-mediated structure of relations in a field (including the
>>>>>>>> field
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> opinion/discourse), and this explains the forms of discourse that
>>>>>>>>>> express
>>>>>>>>>> these power relationships and help to hold powerful positions in
>>>>>>>> place
>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>> the field. In this view it is not possible to identify the
>>>> 'value'
>>>>>>>> of an
>>>>>>>>>> utterance or a sign outside of this wider analysis… and an
>>>> analysis
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> particular discursive/cultural field within its wider sociality.'
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The sort of thing I had in mind was this
>>>> 'word/utterance/statement'
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> yours (I care not at the moment which of these is chosen - in
>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>> context
>>>>>>>>>> I am not clear it matters, though I recognise that every work was
>>>>>>>> once
>>>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>>> utterance and a speech act… and that parsing into words is a
>>>>>>>> relatively
>>>>>>>>>> recent cultural artifice):
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> '…. My personal inclination would be to take Ricœur as more
>>>>>>>>>> authoritative
>>>>>>>>>> on the subject than any or most of us' (see below)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I think the 'value' (i.e. exchange value) of this statement of
>>>>> yours
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>> my
>>>>>>>>>> frame has to be understood in the context of its function/workthe
>>>>>>>>>> academic field (or this section of it), how power is exerted here
>>>>>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>>>> reference to 'authorities' like Ricoeur (NB not just 'authors'
>>>> like
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> rest of us? ), whether this is really useful in helping the
>>>>>>>> community to
>>>>>>>>>> progress its understanding of the issue for practical purposes
>>>>> (e.g.
>>>>>>>> How
>>>>>>>>>> many of the readers of this post have seriously read Ricoeur
>>>> enough
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> get
>>>>>>>>>> the point?).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> How our community of discourse comes to be structured so that
>>>> power
>>>>>>>>>> 'works' like this - that is a wider issue - and here it does get
>>>>>>>> hard
>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>> us academics to see ourselves as we perhaps could or should be
>>>>> seen.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Michael: I hope you don't take this cheeky affront too
>>>> personally:
>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>> could
>>>>>>>>>> do the same to most of the posts that one reads on xmca, and
>>>>> probably
>>>>>>>>>> my
>>>>>>>>>> own- I don't mean to suggest that they have no use-value, and
>>>>>>>> certainly
>>>>>>>>>> not that the collective dialogue has no use value. Yet still… we
>>>>>>>> should
>>>>>>>>>> recognise that there is a power game in this field of
>>>>>>>> discourse/opinion,
>>>>>>>>>> if we are to understand one another well. It may even be argued
>>>>> (with
>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>> merit?) that a quote appealing to Marx - or even Ricoeur - has
>>>> some
>>>>>>>> use
>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>> well as exchange value (or lets say merit) in linking ideas to a
>>>>>>>> body of
>>>>>>>>>> previous revolutionary work.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hugs!
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Julian
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 21/04/2017 16:53, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Ricœur (1985), in *Time and Narrative 2*, uses the following
>>>>>>>>>> distinction
>>>>>>>>>>> for the purposes of theorizing the difference between narrated
>>>>> time
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> time of narration. Accordingly, "narrative posses" "the
>>>> remarkable
>>>>>>>>>>> property" "of being split into utterance [*énociation*] and
>>>>>>>> statement [
>>>>>>>>>>> *énoncé*]."
>>>>>>>>>>> To introduce this distinction, it suffices to recall that the
>>>>>>>>>>> configurating
>>>>>>>>>>> act presiding
>>>>>>>>>>> over emplotment is a judicative act, involving a "grasping
>>>>>>>> together."
>>>>>>>>>> More
>>>>>>>>>>> precisely, this act belongs to the family of reflective
>>>>> judgments.1
>>>>>>>> We
>>>>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>>>>> been
>>>>>>>>>>> led to say therefore that to narrate a story is already to
>>>>> "reflect
>>>>>>>>>> upon"
>>>>>>>>>>> the event
>>>>>>>>>>> narrated. For this reason, narrative "grasping together" carries
>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>>>>> the capacity
>>>>>>>>>>> for distancing itself from its own production and in this way
>>>>>>>> dividing
>>>>>>>>>>> itself in two. (p. 61)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> My personal inclination would be to take Ricœur as more
>>>>>>>> authoritative
>>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>>> the subject than any or most of us.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> -----------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> ---------------
>>>>>>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor
>>>>>>>>>>> Applied Cognitive Science
>>>>>>>>>>> MacLaurin Building A567
>>>>>>>>>>> University of Victoria
>>>>>>>>>>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2
>>>>>>>>>>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/
>>>>> faculty/mroth/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
>>>>>>>>>> directions-in-mat
>>>>>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-
>>>> mathematics/>*
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 10:38 PM, David Kellogg
>>>>>>>> <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I think that "statement" is too tight, and "utterance" is too
>>>>>>>> loose.
