[Xmca-l] Re: Which comes first, context or text?

[Rod Parker-Rees]

Mike,

I would say that for you, as an already accomplished participant in a culture of concept systems, the sharing of your oriole experience might well be with a whole host of internalised others. As adults we can share an experience with our friends without needing them to be there ('X and Y would love this') - and of course social media allows us to share experiences with remote friends, though I am not sure that the pleasure of sharing is of quite the same order - maybe it is more so for digital natives.

My interest in 'which comes first' is really ontological - I would have to argue that for any individual person context always comes first because we are born into a pre-existing (albeit fluid) culture. I am also inclined to go along with Steven Mithen's contention (e.g. in 'The Singing Neanderthals') that interactions and relations, first expressed through movements and vocalisations, must have preceded any form of language.

An image which I particularly like is of a mountain rising out of lush, verdant valleys. Down in the valleys life is abundant, rich and complicated but as one ascends the mountain the vegetation gives way to ice and snow. The air becomes clear and cold and one can see for miles. Climbing is a very direct form of abstraction, lifting oneself out of the muddle of context to be able to see further and more clearly. But you can't live up there for long. Very young children live in the foothills but they don't have to find their own ways up to higher places because they are able to see their parents and siblings making the ascent.

For me it is a particular challenge to try to imagine what it is like to be a two-year-old, not yet able to lift oneself out of one's immediate context to think 'about' things but instead able to think in and with the things and people and interactions that make up one's environment or context. I would argue that it is easy to forget this 'withness thinking' as John Shotter calls it, once thought is marshalled by more or less shared concept systems. Even the most abstract of thinkers still have to come down the mountain sometimes to engage with other people, to eat, wash and sleep and these contexts of lived practice are also internalised, like the opinions of our friends, and become part of our own relationships with our contexts.

All the best,

Rod

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole
Sent: 22 March 2016 00:27
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Which comes first, context or text?

Dear Colleagues.

Mike:

I did not intend to offer the oriole example as an example of foreground
and background, David. Rather, what I was after was the process of an event
becoming a semantic event. I was under the influence of the discussion of
fon/phonem and Rod's questions about which comes first.



My example seems to fit Rod's specifies the process as I experienced it
pretty well. An initial flash of unexpected light for which there is no
name that becomes lexified as "the male oriole!"  But the issue of sharing
is a little problematic. Standing in the backyard, not talking aloud, with
whom was I sharing an event being woven into a semantic event? The semantic
event happened, but the sharing?



It seems important that Tomsello's monumental corpus of work should find
its way into this discussion. And Nelson's too.



Anyway, thanks to all for bringing round this topic. That it should occur
mutually relevant to community psychology and to whatever this list
represents, seems non-accidental.



mike



PS- On the question of context and figure/ground, I will send around three
uses of the metaphor of context as rope. Their variety of
origins/applications of the metaphor strike me as worth thinking about and
speak to David's characterization of my views.

On Mon, Mar 21, 2016 at 3:31 PM, Rod Parker-Rees <
R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:

