[Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal

Tue Jun 28 08:36:31 PDT 2016

Wasn't Waddington talking about physical development.   Perhaps a different kettle of fish.
________________________________________
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2016 11:24 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal

Each new level of development is a new relevant context. C. Waddington, 1942

On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 7:44 AM, WEBSTER D.S. <d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk>
wrote:

> The scope, content, and variety of contexts, of your activity
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> Sent: 28 June 2016 15:42
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
>
> your activity
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy
> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
>
> On 29/06/2016 12:24 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote:
> > Cognitive or intellectual development.  Because it you are non-dualist
> pray tell, what is developing?
> > ________________________________________
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer
> > [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co]
> > Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2016 9:04 AM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
> >
> > Why (on earth) would non-dualism prevent a theory of individual
> development, Michael?
> >
> > Martin
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >> On Jun 28, 2016, at 1:20 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> In my view Pierce is not non-dualist because of his ideas on semiosis,
> which are extremely interesting.  He is a non-dualist because he is a
> Pragmatist.  That means their philosophy of human intelligence is based on
> doing not on thinking.  Following James (or perhaps James followed him)
> Pierce did not make any assumptions that posited a human mind inside of the
> head.  The fact that semiosis is non-dualist is I would say an outgrowth of
> this and not a cause.
> >>
> >> What I think Pragmatists understood is that you have to give up a great
> deal when you avoid dualism at all costs.  I would suggest there is no
> theory of individual development in Pragmatism (although there is societal
> and community development).
> >>
> >> Years ago I struggled with whether Vygotsky was willing to make the
> same type of sacrifice.  He did have a theory of individual development,
> was is possible for him to be a non-dualist.  Not that I want to have that
> argument.
> >>
> >>
> >> MIchael
> >>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> >> Sent: Monday, June 27, 2016 9:09 PM
> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
> >>
> >> Exactly! which is what is so marvellously non-dualistic about Peirce!
> Semiosis is a natural process taking place in the objective world. It is an
> alternative, more general approach than the usual concept of causality.
> >>
> >> Andy
> >>
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> Andy Blunden
> >> http://home.mira.net/~andy
> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> >>
> >> On 28/06/2016 5:19 AM, Martin John Packer wrote:
> >>> Hi James,
> >>>
> >>> You write that "To my mind, Interpretant (Thirdness) is very important
> as it implies a mental concept - in Peirce's words, "sign in the mind"."
> >>>
> >>> Do you know Paul Kockelman's work (ref below)? Kockelman emphasizes
> that the interpretant is *not* necessary mental. For example, a plant can
> respond to sunlight as an Object by turning in its direction
> (Interpretant). It is hard to see how a 'mental concept' could be a sign
> for a subsequent step of semiosis, whereas a plant turning, or an umbrella
> opened, or . more obviously could be.
> >>>
> >>> This video is in Spanish, but otherwise pretty clear!
> >>>
> >>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXptyWLJT14>
> >>>
> >>> Martin
> >>>
> >>> Kockelman, P. (2005). The semiotic stance. Semiotica, 2005(157),
> 233-304.
> >>>
> >>>> On Jun 27, 2016, at 1:54 PM, Ma, James (james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk) <
> james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> I like David's elaboration. Just to add a few comments to his and
> others' points:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> For Peirce, any sign is a triad which constitutes three realms:
> Representamen, Object & Interpretant, corresponding to Firstness,
> Secondness & Thirdness as three aspects of the sign. Within the aspect of
> Secondness, there are three forms: Icon, Index & Symbol, relating to the
> three realms - hence, Icon (Firstness), Index (Secondness) & Symbol
> (Thirdness). Through the realm of Interpretant, each of the three forms
> contributes to an understanding of the sign (i.e. Object), although such
> understanding is insusceptible of final proof. To my mind, Interpretant
> (Thirdness) is very important as it implies a mental concept - in Peirce's
> words, "sign in the mind". What's more, Interpretant is in itself a new
> sign for the next triad (i.e. semiosis).
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Peirce's semiosis is an interplay of these three realms - it is
> concerned with sign action in terms of production and interpretation of a
> sign through the representamen-interpretant relation that leads to "a
> discovery of true meaning, the object" (see Mats Bergman's Peirce's
> Philosophy of Communication, 2009, p.114). My take on Peirce's semiosis is
> that any sign is an end in itself - here, "end" means "purpose" or "goal"
> (rather than "closure").
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> The term "sign" was used loosely both Saussure and Peirce. For
> Saussure, sign means signifier, whereas for Peirce it means the form the
> sign takes. The "object" is normally hidden; it would have been otherwise
> pointless to make a sign if the object is already present. Object is absent
> in Saussure's dyad (which is self-contained: signifié-signifiant, i.e.
> signified-signifier). Saussure's "signified" is not quite the same as
> Peirce's "interpretant". In the former, the system of signification which
> bridges the signified and the signifier is fixated, e.g. the sound MIAO as
> signifier resulting in a linguistic concept CAT as signified is determined
> by the system of signification, English language. If the system is French