>>>>>>>>>> A
>>>>>>>>>>>> statement is an indicative-declarative wording of some kind:
>>>> we
>>>>>>>> don't
>>>>>>>>>>>> usually refer to commands (imperatives), questions
>>>>>>>>>>>> (indicative-interrogatives), or exclamations as "statements"
>>>>>>>> because
>>>>>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>>>>>> primary purpose is not to state facts (that is, if there are
>>>>>>>> facts,
>>>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>>>>>> are ancillary, and not constitutive: we can have a command, a
>>>>>>>>>> question,
>>>>>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>>>>> an exclamation without any statement of any state of affairs,
>>>>> e.g.
>>>>>>>>>> "Look
>>>>>>>>>>>> out!" "Why?" "Oh, no!"). So "statement" is too narrow.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> An utterance, as Bakhtin defines it, is simply the stretch of
>>>>>>>>>> language
>>>>>>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>>>>> find between two changes in speaker (this is why a book is a
>>>>>>>> single
>>>>>>>>>>>> utterance). This is an entirely descriptive unit: if I give
>>>> you
>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>> tape
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> listening test dialogues for the Test of Proficiency in
>>>> Korean,
>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>>>>> will be
>>>>>>>>>>>> able to tell me exactly how many utterances there are in each
>>>>>>>>>> dialogue,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> even whether the speakers are men or women, without
>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>>>>> any of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the language. As a link between thinking and speech, such a
>>>> unit
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>> beside
>>>>>>>>>>>> the point. So "utterance" is too broad.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> And linking thinking and speech IS the point. I think you and
>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky
>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>> using the word "holophrase" somewhat teleologically, like a
>>>>> fond,
>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>>>> expectant, grandpa. You both think that the baby who says
>>>> "mama"
>>>>>>>>>> really
>>>>>>>>>>>> means a holophrase like "Mama, put me in the high chair". It's
>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> case
>>>>>>>>>>>> that "Mama" is a reduction of a full sentence (like "Fine,
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> you?"). It's more like the Ur Wir, or "Grandwe", the "we" that
>>>>>>>>>>>> pre-exists
>>>>>>>>>>>> "me" and "you" the way that my grandpa pre-existed me. I am
>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>> using
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> word "wording" teleologically, you notice: "Mama" is, from the
>>>>>>>>>> child's
>>>>>>>>>>>> point of view, meaning and sounding, but not wording at all.
>>>> But
>>>>>>>>>>>> teleology
>>>>>>>>>>>> is very useful here; indeed, I think that teleology in speech
>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenesis
>>>>>>>>>>>> is a more useful principle than evolution: there is, after
>>>> all,
>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>> "complete
>>>>>>>>>>>> form" right there in the environment.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The problem with Thinking and Speech is that, unlike Capital,
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> author
>>>>>>>>>>>> died in the middle of writing it, and it had to be eked out
>>>> with
>>>>>>>> his
>>>>>>>>>> old
>>>>>>>>>>>> articles. So although Chapter One and Chapter Seven really do
>>>>> use
>>>>>>>>>>>> wording
>>>>>>>>>>>> and not word as a unit of analysis (and the "phoneme" is
>>>> really
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> morpho-phoneme, e.g. a Russian case ending, something Vygotsky
>>>>>>>>>> probably
>>>>>>>>>>>> learned all about from his old professor Trubetskoy and his
>>>>>>>>>> classmate at
>>>>>>>>>>>> Moscow University Jakobson). you also have Chapter Five, which
>>>>> our
>>>>>>>>>> late,
>>>>>>>>>>>> beloved friend Paula Towsey loved so much.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> She had reason: Chapter Five is Vygotsky, and so it's
>>>> brilliant.
>>>>>>>> But
>>>>>>>>>>>> it's
>>>>>>>>>>>> OLD Vygotsky, 1928-1929 Vygotsky (that was the year that
>>>>>>>> Trubetskoy
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> Jakobson left Moscow for Prague and set up the Prague
>>>> Linguistic
>>>>>>>>>> Circle
>>>>>>>>>>>> which eventually became systemic-functional linguistics).
