[Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Article for Discussion
Cliff O'Donnell
cliffo@hawaii.edu
Mon Mar 21 15:51:02 PDT 2016
On Mar 20, 2016, at 3:48 PM, mike cole wrote:
> Contextors-
> Call this one, "on the ordering of things"
>
> --------
>
> Apropos David's thoughts about text emerging from context, I had
> what I
> believe is a relevant experience last evening. Perhaps this is a
> relevant
> context in which to relate the experience.
>
>
>
> We have a bird feeder on the hill that rises from the back of the
> house.
> Bird seed is for most of the finches and other small birds that live
> in
> this semi desert (and the rabbit who feasts on the dropped seeds).
> Near the
> bird seed is a cup of grape jelly. It is a favored food of the
> orioles,
> hooded orioles, among whom the male is bright orange-yellow.
>
>
>
> It was late afternoon. The sun was setting to the west, and our
> hillside
> was alight with the slowly fading glow as it slipped behind the
> horizon. I
> stood for a moment to watch the finch-like birds eating and
> reflecting on
> the fact that a feeder that had remained full all day was rapidly
> being
> depleted. Then... in what is said to be the blink of the eye. a bright
> yellow flash appeared in the middle of my visual/attentional field.
> It was
> so striking a physical experience that it was a noticeable moment
> before I
> could name the phenomenon that I had experienced - the appearance of
> a male
> oriole.
>
>
>
> I was focused in my thoughts last night on the distinction between
> natural/phylogenetic and culturally mediated perception ala LSV. As a
> result of Ross and David's exchange,
>
> I need to rethink the experience in terms of which comes first, the
> text or
> the context. David has this relations as first the natural, then the
> conscious. I am not so sure of a first-second ordering. To me it
> seems that
> the second overlaid the first with a very brief, seemingly unconsious
> experience of "re-cognition."
>
>
>
> Gotta love con-text as a topic for chatting!
>
> mike
>
>
> On Sun, Mar 20, 2016 at 6:12 PM, David Kellogg
> <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Larry:
>>
>> As usual, you "select" exactly what I was trying share. By focusing
>> on the
>> selection of certain things (objects and the feelings/thoughts they
>> evoke, exemplars of concepts) from the material setting we return,
>> with a
>> resounding creak and a crash, to the door of choice, of volition,
>> of will,
>> that gate of human freedom upon which all meaning (meaning,
>> intention!)
>> must perforce hinge. And that door opens on text, without which we
>> cannot
>> speak of context.
>>
>> I think that all text must be seen as more or less metaphorical,
>> which is
>> really a way of saying that any way of saying can be more or less
>> mediated.
>> Any wording is a "phonological" metaphor: that is, an attempt to
>> make an
>> act of sounding stand for an act of thinking. Some wordings are
>> even more
>> metaphorical; that is, more mediated, because there is metaphor on
>> top of
>> metaphor, or mediation on top of mediation. If I say (or better
>> yet, sing)
>> that Violetta is both a cross and a delicacy to the heart, then I
>> am making
>> a complex act of sounding ("croce e delizia al cor") stand for an
>> act of
>> thinking of three objects (a wooden cross, a Parisian patisserie,
>> and a
>> pump for blood) which makes me think of three other things (torture,
>> delight, and a love which causes the whole universe to palpitate
>> from one
>> to the other).
>>
>> Ilyenkov's big problem was this: the orthodox, Pavlovian,
>> interpretation of
>> Vygotsky's legacy was that meaning was "objective" because it was a
>> "second
>> signal system"--that is, a stimulus that made some kind of sensory
>> response
>> in the nerves that made some kind of higher response in the brain.
>> I think
>> Ilyenkov could see perfectly well that this was just another
>> Cartesian
>> dualism: physical sensation in the nerves was a stimulus and
>> cogitation in
>> the brain was the response. So he turned us all inside out. Oh, yes:
>> meaning is objective alright, but not because it leads us to some
>> kind of
>> spark in the brain neurons; it's objective because it leads us to
>> human
>> activity in the environment.
