[Xmca-l] Re: Help needed finding LSV references to *First*and*Second* Signal Systems

[David Kellogg]

Larry:

I think that "sens" is one kind of "valeur", specifically, it's use value
and not exchange value. Word value changes from being mostly "sens" (smysl)
in the child to being mostly "signification" (znachenie) in the adult. The
French is actually not very useful here, because the distinction
sens/signification comes to us from Paulhan, for whom both are
psychological concepts and neither one is sociological, but if you rework
the distinction using Volosinov's "theme" and "meaning" it makes perfect
sense (the same is true of reworking Saussure's "valeur" as Marx's
"value"). We start with use-values, and through "co-generalization" we
create exchange-values.

As you say, the real distinction Vygotsky is getting at, outside word
value, lies in the disinction between "environment" (what Hasan and
Malinowski would call the "Context of Situation") and "world" (what they
would call the "Context of Culture"). These two kinds of context are
related in more or less the same way that a text (in a Context of
Situation) is related to a whole language system (in a Context of Culture).
That is, they are related along a cline of instantiation, like weather and
climate, or like coins in your pocket and the whole money supply.

When Vygotsky complains that Claparede and Piaget have left no "inner link"
between conscious awareness and free will, he means something pretty
specific. For Piaget and his boss Claparede, the both free will and
conscious awareness are caused by "unsuccessful adaptations"--that is, by
drinking the coffee before it is cooled off, which teaches you to be aware
of the temperature and select the wiser option of eating your doughnut
first. Nothing here that an associative model of thinking can't handle.

But for Vygotsky, the existence of conscious awareness and free will is all
the proof we need to know that the nature of thinking is NOT associative.
Associative thinking is made up of minimal choices arranged right in your
face, like whether you are going to drink your coffee first or eat your
donut first. It's the meal and not the menu. But free will is a choice
between what is and what could be: it's a menu and not a meal. You can see
that free will only exists if you are conscious of what you could have, and
only if you have consciousness of what you could have do you have free
choice. That's an inner link.

David Kellogg
Macquarie University

On Sat, Nov 5, 2016 at 2:32 AM, <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> On the first page of David’s translation he say Vugotsky asks how
> çonsciousness and free will are internally linked because the answer that
> the common cause of this linking through *unsuccessful adaptations to the
> environment* - are a *purely external link*.
> Vygotsky’s alternative answer is that both consciousness and free will
> come into view through co-generalization -that is through word *values*
> (implying sens which always has a direction of action toward actual*ity).
> Thesw word values are shared in communication. They are *internally
> linked* through their shared co-generated and co-generating (which resumes
> the temporally co-generated)  *intellectualization*
> This intellectualization with its *internal moment* of sens contrasts with
> the notion that sens is a purely external link of consciousness through
> adaptation to the environment.
> I will add these alternatives contrast *worlds* and *environment*
> Apology for jumping in quickly but i hope it is relevant to the
> exploration of gender equality. I will start a new thread.
>
> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>
> From: Rod Parker-Rees
> Sent: November 4, 2016 6:52 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help needed finding LSV references to
> *First*and*Second* Signal Systems
>
> Many thanks for sending the lecture, David.
>
> I think the passage where V underlines the distinction between
> 'co-generalized' and non co-generalized' thinking is intriguing:
>
> "From the psychological point of view, the transition from sensation to
> thinking signifies in the first place a transition from a
> non-co-generalized to a co-generalized reflection of reality in
> consciousness".
>
> Is there an etymological connection between the Russian words общения and
> обобщения and the word for teaching/learning which I know as 'obuchenie'?
>
> I teach a module which is grandly entitled 'Understanding Understanding',
> the main focus of which is on the social nature of understanding
> (etymologically 'standing among' rather than standing under!) - how we
> don't understand something unless we know something of what it means to
> other people. I think this was understood centuries ago and it informs the
> etymology of words like conscience and consciousness (con-scientia -
> co-knowing) and concepts (what is known together). So when V writes here
> about co-generalized thinking is he using the same terms as he used in
> Thinking and Speech (I believe) to contrast spontaneous and 'scientific' or
> 'schooled' concepts? I have always read this as an argument that the
> 'private' and the 'public' cannot be understood in isolation - the
> spontaneous concepts bring 'colour and vitality' and significance to the
> abstract scientific concepts which provide structure and sharability for
> the spontaneous concepts.
>
> Is there something you can recommend as a way in to Hasan's work?
>
> All the best,
>
> Rod
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@
> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg
> Sent: 04 November 2016 04:25
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help needed finding LSV references to *First*and
> *Second* Signal Systems
>
> Peter: (Maybe both Peters?)