>>>>> Chapter
>>>>>>>> 5
>>>>>>>>>>>> is based on something from the German idealist psychologists
>>>>>>>> Reimat
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> Ach, who really DID believe in one-word concepts. And so we
>>>> have
>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>>> weird
>>>>>>>>>>>> block-like model of word meaning. Vygotsky tries to disenchant
>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> de-fetishize the blocks by saying the concept is really the
>>>>>>>> process
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> relating the word meaning to the block, but that still means
>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>> concept
>>>>>>>>>>>> is an abstraction and a generalization of some block-like
>>>>> quality.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Chapter Six is better, because here the "model" of word
>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>> is a
>>>>>>>>>>>> RELATOR, like "because" or "although". Notice that these are
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> kinds
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> words that preliterate children do not consider words. And in
>>>>> fact
>>>>>>>>>>>> that's
>>>>>>>>>>>> why Piaget got the results he did--the kids really couldn't
>>>>> figure
>>>>>>>>>> out
>>>>>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>>>>>> he meant when he asked them to explain what the word "because"
>>>>>>>> meant
>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>> particular sentence--they assumed he wanted to know what the
>>>>>>>> sentence
>>>>>>>>>>>> meant, because asking what a word like "because" means in a
>>>>>>>> sentence
>>>>>>>>>>>> without the rest of the sentence is really a little like
>>>> asking
>>>>> if
>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>> are more white flowers or more flowers in a bouquet of red and
>>>>>>>> white
>>>>>>>>>>>> flowers. But suppose (over a period of some years) we give the
>>>>> kid
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> following
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> utterances-cum-statement/wordings-cum-wordgroup/wordings-cum-words.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> a) A rational, designed, and planned economy is possible in
>>>> the
>>>>>>>> USSR.
>>>>>>>>>>>> (Why
>>>>>>>>>>>> is that, Teacher?) Oh, it is just because all the means of
>>>>>>>> production
>>>>>>>>>>>> belong to the workers and peasants.
>>>>>>>>>>>> b) Planned economy is possible in the USSR because all the
>>>> means
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> production belong to the workers and peasants.
>>>>>>>>>>>> c) All the means of production belong to the workers and
>>>>> peasants
>>>>>>>> so
>>>>>>>>>>>> economic planning is possible in the USSR.
>>>>>>>>>>>> d) Workers and peasant's ownership of the means of production
>>>>>>>> means
>>>>>>>>>>>> socialist construction is possible.
>>>>>>>>>>>> e) Public ownership of production enables social construction.
>>>>>>>>>>>> f) the proprietary preconditions of construction
>>>>>>>>>>>> g) socialist property forms
>>>>>>>>>>>> h) socialist property
>>>>>>>>>>>> i) socialism
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> By the time the child is the age when children beget other
>>>>>>>> children,
>>>>>>>>>>>> this child will see that the clause wording "all the means of
>>>>>>>>>> production
>>>>>>>>>>>> belong to the workers and peasants" has become a nominal group
>>>>>>>>>> wording
>>>>>>>>>>>> "public ownership", and the nominal group wording "a rational,
>>>>>>>>>> designed,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and planned economy" has become a single, block-like word
>>>>>>>>>> "socialism".
>>>>>>>>>>>> And
>>>>>>>>>>>> because for Vygotsky the "internal" really means the
>>>>>>>> psychological,
>>>>>>>>>>>> while
>>>>>>>>>>>> the "external" really just means the interpersonal, and
>>>> because
>>>>>>>>>> wording
>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>> inversely proportional to the internalization of inner
>>>> speech, I
>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>>>>> can see that e) is a kind of internalization of a) and I) is
>>>> an
>>>>>>>>>>>> internalization of e).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> But neither tight knickers nor baggy trousers will show this.
>>>> We
>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>> need
>>>>>>>>>>>> a theory of grammar that can make fine distinctions between
>>>>>>>>>> clause-level
>>>>>>>>>>>> wording, group-level wording, and word-level wording in order
>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>> describe
>>>>>>>>>>>> and explain it, much less intervene in it and promote it.
>>>>>>>> Otherwise,
>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>> only will our model of the concept look like a wooden block,
>>>> our
>>>>>>>>>> model
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> "internalization" will look like a "suture" or an "ingrowing"
>>>>>>>> (c.f.