>>
>> MY problem is that this is only a reasonable description of how
>> meaning
>> might occur in infants. But most meaning is not like this: most
>> meaning
>> is conventional, not so much in the sense that it is
>> "arbitrary" (that's
>> exactly what it isn't, as soon as we put it in context) but in the
>> sense
>> that it leads us along links that, unlike those of activity, are
>> non-causal. It may make perfect sense to say that the word "clap"
>> leads, along a causal link, to the activity of clapping. But it makes
>> no sense to say that the word "croce" causes one to be nailed on a
>> cross,
>> or the word "delizia" fills one's stomach with French pastry, or
>> even that
>> my thoughts and feelings are what cause me to sing in the shower.
>> Coincide
>> they do, but that coincidence is conventional and not causal.
>> That's why it
>> is one thing to say (as Helen Keller did) that everything must have
>> a name,
>> but it is very different to say that anything can be a name (the
>> first is
>> manifestly false, while the second is almost true).
>>
>> Anything can be a name, and we need a name for this non-causal
>> relationship
>> between soundings, wordings, meanings, contexts, and material
>> settings.
>> Halliday likes the word "realization", and my supervisor, David Butt,
>> dislikes it for exactly the same reason. In English, the word
>> "realization"
>> has TWO apparently opposed meanings. When we say that a word is a
>> meaning
>> is "realized" as a wording, or a wording is "realized" as a
>> sounding, we
>> are saying that there is a step away from ideality towards tangible,
>> physical, sensuous reality. But when we say that a sounding
>> "realizes" a
>> wording, or a wording "realizes" a meaning, or a meaning "realizes" a
>> context, or that a context "realizes" a material setting, we are
>> saying
>> precisely the opposite. We're not just looking at active and
>> passive forms
>> of the same process: it's a different process. We are saying that the
>> wording makes us realize what is meant, and the meaning makes us
>> aware of
>> the context, and the context makes us aware of some element in the
>> material
>> setting. Even in the last case, "realization" is a step in the
>> direction of
>> awareness, that is, ideality, and not reality. Halliday sees these
>> two
>> different processes as linked (and so they are), and David thinks
>> they are
>> more distinct (that too).
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>>
>> PS: For those who are curious about the references to wooden
>> crosses and
>> French pastries, or who just want to hear a thumping good tune
>> realized by
>> two exquisite singers:
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xBm4fX7v8_A
>>
>>
>> dk
>>
>>
>>
>> .
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 21, 2016 at 8:34 AM, <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> David,
>>>
>>> I am slowly beginning to make some sense of where you are leading
>>> us in
>>> the way you are qualifying the meaning of con/text to that which
>>> particular phenomena that occurs as a particular kind of
>>> **activity** or
>> *
>>> *behavior**. It is NOT a general endorsement of activity or
>>> behavior.
>>>
>>> The particular quality forming this **text/context** is this
>>> process of *
>>> *selection** that occurs within metaphorical ways of proceeding.
>>>
>>> You do NOT see how activity which is NOT semiotic activity
>>> [metaphorical
>>> selecting activity] and you do NOT see how behavior that is NOT
>>> semiotic
>>> behavior [metaphorical selecting behavior] can possibly create
>>> texts/contexts.
>>>
>>> You are inviting [or calling] us to limit our understanding [or
>>> interstanding] of text/context to a particular subset of
>> activity/behavior
>>> that **transforms** [through metaphorical selecting processes] the
>>> material settings.
>>>
>>> We can speak or call something text/context only AFTER this
>>> metaphorical
>>> selecting kind of activity/behavior **constitutes** THESE texts/
>>> contexts.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Another interesting observation is that this kind of semiotic
>>> mediation
>>> forming texts/contexts **realizes** concepts and **realizes**
>>> feelings
>>> and **realizes** perceptions . The underlying metaphorical selecting
>>> process of something becoming text/context AS semiotic mechanism
>>> remains
>>> pretty much the same.
>>>
>>> As you call to our attention, there is ONLY the forming of text/
>>> context
>>> when **something** has been metaphorically selected **as** a
>>> selecting
>>> process [which includes gestural metaphor, phonological metaphor,
>>> and
>>> lexicogrammatical metaphor].