> language, then the linguistic concept will be LE CHAT. More importantly,
> the idea behind Peirce's interpretant is "dialogical thought" which is also
> absent in Saussure's dyad.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Regarding word-image relations, what's interesting is that both modes
> of meaning are slippery and elusive - which opens up a huge scope for
> semiotic thinking. The approach to written texts is in the form of linear
> itinerary, but the approach to visual images is in the form of
> circumnavigation, which spirals outwards from the centre to the periphery
> and at the same time inwards from the periphery to the centre. In terms of
> meaning potential, I don't think the centre necessarily implies a deep
> structure whereas the periphery a surface structure - both can be either,
> depending on the phenomenon and the person who finds himself in that
> phenomenon.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> James
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> ________________________________
> >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of David Kellogg
> >>>> <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> >>>> Sent: 26 June 2016 22:19
> >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
> >>>>
> >>>> Martin:
> >>>>
> >>>> Actually, it's the icon that is "first" for Peirce, but it's
> >>>> sometimes pretty hard to tell what "firstness" means, because it's
> >>>> not really equivalent to mediacy, which is the way most Vygotskyans
> >>>> are trained to think. Instead, Peirce uses a set of thought
> >>>> experiments to distinguish what comes first: "An icon is a
> >>>> represntamen whose representative quality is a firstness of it as a
> >>>> first. That is a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be
> >>>> a representament.". (Philosophical writings of Peirce, J. Buchler
> ed., New York: Dover, p. 104).
> >>>>
> >>>> Here's the passage of Peirce I find most useful:
> >>>>
> >>>> "A sign is either an icon, an index or a symbol. An icon is a sign
> >>>> that would possess the character which renders it significant even
> >>>> though its object had no existence: such as a lead pencil streak
> >>>> representing a geometrical line. An index is a sign which would,at
> >>>> once,lose the character which makes it a sign if its object where
> >>>> removed, but would not lose that character if there were no
> >>>> interpretant. Such,for instance, is a piece of mould (i.e. particle
> >>>> board--DK) with a bullet hole in it as a sign of a shot; for
> >>>> without the shot there would have been no hole,but there is a hole
> there, whether anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not.
> >>>> A symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it
> >>>> a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of
> >>>> speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being
> >>>> understood to have that signification." (104).
> >>>>
> >>>> So icons are "first" because they don't need an object to mean;
> >>>> indexes are "second" because although they need an object, they
> >>>> don't need an interpretant, and symbols are "third" because in
> >>>> order to mean they need an object, and an interpretant. What is
> >>>> confusing to people is that this doesn't create three distinct
> >>>> categories: a symbol has to also be some kind of index and some
> >>>> kind of icon, and an index has to be an icon. So a foot is a foot
> >>>> and it doesn't need any aim or goal or object to mean a foot. In
> >>>> the same way, a foot print is a footprint, but it it's not just a
> >>>> footprint: it also means that there was a foot there at one
> >>>> time,and that's what makes it an index as well as an icon. Finally,
> >>>> the word "foot" or "pied" or "jiao" is a sound, but it's not just a
> >>>> sound; it also means that there was a speaking mouth, tongue, vocal
> >>>> cords, lungs and brain there at one time, and these are what makes
> >>>> each spoken word an icon and an index as well as a symbol.
> >>>>
> >>>> David Kellogg
> >>>> Macquarie University
> >>>>
> >>>> On Mon, Jun 27, 2016 at 4:18 AM, Martin John Packer
> >>>> <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>> Hi Larry,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I though that Greg was asking whether it was not the case that the
> >>>>> Ur-sign for LSV was the index, rather than the icon or symbol. I
> >>>>> took this to be a reference to LSV's frequent mention of the
> >>>>> infant's pointing - an indexical sign if ever that was one, since
> >>>>> the gesture is literally done  with the index finger.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> As I understand it, for Peirce the index was basic, the icon more
> >>>>> complex, and the symbol the most complex kind of sign.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> And for what it's worth, I read Hegel (and many other
> >>>>> phenomenologists) as aiming to describe the movement in
> >>>>> consciousness from appearance to reality. Or perhaps better put,
> >>>>> the movement from what seems real to what turns out to be the mere
> >>>>> appearance of a deeper reality. For Hegel (for Marx, for LSV?),
> >>>>> this movement never ends. (Well, there's some debate over that
> >>>>> claim, but let it stand for now!)
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> On Jun 26, 2016, at 2:08 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I hope this topic (noumenal and phenomenal) can continue.
> >>>>>> Greg's question if objects (and objectives) is the *ur*
> >>>>>> phenomenon for
> >>>>> Vygotsky, and this model contrasting with Peirce's triadic model
> >>>>> where the objects ( *ur* phenomenon)  is one element of semiosis.
> >>>>>> I am going to introduce a quote from Hegel that  may add to this
> topic:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> "Philosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a
> >>>>>> cognition
> >>>>> of what is *true* in them, and further, on the basis of this
> >>>>> cognition, to
> >>>>> *comprehend* that which, in the narrative, appears as a mere
> happening."
> >>>>>> Is this process of truth as the basis for *comprehending*
> >>>>>> noumenal or
> >>>>> phenomenal?
> >>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> From: Lplarry
> >>>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>

--

It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object
that creates history. Ernst Boesch