>>>>>>>>>>>> end of
>>>>>>>>>>>> HDHMF Chapter Five). No fond, expectant, grandpa wants a
>>>>>>>> grandchild's
>>>>>>>>>>>> mind covered with scars.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 10:47 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Choosing your wording carefully, David, you come up with
>>>>>>>> "wording"
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> describe what I think of as the holophrases in question. To
>>>>>>>> help me
>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify
>>>>>>>>>>>>> your point for myself, and to use your way of communicating
>>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>>>> it,
>>>>>>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>>>>>>> does the wording "wording" relate to the wordings
>>>> "statement"
>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "utterance" offered by Michael in the first case and by
>>>> others
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> group
>>>>>>>>>>>>> on behalf of Bakhtin?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is there a holphorastic rendering/wording that might help us
>>>>> out
>>>>>>>>>> here?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> PS- As an afterthought, the examples feel like an utterance
>>>> to
>>>>>>>> me.
>>>>>>>>>> But
>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> might make a liar out of me too :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 4:33 PM, David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>>> <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In English, the number of syllables or morphemes in a word
>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>> often
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unclear, while the number of words in a sentence is always
>>>>>>>> fairly
>>>>>>>>>>>> clear.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This isn't true for preliterate children, who have a hard
>>>>> time
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding that "a" and "of" are actually words. It's
>>>>> true
>>>>>>>>>> enough
>>>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> people who can read and write, but its really an accident
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> orthography (notice that "it's" appears to be one syllable
>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> morphemes, and it's not really clear, even to the normally
>>>>>>>> quite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> overwheening "wordcount" function in Word, how many words
>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Other languages are not like English. So for example in
>>>>>>>> Chinese
>>>>>>>>>> (a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> non-alphabetic language), the number of syllables and
>>>>>>>> morphemes
>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> always clear, but the number of words in a sentence is
>>>> quite
>>>>>>>>>> unclear
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (when
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you read a page of Chinese, there are no spaces between
>>>>>>>>>>>> morpho-syllables
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that mark out "words". Chinese poetry, and classical
>>>>> Chinese,
>>>>>>>>>> plays
>>>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this a lot: the unit is the morpheme rather than the word,
>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> overall
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> effect (at least on me) is a stream of syllables and
>>>>> morphemes
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meanings
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but not words.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So I think the place to look for Vygotsky's unit of
>>>> analysis
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actual word "word" or "word meaning" (slovo or znachenie
>>>>>>>> slova).
>>>>>>>>>>>> Holbrook
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mahn has proposed translating "znachenie slova" as "verbal
>>>>>>>>>> meaning",
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> although this isn't exactly an accurate way of presenting
>>>>> how
>>>>>>>>>>>> Russian
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammar really works, it IS a good way of getting around
>>>> the
>>>>>>>> trap
>>>>>>>>>>>> set
>>>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> those who are only going by the English word meaning of
>>>>> "word
>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the place to look is in Vygotsky's examples. In
>>>> the
>>>>>>>> first
>>>>>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thinking and Speech, for example, Vygotsky agrees with
>>>> Stern
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> child's first "word" has to be construed as not a word
>>>> but a
>>>>>>>>>> whole
>>>>>>>>>>>>> wording.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He goes even further: he says it's a whole
>>>>>>>> "wording-in-context",
>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning. (And remember, Vygotsky NEVER agrees with Stern
>>>>> about
>>>>>>>>>>>> ANYTHING
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unless he absolutely has to!) And in the LAST part of
>>>>> Thinking
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Speech,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky gives many examples: 'the clock fell", "the tram
>>>> B
>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>> arriving",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Would you like some tea"? What all of these examples have
>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>> common is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that they are not single words but they are single
>>>> wordings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Remember that Russian has no articles; this is something
>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>> himself
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points out with respect to whether "perezhivanie" should
>>>> be
>>>>> "a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perizhivanie" or just "perizhivanie". I think Andy's
>>>>>>>> observation
>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially correct (although of course we undo part of
>>>> his
>>>>>>>>>> insight
>>>>>>>>>>>> when
>>>>>>>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> insist that all languages must "really" have an article of
>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>> kind).
>>>>>>>>>>>>> But
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it needs to be generalized: Vygotsky could NOT have ever
>>>>>>>> written
>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis is "a" word meaning, simply because
>>>>> "a",
>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preliterate child will tell you, is not a word (and
>>>>> certainly
>>>>>>>>>> not a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Russian
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> word).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 5:19 PM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Re the development of punctuation and the origin of
>>>>> 'words'
>>>>>>>> see
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?3.61
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: 20 April 2017 01:45
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "the word" in Russian, Andy, has shades of meaning
>>>> tending
>>>>>>>>>> toward
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> biblical from current common understandings of the term
>>>>> as a
>>>>>>>>>> sort
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "lexical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object." The Vai didnotmakethesamedistinction when
>>>>> writing
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> neithr
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> did
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Greeks.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I believe there are those who would include the
>>>> utterance
>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as used by Vygotsky. Slippery these translation
>>>> problems!