>>>
>>> This selection process occurs FOR creating both text and context
>>> which
>>> moves us towards **sense** and **shared meanings**.
>>>
>>> And this returns us to Cultural Community psychology where culture
>>> is
>>> defined AS shared meaning.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In conclusion **activity settings** and **behavioural settings**
>>> are too
>>> general and do NOT highlight or illuminate the particular KINDS of
>> activity
>>> settings and behavioural settings that generate **sense** and
>>> **shared
>>> meanings**.
>>>
>>> David, I hope I have done justice to your exploration of text/
>>> context??
>>>
>>> If not I will continue to remain open to your calling me back to
>>> this
>>> topic and topos.
>>>
>>> Larry
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Sent from Mail <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=550986> for
>>> Windows 10
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From: *David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>> *Sent: *Sunday, March 20, 2016 1:33 PM
>>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Article for Discussion
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Rod:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Actually, that's just the kind of text I'm working with right now.
>>> Here's
>>>
>>> the plan. Every week, we give a nine month old baby a book. We ask
>>> four
>>>
>>> questions in two languages (because the baby has one Korean speaking
>> parent
>>>
>>> and one English speaking one):
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> a) English: What's this?
>>>
>>> b) English: Is it a ...?
>>>
>>> c) Yigot mueo ya? (What's this?)
>>>
>>> d) ... yi ya? (Is it a ...?)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Sometimes we mix up the order. This goes on every week for the
>>> next three
>>>
>>> years, as the child first figures out that a book is not edible.
>>> That it
>>>
>>> contains pictures. That that the pictures are not just colors but
>>> meant
>> to
>>>
>>> be signs. That beneath the pictures there are letters. That the
>>> letters
>> are
>>>
>>> not just drawings but are meant to be symbols. That the symbols
>>> encode
>>>
>>> settings, characters, and problems. That the problems can only be
>>> solved
>> by
>>>
>>> means of dialogue, etc.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Now, the first time I tried this, the child simply could not
>>> concentrate
>> on
>>>
>>> the object for any length of time. But the SECOND time I did it, the
>> child
>>>
>>> literally could not look away from it! You could see that although
>>> the
>>>
>>> child had no idea what was being said, the child was might just be
>> starting
>>>
>>> to think some proto-language equivalent of "What's this?" "Is it
>>> a...?"
>> "Yi
>>>
>>> got mu eo ya?" "Chaek yi ya?" And after a minute or so, the child
>>> looked
>>>
>>> up, as if to see whether the large person making so much noise
>>> might be
>>>
>>> thinking something along those lines too.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So maybe THAT's text! And as you can see it doesn't matter at all
>>> whether
>>>
>>> the text realizes concepts or feelings or just perceptions, the
>> underlying
>>>
>>> semiotic mechanism is pretty much the same. But it seems that
>>> there's
>> only
>>>
>>> text when something has been selected from the material setting by
>>> some
>>>
>>> human consciousness or consciousnesses for semiotic transformation;
>> there's
>>>
>>> only text when there some kind of "metaphor" (gestural,
>>> phonological,
>>>
>>> lexicogrammatical) for context. It seems that it's precisely THIS
>>> act of
>>>
>>> selection which transforms a material setting into a context, and
>>> it's
>>>
>>> premature to speak of context before that happens. So for example I
>>>
>>> wouldn't use the term context for the first week of work, only for
>>> the
>>>
>>> second.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think it's legitimate to talk about "social context" and "cultural
>>>
>>> context", because I believe that context, like text, exists on a
>>> cline of
>>>
>>> instantiation. At one end, we have the relationship between a
>>> context of
>>>
>>> situation (Malinowski) and a text (Halliday). That's the end I'm
>>> at right
>>>
>>> now. At the other, we have the relationship between a context of
>>> culture
>>>
>>> (again, Malinowski) and...and a whole language system (again,
>>> Halliday).
>> I
>>>
>>> gather that's the end at which the KEEP and the Community
>>> Development
>>>
>>> projects in Micronesia and the Delinquency Research plans are
>>> working.