> This is helpful, David but I am not sure that your cline, as I understand
> it, fully recognises the asymmetries of texts framed in systems of concepts
> and texts framed in 'real' things and interactions. For the infant there is
> no significant distinction between the attention and activity and the
> knowledge which subtends them. Concepts, categories and words allow
> multiple instances to be woven into nameable ideas which can exist outside
> any particular 'real' context and can therefore be shared but whether we
> think lived experience is reduced or elevated to shareable knowledge, that
> knowledge can only be understood if it is given colour and vitality by
> 'spontaneous concepts'. So the wordy, abstractable text depends on every
> hearer/reader/participant's ability to connect shared branches with private
> roots - breathing meaning into it but when meaning is shared directly, in
> shared attention, for example, it does not depend on participants' ability
> to make connections with the branches of a system of concepts. It may be
> possible to put this sort of 'face to face' meaning sharing into words
> (though inevitably this will involve some reduction or elevation) but this
> translation is not a necessary part of the experience of the text.
>
> I have a feeling that weather is already half way reduced/elevated, a
> generalisation which can describe an experience shared by many, even if it
> has not attained the level of generalisation required for thinking about
> climate. Shared attention may be something more contained - a flash of
> lightning, a gust of wind or a flurry of snow on the face of that beast!
>
> It seems to me that what is required for an event to be woven into a
> semantic event is just that its noticing is shared. When infants 'discover'
> that a previously undifferentiated 'Great We' can be differentiated into
> 'my attention' AND 'your attention' they can delight in the experience of
> 'locking on' which is felt when attention is shared. I am still very
> uncertain about the boundary beyond which an event can be thought of as
> semantic. I suspect that the felt familiarity of a situation which has been
> shared before (like Andy's book sharing but not necessarily with anything
> as texty as a book) may be enough to produce a sense of 'Ah, I know what to
> expect here' which might convert an experience into a kind of experience,
> elevating it (or reducing it) out of the weather of context.
>
> It is difficult to form uncertain ideas into texts which stand a chance of
> sharing meaning with people I have never even met but grappling with these
> posts does sometimes bring me up with a flash of connection (or what feels
> to me like connection!). I did like the footprints in the snow.
>
> All the best,
>
> Rod
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg
> Sent: 21 March 2016 20:57
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Which comes first, context or text?
>
> Rod:
>
> I think the word "context" will work just fine. We just have to see a
> cline of instantiation, from the context of culture (the speech community
> as a whole, seen as the sum total of all the persons who speak a language)
> and the context of situation (the elements of the context of culture and
> the elements of a material situational setting which are selected to be
> semanticized in a given exchange). This cline of instantiation between
> context of culture and context of situation is exactly what Malinowski
> describes in the long addendum he appended to "The Meaning of Meaning"
> in Ogden and Richards, except that Malinowski is not so clear about
> distinguishing between a material situational setting and a context of
> situation.
>
> Halliday (who was a big influence on Stephen P. Witte) describes the
> relationship between context of culture and context of situation as being
> like weather and climate: two different perspectives brought about by two
> different timescales on one and the same phenomenon. The difference in
> timescale does mean that in a context of culture certain phenomena which I
> will call cultural and social are foregrounded and other phenomena which I
> will call interpersonal and psychological are backgrounded, while in a
> context of situation, we find things the other way around: the
> interpersonal and psychological is made explicit and thus tends to get
> foregrounded while the cultural and social are left implicit and therefore
> backgrounded. This is not that different from climate and
> weather: with climate, what is decisive is the angle of the sun and the
> extent to which the earth retains solar radiation and what is accidental is
> the patterns of air movement, while with weather what is decisive is the
> pattern of air movement and the incidence of solar radiation is...well,
> incidental.
>
> Mike likes to say that foreground and background "create each other" I
> think that's one reason he is so taken with his orioles and with
> McDermott's spirals/concentric circles. I am less taken with these: taken
> too far, they set my dialectics against my materialism. To me the reason
> why the infant must give up proto-speech and learn mother tongue as a
> SECOND language is because in the long run climate determines weather
> rather than the other way around; in a language, the context of culture is
> ultimately mightier than the context of situation even though (and even