>>>>>>>> But
>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> them often reveals clarification of the various concepts
>>>>>>>>>> involved
>>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> appear in different peoples' vocabularies. Mediation has
>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> those
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The polysemy of just one language is enough for one poor
>>>>>>>>>>>> translator
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deal with! The polsyemic playing field when you cross
>>>>>>>>>>>> language/cultural
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> systems is what gives academics something to do. :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:26 PM, Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>> <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and as a further note of caution, the unit in
>>>> "Thinking
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> Speech"
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a word, not an utterance, and yet it is utterance
>>>> which
>>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>>>>>> to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogous to "commodity."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/
>>>> book/origins-collective-
>>>>>>>>>>>>> decision-making
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/04/2017 7:01 AM, Julian Williams wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael/all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I go back a few posts (as ever being a bit slower
>>>> than
>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> list-serve demands - let me do this before the
>>>>> discussion
>>>>>>>>>>>> moves to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'binocular
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> vision') and challenge the metaphor of
>>>>>>>> commodity/utterance:
>>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>>> can
>>>>>>>>>>>>> see
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it has merit but also I want to look at the
>>>>> limitations.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You say: 'the sign is to the verbal exchange what the
>>>>>>>>>>>> commodity is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Commodity-exchange' … But I think I was asking
>>>> for
>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> characterisation of the larger totality involved -
>>>> e.g.
>>>>>>>> The
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'economy/mode of production and its
>>>>>>>> contradictions/collapse'
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - dialogue?'
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And I think Andy B agrees with you when he says 'both
>>>>>>>> take
>>>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> artefact-mediated relation between individuals as the
>>>>>>>> unit'…
>>>>>>>>>>>> But
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suggests he recognises my problem when he refers to
>>>>> 'its
>>>>>>>>>>>> language'
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (or I might say 'consciousness', 'discourse' or
>>>> maybe
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'intercourse').
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But - as I argued in critique of the metaphor
>>>> 'labour =
>>>>>>>>>>>> learning',
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this mapping only goes so far, and has certain
>>>> dangers.
>>>>>>>> The
>>>>>>>>>>>> relation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between commodity/economy (and the mode of
>>>> production)
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> utterance/discourse (and the ideological
>>>>>>>>>>>> super/infra-structure) is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> much more interesting in the concrete relations of
>>>>>>>> history.
>>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>>> refer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to Marx (the German ideology) and Volosinov.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In reality the relation between commodity production
>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'sign-related/mediated' discourse (Marx calls
>>>>>>>>>> 'intercourse') is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dialectical. Each 'mediates' the other in historical
>>>>>>>>>>>> development,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even in collective production-and-dialogue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, I suggest, the 'exchange/use value' of an
>>>>>>>>>>>> utterance/dialogic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exchange maybe ought to be examined in the
>>>> ideological
>>>>>>>>>> context
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship with the 'whole' of social re/production
>>>>>>>> where
>>>>>>>>>>>> class
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> power becomes visible. I don't know how to do this,
>>>> but
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> argument
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is there in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bourdieu: the power relations between people are part
>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> capital-mediated structure of relations in a field
>>>>>>>>>> (including
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> field of opinion/discourse), and this explains the
>>>>> forms
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> discourse
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that express these power relationships and help to
>>>> hold
>>>>>>>>>>>> powerful
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positions in place in the field. In this view it is
>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>> possible
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identify the 'value' of an utterance or a sign
>>>> outside
>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>>> wider
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analysis… and an analysis of the particular
>>>>>>>>>> discursive/cultural
>>>>>>>>>>>>> field
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within its wider sociality.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sorry this is a bit prolix and so likely to provoke
>>>>>>>>>> tangential
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responses:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I did not have time tonight to write a shorter more
>>>>>>>> focussed
>>>>>>>>>>>> post.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Best wishes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Julian
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ps The separate discussion on mediation: this might
>>>> be
>>>>>>>>>> another
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thread. I only want to note here that the mediation
>>>> of
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'intercourse' through its 'other' in the material
>>>> form
>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'production' (I call the economy above) and vice
>>>> versa
>>>>>>>> does
>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> involve a mediator 'between' the two, but is purely
>>>>>>>>>> hegelian in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seeing the mediation of 'x' through 'not x' in a
>>>>>>>> totality.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 18/04/2017 16:34, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.