>> But
>>>
>>> I don't see how "activity" or "behaviour" can ever realize context,
>> unless
>>>
>>> it is semiotic activity and semiotic behaviour, in which case we
>>> might as
>>>
>>> well start looking around for text. That's where the garlic and
>>> ginger
>> is.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> (Rod--I'm new at this stuff: watching infants crack the whole
>>> problem of
>>>
>>> anthropogenesis single-handed, I mean. That's how exciting it is,
>>>
>>> and that's about how baffling it is too. I know you are an old
>>> hand. Can
>>>
>>> you give me any tips on what to read and advice about what to do
>>> next?)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> David Kellogg
>>>
>>> Macquarie University
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Mar 20, 2016 at 10:14 PM, Rod Parker-Rees <
>>>
>>> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> I was driven to respond to David's earlier comments about context
>>>> since
>>> my
>>>
>>>> own understanding of this term is in the context of trying to
>> understand
>>>
>>>> how preverbal children make sense (meanings framed by social and
>> physical
>>>
>>>> contexts more than by systems of concepts). Here it is difficult to
>>>
>>>> separate a text out of the context, an 'individual' thought process
>> apart
>>>
>>>> from the interactions in which it can occur.
>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>> It strikes me that Andy's point about the contexts in which
>>>> concepts
>> have
>>>
>>>> their meanings is particularly relevant here. The intersubjectivity
>>>
>>>> available to a caregiver-child dyad or within a family is of a
>> different
>>>
>>>> order to that available between otherwise unconnected speakers of
>>>> the
>>>
>>>> 'same' language. Where one is rooted in a history of shared
>>>> experiences
>>> in
>>>
>>>> common contexts the other is rooted in a history of more or less
>>>
>>>> abstracted ideas (concepts) which refer to experiences but 'from
>>>> above'
>>>
>>>> rather than 'from within'. Knowing what someone else means is never
>>>
>>>> completely achievable and I think the positive consequence of
>>>> this is
>>> that
>>>
>>>> intersubjectivity has to be understood as a process, a conversation
>>> rather
>>>
>>>> than an answer. 'Feeling' with other people is not an achieved
>>>> end but
>> a
>>>
>>>> means towards sharing understanding (I like the idea that the word
>>>
>>>> understanding is misunderstood - 'under' deriving from the same
>>>> root as
>>>
>>>> 'inter' and meaning 'among' rather than 'below' - to understand
>> something
>>>
>>>> is to stand IN it).
>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>> We can know ABOUT other cultures through reading about them or
>>>> watching
>>>
>>>> films but how we know cultures in which we have stood is
>>>> importantly
>>>
>>>> different - I think. Meeting other people, or meeting with them,
>>>> can
>>> enrich
>>>
>>>> our personal understanding by exposing us to different ways of
>>>> thinking
>>> but
>>>
>>>> I think we have to recognise that thinking ABOUT ways of
>>>> interacting
>> has
>>> to
>>>
>>>> be understood as a multi-layered thing, ranging from the thickest
>> knowing
>>>
>>>> of our lived and co-lived experiences to the ethereal
>>>> abstractions of
>>>
>>>> philosophical thought-play.
>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>> So sharing concepts out of context is doable but not achievable.
>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>> All the best,
>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>> Rod
>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>
>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>>>
>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>>>
>>>> Sent: 20 March 2016 10:34
>>>
>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Article for Discussion
>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>> I don't know if the issue is having common interests, Cliff.
>>>
>>>> I think it's very productive, even necessary, that each little
>>>> bunch of
>>> us
>>>
>>>> has different concerns and shines light on different aspects of
>>>> human
>>> life.
>>>
>>>> But what we really need is shared concepts, through which we can
>>> understand
>>>
>>>> each other and collaborate. So it is good news that CC has
>>>> appropriated
>>>
>>>> zone of proximal development, activity setting, shared activity
>>>> and the
>>> law
>>>
>>>> of genetic development.