> precisely because) the context of culture is really nothing more than the
> sum total of contexts of situations.
>
> But let us apply Mike's principle here. If context and text really do
> create each other (and if they evolve, as you and Katherine Nelson and also
> Vygotsky describe, out of an undifferentiated joint attention) then we
> should be able to find a counterpart to text at one end of the cline of
> instantiation as easily as we do at the other.
>
> So we do. The counterpart to a context of situation is, of course, a text,
> so long as we see text as a semantic event and not simply the recording
> thereof in paper and ink. Text is what people like to call discourse, but
> such is the conservatism of academics we tend to associate text with
> writing rather than with thinking and with speech. If that were text,
> though, infants would have to wait for half a decade for it, and they
> don't. Text is semantic; we have text wherever we have the analysis of a
> setting into a context and the sharing of that analysis through
> communication. Text is the beast itself and not simply its footprints in
> the snow.
>
> And the counterpart to a context of culture? It's just the sum total of
> everything that a speech community writes, reads, speaks and understands:
> it's the sum total of text produced in a language. But my point was that
> it's text, or anyway the socio/cultural equivalent of text (and in some
> cases, e.g. the Torah or the Confucian Classics, it's literally reducible
> to a handful of written texts). It's not just "behaviour", or "activity",
> or "production".
>
> It's not behaviour because it's more about knowing than doing. It's not
> activity because it's not defined by single goals. And it's not production
> because there is no exchanging of labor and capital, no production of
> commodities, no use or exchange value, just "value" tout court. But it's
> value to which every infant is invited to partake, and in at least one way
> the infant's understanding of what is going on with the context of culture
> is more accurate than ours. Infants, unlike adults, appear to assume that
> since attention and even activity is shared, the knowledge which subtends
> them must be shared as well.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 21, 2016 at 8:01 PM, Rod Parker-Rees <
> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > David,
> >
> > I have opened a new strand to avoid distracting from the discussion of
> > the Tharp and O'Donnell article.
> >
> > If we go back to the roots of text in weaving it makes sense that, in
> > the wider sense to which you allude, text is always between people. It
> > is when people connect their interests in some way and share meanings
> > that stuff and events get woven into text. Even if you hadn't said
> > anything when you presented the book to the 9 month old baby, the
> > second presentation would be recognised as a social event - 'Oh yes,
> > this thing that we do' and this feeling of shared experience does seem
> > to play an important part in infants' assisted ability to weave
> > public, cultural meanings into their private, personal experiences.
> >
> > As Vygotsky noted, infants develop within an already woven context of
> > culture so what happens to and around them is pre-patterned and
> > because humans are oddly interested in what their infants are
> > interested in, interactions serve to model particular weaving patterns
> > and styles. Studies by Tomasello, Moll and colleagues (discussed in
> Moll, H. and Meltzoff, A.
> > (2011) Joint Attention as the fundamental basis of understanding
> > perspectives. In A. Seemann (ed.) Joint Attention: new developments in
> > psychology, philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience. Cambridge,
> > MA: MIT Press, 393-413) show that 12 month old infants appear to
> > 'remember' their interactions with a researcher and selected toys but
> > only if they have played with the toys together - watching the
> > researcher play with the toys, or playing with them while the
> > researcher watches, does not provide enough embodied, enactive,
> > interactive experience to shape future interactions (and the infant's
> > knowledge is 'context specific' - not extended to other researchers or
> other toys).
> >
> > So there is a naming problem here. Is there, as you say, no context
> > without specific, personally experienced and woven text? Or is there a
> > pre-existing context which, as yet unbeknown to the weaver, influences
> > and guides the texts which come to be formed? Infants are surrounded
> > by a cultural context which is richly and densely shaped by the
> > concept systems which have evolved out of the patterns in people's
> > behaviour. What their caregivers do with, to and around them is shaped
> > both by what those caregivers have seen other people do and by a long
> > history of people hearing and reading about what other people do and
> > have done. I would like to be able to use context to refer to the
> > culturally patterned environment in which infants are helped to notice
> > particular kinds of patterns but you want the word (if I have
> > understood correctly - and what are the chances?) to refer to a
> > personal frame of reference. This is helpful for me, highlighting the
> > way the 'same' cultural environment can be woven into different
> > contexts by different weavers, but that leaves me needing another word
