[Xmca-l] Fwd: Re: Article for Discussion

[David Kellogg]

Larry:

As usual, you "select" exactly what I was trying share. By focusing on the
selection of certain things (objects and the feelings/thoughts they
evoke, exemplars of concepts) from the material setting we return, with a
resounding creak and a crash, to the door of choice, of volition, of will,
that gate of human freedom upon which all meaning (meaning, intention!)
must perforce hinge. And that door opens on text, without which we cannot
speak of context.

I think that all text must be seen as more or less metaphorical, which is
really a way of saying that any way of saying can be more or less mediated.
Any wording is a "phonological" metaphor: that is, an attempt to make an
act of sounding stand for an act of thinking. Some wordings are even more
metaphorical; that is, more mediated, because there is metaphor on top of
metaphor, or mediation on top of mediation. If I say (or better yet, sing)
that Violetta is both a cross and a delicacy to the heart, then I am making
a complex act of sounding ("croce e delizia al cor") stand for an act of
thinking of three objects (a wooden cross, a Parisian patisserie, and a
pump for blood) which makes me think of three other things (torture,
delight, and a love which causes the whole universe to palpitate from one
to the other).

Ilyenkov's big problem was this: the orthodox, Pavlovian, interpretation of
Vygotsky's legacy was that meaning was "objective" because it was a "second
signal system"--that is, a stimulus that made some kind of sensory response
in the nerves that made some kind of higher response in the brain. I think
Ilyenkov could see perfectly well that this was just another Cartesian
dualism: physical sensation in the nerves was a stimulus and cogitation in
the brain was the response. So he turned us all inside out. Oh, yes:
meaning is objective alright, but not because it leads us to some kind of
spark in the brain neurons; it's objective because it leads us to human
activity in the environment.

MY problem is that this is only a reasonable description of how meaning
might occur in infants. But most meaning is not like this: most meaning
is conventional, not so much in the sense that it is "arbitrary" (that's
exactly what it isn't, as soon as we put it in context) but in the sense
that it leads us along links that, unlike those of activity, are
non-causal. It may make perfect sense to say that the word "clap"
leads, along a causal link, to the activity of clapping. But it makes
no sense to say that the word "croce" causes one to be nailed on a cross,
or the word "delizia" fills one's stomach with French pastry, or even that
my thoughts and feelings are what cause me to sing in the shower. Coincide
they do, but that coincidence is conventional and not causal. That's why it
is one thing to say (as Helen Keller did) that everything must have a name,
but it is very different to say that anything can be a name (the first is
manifestly false, while the second is almost true).

Anything can be a name, and we need a name for this non-causal relationship
between soundings, wordings, meanings, contexts, and material settings.
Halliday likes the word "realization", and my supervisor, David Butt,
dislikes it for exactly the same reason. In English, the word "realization"
has TWO apparently opposed meanings. When we say that a word is a meaning
is "realized" as a wording, or a wording is "realized" as a sounding, we
are saying that there is a step away from ideality towards tangible,
physical, sensuous reality. But when we say that a sounding "realizes" a
wording, or a wording "realizes" a meaning, or a meaning "realizes" a
context, or that a context "realizes" a material setting, we are saying
precisely the opposite. We're not just looking at active and passive forms
of the same process: it's a different process. We are saying that the
wording makes us realize what is meant, and the meaning makes us aware of
the context, and the context makes us aware of some element in the material
setting. Even in the last case, "realization" is a step in the direction of
awareness, that is, ideality, and not reality. Halliday sees these two
different processes as linked (and so they are), and David thinks they are
more distinct (that too).

David Kellogg
Macquarie University

PS:  For those who are curious about the references to wooden crosses and
French pastries, or who just want to hear a thumping good tune realized by
two exquisite singers:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xBm4fX7v8_A


dk



.