>>>
>>>> I think we need to be very conscious of the dangers inherent in
>>>
>>>> appropriating expressions like these though. You pointed out that
>>>> in
>> the
>>>
>>>> early days of CC, "'cultural psychology' was generally practiced as
>>>
>>>> 'cross-cultural', largely as comparison studies", but everything
>>>> I read
>>> in
>>>
>>>> your paper tends to suggest "culture" is still understood and
>>>> used in
>>> just
>>>
>>>> this sense. Consequently it is very easy to miss the meaning
>>>> attached
>> to
>>>
>>>> "culture" in CHAT, which, after all, originated in pretty much a
>>>
>>>> mono-cultural situation. One word can index different concepts.
>> Achieving
>>>
>>>> interdisciplinarity is only achieved by means of shared concepts.
>>>> But
>> on
>>>
>>>> the other hand, since the content of a concept is ultimately the
>>>> larger
>>>
>>>> system of practices to which it is indigenous, it seems almost as
>>>> if a
>>>
>>>> concept can only be shared when the broader context of its use is
>> already
>>>
>>>> assimilated.
>>>
>>>> Along these lines, it was a little while before I realised that you
>> were
>>>
>>>> using the word "intersubjectivity" with quite a different meaning
>>>> than
>> I
>>>
>>>> would. It seems to denote empathy. "Intersubjectivity involves
>> co-actors
>>>
>>>> feeling the same emotions and values in the same situations," and I
>> don't
>>>
>>>> even know it means to "feel values."
>>>
>>>> Connected with this the description of joint action, turned out
>>>> to be
>> in
>>>
>>>> sharp contrast to my conception of it. As I see it, collaboration
>>>> (my
>>>
>>>> preferred term, rather than "joint
>>>
>>>> action") necessarily entails both moments of conflict as well as
>>>
>>>> cooperation. Harmony and bliss are great things, but I think they
>>>> are
>>>
>>>> rather cheaply purchased simply by everyone marching in step.
>>>
>>>> I suspect that these two examples of shared words indicating
>>>> different
>>>
>>>> concepts are connected to the hope of mutual appropriation by
>>>> means of
>>>
>>>> having a "center of commonality."
>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>
>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>
>>>> On 20/03/2016 12:28 PM, Cliff O'Donnell wrote:
>>>
>>>>> Thanks for your thoughtful comments, Alfredo. Roland and I thought
>>>
>>>>> that although CC and CHAT have many common interests, most folks
>>>>> in
>>>
>>>>> each appeared to be unaware of the other (judging by the
>>>>> infrequency
>>>
>>>>> of common citations). As described in our article, we and
>>>>> several of
>>>
>>>>> our colleagues have been influenced by CHAT and have used CHAT
>>>
>>>>> concepts in our research and intervention programs.
>>>
>>>>> As for influence in the opposite direction, perhaps the KEEP
>>>>> project,
>>>
>>>>> Seymour Sarason's work, and some of Maynard's work with
>>>>> Greenfield.
>>>
>>>>> Also Kurt Lewin is a source common to both CC and CHAT. I too
>>>>> would
>> be
>>>
>>>>> interested to hear of additional influence in the opposite
>>>>> direction.
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>> You are correct that Delta Theory builds on psychosocial systems
>>>>> with
>>>
>>>>> Vygotsky as an important source. Delta Theory boldly attempts to
>>>>> be a
>>>
>>>>> universal theory of how change occurs using Delta as the symbol
>>>>> for
>>>
>>>>> change.
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>> I'm pleased that you found the discussion of cognitive science,
>>>
>>>>> psycho-neurology, and a potential center of commonality in
>>>>> psychology
>>>
>>>>> of interest! That is the goal of the article, i.e., to show how
>>>>> the
>>>
>>>>> commonality of CC and CHAT have the potential to form that
>> commonality
>>>
>>>>> with developmental, educational, cognitive, and neuro-psychology.
>>>
>>>>> Hopefully this discussion format will facilitate interest in the
>>>
>>>>> process.
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>> Cliff
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>> On Mar 19, 2016, at 6:17 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> Thanks Cliff and Mike for sharing this interesting article. I was
>> not
>>>
>>>>>> familiar to cultural community psychology and this and the other
>>>
>>>>>> papers in the symposium do a great job introducing and concisely
>>>
>>>>>> describing the field, and how it evolved from community to
>>>>>> cultural
>>>
>>>>>> community psychology.
