[Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal

Tue Jun 28 17:09:08 PDT 2016

Martin (and others),

Well, yes, one wouldn't want to leave out what these things accomplish, but
one might want to leave out the dualistic baggage that a reified notion of
intellect and cognition bring with them (and as Michael notes, one might
find this baggage not too burdensome to carry - or at least less burdensome
than the task of trying to come up with a new language for thinking
thought).

So then the question with intellect and cognition, in short "thinking", is
really: how might we think thinking in ways that do not presuppose the
separation of thinking from living - as if thinking happens in some
otherworldly (rational?) realm apart from everyday life?

How might we instead conceive of thinking as something that dwells within a
being? How might we return thinking to Being? And by doing so, take hold of
a notion of thinking-Being as something that can develop across time?

To put the core question slight differently, we might ask: What is called
thinking?

Here is one response (of which I'm sure you, Martin, are quite aware):
http://hermitmusic.tripod.com/heidegger_thinking.pdf

-greg

On Wed, Jun 29, 2016 at 1:19 AM, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
> wrote:

> Greg,
>
> I wasn’t *equating* individual psychological development with the
> development of intellect and cognition, but one sure wouldn’t want to leave
> those out, would one?  That indeed would be a costly price to pay! (And
> there’s no evidence that LSV wanted to leave them out, is there?)
>
> Martin
>
>
> > On Jun 28, 2016, at 10:21 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > Just a minute folks!
> >
> > Is everyone okay with the assumption that the
> > individual=intellect/cognition?
> >
> > If so, then asking if non-dualism can have a theory of individual
> > development is like asking if atheists pray to God. It's definitional.
> >
> > Seems like the question should be: can we imagine an individual without
> > intellect/cognition?
> >
> > Some of you will immediately say, "of course not, that's a dumb
> question."
> >
> > But some others out there have been trying a different answer to this
> > question. Paul Kockelman is one. Vincent Colapietro (whom Kockelman
> cites)
> > is another. Martin is another. And maybe Vygotsky too?
> >
> > Speaking of which, Martin, can you re-send that Vygotsky piece? I didn't
> > see it as an attachment.
> >
> > -greg 
> >
> > On Wed, Jun 29, 2016 at 12:05 AM, Martin John Packer <
> > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote:
> >
> >> You’re saying there has to be a god??
> >>
> >> Martin
> >>
> >>> On Jun 28, 2016, at 10:01 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> >> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> How do you posit activity as developing without a human mind that
> >> manipulates activity, remaining a constant as the circumstances of
> activity
> >> constantly change.  Think Intelligent Design.  I'm not saying
> development
> >> is parallel to intelligent design, simply that they are based on the
> same
> >> idea.
> >>>
> >>> Michael
> >>>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> >>> Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2016 10:42 AM
> >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
> >>>
> >>> your activity
> >>>
> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >>> Andy Blunden
> >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
> >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> >>>
> >>> On 29/06/2016 12:24 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote:
> >>>> Cognitive or intellectual development.  Because it you are non-dualist
> >> pray tell, what is developing?
> >>>> ________________________________________
> >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer
> >>>> [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co]
> >>>> Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2016 9:04 AM
> >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
> >>>>
> >>>> Why (on earth) would non-dualism prevent a theory of individual
> >> development, Michael?
> >>>>
> >>>> Martin
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> On Jun 28, 2016, at 1:20 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> >> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> In my view Pierce is not non-dualist because of his ideas on
> semiosis,
> >> which are extremely interesting.  He is a non-dualist because he is a
> >> Pragmatist.  That means their philosophy of human intelligence is based
> on
> >> doing not on thinking.  Following James (or perhaps James followed him)
> >> Pierce did not make any assumptions that posited a human mind inside of
> the
> >> head.  The fact that semiosis is non-dualist is I would say an
> outgrowth of
> >> this and not a cause.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> What I think Pragmatists understood is that you have to give up a
> >> great deal when you avoid dualism at all costs.  I would suggest there
> is
> >> no theory of individual development in Pragmatism (although there is
> >> societal and community development).
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Years ago I struggled with whether Vygotsky was willing to make the
> >> same type of sacrifice.  He did have a theory of individual development,
> >> was is possible for him to be a non-dualist.  Not that I want to have
> that
> >> argument.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> MIchael
> >>>>>
> >>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> >>>>> Sent: Monday, June 27, 2016 9:09 PM
