[Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'

Thu Apr 20 22:44:52 PDT 2017

Marx did die in the middle of writing Capital, David, and it 
was finished by Engels thirty years later.

Andy

------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy
http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making 

On 21/04/2017 3:38 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> I think that "statement" is too tight, and "utterance" is too loose. A
> statement is an indicative-declarative wording of some kind: we don't
> usually refer to commands (imperatives), questions
> (indicative-interrogatives), or exclamations as "statements" because their
> primary purpose is not to state facts (that is, if there are facts, they
> are ancillary, and not constitutive: we can have a command, a question, or
> an exclamation without any statement of any state of affairs, e.g. "Look
> out!" "Why?" "Oh, no!"). So "statement" is too narrow.
>
> An utterance, as Bakhtin defines it, is simply the stretch of language we
> find between two changes in speaker (this is why a book is a single
> utterance). This is an entirely descriptive unit: if I give you a tape of
> listening test dialogues for the Test of Proficiency in Korean, you will be
> able to tell me exactly how many utterances there are in each dialogue, and
> even whether the speakers are men or women, without understanding any of
> the language. As a link between thinking and speech, such a unit is beside
> the point. So "utterance" is too broad.
>
> And linking thinking and speech IS the point. I think you and Vygotsky are
> using the word "holophrase" somewhat teleologically, like a fond, but
> expectant, grandpa. You both think that the baby who says "mama" really
> means a holophrase like "Mama, put me in the high chair". It's not the case
> that "Mama" is a reduction of a full sentence (like "Fine, thanks, and
> you?"). It's more like the Ur Wir, or "Grandwe", the "we" that pre-exists
> "me" and "you" the way that my grandpa pre-existed me. I am also using the
> word "wording" teleologically, you notice: "Mama" is, from the child's
> point of view, meaning and sounding, but not wording at all. But teleology
> is very useful here; indeed, I think that teleology in speech ontogenesis
> is a more useful principle than evolution: there is, after all, a "complete
> form" right there in the environment.
>
> The problem with Thinking and Speech is that, unlike Capital, the author
> died in the middle of writing it, and it had to be eked out with his old
> articles. So although Chapter One and Chapter Seven really do use wording
> and not word as a unit of analysis (and the "phoneme" is really the
> morpho-phoneme, e.g. a Russian case ending, something Vygotsky probably
> learned all about from his old professor Trubetskoy and his classmate at
> Moscow University Jakobson). you also have Chapter Five, which our late,
> beloved friend Paula Towsey loved so much.
>
> She had reason: Chapter Five is Vygotsky, and so it's brilliant. But it's
> OLD Vygotsky, 1928-1929 Vygotsky (that was the year that Trubetskoy and
> Jakobson left Moscow for Prague and set up the Prague Linguistic Circle
> which eventually became systemic-functional linguistics). Chapter 5
> is based on something from the German idealist psychologists Reimat and
> Ach, who really DID believe in one-word concepts. And so we have this weird
> block-like model of word meaning. Vygotsky tries to disenchant and
> de-fetishize the blocks by saying the concept is really the process of
> relating the word meaning to the block, but that still means that a concept
> is an abstraction and a generalization of some block-like quality.
>
> Chapter Six is better, because here the "model" of word meaning is a
> RELATOR, like "because" or "although". Notice that these are the kinds of
> words that preliterate children do not consider words. And in fact that's
> why Piaget got the results he did--the kids really couldn't figure out what
> he meant when he asked them to explain what the word "because" meant in a
> particular sentence--they assumed he wanted to know what the sentence
> meant, because asking what a word like "because" means in a sentence
> without the rest of the sentence is really a little like asking if there
> are more white flowers or more flowers in a bouquet of red and white
> flowers. But suppose (over a period of some years) we give the kid the
> following
> utterances-cum-statement/wordings-cum-wordgroup/wordings-cum-words.
>
> a) A rational, designed, and planned economy is possible in the USSR. (Why
> is that, Teacher?) Oh, it is just because all the means of production
> belong to the workers and peasants.
> b) Planned economy is possible in the USSR because all the means of
> production belong to the workers and peasants.
> c) All the means of production belong to the workers and peasants so
> economic planning is possible in the USSR.
> d) Workers and peasant's ownership of the means of production means
> socialist construction is possible.