> > for the co-woven, negotiated environment which enables infants to join
> > in before they have sorted out or internalised the concept systems
> > which shape it. And which allows someone entering a new job or a new
> > role to sidle in from peripheral participation to feeling they belong at
> the core of the group.
> >
> > If you haven't already read Katherine Nelson's 'Young Minds in Social
> > Worlds: experience, meaning and memory' (Harvard 2007) I would
> > strongly recommend this - she develops a strongly Vygotskyan argument
> > that infant development has to be understood in terms of interwoven
> > processes of making sense and making relationships - drawing together
> > a huge amount of research on early communication and meaning sharing.
> >
> > All the best,
> >
> > Rod
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg
> > Sent: 20 March 2016 20:31
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Article for Discussion
> >
> > Rod:
> >
> > Actually, that's just the kind of text I'm working with right now.
> > Here's the plan. Every week, we give a nine month old baby a book. We
> > ask four questions in two languages (because the baby has one Korean
> > speaking parent and one English speaking one):
> >
> > a) English: What's this?
> > b) English: Is it a ...?
> > c) Yigot mueo ya? (What's this?)
> > d) ... yi ya?   (Is it a ...?)
> >
> > Sometimes we mix up the order. This goes on every week for the next
> > three years, as the child first figures out that a book is not edible.
> > That it contains pictures. That that the pictures are not just colors
> > but meant to be signs. That beneath the pictures there are letters.
> > That the letters are not just drawings but are meant to be symbols.
> > That the symbols encode settings, characters, and problems. That the
> > problems can only be solved by means of dialogue, etc.
> >
> > Now, the first time I tried this, the child simply could not
> > concentrate on the object for any length of time. But the SECOND time
> > I did it, the child literally could not look away from it! You could
> > see that although the child had no idea what was being said, the child
> > was might just be starting to think some proto-language equivalent of
> > "What's this?" "Is it a...?" "Yi got mu eo ya?" "Chaek yi ya?" And
> > after a minute or so, the child looked up, as if to see whether the
> > large person making so much noise might be thinking something along
> those lines too.
> >
> > So maybe THAT's text! And as you can see it doesn't matter at all
> > whether the text realizes concepts or feelings or just perceptions,
> > the underlying semiotic mechanism is pretty much the same. But it
> > seems that there's only text when something has been selected from the
> > material setting by some human consciousness or consciousnesses for
> > semiotic transformation; there's only text when there some kind of
> > "metaphor" (gestural, phonological,
> > lexicogrammatical) for context. It seems that it's precisely THIS act
> > of selection which transforms a material setting into a context, and
> > it's premature to speak of context before that happens. So for example
> > I wouldn't use the term context for the first week of work, only for
> > the second.
> >
> > I think it's legitimate to talk about "social context" and "cultural
> > context", because I believe that context, like text, exists on a cline
> > of instantiation. At one end, we have the relationship between a
> > context of situation (Malinowski) and a text (Halliday). That's the
> > end I'm at right now. At the other, we have the relationship between a
> > context of culture (again, Malinowski) and...and a whole language
> > system (again, Halliday). I gather that's the end at which the KEEP
> > and the Community Development projects in Micronesia and the
> > Delinquency Research plans are working. But I don't see how "activity"
> > or "behaviour" can ever realize context, unless it is semiotic
> > activity and semiotic behaviour, in which case we might as well start
> looking around for text. That's where the garlic and ginger is.
> >
> > (Rod--I'm new at this stuff: watching infants crack the whole problem
> > of anthropogenesis single-handed, I mean. That's how exciting it is,
> > and that's about how baffling it is too. I know you are an old hand.
> > Can you give me any tips on what to read and advice about what to do
> > next?)
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Macquarie University
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Mar 20, 2016 at 10:14 PM, Rod Parker-Rees <
> > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
> >
> > > I was driven to respond to David's earlier comments about context
> > > since my own understanding of this term is in the context of trying
> > > to understand how preverbal children make sense (meanings framed by
> > > social and physical contexts more than by systems of concepts). Here
> > > it is difficult to separate a text out of the context, an 'individual'
> > > thought process apart from the interactions in which it can occur.
> > >
> > > It strikes me that Andy's point about the contexts in which concepts
> > > have their meanings is particularly relevant here. The
> > > intersubjectivity available to a caregiver-child dyad or within a
> > > family is of a different order to that available between otherwise
> > > unconnected speakers of the 'same' language. Where one is rooted in
