[Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)

[Huw Lloyd]

That seems to be about the development of understanding of the units of
construed things, David, from the unit at the level of an ostensive thing,
to a unit of any ostensive index as a thing. That is, for the young child
thingness is socially given, it isn't socially construed, whereby the
understanding of the construal of objects resolves the contradiction
between things that can be named but not pointed to ostensively.

According to our 4.5 year old, Monday is thing that you are in, but that
you can't point to.

Our 1.5 year old is a virtuoso pointer, and will rather point than utter
sounds.  Some of his pointing seems to have some particular qualifications:
occasionally he will point with his finger alongside his eye (a bit like
the way we can make pretend horns) and sometimes he points upwards, like a
gesture half-way between raising his hand and very vaguely gesturing at the
thing that is wanted.  He will often go and fetch books that we look at
together.  One of the books we looked at today has pictures of a man and
toddler (example picture here:
https://jillsbooks.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/jan-ormerod-illustration-reading.jpg?w=500&h=375).
When I asked him who the child is, he pointed at himself, when I asked him
who the man was, he pointed to me.  My interpretation is that he is saying
something along the lines of, "that is a toddler like me, and this is the
toddler's daddy, like you".

Best,
Huw



On 10 January 2016 at 17:32, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:

> Huw:
>
> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the word
> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the three
> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself", "for
> others", "for myself".
>
> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the
> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three
> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying.
> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. "Nominating" is
> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has a
> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place
> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult understanding
> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing that
> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named?
>
> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant
> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, pointing
> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to something
> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a name",
> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it could
> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the
> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name
> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence modes of
> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is
> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of speech
> development.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I
> thought
> > Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can not
> > only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics
> you
> > have elucidated from Volkelt's schema.
> >
> > I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a
> > process" is probably off the mark too.  What is really meant, I believe,
> is
> > "instants of a process".  These have two rather different meanings from
> the
> > perspective of thinking about processes.
> >
> > Best,
> > Huw
> >
> > On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Huw:
> > >
> > > Here's what Vygotsky really says:
> > >
> > > Если задача не превышает естественных сил ребенка, он справляется с ней
> > > непосредственным или примитивным способом. В этих случаях структура его
> > > поведения совершенно напоминает схему, нарисованную Фолькельтом.
> > (Russian
> > > Collected Works, p. 117).
> > >
> > > This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go
> beyond
> > > the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an
> > unmediated
> > > or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior would
> > be
> > > completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt".
> > >
> > > I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two
> > > dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is referring
> to
> > > is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of an
> > > affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively
> > > colored, unanalyzable, whole  in which perception and behavior were
> > > absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a
> > series
> > > of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in
> > the
> > > Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
> > >
> > > What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like a
> > > triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all
> > > different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the
> > teat:
> > > you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. He
> > > taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling of
> > > satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually
> ignore
> > > the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity,
> > blueness,
> > > etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was not
> > > drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively
> colored
> > > whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's
> > > schemata".
> > >
> > > Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we never
> > > grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior
> wholes,
> > > and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of the
> > > German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very careful
> to
> > > distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant
> > behavior:
> > > in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of behavior
> > > (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy.
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Macquarie University
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is
> referred
> > > to
> > > > in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997,
> > p.85
> > > > and onwards in ch. 4)?  I don't think a reference is given.
> > > >
> > > > Best,
> > > > Huw
> > > >
> > >
> >
>