> >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Exactly! which is what is so marvellously non-dualistic about Peirce!
> >> Semiosis is a natural process taking place in the objective world. It
> is an
> >> alternative, more general approach than the usual concept of causality.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Andy
> >>>>>
> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>> Andy Blunden
> >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
> >>>>>
> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On 28/06/2016 5:19 AM, Martin John Packer wrote:
> >>>>>> Hi James,
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> You write that "To my mind, Interpretant (Thirdness) is very
> >> important as it implies a mental concept - in Peirce's words, "sign in
> the
> >> mind"."
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Do you know Paul Kockelman's work (ref below)? Kockelman emphasizes
> >> that the interpretant is *not* necessary mental. For example, a plant
> can
> >> respond to sunlight as an Object by turning in its direction
> >> (Interpretant). It is hard to see how a 'mental concept' could be a sign
> >> for a subsequent step of semiosis, whereas a plant turning, or an
> umbrella
> >> opened, or . more obviously could be.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> This video is in Spanish, but otherwise pretty clear!
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXptyWLJT14>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Kockelman, P. (2005). The semiotic stance. Semiotica, 2005(157),
> >> 233-304.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On Jun 27, 2016, at 1:54 PM, Ma, James (james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk)
> <
> >> james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk> wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I like David's elaboration. Just to add a few comments to his and
> >> others' points:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> For Peirce, any sign is a triad which constitutes three realms:
> >> Representamen, Object & Interpretant, corresponding to Firstness,
> >> Secondness & Thirdness as three aspects of the sign. Within the aspect
> of
> >> Secondness, there are three forms: Icon, Index & Symbol, relating to the
> >> three realms - hence, Icon (Firstness), Index (Secondness) & Symbol
> >> (Thirdness). Through the realm of Interpretant, each of the three forms
> >> contributes to an understanding of the sign (i.e. Object), although such
> >> understanding is insusceptible of final proof. To my mind, Interpretant
> >> (Thirdness) is very important as it implies a mental concept - in
> Peirce's
> >> words, "sign in the mind". What's more, Interpretant is in itself a new
> >> sign for the next triad (i.e. semiosis).
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Peirce's semiosis is an interplay of these three realms - it is
> >> concerned with sign action in terms of production and interpretation of
> a
> >> sign through the representamen-interpretant relation that leads to "a
> >> discovery of true meaning, the object" (see Mats Bergman's Peirce's
> >> Philosophy of Communication, 2009, p.114). My take on Peirce's semiosis
> is
> >> that any sign is an end in itself - here, "end" means "purpose" or
> "goal"
> >> (rather than "closure").
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> The term "sign" was used loosely both Saussure and Peirce. For
> >> Saussure, sign means signifier, whereas for Peirce it means the form the
> >> sign takes. The "object" is normally hidden; it would have been
> otherwise
> >> pointless to make a sign if the object is already present. Object is
> absent
> >> in Saussure's dyad (which is self-contained: signifié-signifiant, i.e.
> >> signified-signifier). Saussure's "signified" is not quite the same as
> >> Peirce's "interpretant". In the former, the system of signification
> which
> >> bridges the signified and the signifier is fixated, e.g. the sound MIAO
> as
> >> signifier resulting in a linguistic concept CAT as signified is
> determined
> >> by the system of signification, English language. If the system is
> French
> >> language, then the linguistic concept will be LE CHAT. More importantly,
> >> the idea behind Peirce's interpretant is "dialogical thought" which is
> also
> >> absent in Saussure's dyad.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Regarding word-image relations, what's interesting is that both
> >> modes of meaning are slippery and elusive - which opens up a huge scope
> for
> >> semiotic thinking. The approach to written texts is in the form of
> linear
> >> itinerary, but the approach to visual images is in the form of
> >> circumnavigation, which spirals outwards from the centre to the
> periphery
> >> and at the same time inwards from the periphery to the centre. In terms
> of
> >> meaning potential, I don't think the centre necessarily implies a deep
> >> structure whereas the periphery a surface structure - both can be
> either,
> >> depending on the phenomenon and the person who finds himself in that
> >> phenomenon.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> James
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> ________________________________
> >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of David Kellogg
> >>>>>>> <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> >>>>>>> Sent: 26 June 2016 22:19
> >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Martin:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Actually, it's the icon that is "first" for Peirce, but it's
> >>>>>>> sometimes pretty hard to tell what "firstness" means, because it's