On Mon, Mar 21, 2016 at 8:34 AM, <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> David,
>
> I am slowly beginning to make some sense of where you are leading us in
> the way you are qualifying  the meaning of con/text to that which
> particular phenomena that occurs as a particular kind of **activity** or *
> *behavior**. It is NOT a general endorsement of activity or behavior.
>
> The particular quality forming this **text/context** is this process of *
> *selection** that occurs within metaphorical ways of proceeding.
>
> You do NOT see how activity which is NOT semiotic activity [metaphorical
> selecting activity] and you do NOT see how behavior that is NOT semiotic
> behavior  [metaphorical selecting behavior] can possibly create
> texts/contexts.
>
> You are inviting [or calling] us to limit our understanding [or
> interstanding] of text/context to a particular subset of activity/behavior
> that **transforms** [through metaphorical selecting processes] the
> material settings.
>
> We can speak or call something  text/context only AFTER this metaphorical
> selecting kind of activity/behavior **constitutes** THESE texts/contexts.
>
>
>
> Another interesting observation is that this kind of semiotic mediation
> forming texts/contexts **realizes** concepts and **realizes** feelings
> and **realizes** perceptions . The underlying metaphorical selecting
> process of something becoming text/context AS semiotic mechanism remains
> pretty much the same.
>
> As you call to our attention, there is ONLY the forming of text/context
> when **something** has been metaphorically selected **as** a selecting
> process [which includes gestural metaphor, phonological metaphor, and
> lexicogrammatical metaphor].
>
> This selection process occurs FOR creating both text and context which
> moves us towards **sense** and **shared meanings**.
>
> And this returns us to Cultural Community psychology where culture is
> defined AS shared meaning.
>
>
>
> In conclusion **activity settings** and **behavioural settings** are too
> general and do NOT highlight or illuminate the particular KINDS of activity
> settings and behavioural settings that generate **sense** and **shared
> meanings**.
>
> David, I hope I have done justice to your exploration of text/context??
>
> If not I will continue to remain open to your calling me back to this
> topic and topos.
>
> Larry
>
>
>
> Sent from Mail <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=550986> for
> Windows 10
>
>
>
> *From: *David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> *Sent: *Sunday, March 20, 2016 1:33 PM
> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Article for Discussion
>
>
>
> Rod:
>
>
>
> Actually, that's just the kind of text I'm working with right now. Here's
>
> the plan. Every week, we give a nine month old baby a book. We ask four
>
> questions in two languages (because the baby has one Korean speaking parent
>
> and one English speaking one):
>
>
>
> a) English: What's this?
>
> b) English: Is it a ...?
>
> c) Yigot mueo ya? (What's this?)
>
> d) ... yi ya?   (Is it a ...?)
>
>
>
> Sometimes we mix up the order. This goes on every week for the next three
>
> years, as the child first figures out that a book is not edible. That it
>
> contains pictures. That that the pictures are not just colors but meant to
>
> be signs. That beneath the pictures there are letters. That the letters are
>
> not just drawings but are meant to be symbols. That the symbols encode
>
> settings, characters, and problems. That the problems can only be solved by
>
> means of dialogue, etc.
>
>
>
> Now, the first time I tried this, the child simply could not concentrate on
>
> the object for any length of time. But the SECOND time I did it, the child
>
> literally could not look away from it! You could see that although the
>
> child had no idea what was being said, the child was might just be starting
>
> to think some proto-language equivalent of "What's this?" "Is it a...?" "Yi
>
> got mu eo ya?" "Chaek yi ya?" And after a minute or so, the child looked
>
> up, as if to see whether the large person making so much noise might be
>
> thinking something along those lines too.
>
>
>
> So maybe THAT's text! And as you can see it doesn't matter at all whether
>
> the text realizes concepts or feelings or just perceptions, the underlying
>
> semiotic mechanism is pretty much the same. But it seems that there's only
>
> text when something has been selected from the material setting by some
>
> human consciousness or consciousnesses for semiotic transformation; there's
>
> only text when there some kind of "metaphor" (gestural, phonological,
>
> lexicogrammatical) for context. It seems that it's precisely THIS act of
>
> selection which transforms a material setting into a context, and it's
>
> premature to speak of context before that happens. So for example I
>
> wouldn't use the term context for the first week of work, only for the
>
> second.
>
>
>
> I think it's legitimate to talk about "social context" and "cultural
>
> context", because I believe that context, like text, exists on a cline of
>
> instantiation. At one end, we have the relationship between a context of
>
> situation (Malinowski) and a text (Halliday). That's the end I'm at right
>
> now. At the other, we have the relationship between a context of culture
>
> (again, Malinowski) and...and a whole language system (again, Halliday). I
>
> gather that's the end at which the KEEP and the Community Development
>
> projects in Micronesia and the Delinquency Research plans are working. But
>
> I don't see how "activity" or "behaviour" can ever realize context, unless
>
> it is semiotic activity and semiotic behaviour, in which case we might as
>
> well start looking around for text. That's where the garlic and ginger is.
>
>
>
> (Rod--I'm new at this stuff: watching infants crack the whole problem of
>
> anthropogenesis single-handed, I mean. That's how exciting it is,
>