> > > a history of shared experiences in common contexts  the other is
> > > rooted in a history of more or less abstracted ideas (concepts)
> > > which refer to
> > experiences but 'from above'
> > > rather than 'from within'. Knowing what someone else means is never
> > > completely achievable and I think the positive consequence of this
> > > is that intersubjectivity has to be understood as a process, a
> > > conversation rather than an answer. 'Feeling' with other people is
> > > not an achieved end but a means towards sharing understanding (I
> > > like the idea that the word understanding is misunderstood - 'under'
> > > deriving from the same root as 'inter' and meaning 'among' rather than
> 'below'
> > > - to understand something is to stand IN it).
> > >
> > > We can know ABOUT other cultures through reading about them or
> > > watching films but how we know cultures in which we have stood is
> > > importantly different - I think. Meeting other people, or meeting
> > > with them, can enrich our personal understanding by exposing us to
> > > different ways of thinking but I think we have to recognise that
> > > thinking ABOUT ways of interacting has to be understood as a
> > > multi-layered thing, ranging from the thickest knowing of our lived
> > > and co-lived experiences to the ethereal abstractions of
> > > philosophical
> > thought-play.
> > >
> > > So sharing concepts out of context is doable but not achievable.
> > >
> > > All the best,
> > >
> > > Rod
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > > Sent: 20 March 2016 10:34
> > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Article for Discussion
> > >
> > > I don't know if the issue is having common interests, Cliff.
> > > I think it's very productive, even necessary, that each little bunch
> > > of us has different concerns and shines light on different aspects
> > > of
> > human life.
> > > But what we really need is shared concepts, through which we can
> > > understand each other and collaborate. So it is good news that CC
> > > has appropriated zone of proximal development, activity setting,
> > > shared activity and the law of genetic development.
> > > I think we need to be very conscious of the dangers inherent in
> > > appropriating expressions like these though. You pointed out that in
> > > the early days of CC, "'cultural psychology' was generally practiced
> > > as 'cross-cultural', largely as comparison studies", but everything
> > > I read in your paper tends to suggest "culture" is still understood
> > > and used in just this sense. Consequently it is very easy to miss
> > > the meaning attached to "culture" in CHAT, which, after all,
> > > originated in pretty much a mono-cultural situation. One word can
> > > index different concepts. Achieving interdisciplinarity is only
> > > achieved by means of shared concepts. But on the other hand, since
> > > the content of a concept is ultimately the larger system of
> > > practices to which it is indigenous, it seems almost as if a concept
> > > can only be shared when the broader context of its use is already
> assimilated.
> > > Along these lines, it was a little while before I realised that you
> > > were using the word "intersubjectivity" with quite a different
> > > meaning than I would. It seems to denote empathy. "Intersubjectivity
> > > involves co-actors feeling the same emotions and values in the same
> > > situations," and I don't even know it means to "feel values."
> > > Connected with this the description of joint action, turned out to
> > > be in sharp contrast to my conception of it. As I see it,
> > > collaboration (my preferred term, rather than "joint
> > > action") necessarily entails both moments of conflict as well as
> > > cooperation. Harmony and bliss are great things, but I think they
> > > are rather cheaply purchased simply by everyone marching in step.
> > > I suspect that these two examples of shared words indicating
> > > different concepts are connected to the hope of mutual appropriation
> > > by means of having a "center of commonality."
> > >
> > > Andy
> > > ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > *Andy Blunden*
> > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> > > On 20/03/2016 12:28 PM, Cliff O'Donnell wrote:
> > > > Thanks for your thoughtful comments, Alfredo. Roland and I thought
> > > > that although CC and CHAT have many common interests, most folks
> > > > in each appeared to be unaware of the other (judging by the
> > > > infrequency of common citations). As described in our article, we
> > > > and several of our colleagues have been influenced by CHAT and
> > > > have used CHAT concepts in our research and intervention programs.
> > > > As for influence in the opposite direction, perhaps the KEEP
> > > > project, Seymour Sarason's work, and some of Maynard's work with
> > Greenfield.
> > > > Also Kurt Lewin is a source common to both CC and CHAT. I too
> > > > would be interested to hear of additional influence in the
> > > > opposite
> > direction.
> > > >
> > > > You are correct that Delta Theory builds on psychosocial systems
> > > > with Vygotsky as an important source. Delta Theory boldly attempts
> > > > to be a universal theory of how change occurs using Delta as the
> > > > symbol for change.
> > > >
> > > > I'm pleased that you found the discussion of cognitive science,
> > > > psycho-neurology, and a potential center of commonality in