>>>> edu
>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>> behalf
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>> behalf
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry, do not be confused. Take it with Bateson (Mind
>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> Nature),
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and see
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy and Michael as two eyes. You then get this:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is correct (and a great improvement) to begin to
>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> parties to the interaction as two eyes , each
>>>> giving a
>>>>>>>>>>>> monocular
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> view of what goes on and , together , giving a
>>>>> binocular
>>>>>>>>>> view
>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depth. This double view is the relationship .
>>>> (p.133)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What is gained by comparing the data collected by
>>>> one
>>>>>>>> eye
>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> data collected by the other? Typically , both eyes
>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>> aimed
>>>>>>>>>>>> at
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same region of the surrounding universe, and this
>>>>> might
>>>>>>>>>> seem
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wasteful use of the sense organs. But the anatomy
>>>>>>>> indicates
>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very considerable advantage must accrue from this
>>>>> usage.
>>>>>>>>>> The
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> innervation of the two retinas and the creation at
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> optic
>>>>>>>>>>>>> chiasma
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of pathways for the redistribution of information is
>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> extraordinary feat of morphogenesis as must surely
>>>>>>>> denote
>>>>>>>>>>>> great
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evolutionary advantage . (p.69)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied
>>>>>>>> Cognitive
>>>>>>>>>>>> Science
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria
>>>>> Victoria,
>>>>>>>>>> BC,
>>>>>>>>>>>> V8P
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 5C2
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <
>>>> http://education2.uvic.ca/
>>>>>>>>>>>>> faculty/mroth/>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-dir
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ections-in-mat
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-
>>>> mathematics/>*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 8:18 AM, Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>>>> <ablunden@mira.net
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different trajectories, Larry.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/
>>>>> book/origins-collective-
>>>>>>>>>>>>> decision-maki
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ng On 18/04/2017 11:44 PM, lpscholar2@gmail.com
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy, Julian, Michael,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My learning curve at this moment is in the way of
>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> describing the back and forth double movement.
>>>> That
>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>> both
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> giving/receiving, both
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (expressing/listening) occurring WITHIN our
>>>>>>>> relationship.
>>>>>>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prior to or more primordial then taking the
>>>>> individual
>>>>>>>>>>>> stance
>>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary and the relation as derivative.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So... In this ‘spirit’ I will pose a question?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy says: ‘artefact mediated relation BETWEEN
>>>>>>>>>> INDIVIDUALS
>>>>>>>>>>>> as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael says: You remain with back-and-forth
>>>>> movement
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> NEVER action but IS transcation. Here the
>>>>>>>> back-and-forth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ‘relation’ is the UNIT, and the individuals emerge
>>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>>>>>> WITHIN
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this primordial double relation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Are Andy and Michael on the same trajectory,
>>>>> shifting
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> accent,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or are imdividuals situated differently in the
>>>>>>>>>> comtrasting
>>>>>>>>>>>>> notions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of units.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In particular does Andy ‘figure’ bridges whereas
>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ‘figures’
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gaps in the notion of BETWEEN.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pursuing my growing edge, going out on a limb
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *From: *Andy Blunden <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Sent: *April 17, 2017 11:54 PM
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *To: *xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' &
>>>>>>>> 'value'
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Julian/Michael,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I remember getting very excited back in the early
>>>>> '80s
>>>>>>>>>> when
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I spotted the symmetry between the first chapters
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> Capital
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Marx's critique of algebra in his Mathematical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Manuscripts. That lasted about a week. The
>>>> symmetry
>>>>>>>>>> between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's analysis of speech and Marx's analysis
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> production is a strong one because both take an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> artefact-mediated relation between individuals as
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> unit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is a symmetry at the level of the molar unit
>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>> well,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which, so far as I know has been neglected. But
>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structural symmetry cannot usefully be taken too
>>>>> far.