> and that's about how baffling it is too. I know you are an old hand. Can
>
> you give me any tips on what to read and advice about what to do next?)
>
>
>
> David Kellogg
>
> Macquarie University
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Mar 20, 2016 at 10:14 PM, Rod Parker-Rees <
>
> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
>
>
>
> > I was driven to respond to David's earlier comments about context since
> my
>
> > own understanding of this term is in the context of trying to understand
>
> > how preverbal children make sense (meanings framed by social and physical
>
> > contexts more than by systems of concepts). Here it is difficult to
>
> > separate a text out of the context, an 'individual' thought process apart
>
> > from the interactions in which it can occur.
>
> >
>
> > It strikes me that Andy's point about the contexts in which concepts have
>
> > their meanings is particularly relevant here. The intersubjectivity
>
> > available to a caregiver-child dyad or within a family is of a different
>
> > order to that available between otherwise unconnected speakers of the
>
> > 'same' language. Where one is rooted in a history of shared experiences
> in
>
> > common contexts  the other is rooted in a history of more or less
>
> > abstracted ideas (concepts) which refer to experiences but 'from above'
>
> > rather than 'from within'. Knowing what someone else means is never
>
> > completely achievable and I think the positive consequence of this is
> that
>
> > intersubjectivity has to be understood as a process, a conversation
> rather
>
> > than an answer. 'Feeling' with other people is not an achieved end but a
>
> > means towards sharing understanding (I like the idea that the word
>
> > understanding is misunderstood - 'under' deriving from the same root as
>
> > 'inter' and meaning 'among' rather than 'below' - to understand something
>
> > is to stand IN it).
>
> >
>
> > We can know ABOUT other cultures through reading about them or watching
>
> > films but how we know cultures in which we have stood is importantly
>
> > different - I think. Meeting other people, or meeting with them, can
> enrich
>
> > our personal understanding by exposing us to different ways of thinking
> but
>
> > I think we have to recognise that thinking ABOUT ways of interacting has
> to
>
> > be understood as a multi-layered thing, ranging from the thickest knowing
>
> > of our lived and co-lived experiences to the ethereal abstractions of
>
> > philosophical thought-play.
>
> >
>
> > So sharing concepts out of context is doable but not achievable.
>
> >
>
> > All the best,
>
> >
>
> > Rod
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > -----Original Message-----
>
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>
> > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>
> > Sent: 20 March 2016 10:34
>
> > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Article for Discussion
>
> >
>
> > I don't know if the issue is having common interests, Cliff.
>
> > I think it's very productive, even necessary, that each little bunch of
> us
>
> > has different concerns and shines light on different aspects of human
> life.
>
> > But what we really need is shared concepts, through which we can
> understand
>
> > each other and collaborate. So it is good news that CC has appropriated
>
> > zone of proximal development, activity setting, shared activity and the
> law
>
> > of genetic development.
>
> > I think we need to be very conscious of the dangers inherent in
>
> > appropriating expressions like these though. You pointed out that in the
>
> > early days of CC, "'cultural psychology' was generally practiced as
>
> > 'cross-cultural', largely as comparison studies", but everything I read
> in
>
> > your paper tends to suggest "culture" is still understood and used in
> just
>
> > this sense. Consequently it is very easy to miss the meaning attached to
>
> > "culture" in CHAT, which, after all, originated in pretty much a
>
> > mono-cultural situation. One word can index different concepts. Achieving
>
> > interdisciplinarity is only achieved by means of shared concepts. But on
>
> > the other hand, since the content of a concept is ultimately the larger
>
> > system of practices to which it is indigenous, it seems almost as if a
>
> > concept can only be shared when the broader context of its use is already
>
> > assimilated.
>
> > Along these lines, it was a little while before I realised that you were
>
> > using the word "intersubjectivity" with quite a different meaning than I
>
> > would. It seems to denote empathy. "Intersubjectivity involves co-actors
>
> > feeling the same emotions and values in the same situations," and I don't
>
> > even know it means to "feel values."
>
> > Connected with this the description of joint action, turned out to be in
>
> > sharp contrast to my conception of it. As I see it, collaboration (my
>
> > preferred term, rather than "joint
>
> > action") necessarily entails both moments of conflict as well as
>
> > cooperation. Harmony and bliss are great things, but I think they are
>
> > rather cheaply purchased simply by everyone marching in step.
>
> > I suspect that these two examples of shared words indicating different
>
> > concepts are connected to the hope of mutual appropriation by means of
>
> > having a "center of commonality."
>
> >
>
> > Andy
>
> > ------------------------------------------------------------
>
> > *Andy Blunden*
>
> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>
> > On 20/03/2016 12:28 PM, Cliff O'Donnell wrote:
>
> > > Thanks for your thoughtful comments, Alfredo. Roland and I thought
>
> > > that although CC and CHAT have many common interests, most folks in
>
> > > each appeared to be unaware of the other (judging by the infrequency
>
> > > of common citations). As described in our article, we and several of
>
> > > our colleagues have been influenced by CHAT and have used CHAT
>
> > > concepts in our research and intervention programs.
>