> e) Public ownership of production enables social construction.
> f) the proprietary preconditions of construction
> g) socialist property forms
> h) socialist property
> i) socialism
>
> By the time the child is the age when children beget other children,
> this child will see that the clause wording "all the means of production
> belong to the workers and peasants" has become a nominal group wording
> "public ownership", and the nominal group wording "a rational, designed,
> and planned economy" has become a single, block-like word "socialism". And
> because for Vygotsky the "internal" really means the psychological, while
> the "external" really just means the interpersonal, and because wording is
> inversely proportional to the internalization of inner speech, I think we
> can see that e) is a kind of internalization of a) and I) is an
> internalization of e).
>
> But neither tight knickers nor baggy trousers will show this. We will need
> a theory of grammar that can make fine distinctions between clause-level
> wording, group-level wording, and word-level wording in order to describe
> and explain it, much less intervene in it and promote it. Otherwise, not
> only will our model of the concept look like a wooden block, our model of
> "internalization" will look like a "suture" or  an "ingrowing" (c.f. end of
> HDHMF Chapter Five). No fond, expectant, grandpa wants a grandchild's
> mind covered with scars.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 10:47 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>
>> Choosing your wording carefully, David, you come up with "wording" to
>> describe what I think of as the holophrases in question. To help me clarify
>> your point for myself, and to use your way of communicating about it,  how
>> does the wording "wording" relate to the wordings "statement" or
>> "utterance" offered by Michael in the first case and by others in the group
>> on behalf of Bakhtin?
>>
>> is there a holphorastic rendering/wording that might help us out here?
>>
>> Mike
>>
>> PS- As an afterthought, the examples feel like an utterance to me. But that
>> might make a liar out of me too :-)
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 4:33 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> In English, the number of syllables or morphemes in a word is often
>>> unclear, while the number of words in a sentence is always fairly clear.
>>> This isn't true for preliterate children, who have a hard time
>>> understanding that "a" and "of" are actually words. It's true enough for
>>> people who can read and write, but its really an accident of
>>> orthography (notice that "it's" appears to be one syllable but two
>>> morphemes, and it's not really clear, even to the normally quite
>>> overwheening "wordcount" function in Word, how many words are
>>> actually there.
>>>
>>> Other languages are not like English. So for example in Chinese (a
>>> non-alphabetic language), the number of syllables and morphemes is
>>> always clear, but the number of words in a sentence is quite unclear
>> (when
>>> you read a page of Chinese, there are no spaces between morpho-syllables
>>> that mark out "words". Chinese poetry, and classical Chinese, plays with
>>> this a lot: the unit is the morpheme rather than the word, and the
>> overall
>>> effect (at least on me) is a stream of syllables and morphemes and
>> meanings
>>> but not words.
>>>
>>> So I think the place to look for Vygotsky's unit of analysis is not in
>> the
>>> actual word "word" or "word meaning" (slovo or znachenie slova). Holbrook
>>> Mahn has proposed translating "znachenie slova" as "verbal meaning", and
>>> although this isn't exactly an accurate way of presenting how Russian
>>> grammar really works, it IS a good way of getting around the trap set for
>>> those who are only going by the English word meaning of "word meaning".
>>>
>>> I think the place to look is in Vygotsky's examples. In the first part of
>>> Thinking and Speech, for example, Vygotsky agrees with Stern that the
>>> child's first "word" has to be construed as not a word but a whole
>> wording.
>>> He goes even further: he says it's a whole "wording-in-context", that
>> is, a
>>> meaning. (And remember, Vygotsky NEVER agrees with Stern about ANYTHING
>>> unless he absolutely has to!) And in the LAST part of Thinking and
>> Speech,
>>> Vygotsky gives many examples: 'the clock fell", "the tram B is arriving",
>>> "Would you like some tea"? What all of these examples have in common is
>>> that they are not single words but they are single wordings.
>>>
>>> Remember that Russian has no articles; this is something that Andy
>> himself
>>> points out with respect to whether "perezhivanie" should be "a
>>> perizhivanie" or just "perizhivanie". I think Andy's observation is
>>> essentially correct (although of course we undo part of his insight when
>> we
>>> insist that all languages must "really" have an article of some kind).