>
> Sometimes I think the best we husbands, fathers, and political activists
> can really do to promote gender equality in intellectual discourse is not
> to maintain a respectful male silence but rather to use our own booming
> baritones to amplify outstanding thinkers whose voices are in danger of
> being lost precisely because they were more soprano, or because they
> belonged to women born on the wrong side of the planet, or both. I am
> thinking of Ruqaiya Hasan, who is in imminent danger of being lost, even to
> feminist writers, in the cacaphony of Bourdieu, Baudrillard, Lyotard,
> Habermas, Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, and even Freud, none of whom had
> anything to say about Vygotsky (and, not coincidentally, all of whom are
> lesser sociolinguists than she was).
>
> Ruqaiya was an appreciative but also very critical reader of Vygotsky.
> Sometimes, when I am reading her thoughts on Vygotsky I feel like she is
> holding the book upside down, but then when I read it again I find that I
> am the one standing on my head. For example, one of the great advantages
> that Hasan finds in Vygotsky is not that he distinguishes between the
> higher and lower psychological functions. As far as Ruqaiya was concerned
> there was a bit too much of that around, and there still is. Instead,
> Ruqaiya finds that Vygotsky's strength is being able to link them together,
> precisely through his studies of children, including the biological and the
> social in a single complex unit of analysis (e.g. phonology AND
> lexicogrammar in a single dimension, which Vygotsky calls "phasal").
>
> Ruqaiya doesn't mean that "signalization" is tied to "signification"--she
> is too much of a linguist and too much of a dialectician not to see the
> huge gap between them. But she does think that the word values (or, as she
> would prefer it, the "wording values") that are the bases for signification
> are Whorfian, Sapirian social co-generalizations. These are biological in
> the sense that they are huntable, gatherable, herdable, farmable,
> reproducible. They are also, in materialized form, edible and wearable:
> they are often made out of economic interests: they are exchange values,
> like the exchange value of any commodity they evolve from use values based
> in adapting the environment to human needs.
>
> Take a look at this. I think it is probably literally the last public
> lecture Vygotsky ever gave, and as far as I know it's never been translated
> into any language (except now Korean). I'm including the Russian because my
> own Russian is...well, lousy, and I keep hoping some of the Russophones on
> the list may catch some errors before it goes to press in February. In it,
> Vygotsky is trying to show exactly what Ruqaiya was talking about: the way
> in which the child goes from "non-co-generalized" thinking to
> co-generalized thinking. It's not a step. It's not a leap. It's a whole set
> of leaps, some of which depend on parents, professionals, and political
> activists.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 9:04 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] <
> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:
>
> > Dear colleagues,
> >
> > As a representative of the category *Slow Responder* (I am a busy
> > professional, a husband, a father of two, and a political activist), I
> > am only now getting around to replying to those who responded to my
> > earlier request for help. My apologies if my pace is too slow for a
> > satisfying exchange.
> >
> > Because I was fairly vague about my reason for asking for a reference
> > to first and second signal systems in Vygotsky's writings, I
> > unwittingly opened the door to discussion of the differences between
> > *signals* and *signs*. In fact, my interest is in their
> > *similarities*, in the properties that are common to both. I am
> > seeking the common denominator between animal stimulus-response thinking
> and human initiation-response thinking.
> > Fortunately, that linkage exists precisely where David Kellogg pointed
> me:
> > in Vol. 4, on p.55 of HDHMF in Vygotsky's Collected Works in English.
> >
> > Vygotsky is very clear when he distinguishes between *natural* signals
> > (or
> > signalization) and *artificial* signs (or signification). The former
> > occurs when animals interact with the environment and their brains
> > form conditioned reflexes, whereas the latter occurs when humans
> > invent their own conditioned reflexes (words) and then apply those
> > reflexes to themselves (or others) in order to master their own
> > behavior. In essence, Vygotsky considered *signification* a special case
> of *signalization*.
> >
> > One issue I had not counted on is the historical/political one. I was
> > unprepared for the possibility that the first and second signal
> > systems may have been a political problem of accommodation to the
> > authorities rather than an actual scientific problem. Thanks to Mike
> > for pointing that out, and for pointing out A.R. Luria's fairly
> > substantial contribution to the discussion--but especially for
> > contacting (the wonderful and brilliant) Tanya Akhutina!
> >
> > I'm not quite sure how to make good use of Huw's suggestion about
> > serial and parallel circuits, so I'll have to put that issue to the side
> for now.
> > But thanks for raising it.
> >
> > In light of the ongoing discussion about how to create a more
> > gender-sensitive and gender-balanced dialogue on this listserv, I
> > would like to invite anyone who is lurking (or very busy) to
> > contribute any useful information you may have about my request *in your
> own good time*.
> > These problems are complicated, and I'm learning to be patient.
> >
> > Thanks to all.
> >
> > In solidarity,
> > Peter
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Oct 29, 2016 at 6:55 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >
> > > Peter -- Concerning your initial question. I obtained the following
> > answer
> > > from Tanya Akhutina.
> > >
> > > Майк,
> > > Павлов написал о второй сигнальной системе в 1932 г. Соответственно
> > > упоминаний о ней можно ждать только в 33 и 34 годах. Я таких
> > > упоминаний у Выготского не помню.