>>>>>>>> The
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "point" is that the unit is a unit of a whole, and
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> productive activity of a community is not the same
>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language, which as Marx said "the philosophers are
>>>>>>>> bound
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make into an independent realm." Concretely,
>>>>> speaking
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> producing. But like all human activities, both are
>>>>>>>>>> subject
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to analysis by units of artefact-mediated actions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/
>>>>>> book/origins-collective-
>>>>>>>>>>>>> decision-mak
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 18/04/2017 7:01 AM, Julian Williams wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In principle I am Ok with the idea of the unit
>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>> contains
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essential
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradictions… but of what?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For Marx the whole point of commodity
>>>>> exchange/value
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> beginning of an explanation of the 'economy',
>>>>>>>> capitalism,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> labour
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory of value is the key to its collapse …
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What is the equivalent 'point' of sign exchange
>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogue?
>>>>>>>>>>>> And
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the equivalent of the theory of value? I think the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sensuous/supersensuous
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a distraction from the 'point'.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That’s my puzzle.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Julian
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 17/04/2017 21:49,
>>>> "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.
>>>>>> edu
>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>>>> behalf
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of Wolff-Michael Roth"
>>>>>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>>>>> behalf
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Julian,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the sign is to the verbal exchange what the
>>>>>>>> commodity
>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> commodity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exchange--both the sensuous and supersensuous
>>>> parts
>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky are writing about. :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied
>>>>>>>>>> Cognitive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of
>>>>>>>> Victoria
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Victoria,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-dir
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ections-in-mat
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-
>>>> education/the-mathematics-of-
>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematics/>*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 12:11 PM, Julian
>>>> Williams
>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael and all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am coming late to this discussion and maybe
>>>>> have
>>>>>>>>>> been
>>>>>>>>>>>>> missing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> important thingsŠ but I want to see a few issues
>>>>>>>>>> addressed
>>>>>>>>>>>> by
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Functor:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Commodity => Sign: my skepticism follows to
>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>> extent
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> critique I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote of the mapping 'labor = learning' that you
>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>> familiar
>>>>>>>>>>>>> with:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some ways I am even more skeptical of this
>>>>>>>> metaphor.
>>>>>>>>>> So:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Commodity to sign, is a unit of a totality as
>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>> 'economy'
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ..
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'Š?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Š '
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What ? Maybe 'dialogue/discourse'?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What is the 'value' that is exchanged in
>>>>> discourse,
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does it ultimately realise its 'use value' in
>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>> sort
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogic 'consumption'
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of useful understanding?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> How does the producer of value 'labour' to
>>>>> produce
>>>>>>>> it,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'labour time' related to the 'exchange value' of
>>>> the
>>>>>>>> sign
>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> results?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [Bearing in mind that the labour theory of value
>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>> Marx's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essential
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contribution.]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then how does this work relate to devious
>>>>> studies:
>>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>>>>> already
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of Bourdieu who assigns cultural
>>>> capital/value
>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> power
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the cultural fieldŠ is there a connection here?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Best regards as ever
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Julian
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ps I need to come back to you about Hegel (I am
>>>>> far
>>>>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>>>>>> happy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with reading the 'Ideal' as a straightforward
>>>>>>>>>> negation of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'Real'
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> implicit
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in what you sayŠ) when I have thought about this a
>>>>> bit
>>>>>>>>>> more
>>>>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maybe in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2018Š we should pick up! :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 17/04/2017 18:22,
>>>>>>>> "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>>>>> behalf
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of Wolff-Michael Roth"
>>>>>>>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behalf of wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> things become easier to think through if you
>>>> do
>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>> take an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> individualist
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> starting point but a relational one---not "she
>>>>>>>> has to
>>>>>>>>>>>> produce
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> . .