>> But
>>> it needs to be generalized: Vygotsky could NOT have ever written that
>>> the unit of analysis is "a" word meaning, simply because "a", as any
>>> preliterate child will tell you, is not a word (and certainly not a
>> Russian
>>> word).
>>>
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 5:19 PM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. <
>>> d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk
>>>> wrote:
>>>> Re the development of punctuation and the origin of 'words' see
>>>> http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?3.61
>>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@
>>>> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole
>>>> Sent: 20 April 2017 01:45
>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'
>>>>
>>>> "the word" in Russian, Andy, has shades of meaning tending toward the
>>>> biblical from current common understandings of the term as a sort
>>> "lexical
>>>> object."  The Vai didnotmakethesamedistinction when writing and neithr
>>> did
>>>> the Greeks.
>>>> I believe there are those who would include the utterance in its
>> meaning
>>>> as used by Vygotsky. Slippery these translation problems! But
>> discussion
>>> of
>>>> them often reveals clarification of the various concepts involved as
>> they
>>>> appear in different peoples' vocabularies. Mediation has some of those
>>>> properties.
>>>>
>>>> The polysemy of just one language is enough for one poor translator to
>>>> deal with! The polsyemic playing field when you cross language/cultural
>>>> systems is what gives academics something to do.  :-)
>>>>
>>>> mike
>>>>
>>>> mike
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:26 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>> wrote:
>>>>> and as a further note of caution, the unit in "Thinking and Speech"
>> is
>>>>> a word, not an utterance, and yet it is utterance which seems to be
>>>>> analogous to "commodity."
>>>>>
>>>>> Andy
>>>>>
>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
>> decision-making
>>>>> On 20/04/2017 7:01 AM, Julian Williams wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Michael/all
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I  go back a few posts (as ever being a bit slower than this
>>>>>> list-serve demands - let me do this before the discussion moves to
>>>>>> 'binocular
>>>>>> vision') and challenge the metaphor of commodity/utterance: I can
>> see
>>>>>> it has merit but also I want to look at the limitations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You say: 'the sign is to the verbal exchange what the commodity is
>> to
>>>>>> the Commodity-exchange' … But I think I was asking for a
>>>>>> characterisation of the larger totality involved - e.g. The
>>>>>> 'economy/mode of production and its contradictions/collapse' and
>> 'what
>>>> - dialogue?'
>>>>>> And I think Andy B agrees with you when he says 'both take an
>>>>>> artefact-mediated relation between individuals as the unit'… But
>>>>>> suggests he recognises my problem when he refers to 'its language'
>>>>>> (or I might say 'consciousness', 'discourse'  or maybe
>> 'intercourse').
>>>>>> But - as I argued in critique of the metaphor 'labour = learning',
>>>>>> this mapping only goes so far, and has certain dangers. The relation
>>>>>> between commodity/economy (and the mode of production) and
>>>>>> utterance/discourse (and the ideological super/infra-structure) is
>>>>>> much more interesting in the concrete relations of history. I refer
>>>>>> to Marx (the German ideology) and Volosinov.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In reality the relation between commodity production and
>>>>>> 'sign-related/mediated' discourse (Marx calls 'intercourse') is
>>>>>> dialectical. Each 'mediates' the other in historical development,
>> and
>>>>>> even in collective production-and-dialogue.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thus, I suggest, the 'exchange/use value' of an utterance/dialogic
>>>>>> exchange maybe ought to be examined in the ideological context of
>> its
>>>>>> relationship with the 'whole' of social re/production where class
>>>>>> power becomes visible. I don't know how to do this, but the argument
>>>>>> is there in
>>>>>> Bourdieu: the power relations between people are part of the
>>>>>> capital-mediated structure of relations in a field (including the
>>>>>> field of opinion/discourse), and this explains the forms of
>> discourse
>>>>>> that express these power relationships and help to hold powerful
>>>>>> positions in place in the field. In this view it is not possible to
>>>>>> identify the 'value' of an utterance or a sign outside of this wider
>>>>>> analysis… and an analysis of the particular discursive/cultural
>> field
>>>> within its wider sociality.