> > > АРЛ - другое дело, он обязан был так говорить. Об этом хорошо пишет
> > > Ольга Виноградова, ученица АРЛ, первая жена В.И.Лубовского. Ее
> > > воспоминания о времени после Павловской сессии Лена Лурия цитирует в
> > > своей книжке на
> > стр.
> > > 144: " А.Р. прекрасно знал Павловское учение, и в его лекциях
> > > изменилась лексика и красоты прямого психологического языка были
> > > заменены, но тем не менее знания, которые он нам давал, оставались
> > > на уровне настоящей
> > науки".
> > >
> > > Roughly,
> > > Mike,
> > > Pavlov wrote about the second signal system in 1932.
> > > Correspondingly, references/rememberances to it had to wait until
> > > 1933-34. Such
> > references/
> > > rememberances in Vygotsky I do not recall.
> > >
> > > ARL was another case, he was obligated to speak in this way. Olga
> > Sergeevna
> > > Vinogradova, a student of ARL's [with whom I conducted research in
> > > the winter of 1962/63-mc] is cited by Lena Luria [Luria's daughter]
> > > in her
> > book
> > > on p. 144 "A.R. new the teachings of Pavlov perfectly, and in his
> > lectures
> > > he changed the lexicon and the beauty of a straightforward
> > > psychological language was replaced, but none the less the knowledge
> > > which he gave us remained on the the level of real science."
> > >
> > > On Sat, Oct 29, 2016 at 3:42 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> > >
> > > > It seems that side-by-side translations of the two documents merit
> > > > archival publication, David. JREEP is an obvious repository. In
> > addition
> > > to
> > > > which at present we have a good deal more evidence about children,
> > chess
> > > > boards, and the issues vexing Vygotsky than he had access to. The
> > > > non/difficult chronology of the texts complicates an already
> > complicated
> > > > process of interpretation as we have long witnessed here.
> > > >
> > > > Perhaps as a separate thread, it would be nice to put together a
> > > > discussion of the core linkages between Vygotsky and Halliday in
> > > > your work..... one of those chains of discussion that come and go.
> > > > Perhaps a mini-course devoted to the following, to me, essential
> idea:
> > > >
> > > >  It seems to me that ALL of these are signalization systems (not
> > > > signifying systems, because they do not have lexicogrammar and
> > > > cannot convey ideal values)
> > > >
> > > > Providing a "cheat sheet" for autodidacts, might it be possible to
> > create
> > > > some
> > > > "field of interest" in the xmca discussion for dealing with this
> idea?
> > > >
> > > > I have in no way forgotten the issue of the relation of
> > > > microgenesis
> > and
> > > > ontogenesis. It seems another "key point" as most of us go about
> > > > using
> > > CHAT
> > > > ideas in the course of the teaching/learning activities that pay
> > > > the
> > > bread
> > > > and butter. As matters stand, I offer Franklin in the blocks as an
> > > example
> > > > of microgenesis in a preschool classroom involving play as an
> > > > example
> > of
> > > a
> > > > zone of proximal development where childre are a head taller than
> > > > themselves. That discussion is for the microgenesis/ontogenesis
> > > > thread
> > > if I
> > > > recall.
> > > >
> > > > I would be VERY interested to learn of ways that feminist, queer
> > theory,
> > > > critical disability studies theory, neurodiversity theory, and
> > > > others
> > can
> > > > help me to understand these categories and the theories that
> > > > purport to account for them.
> > > >
> > > > If they need to be re-thought, might as well be here. Ain't goin
> > nowhere.
> > > >
> > > > mike
> > > >
> > > > On Sat, Oct 29, 2016 at 2:28 PM, David Kellogg
> > > > <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> I'm working with two versions of one of Vygotsky's last lectures
> > > >> (the second version is given exactly five days before he was
> > > >> brought home
> > > with
> > > >> a
> > > >> throat haemorrhage to die, the first about a year earlier). There
> > > >> are passages that are almost word for word repetitions. There are
> > > >> passages that are semantically the same and but quite differently
> > > >> worded (the
> > earlier
> > > >> Vygotsky is quite modest and tentative; the later Vygotsky is
> > > >> much
> > more
> > > >> critical and also more confident). Then there are passages that
> > > >> say
> > > pretty
> > > >> much the opposite of what was said a year earlier: for example,
> > > >> in the early lecture Vygotsky says that a child faced with a
> > > >> chessboard who doesn't know how to play will see it structurally
> > > >> and sort the pieces
> > by
> > > >> color (black pieces on black squares, white on white) but in the
> > > >> later lecture it is the child who does know how to play who sees
> > > >> it structurally, because the child sees a black knight in a
> > > >> "structure" with a white
> > > pawn.
> > > >> He's a genius, and geniuses tend to think things over a lot,
> > > >> turning
> > > them
> > > >> this way and that, and never looking at anything as final, not
> > > >> even
> > when
> > > >> they are about to die.
> > > >>
> > > >> HDHMF has to be read the same way. Vygotsky cannot quite seem to
> > > >> make
> > up
> > > >> his mind whether there are three stages of higher behavior
> > > >> (instinct, habit, intelligence) or four different stages of
> > > >> higher behavior (instinct, habit, intelligence, and freedom). In
> > > >> Chapter Four, he very clearly
> > > argues
> > > >> for four or more, but in Chapter Five, which may have been
> > > >> written
> > much
> > > >> earlier, he argues for three but then three paragraphs later
> > > >> considers
> > > it
> > > >> safer to begin as Thorndike does with two levels (unconditional
> > > >> and conditional responses). So "signal" vs. "signification" could
> > > >> just be
> > > seen
> > > >> as the difference between unconditional and conditional
> > > >> responses, or
> > it
> > > >> could be seen as the difference between instinct and
> > > >> intelligence, or
> > it
> > > >> could be seen as two poles with an almost infinite number of
> > > >> genetic variations in between. I prefer the latter view, but I
> > > >> recognize that Vygotsky has to package things pretty differently
> > > >> for different
> > > audiences,
> > > >> and we are not one of the audiences that he has foremost in his
> mind.
> > > >>
> > > >> Take bacteria. Bacteria are apparently capable of quorum sensing:
> > > >> that
> > > is,
> > > >> bacteria don't multiply when there are no other bacteria around,
> > > >> they
> > do
> > > >> when there are some but not too many, and they don't when there
> > > >> are
> > too
> > > >> many. Now, take ants. Ants have a system of finding new nests
> > > >> that involves scouting for potential sites. If the site is
> > > >> extremely good, they go
> > > back
> > > >> and take other ants there quickly, but if it is not so good they
> > > >> tend
> > to
> > > >> dawdle a little, with the result that the best site gets more
> > > >> ants,
> > and
> > > at
> > > >> a certain point the whole nest "decides" to move there. Now, take
> > > >> bees. Like ants, bees go scouting. The scouts come back and they
> > dance;
> > > >> the
> > > >> dances attract more or fewer onlookers, and when a quorum is
> > > >> reached,
> > > the
> > > >> hive moves. It seems to me that ALL of these are signalization
> > > >> systems (not signifying systems, because they do not have
> > > >> lexicogrammar and cannot convey ideal values) but the difference
> > > >> between the ant system  and
> > the
> > > >> bee
> > > >> system is as big as the difference between the bee system and
> > > >> early
> > > child
> > > >> language. For ants, the scouting and decision making are not
> > > >> differentiated, but for bees they are distinct moments--so the
> > > >> ant
> > > system
> > > >> involves a simple signal system and the bee system involves a
> > > >> second signal system.
> > > >>
> > > >> David Kellogg
> > > >> Macquarie University
> > > >>
> > > >> On Sun, Oct 30, 2016 at 3:45 AM, <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >> > In this discussion The center of this relational exploration is
> > > between
> > > >> > signalization AND signification and my question goes back to
> > > >> > the
> > place
> > > >> of
> > > >> > the general term *gesturing*.
> > > >> > Is this signalization or is this phenomena signification.
> > > >> > The act creating actual*ity (sens) which always includes
> > > >> > tendency or orientation towards or away from something.
> > > >> > The act is gestural acts and implies *each in the other*.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > The relation of gestural receiving and responding and this
> > > >> > phenomena
> > > in
> > > >> > relation to signalization and signification.
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> > Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> > > >> >
> > > >> > From: Huw Lloyd
> > > >> > Sent: October 29, 2016 9:01 AM
> > > >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA-ers: Help needed finding LSV
> > > >> > references
> > to
> > > >> > *First*and *Second* Signal Systems
> > > >> >
> > > >> > Peter,
> > > >> >
> > > >> > If by signalisation you mean use of signs to influence
> > > >> > behaviour in
> > > >> terms
> > > >> > of operational criteria and speech, then yes this is so.  It
> > > >> > has
> > been
> > > >> > studied quite systematically, but is perhaps less well known. I
> > > >> > can elaborate on this if this is your drift.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > Best,
> > > >> > Huw
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> > On 28 October 2016 at 22:43, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] <
> > > >> > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:
> > > >> >
> > > >> > > David,
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > As usual, your suggestions are both helpful and erudite.
> > > >> > > Thanks
> > for
> > > >> the
> > > >> > > poignant references to Vygotsky and to Marx.  Although Soviet
> > > academic
> > > >> > > politics may have complicated the issue, there does seem to
> > > >> > > be
> > some
> > > >> > > substance to the argument that the nervous systems of animals
> > > >> > > and
> > > the
> > > >> > > speech communication systems of humans share the common
> > > >> > > property
> > of
> > > >> > > *signalization*. Personally, I think there's a lot more to
> > > >> > > this
> > > topic
> > > >> > than
> > > >> > > meets the eye--or, better yet, there's a lot of opportunity
> > > >> > > here
> > for
> > > >> > > developing the problem further.
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > Once again, I owe an intellectual debt to the participants of
> > > >> > > this listserv!
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > Cheers,
> > > >> > > Peter
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 5:10 PM, David Kellogg <
> > > dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> > > >> > > wrote:
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > > Peter:
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > I think Mike's right. The "second signal system" was an
> > > >> > > > attempt
> > to
> > > >> > > preserve
> > > >> > > > the idea of higher psychological functions in an atmosphere
> > > >> > > > that
> > > was
> > > >> > not
> > > >> > > > that different from what was going on in America at the
> > > >> > > > same
> > time
> > > >> (and
> > > >> > > > which Mike experienced first hand in both places). When I
> > > >> > > > read
> > > >> > Belyayev's
> > > >> > > > work on foreign language teaching, he talks a lot about the
> > > "second
> > > >> > > signal
> > > >> > > > system". There, are, however, two places in Vygotsky which
> > > >> > > > MIGHT
> > > >> > provide
> > > >> > > > some support, if you wanted to make the case that the
> > > >> > > > "second
> > > signal
> > > >> > > > system" is not completely incompatible with Vygotsky.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > One is Chapter Two of the History of the Development of the
> > Higher
> > > >> > Mental
> > > >> > > > functions. See below. Starting around paragraph 142,
> > > >> > > > Vygotsky
> > > likens
> > > >> > > > Pavlov's model of the brain as a telephone exchange. The
> > problem,
> > > of
> > > >> > > > course, is that back then telephone exchanges did require
> > > >> > > > human
> > > >> > operators
> > > >> > > > to make the connection!
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > The other is the discussion of "second order symbolism" in
> > > >> > > > the
> > > work
> > > >> of
> > > >> > > > Delacroix, which you can find in Chapter Six of Thinking
> > > >> > > > and
> > > Speech
> > > >> and
> > > >> > > > also in Chapter 7 of HDHMF (fifth para). This is a very
> > different
> > > >> > > > notion--it's the idea that writing is a set of symbols for
> > > speaking.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > David Kellogg
> > > >> > > > Macquarie University
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > >From HDHMF, Chapter Two, Research Method
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > We know that, as Pavlov says, “the most general bases of
> > > >> > > > higher
> > > >> nervous
> > > >> > > > activity are ascribed to the large hemispheres, the same in
> > > >> > > > both
> > > >> higher
> > > >> > > > animals and in people, and for this reason even elementary
> > > >> phenomena of
> > > >> > > > this activity must be identical in the one and in the other
> > > >> > > > in
> > > both
> > > >> > > normal
> > > >> > > > and pathological cases” (1951, p. 15). Actually, this can
> > scarcely
> > > >> be
> > > >> > > > disputed. But as soon as we go from the elementary
> > > >> > > > phenomena of
> > > >> higher
> > > >> > > > nervous activity to the complex, to the higher phenomena
> > > >> > > > within
> > > this
> > > >> > > higher
> > > >> > > > – in the physiological sense – activity, then two different
> > > >> > > methodological
> > > >> > > > paths for studying the specific uniqueness of human higher
> > > behavior
> > > >> > open
> > > >> > > > before us.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > One is the path to further study of complication,
> > > >> > > > enrichment,
> > and
> > > >> > > > differentiation of the same phenomena that experimental
> > > >> > > > study
> > > >> > ascertains
> > > >> > > in
> > > >> > > > animals. Here, on this path, the greatest restraint must be
> > > >> observed.
> > > >> > In
> > > >> > > > transferring information on higher nervous activity of
> > > >> > > > animals
> > to
> > > >> > higher
> > > >> > > > activity of man, we must constantly check the factual
> > similarities
> > > >> in
> > > >> > the
> > > >> > > > function of organs in man and animals, but in general the
> > > principle
> > > >> > > itself
> > > >> > > > of the research remains the same as it was in the study of
> > > animals.
> > > >> > This
> > > >> > > is
> > > >> > > > the path of physiological study.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > True, this circumstance is of major significance and in the
> > > >> > > > area
> > > of
> > > >> > > > physiological study of behavior, in a comparative study of
> > > >> > > > man
> > and
> > > >> > > animals,
> > > >> > > > we must not put the function of the heart, stomach, and
> > > >> > > > other
> > > organs
> > > >> > > which
> > > >> > > > are so similar to that of man on the same plane with higher
> > > nervous
> > > >> > > > activity. In the words of I. P. Pavlov, “It is specifically
> > > >> > > > this
> > > >> > activity
> > > >> > > > that so strikingly sets man apart from the rank of animals,
> > > >> > > > that
> > > >> places
> > > >> > > man
> > > >> > > > immeasurably above the whole animal world” (ibid. p. 414).
> > > >> > > > And
> > we
> > > >> might
> > > >> > > > expect that along the path of physiological research we
> > > >> > > > will
> > find
> > > a
> > > >> > > > specific qualitative difference in human activity. Let us
> > > >> > > > recall
> > > the
> > > >> > > words
> > > >> > > > of Pavlov cited above on the quantitative and qualitative
> > > >> > incomparability
> > > >> > > > of the word with conditioned stimuli of animals. Even in
> > > >> > > > the
> > plan
> > > of
> > > >> > > strict
> > > >> > > > physiological consideration, “the grandiose signalistics of
> > > speech”
> > > >> > > stands
> > > >> > > > outside the whole other mass of stimuli, the
> > > >> > > > “multicapaciousness
> > > of
> > > >> the
> > > >> > > > word” places it in a unique position.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > The other path is the path of psychological research. From
> > > >> > > > the
> > > very
> > > >> > > > beginning, it proposes to seek the specific uniqueness of
> > > >> > > > human
> > > >> > behavior
> > > >> > > > which does take us beyond the initial point. The specific
> > > >> uniqueness is
> > > >> > > > considered not only in its subsequent complexity and
> > development,
> > > >> > > > quantitative and qualitative refinement of the cerebral
> > > hemispheres,
> > > >> > but
> > > >> > > > primarily in the social nature of man and in a new method
> > > >> > > > of
> > > >> > adaptation,
> > > >> > > as
> > > >> > > > compared with animals, that sets man apart. The main
> > > >> > > > difference
> > > >> between
> > > >> > > the
> > > >> > > > behavior of man and of animals consists not only in that
> > > >> > > > the
> > human
> > > >> > brain
> > > >> > > is
> > > >> > > > immeasurably above the brain of the dog and that the higher
> > > nervous
> > > >> > > > activity “so strikingly sets man apart from the rank of
> > animals,”
> > > >> but
> > > >> > > most
> > > >> > > > of all, because it is the brain of a social being and
> > > >> > > > because
> > the
> > > >> laws
> > > >> > of
> > > >> > > > higher nervous activity of man are manifested and act in
> > > >> > > > the
> > human
> > > >> > > > personality.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > But let us return again to the “most general bases of
> > > >> > > > higher
> > > nervous
> > > >> > > > activity, related to the cerebral hemispheres,” and
> > > >> > > > identical in
> > > >> higher
> > > >> > > > animals and man. We think that it is in this point that we
> > > >> > > > can
> > > >> disclose
> > > >> > > > with definitive clarity the difference of which we speak.
> > > >> > > > The
> > most
> > > >> > > general
> > > >> > > > basis of behavior, identical in man and animals, is
> > > *signalization.*
> > > >> > > Pavlov
> > > >> > > > said, “So the basic and most general activity of the
> > > >> > > > cerebral
> > > >> > hemispheres
> > > >> > > > is signaling with an infinite number of signals and with
> > > changeable
> > > >> > > > signalization” (ibid., p. 30). As is known, this is the
> > > >> > > > most
> > > general
> > > >> > > > formulation of the whole idea of conditioned reflexes that
> > > >> > > > lies
> > at
> > > >> the
> > > >> > > base
> > > >> > > > of the physiology of higher nervous activity.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > But human behavior is distinguished exactly in that it
> > > >> > > > creates
> > > >> > artificial
> > > >> > > > signaling stimuli, primarily the grandiose signalization of
> > > speech,
> > > >> and
> > > >> > > in
> > > >> > > > this way masters the signaling activity of the cerebral
> > > >> hemispheres. If
> > > >> > > the
> > > >> > > > basic and most general activity of the cerebral hemispheres
> > > >> > > > in
> > > >> animals
> > > >> > > and
> > > >> > > > in man is signalization, then the basic and most general
> > activity
> > > of
> > > >> > man
> > > >> > > > that differentiates man from animals in the first place,
> > > >> > > > from
> > the
> > > >> > aspect
> > > >> > > of
> > > >> > > > psychology, is *signification,* that is, creation and use
> > > >> > > > of
> > > signs.
> > > >> We
> > > >> > > are
> > > >> > > > using this word in its most literal sense and precise meaning.
> > > >> > > > Signification is the creation and use of signs, that is,
> > > artificial
> > > >> > > > signals.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > We will consider more closely this new principle of
> > > >> > > > activity. It
> > > >> must
> > > >> > not
> > > >> > > > in any sense be contrasted with the principle of
> signalization.
> > > >> > > Changeable
> > > >> > > > signalization that results in the formation of temporary,
> > > >> conditional,
> > > >> > > > special connections between the organism and the
> > > >> > > > environment is
> > an
> > > >> > > > indispensable, biological prerequisite of the higher
> > > >> > > > activity
> > that
> > > >> we
> > > >> > > > arbitrarily call signification and is its base. The system
> > > >> > > > of
> > > >> > connections
> > > >> > > > that is established in the brain of an animal is a copy or
> > > >> reflection
> > > >> > of
> > > >> > > > natural connections between “all kinds of agents of nature”
> > > >> > > > that
> > > >> signal
> > > >> > > the
> > > >> > > > arrival of immediately favorable or destructive phenomena.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > It is very obvious that such signalization – a reflection
> > > >> > > > of the
> > > >> > natural
> > > >> > > > connection of phenomena, wholly created by natural
> > > >> > > > conditions –
> > > >> cannot
> > > >> > be
> > > >> > > > an adequate basis of human behavior. For human adaptation,
> > > >> > > > an
> > > active
> > > >> > > > *change
> > > >> > > > in the nature of man *is essential. It is the basis of all
> > > >> > > > human
> > > >> > history.
> > > >> > > > It necessarily presupposes an active change in man’s behavior.
> > > >> > “Affecting
> > > >> > > > the environment by this movement and changing it, he
> > > >> > > > changes his
> > > own
> > > >> > > nature
> > > >> > > > at the same time,” says Marx. “He develops forces asleep in
> > > >> > > > it
> > and
> > > >> > > subjects
> > > >> > > > the play of these forces to his own will” (K. Marx and F.
> > Engels,
> > > >> > > > *Collected
> > > >> > > > Works,* Vol. 23, pp. 188-189
> > > >> > > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-
> > > >> > > > 3A__www.marxists.org_archive_marx_works_1867-2Dc1_ch07.htm-
> > > >> > > > 23forces&d=DQIFaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURk
> > > cqADc2guUW8IM&r=
> > > >> > > > mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=
> > > >> > cxiDdHmIrHosSMq59vJlZ4j-S-
> > > >> > > > 4h5DSiLaMzqzi2yNA&s=J3sZBxFP1DTk3B8MLGJTyEw-
> > > RZmpA347cJfMSUrwSa4&e=
> > > >> >).
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > On Sat, Oct 29, 2016 at 7:50 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] <
> > > >> > > > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > > Mike,
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > Thanks for the Luria references.  From a cursory reading
> > > >> > > > > of
> > the
> > > >> > > relevant
> > > >> > > > > passages in the Luria & Yudovich book, and judging by
> > > >> > > > > some of
> > > the
> > > >> > other
> > > >> > > > > sources you listed, I get the impression that there
> > > >> > > > > hasn't
> > been
> > > >> much
> > > >> > > > > theoretical *fleshing out* of the structures of the
> > > >> > > > > second
> > > signal
> > > >> > > system.
> > > >> > > > > I hope that the concept of a first and second signal
> > > >> > > > > system is
> > > not
> > > >> > > just a
> > > >> > > > > political argument, but instead has some real substance.
> > > >> > > > > I
> > find
> > > it
> > > >> > hard
> > > >> > > > to
> > > >> > > > > imagine that our *animal* (stimulus-response) system of
> > thinking
> > > >> is
> > > >> > > > > developmentally unrelated to our *human* (conversational
> > > >> > > > > initiation-response) system of thinking.
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > If anyone else knows of any passages from Vygotsky
> > > >> > > > > related to
> > > this
> > > >> > > topic,
> > > >> > > > > please don't hold back!
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > Much obliged.
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > In solidarity,
> > > >> > > > > Peter
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 1:56 PM, mike cole
> > > >> > > > > <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > > >> wrote:
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > Peter-- If you google Luria "second signal system" you
> > > >> > > > > > will
> > > >> come up
> > > >> > > > with
> > > >> > > > > > several references. There is a copy at luria.ucsd.edu
> > > >> > > > > > of
> > his
> > > >> > little
> > > >> > > > book
> > > >> > > > > > with Yudovich on twins that uses that language.
> > > >> > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > It is not online (so far as i know), but Luria's
> > > >> > > > > > article on
> > > >> "Speech
> > > >> > > > > > development and the formation of mental processes" in
> > > >> > > > > > Cole
> > and
> > > >> > > > > > Maltzman, *Handbook
> > > >> > > > > > of Soviet Psychology. *Basic Books, 1969 uses this term
> > > >> > > > > > a
> > lot.
> > > >> > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > I believe you will find an upsurge of usage associated
> > > >> > > > > > with
> > > the
> > > >> > late
> > > >> > > > > > 1940's-50's when Vygotskians were under severe attack,
> > > >> > > > > > there
> > > >> were
> > > >> > > > special
> > > >> > > > > > "Pavlov sessions" where they had to recant their
> > > >> > > > > > errors, and
> > > the
> > > >> > use
> > > >> > > of
> > > >> > > > > > first and second signal system by Pavlov allowed them a
> > > >> > > > > > life line to orthodoxy.