> > > As for influence in the opposite direction, perhaps the KEEP project,
>
> > > Seymour Sarason's work, and some of Maynard's work with Greenfield.
>
> > > Also Kurt Lewin is a source common to both CC and CHAT. I too would be
>
> > > interested to hear of additional influence in the opposite direction.
>
> > >
>
> > > You are correct that Delta Theory builds on psychosocial systems with
>
> > > Vygotsky as an important source. Delta Theory boldly attempts to be a
>
> > > universal theory of how change occurs using Delta as the symbol for
>
> > > change.
>
> > >
>
> > > I'm pleased that you found the discussion of cognitive science,
>
> > > psycho-neurology, and a potential center of commonality in psychology
>
> > > of interest! That is the goal of the article, i.e., to show how the
>
> > > commonality of CC and CHAT have the potential to form that commonality
>
> > > with developmental, educational, cognitive, and neuro-psychology.
>
> > > Hopefully this discussion format will facilitate interest in the
>
> > > process.
>
> > >
>
> > > Cliff
>
> > >
>
> > > On Mar 19, 2016, at 6:17 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
>
> > >
>
> > >> Thanks Cliff and Mike for sharing this interesting article. I was not
>
> > >> familiar to cultural community psychology and this and the other
>
> > >> papers in the symposium do a great job introducing and concisely
>
> > >> describing the field, and how it evolved from community to cultural
>
> > >> community psychology.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> As I was reading, I wondered how much the influence of CHAT
>
> > >> literature had influenced the development of community psychology
>
> > >> itself from the start. As I progressed in my reading, I then found
>
> > >> clear references to these influences, which even meant the delay of
>
> > >> the publishing of Roland's work, I assume, due to the important input
>
> > >> that Vygotsky's publications meant for the project. But then I
>
> > >> wondered on what had been other sources. What were other foundational
>
> > >> influences to the field? I'd be interested to know about them in part
>
> > >> because, while the paper discusses many examples in which CHAT gives
>
> > >> input to CC, I would like to know more about the (possible) inputs in
>
> > >> the other direction.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> Also, I found interesting the mention of a new center of commonality
>
> > >> in psychology in general. I was glad to see, however brief, mentions
>
> > >> to research in cognitive science and psycho-neurology. In your paper,
>
> > >> Delta theory is mentioned as a move forward towards integration. In
>
> > >> the case of CHAT, this was pursued by means of developing a
>
> > >> scientific discipline based on dialectical materialism and the
>
> > >> sociogenetic method. Delta theory (I just had a very brief first
>
> > >> contact) seems to build upon the notion of psychosocial systems. This
>
> > >> sounds very much in line with Vygotsky, who surely is a central
>
> > >> source. Again, here I would love to hear what other insights/sources
>
> > >> are involved that may provide new insights to those more familiar to
>
> > >> CHAT but not so much with CC and Delta theory.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> Thanks,
>
> > >> Alfredo
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >> ________________________________________
>
> > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>
> > >> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of mike cole
>
> > >> <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>
> > >> Sent: 18 March 2016 02:39
>
> > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>
> > >> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Article for Discussion
>
> > >>
>
> > >> Dear XCMA-er-o-philes-
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >> We thought it appropriate to put up for discussion the paper by
>
> > >> Roland Tharp and Cliff  O'Donnell from the most recent issue of MCA.
>
> > >> Roland wanted to stimulate discussion among what he and Cliff saw as
>
> > >> people with a strong family resemblance. He passed away before this
>
> > >> part of the discussion could take place.
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >> Roland and Cliff argue for the mutual relevance of Cultural Community
>
> > >> Psychology and Vygotskian inspired research in the approach referred
>
> > >> to often in these pages as CHAT, not only because it is an acronym
>
> > >> for cultural-historical activity theory, but because we have a
>
> > >> tradition of chatting here about the ideas in papers that sample our
>
> > >> different interests.
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >> In this case, Cliff is intending to send this message and an
>
> > >> invitation to people from Community Psychology to join in. May it be
>
> > >> celebratory of Roland's long life seeking to promote growth enhancing
>
> > >> communication.
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >> get your copy at
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/current
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >> Enjoy, and of course, send along to others you think might be
>
> > >> interested.
>
> > >> Its legal, free, above board, and, hopefully, interesting!
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >> mike
>
> > >>
>
> > >> --
>
> > >>
>
> > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>
> > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>
> > >
>
> > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D.
>
> > > Professor Emeritus
>
> > > Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA
>
> > > Division 27)
>
> > >
>
> > > University of Hawai'i
>
> > > Department of Psychology
>
> > > 2530 Dole Street
>
> > > Honolulu, HI 96822
>
> > >
>
> > >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > ________________________________
>
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