>>>>>> Sorry this is a bit prolix and so likely to provoke tangential
>>>> responses:
>>>>>> I did not have time tonight to write a shorter more focussed post.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best wishes
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Julian
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ps The separate discussion on mediation: this might be another
>>>>>> thread. I only want to note here that the mediation of the
>>>>>> 'intercourse' through its 'other' in the material form of
>>>>>> 'production' (I call the economy above) and vice versa does not
>>>>>> involve a mediator 'between' the two, but is purely hegelian in
>>>>>> seeing the mediation of 'x' through 'not x' in a totality.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 18/04/2017 16:34, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
>>>>>> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Larry, do not be confused. Take it with Bateson (Mind and Nature),
>>>>>> and see
>>>>>>> Andy and Michael as two eyes. You then get this:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is correct (and a great improvement) to begin to think of the
>> two
>>>>>>> parties to the interaction as two eyes , each giving a monocular
>>>>>>> view of what goes on and , together , giving a binocular view in
>>>>>>> depth. This double view is the relationship . (p.133)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What is gained by comparing the data collected by one eye with the
>>>>>>> data collected by the other? Typically , both eyes are aimed at the
>>>>>>> same region of the surrounding universe, and this might seem to be
>> a
>>>>>>> wasteful use of the sense organs. But the anatomy indicates that
>>>>>>> very considerable advantage must accrue from this usage. The
>>>>>>> innervation of the two retinas and the creation at the optic
>> chiasma
>>>>>>> of pathways for the redistribution of information is such an
>>>>>>> extraordinary feat of morphogenesis as must surely denote great
>>>>>>> evolutionary advantage . (p.69)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> --------------
>>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied Cognitive Science
>>>>>>> MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P
>> 5C2
>>>>>>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/
>> faculty/mroth/>
>>>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-dir
>>>>>>> ections-in-mat
>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 8:18 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> different trajectories, Larry.
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
>> decision-maki
>>>>>>>> ng On 18/04/2017 11:44 PM, lpscholar2@gmail.com wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Andy, Julian, Michael,
>>>>>>>>> My learning curve at this moment is in the way of Michael
>>>>>>>>> describing the back and forth double movement. That is both
>>>>>>>>> giving/receiving, both
>>>>>>>>> (expressing/listening) occurring WITHIN our relationship. This
>>>>>>>>> prior to or more primordial then taking the individual stance as
>>>>>>>>> primary and the relation as derivative.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So... In this ‘spirit’ I will pose a question?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Andy says: ‘artefact mediated relation BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS as a
>>> unit.
>>>>>>>>> Michael says: You remain with back-and-forth movement that is
>>>>>>>>> NEVER action but IS transcation. Here the back-and-forth
>>>>>>>>> ‘relation’ is the UNIT, and the individuals emerge from WITHIN
>>>>>>>>> this primordial double relation.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Are Andy and Michael on the same trajectory, shifting the accent,
>>>>>>>>> or are imdividuals situated differently in the comtrasting
>> notions
>>>>>>>>> of units.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In particular does Andy ‘figure’ bridges whereas Michael
>> ‘figures’
>>>>>>>>> gaps in the notion of BETWEEN.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Pursuing my growing edge, going out on a limb
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *From: *Andy Blunden <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>> *Sent: *April 17, 2017 11:54 PM
>>>>>>>>> *To: *xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Julian/Michael,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I remember getting very excited back in the early '80s when
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I spotted the symmetry between the first chapters of Capital
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> and Marx's critique of algebra in his Mathematical
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Manuscripts. That lasted about a week. The symmetry between
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's analysis of speech and Marx's analysis of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> production is a strong one because both take an
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> artefact-mediated relation between individuals as the unit.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There is a symmetry at the level of the molar unit as well,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> which, so far as I know has been neglected. But this
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> structural symmetry cannot usefully be taken too far. The
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> "point" is that the unit is a unit of a whole, and the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> productive activity of a community is not the same as its
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> language, which as Marx said "the philosophers are bound to
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> make into an independent realm." Concretely, speaking is not
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> producing. But like all human activities, both are subject
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> to analysis by units of artefact-mediated actions.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
>> decision-mak
>>>>>>>>> ing
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 18/04/2017 7:01 AM, Julian Williams wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>> In principle I am Ok with the idea of the unit that contains the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> essential
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> contradictions… but of what?