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> As I was reading, I wondered how much the influence of CHAT
>>>
>>>>>> literature had influenced the development of community psychology
>>>
>>>>>> itself from the start. As I progressed in my reading, I then
>>>>>> found
>>>
>>>>>> clear references to these influences, which even meant the
>>>>>> delay of
>>>
>>>>>> the publishing of Roland's work, I assume, due to the important
>> input
>>>
>>>>>> that Vygotsky's publications meant for the project. But then I
>>>
>>>>>> wondered on what had been other sources. What were other
>> foundational
>>>
>>>>>> influences to the field? I'd be interested to know about them in
>> part
>>>
>>>>>> because, while the paper discusses many examples in which CHAT
>>>>>> gives
>>>
>>>>>> input to CC, I would like to know more about the (possible)
>>>>>> inputs
>> in
>>>
>>>>>> the other direction.
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> Also, I found interesting the mention of a new center of
>>>>>> commonality
>>>
>>>>>> in psychology in general. I was glad to see, however brief,
>>>>>> mentions
>>>
>>>>>> to research in cognitive science and psycho-neurology. In your
>> paper,
>>>
>>>>>> Delta theory is mentioned as a move forward towards
>>>>>> integration. In
>>>
>>>>>> the case of CHAT, this was pursued by means of developing a
>>>
>>>>>> scientific discipline based on dialectical materialism and the
>>>
>>>>>> sociogenetic method. Delta theory (I just had a very brief first
>>>
>>>>>> contact) seems to build upon the notion of psychosocial systems.
>> This
>>>
>>>>>> sounds very much in line with Vygotsky, who surely is a central
>>>
>>>>>> source. Again, here I would love to hear what other insights/
>>>>>> sources
>>>
>>>>>> are involved that may provide new insights to those more
>>>>>> familiar to
>>>
>>>>>> CHAT but not so much with CC and Delta theory.
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>>>>> Alfredo
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>
>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of mike cole
>>>
>>>>>> <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>
>>>>>> Sent: 18 March 2016 02:39
>>>
>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>
>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Article for Discussion
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> Dear XCMA-er-o-philes-
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> We thought it appropriate to put up for discussion the paper by
>>>
>>>>>> Roland Tharp and Cliff O'Donnell from the most recent issue of
>>>>>> MCA.
>>>
>>>>>> Roland wanted to stimulate discussion among what he and Cliff
>>>>>> saw as
>>>
>>>>>> people with a strong family resemblance. He passed away before
>>>>>> this
>>>
>>>>>> part of the discussion could take place.
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> Roland and Cliff argue for the mutual relevance of Cultural
>> Community
>>>
>>>>>> Psychology and Vygotskian inspired research in the approach
>>>>>> referred
>>>
>>>>>> to often in these pages as CHAT, not only because it is an
>>>>>> acronym
>>>
>>>>>> for cultural-historical activity theory, but because we have a
>>>
>>>>>> tradition of chatting here about the ideas in papers that
>>>>>> sample our
>>>
>>>>>> different interests.
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> In this case, Cliff is intending to send this message and an
>>>
>>>>>> invitation to people from Community Psychology to join in. May
>>>>>> it be
>>>
>>>>>> celebratory of Roland's long life seeking to promote growth
>> enhancing
>>>
>>>>>> communication.
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> get your copy at
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/current
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> Enjoy, and of course, send along to others you think might be
>>>
>>>>>> interested.
>>>
>>>>>> Its legal, free, above board, and, hopefully, interesting!
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> mike
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science
>>>>>> with an
>>>
>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D.
>>>
>>>>> Professor Emeritus
>>>
>>>>> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA
>>>
>>>>> Division 27)
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>> University of Hawai'i
>>>
>>>>> Department of Psychology
>>>
>>>>> 2530 Dole Street
>>>
>>>>> Honolulu, HI 96822
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>> ________________________________
>>>
>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]<
>>>
>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass>
>>>
>>>>
>>>
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>
>
>
> --
>
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
> object
> that creates history. Ernst Boesch
Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus
Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA
Division 27)
University of Hawai‘i
Department of Psychology
2530 Dole Street
Honolulu, HI 96822
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