[Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness

[Andy Blunden]

Thanks Paul, Huw and (off-line) Francine.
Points all taken. :)
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
On 1/02/2016 3:01 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
> Hi Andy,
>
> Yes, operations needn't be physical actions (overt 
> object-oriented).
>
> However, you may not need to refer to Leontyev if you're 
> happier with Vygotksy.  The distinction between 
> involuntary attention and voluntary attention may be 
> sufficient for you (vol. 4).
>
> Regarding giving explanations for involuntary activities, 
> a secondary problem is that you may then find that these 
> explanations are 'excuses' for involuntary activity and 
> not necessary the conditions that brought these activities 
> about for the subject.
>
> Hope that helps,
> Huw
>
> On 31 January 2016 at 11:19, Andy Blunden 
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>
>     Can I get an opinion on this from xmca-ers?
>     Anthony Giddens has his own modified-Freudian
>     structure of the personality: "basic security system",
>     "practical consciousness" and "discursive
>     consciousness" instead of id, ego and superego.
>     I am involved in criticising this concept of
>     "practical consciousness" and using Leontyev's three
>     levels of activity.
>     For Giddens, "practical consciousness" is not the
>     practical intelligence which an infant acquires by
>     handling objects or the ability to solve manual tasks,
>     but simply the kind of knowledge which allows people
>     to carry out routine functions, administrative tasks
>     for example, whether social, practical or intellectual
>     in form. According to Giddens this knowledge may have
>     been acquired without ever passing through conscious
>     awareness (although this is not a category he uses).
>     In fact "without conscious awareness" would probably
>     be the correct name for what he calls "practical".
>     SInce Giddens accepts Freud's concept of the
>     Unconscious, it seems that "practical consciousness"
>     is part of the Unconscious.
>
>     My question is this? - Am I right that operations are
>     not necessarily physical actions (like stepping over a
>     curb without thinking, forming a letter when writing
>     or tying your shoelaces), but can equally be things
>     like estimating a person's intentions from their
>     expressions, greeting someone appropriately, filling
>     out a routine form - that is, *not limited to the
>     physical operations* we usually use as examples?
>
>     According to Giddens, if asked to explain why they did
>     something (practical consciousness) then the subject
>     will have to reflect on it and provide an explanation
>     through discursive consciousness. But he says
>     (correctly  I think) that this discursive explanation
>     could only be an *interpretation* of what they did
>     under practical consciousness, i.e., "unconsciously,"
>     and do not normally formulate theories about. He says
>     that there is no "barrier" between practical and
>     discursive consciousness, but the movement between the
>     two seems not to be theorised.
>
>
>     Andy
>     -- 
>     ------------------------------------------------------------
>     *Andy Blunden*
>     http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>     <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
>