>>>>>>>>>> For Marx the whole point of commodity exchange/value is that it
>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> beginning of an explanation of the 'economy', capitalism, and the
>>>>>>>>> labour
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> theory of value is the key to its collapse …
>>>>>>>>>> What is the equivalent 'point' of sign exchange in dialogue? And
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> where
>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> the equivalent of the theory of value? I think the
>>>>>>>>> sensuous/supersensuous
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> is a distraction from the 'point'.
>>>>>>>>>> That’s my puzzle.
>>>>>>>>>> Julian
>>>>>>>>>> On 17/04/2017 21:49, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf
>>>>>>>>>> of Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
>> behalf
>>>>>>>>>> of wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Julian,
>>>>>>>>>>> the sign is to the verbal exchange what the commodity is to the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> commodity
>>>>>>>>> exchange--both the sensuous and supersensuous parts are there
>> that
>>>>>>>>>> Marx
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky are writing about. :-)
>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --------------
>>>>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied Cognitive
>>>>>>>>>>> Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria
>> Victoria,
>>>>>>>>>>> BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth
>>>>>>>>>>> <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
>>>>>>>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-dir
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ections-in-mat
>>>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>*
>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 12:11 PM, Julian Williams <
>>>>>>>>>>> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael and all
>>>>>>>>>>>> I am coming late to this discussion and maybe have been
>> missing
>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>> important thingsŠ but I want to see a few issues addressed by the
>>>>>>>>>>>> Functor:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Commodity => Sign: my skepticism follows to some extent the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> critique I
>>>>>>>>> wrote of the mapping 'labor = learning' that you are familiar
>> with:
>>>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>> some ways I am even more skeptical of this metaphor. So:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Commodity to sign, is a unit of a totality as in 'economy' to
>> ..
>>>>>>>>>>> 'Š?
>>>>>>>>> Š '
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> What ? Maybe 'dialogue/discourse'?
>>>>>>>>>>>> What is the 'value' that is exchanged in discourse, and how
>>>>>>>>>>>> does it ultimately realise its 'use value' in some sort of
>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogic 'consumption'
>>>>>>>>>>>> of useful understanding?
>>>>>>>>>>>> How does the producer of value 'labour' to produce it, and how
>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> 'labour time' related to the 'exchange value' of the sign that
>>>>>>>>>>> results?
>>>>>>>>> [Bearing in mind that the labour theory of value is Marx's
>>>>>>>>>>> essential
>>>>>>>>> contribution.]
>>>>>>>>>>>> Then how does this work relate to devious studies: we already
>>>>>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> work of Bourdieu who assigns cultural capital/value to symbolic
>>>>>>>>>>> power
>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> the cultural fieldŠ is there a connection here?
>>>>>>>>>>>> Best regards as ever
>>>>>>>>>>>> Julian
>>>>>>>>>>>> Ps I need to come back to you about Hegel (I am far from happy
>>>>>>>>>>>> with reading the 'Ideal' as a straightforward negation of the
>>>> 'Real'
>>>>>>>>>>> implicit
>>>>>>>>> in what you sayŠ) when I have thought about this a bit more -
>>>>>>>>>>> maybe in
>>>>>>>>> 2018Š we should pick up!   :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 17/04/2017 18:22, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
>> behalf
>>>>>>>>>>>> of Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
>>>>>>>>>>>> behalf of wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> things become easier to think through if you do not take an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> individualist
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> starting point but a relational one---not "she has to produce
>>> . .
>>>>>>>>>>>> ."
>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>>>>> look at what is happening in the exchange, where each giving
>>>>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> taking, such that in a commodity exchange, you have double
>>>>>>>>>>>> giving-taking;
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a verbal exchange, each speaking also involves listening
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> receiving,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the receiving is for the purpose of giving (speaking,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> replying).