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look at what is happening in the exchange,
>>>> where
>>>>>>>> each
>>>>>>>>>>>> giving
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> taking, such that in a commodity exchange, you
>>>> have
>>>>>>>>>> double
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> giving-taking;
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a verbal exchange, each speaking also
>>>>> involves
>>>>>>>>>>>> listening
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> receiving,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the receiving is for the purpose of giving
>>>>>>>>>>>> (speaking,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> replying).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> soon as you do this, you remain with
>>>> back-and-forth
>>>>>>>>>>>> movement,
>>>>>>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> longer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> action but transaction.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other interesting thing is that the
>>>> Russian
>>>>>>>> word
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> znachenie,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> translated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as "meaning" (really, signification) also
>>>>>>>> translates
>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "value"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "magnitude," and Il'enkov (2009) parenthetically
>>>>> adds
>>>>>>>>>>>> "function"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "rôle". I am quoting from p. 178:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx joins Hegel as regards terminology, and
>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>> Kant or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fichte, who tried to solve the problem of
>>>>>>>> Œideality¹
>>>>>>>>>>>> (i.e.,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> remaining Œinside
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness¹, without venturing into the
>>>>>>>> external
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sensuously-perceptible
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> corporeal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world, the world of the palpable-corporeal
>>>> forms
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This Hegelian definition of the term
>>>>>>>> Œideality¹
>>>>>>>>>>>> takes
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whole
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> range of phenomena
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within which the Œideal¹, understood as the
>>>>>>>>>> corporeally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> embodied
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> form
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the activity of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> social man, really exists as activity in the
>>>>>>>> form
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conversely, as the thing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the form of activity, as a Œmoment¹ of this
>>>>>>>>>>>> activity, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fleeting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metamorphoses.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Without an understanding of this state
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> affairs
>>>>>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> impossible to fathom
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the miracles performed by the commodity before
>>>>>>>>>> people¹s
>>>>>>>>>>>> eyes,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the commodity-form of the product,
>>>> particularly
>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dazzling money-form, in the form
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notorious Œreal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> talers¹, Œreal roubles¹, or Œreal dollars¹,
>>>>> things
>>>>>>>>>>>> which,
>>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> soon
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have the slightest
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretical understanding of them, immediately
>>>>>>>> turn
>>>>>>>>>> out
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œreal¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all, but Œideal¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through and through, things whose category
>>>> quite
>>>>>>>>>>>>> unambiguously
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> includes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> words, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> units of language, and many other Œthings¹.
>>>>> Things
>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wholly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œmaterial¹,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> palpable-corporeal formations, acquire all
>>>> their
>>>>>>>>>>>> Œmeaning¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (function
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rôle) from Œspirit¹,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from Œthought¹ and even owe to it their
>>>> specific
>>>>>>>>>>>> corporeal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Outside spirit and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> without it there cannot even be words; there
>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>> merely a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> vibration of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> air.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>> -----------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ---------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor
>>>> Applied
>>>>>>>>>>>> Cognitive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of
>>>>>>>>>> Victoria
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2
>>>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> directions-in-mat
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-
>>>>>> education/the-mathematics-of-
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematics/
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 8:31 AM,
>>>>>>>>>>>> <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am attempting to follow Wolff-Michael¹s
>>>>>>>>>> trajectory as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> presented in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> article (A Dialectical Materialist Reading of
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> Sign). On
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> page
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 149
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attempts to clarify the difference between
>>>> sign
>>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œuse-value¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> &
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sign
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex Œvalue¹.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> His methodology is to read Marx
>>>> Œsubstituting¹
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> word
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ŒSIGN¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (implying
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sign complex) FOR Œcommodity¹ and intuites
>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>> method
>>>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> generative.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here is his realization through the method of
>>>>>>>>>>>> re-reading
>>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (trading,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> translation, transposition) as I am carried along.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a) USE-VALUE: Œnatural signs¹ such as animal
>>>>>>>>>> footprints
>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful/functional to the hunter inherently;
>>>>> they
>>>>>>>> do
>>>>>>>>>> NOT
>>>>>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œvalue¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (exchangeble value) though they do have use-value
>>>>> for
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> hunter
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hunting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> party in finding game. Similarly a sign
>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>>> can be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> product of human labour without being Œvalue¹
>>>>>>>>>>>> (exchangeable).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Someone
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> who
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> satisfies HER needs through her product
>>>>> produces
>>>>>>>>>>>> Œuse-value¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> NOT
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œvalue¹.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> b) VALUE: (exchangeable). To produce SIGNS
>>>>>>>>>> (complexes),
>>>>>>>>>>>> she
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> produce
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not only Œuse-value¹ but use-value FOR
>>>> others.
>>>>>>>> She
>>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> produce Œsocietal¹ use-values.... To be/come
>>>>>>>>>>>> (exchangeable)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> SIGN, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> product
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HAS
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TO BE TRANSFERRED to another, FOR whom the
>>>> SIGN
>>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œconstitutes¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> use-value.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The production of signs that produce no
>>>> Œvalue¹
>>>>>>>>>> that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exchangeable
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> FOR
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others leads to personal notes often having NO
>>>>>>>>>>>> use-value to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trans/form use-value to BE come Œvalue¹
>>>> requires
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exchangeability
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> under
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lighting various forms of SIGN (complexes).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Apologies to Wolff-Michael if my echoing his
>>>>>>>>>> re-reading
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> methodology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> garrbled the trans/mission?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I offer this because it helps clarify my
>>>>> reading
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œuse-value¹ & Œvalue¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (exchangeable)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My morning musement
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>
>>
>>
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