> > > > psychology of interest! That is the goal of the article, i.e., to
> > > > show how the commonality of CC and CHAT have the potential to form
> > > > that commonality with developmental, educational, cognitive, and
> > neuro-psychology.
> > > > Hopefully this discussion format will facilitate interest in the
> > > > process.
> > > >
> > > > Cliff
> > > >
> > > > On Mar 19, 2016, at 6:17 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> Thanks Cliff and Mike for sharing this interesting article. I was
> > > >> not familiar to cultural community psychology and this and the
> > > >> other papers in the symposium do a great job introducing and
> > > >> concisely describing the field, and how it evolved from community
> > > >> to cultural community psychology.
> > > >>
> > > >> As I was reading, I wondered how much the influence of CHAT
> > > >> literature had influenced the development of community psychology
> > > >> itself from the start. As I progressed in my reading, I then
> > > >> found clear references to these influences, which even meant the
> > > >> delay of the publishing of Roland's work, I assume, due to the
> > > >> important input that Vygotsky's publications meant for the
> > > >> project. But then I wondered on what had been other sources. What
> > > >> were other foundational influences to the field? I'd be
> > > >> interested to know about them in part because, while the paper
> > > >> discusses many examples in which CHAT gives input to CC, I would
> > > >> like to know more about the (possible) inputs in the other
> direction.
> > > >>
> > > >> Also, I found interesting the mention of a new center of
> > > >> commonality in psychology in general. I was glad to see, however
> > > >> brief, mentions to research in cognitive science and
> > > >> psycho-neurology. In your paper, Delta theory is mentioned as a
> > > >> move forward towards integration. In the case of CHAT, this was
> > > >> pursued by means of developing a scientific discipline based on
> > > >> dialectical materialism and the sociogenetic method. Delta theory
> > > >> (I just had a very brief first
> > > >> contact) seems to build upon the notion of psychosocial systems.
> > > >> This sounds very much in line with Vygotsky, who surely is a
> > > >> central source. Again, here I would love to hear what other
> > > >> insights/sources are involved that may provide new insights to
> > > >> those more familiar to CHAT but not so much with CC and Delta
> theory.
> > > >>
> > > >> Thanks,
> > > >> Alfredo
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> ________________________________________
> > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > >> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of mike cole
> > > >> <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > > >> Sent: 18 March 2016 02:39
> > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Article for Discussion
> > > >>
> > > >> Dear XCMA-er-o-philes-
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> We thought it appropriate to put up for discussion the paper by
> > > >> Roland Tharp and Cliff  O'Donnell from the most recent issue of MCA.
> > > >> Roland wanted to stimulate discussion among what he and Cliff saw
> > > >> as people with a strong family resemblance. He passed away before
> > > >> this part of the discussion could take place.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> Roland and Cliff argue for the mutual relevance of Cultural
> > > >> Community Psychology and Vygotskian inspired research in the
> > > >> approach referred to often in these pages as CHAT, not only
> > > >> because it is an acronym for cultural-historical activity theory,
> > > >> but because we have a tradition of chatting here about the ideas
> > > >> in papers that sample our different interests.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> In this case, Cliff is intending to send this message and an
> > > >> invitation to people from Community Psychology to join in. May it
> > > >> be celebratory of Roland's long life seeking to promote growth
> > > >> enhancing communication.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> get your copy at
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/current
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> Enjoy, and of course, send along to others you think might be
> > > >> interested.
> > > >> Its legal, free, above board, and, hopefully, interesting!
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> mike
> > > >>
> > > >> --
> > > >>
> > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with
> > > >> an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> > > >
> > > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D.
> > > > Professor Emeritus
> > > > Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA
> > > > Division 27)
> > > >
> > > > University of Hawai'i
> > > > Department of Psychology
> > > > 2530 Dole Street
> > > > Honolulu, HI 96822
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
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--

It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object
that creates history. Ernst Boesch
________________________________
[http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]<http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass>

This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form.