>>>>>>>>> As
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> soon as you do this, you remain with back-and-forth movement, no
>>>>>>>>>>>> longer
>>>>>>>>> action but transaction.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other interesting thing is that the Russian word
>>>>>>>>>>>>> znachenie,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> translated
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> as "meaning" (really, signification) also translates as
>> "value"
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> "magnitude," and Il'enkov (2009) parenthetically adds "function"
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> "rôle". I am quoting from p. 178:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx joins Hegel as regards terminology, and not Kant or
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fichte, who tried to solve the problem of Œideality¹ (i.e.,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> while
>>>>>>>>> remaining Œinside
>>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness¹, without venturing into the external
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> sensuously-perceptible
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> corporeal
>>>>>>>>>>>>> world, the world of the palpable-corporeal forms and
>> relations
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>        This Hegelian definition of the term Œideality¹ takes
>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> whole
>>>>>>>>> range of phenomena
>>>>>>>>>>>>> within which the Œideal¹, understood as the corporeally
>>>>>>>>>>>>> embodied
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> form
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the activity of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> social man, really exists  as activity in the form of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>> conversely, as the thing
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the form of activity, as a Œmoment¹ of this activity, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> fleeting
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> metamorphoses.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>        Without an understanding of this state of affairs it
>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> impossible to fathom
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the miracles performed by the commodity before people¹s eyes,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the commodity-form of the product, particularly in its
>>>>>>>>>>>>> dazzling money-form, in the form
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> notorious Œreal
>>>>>>>>>>>>> talers¹, Œreal roubles¹, or Œreal dollars¹, things which, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> soon
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> have the slightest
>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretical understanding of them, immediately turn out to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Œreal¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> at
>>>>>>>>>>>>> all, but Œideal¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>> through and through, things whose category quite
>> unambiguously
>>>>>>>>>>>> includes
>>>>>>>>> words, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> units of language, and many other Œthings¹. Things that,
>> while
>>>>>>>>>>>> being
>>>>>>>>> wholly
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œmaterial¹,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> palpable-corporeal formations, acquire all their Œmeaning¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> (function
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> rôle) from Œspirit¹,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> >from Œthought¹ and even owe to it their specific corporeal
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> existence.
>>>>>>>>> Outside spirit and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> without it there cannot even be words; there is merely a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> vibration of
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> air.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>> -----------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ---------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied Cognitive
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
>>>>>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> directions-in-mat
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-
>> mathematics/
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 8:31 AM, <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am attempting to follow Wolff-Michael¹s trajectory as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> presented in
>>>>>>>>> his
>>>>>>>>>>>>> article (A Dialectical Materialist Reading of the Sign). On
>>>>>>>>>>>>> page
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 149
>>>>>>>>> he
>>>>>>>>>>>>> attempts to clarify the difference between sign complex
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œuse-value¹
>>>>>>>>> &
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> sign
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex Œvalue¹.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> His methodology is to read Marx Œsubstituting¹ the word
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ŒSIGN¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (implying
>>>>>>>>>>>>> sign complex) FOR Œcommodity¹ and intuites this method will
>> be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> generative.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here is his realization through the method of re-reading as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (trading,
>>>>>>>>> translation, transposition) as I am carried along.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a) USE-VALUE: Œnatural signs¹ such as animal footprints are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful/functional to the hunter inherently; they do NOT have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œvalue¹
>>>>>>>>> (exchangeble value) though they do have use-value for the hunter
>>>>>>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>> hunting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> party in finding game.  Similarly a sign complex can be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> product of human labour without being Œvalue¹ (exchangeable).
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Someone
>>>>>>>>> who
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> satisfies HER needs through her product produces Œuse-value¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> NOT
>>>>>>>>> Œvalue¹.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> b) VALUE: (exchangeable). To produce SIGNS (complexes), she
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> produce
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not only Œuse-value¹ but use-value FOR others. She has to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> produce Œsocietal¹ use-values.... To be/come (exchangeable)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> SIGN, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> product
>>>>>>>>> HAS
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TO BE TRANSFERRED to another, FOR whom the SIGN complex
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œconstitutes¹
>>>>>>>>> use-value.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The production of signs that produce no Œvalue¹ that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> exchangeable
>>>>>>>>> FOR
>>>>>>>>>>>>> others leads to personal notes often having NO use-value to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>>>> To
>>>>>>>>>>>>> trans/form use-value to BE come Œvalue¹ requires
>>>>>>>>>>>>> exchangeability
>>>>>>>>>>>>> under
>>>>>>>>>>>>> lighting various forms of SIGN (complexes).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Apologies to Wolff-Michael if my echoing his re-reading
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> methodology
>>>>>>>>> garrbled the trans/mission?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I offer this because it helps clarify my reading of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œuse-value¹ & Œvalue¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (exchangeable)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My morning musement
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>
>