> > > >> > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > mike
> > > >> > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 10:43 AM, Peter Feigenbaum
> > > >> > > > > > [Staff] < pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:
> > > >> > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > Dear colleagues,
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > I don't wish to detract in any way from the very
> > > >> > > > > > > serious
> > and
> > > >> > > > absolutely
> > > >> > > > > > > necessary discussion about male sensitivity (or
> > > >> > > > > > > should I
> > say
> > > >> > > > > > insensitivity)
> > > >> > > > > > > to the voices of the women inhabiting this list, but
> > > >> > > > > > > I
> > sure
> > > >> could
> > > >> > > use
> > > >> > > > > > your
> > > >> > > > > > > collective help with a small matter of scholarship. I
> > > >> > > > > > > am
> > > >> trying
> > > >> > to
> > > >> > > > > locate
> > > >> > > > > > > any passages in LSV's Collected Works in English in
> > > >> > > > > > > which
> > he
> > > >> > refers
> > > >> > > > to
> > > >> > > > > > the
> > > >> > > > > > > *first* and *second* signal systems.
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > My understanding is that Vygotsky considers the first
> > signal
> > > >> > system
> > > >> > > > as
> > > >> > > > > > the
> > > >> > > > > > > biologically inherited stimulus-response (S-R) system
> > > >> > > > > > > of
> > > >> reflexes
> > > >> > > as
> > > >> > > > > > > described by Pavlov, whereas the second signal system
> > refers
> > > >> to
> > > >> > the
> > > >> > > > > > > culturally inherited system of initiation-response
> > > >> > > > > > > that is
> > > >> > > particular
> > > >> > > > > to
> > > >> > > > > > > human conversational activity. I am working with the
> > > >> hypothesis
> > > >> > > that,
> > > >> > > > > in
> > > >> > > > > > > ontogenetic development, the first signal system
> > > >> > > > > > > becomes
> > > >> > > > *domesticated*
> > > >> > > > > > by,
> > > >> > > > > > > and ultimately subordinated to, the second signal
> system.
> > > That
> > > >> > is,
> > > >> > > > the
> > > >> > > > > > S-R
> > > >> > > > > > > form of thinking becomes developmentally transformed
> > > >> > > > > > > into
> > > the
> > > >> > > > > > > Initiation-Response form of thinking that is
> > characteristic
> > > >> of a
> > > >> > > > person
> > > >> > > > > > > performing a listening-speaking turn in conversation.
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > If any of the wonderful scholars on this list could
> > > >> > > > > > > help
> > > point
> > > >> > this
> > > >> > > > > poor,
> > > >> > > > > > > stumbling colleague
> > > >> > > > > > > in the right direction, I would be most grateful.
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > Warm wishes to all,
> > > >> > > > > > > Peter
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > p.s. -- Let me take this opportunity to express my
> > heartfelt
> > > >> > thanks
> > > >> > > > to
> > > >> > > > > > Mike
> > > >> > > > > > > for creating this list in the first place, and with
> > > >> > > > > > > it the
> > > >> > > > opportunity
> > > >> > > > > > for
> > > >> > > > > > > Vygotskian scholars the world over to share and
> > > >> > > > > > > discuss
> > our
> > > >> ideas
> > > >> > > in
> > > >> > > > an
> > > >> > > > > > > open and honest forum. For my part, I pledge to do my
> > level
> > > >> best
> > > >> > to
> > > >> > > > > raise
> > > >> > > > > > > my own consciousness where it is deficient so that my
> > > >> > participation
> > > >> > > > in
> > > >> > > > > > this
> > > >> > > > > > > forum will be as inclusive and respectful to all of
> > > >> > > > > > > its
> > > >> > > participants
> > > >> > > > as
> > > >> > > > > > is
> > > >> > > > > > > humanly possible.
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > --
> > > >> > > > > > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> > > >> > > > > > > Director,
> > > >> > > > > > > Office of Institutional Research
> > > >> > > > > > > <http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_> > >
> > > >> > > > provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp>
> > > >> > > > > > > Fordham University
> > > >> > > > > > > Thebaud Hall-202
> > > >> > > > > > > Bronx, NY 10458
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243
> > > >> > > > > > > Fax: (718) 817-3817
> > > >> > > > > > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > >
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > --
> > > >> > > > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> > > >> > > > > Director,
> > > >> > > > > Office of Institutional Research
> > > >> > > > > <http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_>
> > > >> > > > provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp>
> > > >> > > > > Fordham University
> > > >> > > > > Thebaud Hall-202
> > > >> > > > > Bronx, NY 10458
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243
> > > >> > > > > Fax: (718) 817-3817
> > > >> > > > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > --
> > > >> > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> > > >> > > Director,
> > > >> > > Office of Institutional Research
> > > >> > > <http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/
> > > >> > > office_of_institutio/index.asp> Fordham University Thebaud
> > > >> > > Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > Phone: (718) 817-2243
> > > >> > > Fax: (718) 817-3817
> > > >> > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> > > >> > >
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >>
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> > Director,
> > Office of Institutional Research
> > <http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_
> > provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp>
> > Fordham University
> > Thebaud Hall-202
> > Bronx, NY 10458
> >
> > Phone: (718) 817-2243
> > Fax: (718) 817-3817
> > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> >
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