> >>>>>>> not really equivalent to mediacy, which is the way most Vygotskyans
> >>>>>>> are trained to think. Instead, Peirce uses a set of thought
> >>>>>>> experiments to distinguish what comes first: "An icon is a
> >>>>>>> represntamen whose representative quality is a firstness of it as a
> >>>>>>> first. That is a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be
> >>>>>>> a representament.". (Philosophical writings of Peirce, J. Buchler
> >> ed., New York: Dover, p. 104).
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Here's the passage of Peirce I find most useful:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> "A sign is either an icon, an index or a symbol. An icon is a sign
> >>>>>>> that would possess the character which renders it significant even
> >>>>>>> though its object had no existence: such as a lead pencil streak
> >>>>>>> representing a geometrical line. An index is a sign which would,at
> >>>>>>> once,lose the character which makes it a sign if its object where
> >>>>>>> removed, but would not lose that character if there were no
> >>>>>>> interpretant. Such,for instance, is a piece of mould (i.e. particle
> >>>>>>> board--DK) with a bullet hole in it as a sign of a shot; for
> >>>>>>> without the shot there would have been no hole,but there is a hole
> >> there, whether anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not.
> >>>>>>> A symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it
> >>>>>>> a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of
> >>>>>>> speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being
> >>>>>>> understood to have that signification." (104).
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> So icons are "first" because they don't need an object to mean;
> >>>>>>> indexes are "second" because although they need an object, they
> >>>>>>> don't need an interpretant, and symbols are "third" because in
> >>>>>>> order to mean they need an object, and an interpretant. What is
> >>>>>>> confusing to people is that this doesn't create three distinct
> >>>>>>> categories: a symbol has to also be some kind of index and some
> >>>>>>> kind of icon, and an index has to be an icon. So a foot is a foot
> >>>>>>> and it doesn't need any aim or goal or object to mean a foot. In
> >>>>>>> the same way, a foot print is a footprint, but it it's not just a
> >>>>>>> footprint: it also means that there was a foot there at one
> >>>>>>> time,and that's what makes it an index as well as an icon. Finally,
> >>>>>>> the word "foot" or "pied" or "jiao" is a sound, but it's not just a
> >>>>>>> sound; it also means that there was a speaking mouth, tongue, vocal
> >>>>>>> cords, lungs and brain there at one time, and these are what makes
> >>>>>>> each spoken word an icon and an index as well as a symbol.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> David Kellogg
> >>>>>>> Macquarie University
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On Mon, Jun 27, 2016 at 4:18 AM, Martin John Packer
> >>>>>>> <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
> >>>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>> Hi Larry,
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> I though that Greg was asking whether it was not the case that the
> >>>>>>>> Ur-sign for LSV was the index, rather than the icon or symbol. I
> >>>>>>>> took this to be a reference to LSV's frequent mention of the
> >>>>>>>> infant's pointing - an indexical sign if ever that was one, since
> >>>>>>>> the gesture is literally done  with the index finger.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> As I understand it, for Peirce the index was basic, the icon more
> >>>>>>>> complex, and the symbol the most complex kind of sign.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> And for what it's worth, I read Hegel (and many other
> >>>>>>>> phenomenologists) as aiming to describe the movement in
> >>>>>>>> consciousness from appearance to reality. Or perhaps better put,
> >>>>>>>> the movement from what seems real to what turns out to be the mere
> >>>>>>>> appearance of a deeper reality. For Hegel (for Marx, for LSV?),
> >>>>>>>> this movement never ends. (Well, there's some debate over that
> >>>>>>>> claim, but let it stand for now!)
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> On Jun 26, 2016, at 2:08 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I hope this topic (noumenal and phenomenal) can continue.
> >>>>>>>>> Greg's question if objects (and objectives) is the *ur*
> >>>>>>>>> phenomenon for
> >>>>>>>> Vygotsky, and this model contrasting with Peirce's triadic model
> >>>>>>>> where the objects ( *ur* phenomenon)  is one element of semiosis.
> >>>>>>>>> I am going to introduce a quote from Hegel that  may add to this
> >> topic:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> "Philosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a
> >>>>>>>>> cognition
> >>>>>>>> of what is *true* in them, and further, on the basis of this
> >>>>>>>> cognition, to
> >>>>>>>> *comprehend* that which, in the narrative, appears as a mere
> >> happening."
> >>>>>>>>> Is this process of truth as the basis for *comprehending*
> >>>>>>>>> noumenal or
> >>>>>>>> phenomenal?
> >>>>>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> From: Lplarry
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> > --
> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > Assistant Professor
> > Department of Anthropology
> > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > Brigham Young University
> > Provo, UT 84602
> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>
>
>

-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson