[Xmca-l] Re: Political constructions of self vs politicalconstructions of identity

[HENRY SHONERD]

Greg,
Magic. 
Henry

> On Aug 2, 2016, at 10:09 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> It seems, though that a very interesting question to encounter is: how is
> permanence (whether as "appearance" or as a "reality" - I don't really
> care) constituted in everyday life?
> 
> Or perhaps, what are the processes by which ity's are held in place?
> 
> -greg
> 
> On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 8:50 AM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Rein,
>> Thank you for the correction. I am wondering if the sentence you corrected
>> and what follows it is related to the definition of continuity in the
>> calculus. The logic is not from finite math. The continuity may be an
>> illusion, but real, in the same way that Santa Claus may be?
>> Henry
>> 
>> 
>>> On Aug 2, 2016, at 12:20 AM, Rein Raud <rein.raud@tlu.ee> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Correction to the last paragraph: "The philosophically more thoroughly
>> digested definition would state that nothing we can point to is in exactly
>> the same state at any two moments.” Best, RR
>>> 
>>>> On 02 Aug 2016, at 06:52, Rein Raud <rein.raud@tlu.ee> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Chris - spot on. Remember where this thread started: both essential
>> unity and essential categoriality are infringements on the ity of the
>> individual, who cannot be wholly identified with either. But either is a
>> perspective from which candidates can make their calculations seem less
>> complicated. I’d say we need not address the ity’s of the candidates rather
>> than how their politics are likely to affect our our own.
>>>> 
>>>> Annalisa - replace “stable” and “stationary” in my posts with the
>> bulkier “what doesn’t change” and I’ll still sign them. So you are defining
>> “change” as opposed to stability. Morevoer, most of what you describe as
>> fundamental only exists in the human mind. Western languages indeed are
>> conducive to an understanding of the world you have described, but it is
>> not the only possible one. You say “things exist before they are named” and
>> "we can remove all things in [space and time], and existence remains”. So
>> existence is also a thing? Western languages consider sentences as “the
>> rose is red” and “the sky is blue” to be equivalent, but if you look a
>> little more closely, “rose” and “sky” are ontologically quite different.
>> There is no such thing as the sky. And existence is more like the sky than
>> the rose. Just like the referents of negative sentences, it is something
>> produced by the mind. “There are no rusty nails in this soup” may be true,
>> but if it is, then only in our reflection, because there is no thing there
>> (“absence-of-rusty-nails”) that is described by this observation. So we
>> meaningfully say “Uncle Harry exists” to point out the difference of said
>> uncle with Santa Claus, who doesn’t. (Or doesn’t he? A matter of how we
>> define existence. For example, if we grant existence to immaterial entities
>> that can be the causes of real processes, and a child does her homework
>> diligently because of Santa Claus, while otherwise she wouldn’t, then it
>> would be legitiamate to say that Santa Claus exists.) In this particular
>> sense, the word “existence” performs the work of a double negative: “it is
>> not the case that uncle Harry is nothing but a construction of our mind”.
>>>> 
>>>> Saying that constituents exist before their combination, therefore the
>> combination exists before it actually comes into being is not very
>> productive. There are multitudes of ways how to combine the currently
>> avaialble physical objects and only a minuscule part of these will actually
>> be realized. This is what is called “Occam’s razor” according to William
>> Occam (14th century): we should not posit existences that are not logically
>> necessary.
>>>> 
>>>> Impermanence can be defined at least on two levels: the popular one
>> (call it “impermanence light”) insists that nothing is forever, everything
>> changes, everything that exists turns into something else. The
>> philosophically more thoroughly digested definition would state that
>> anything we can point to is in exactly the same state at any two moments.
>> That is, even the briefest duration separates two exhaustive sets of
>> qualities that characterize this thing. As no qualities are essential by
>> themselves, and no differences in degree are essential by themselves, any
>> thing is not self-identical at two given moments.
>>>> 
>>>> With best wishes,
>>>> 
>>>> Rein
>>>> 
>>>>> On 01 Aug 2016, at 22:10, Christopher Schuck <
>> schuckthemonkey@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> All these explanations are very helpful - thank you. So then when Rein
>>>>> writes, "some calculations are less complicated," is this not speaking
>> to
>>>>> the specifically epistemological priority of our efforts to pin down
>> the
>>>>> candidates' essences? On what basis do we decide what is less
>> complicated
>>>>> in a good way (that allows us to evaluate the candidates in tune with
>> how
>>>>> they are as people and future presidents) as opposed to a bad way
>> (being so
>>>>> uncomplicated that you end up missing the truth entirely and/or being
>>>>> manipulated), and what are the implications of appealing to either
>>>>> Trump-ity or Trump-ness, respectively? I am trying to parse out the
>> "cash
>>>>> value" of understanding these candidates in terms of their -ity's
>> rather
>>>>> than their -ness's.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Sorry if some of this may be redundant.    Chris
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Monday, August 1, 2016, Rein Raud <rein.raud@tlu.ee> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Annalisa, I’m afraid we stray too far from the original topic of this
>>>>>> thread if we get much deeper into ontology, and I would end up
>> copy-pasting
>>>>>> a lot from a book I am currently writing. Briefly, I don’t think we
>> can
>>>>>> define “change” as opposed to “stability” at all, and I’d suggest we
>> speak
>>>>>> about impermanence instead. You are quite correct saying that
>> “change” can
>>>>>> only be detected and described in regard of something else. The point
>> is,
>>>>>> this something else is itself always undergoing some other kind of
>> change
>>>>>> from a third point of view, and so on. The stationary point is quite
>>>>>> arbitrary. Most people currently believe that the Earth is rotating
>> around
>>>>>> the Sun. However, the Sun is not stationary, but also in movement. We
>> can
>>>>>> imagine a hypothetical celestial body which moves around in space so
>> that
>>>>>> it is exactly at the same distance from the Earth at all times and
>> does not
>>>>>> move around its own axis so that the Earth is always also at the same
>> angle
>>>>>> seen from it. For someone on this celestial body, the Earth moves
>> around
>>>>>> its axis, but is otherwise stationary, while the Sun moves around it.
>> It is
>>>>>> just that certain calculations are less complicated when we assume the
>>>>>> primacy of the Sun as the center of the solar system in this scheme.
>> And
>>>>>> that’s how we end up with notions such as change vs stability - some
>>>>>> calculations are less complicated. With best wishes, Rein
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 01 Aug 2016, at 20:11, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu
>>>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Hello,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Larry, my questions are straightforward, as I stated them, but I'll
>> just
>>>>>> reiterate that I was asking is what is Rein's definition of change?
>> How is
>>>>>> changed detected? And from who's point of view?
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> In the end, there must be something stationary in order to gauge
>> change.
>>>>>> Whether in time or in space. Otherwise no change can be detected.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Now Chris brings up an interesting extra to this that there is the
>>>>>> reality "out there" changing, and then our perception of it (which
>> can also
>>>>>> change). But I think the definition still holds that even if the
>> world is
>>>>>> illusory, and our perception changes too, there are laws still in
>> play,
>>>>>> whether we understand those laws or not.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> For a law to adhere it must hold for all cases, or, in homage to
>>>>>> Einstein, in those cases relative to it (which would be marked
>> exceptions).
>>>>>> I consider a law as a stationary point.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> It's not pure chaos out there. When I wake up I wake up in the same
>>>>>> body, even though there is a cellular distinction from my body of 7
>> years
>>>>>> ago. I don't wake up as someone else or with an extra limb I didn't
>> have
>>>>>> yesterday. Now someone could ask, "Well how do you really know that?"
>> And I
>>>>>> would say, "Well, how can you ask the question?"
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Something has to be stationary for change to happen. Even if change
>>>>>> happens faster or slower, the point I'm attempting to make is that
>> there
>>>>>> must be a stationary point regardless.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Something must be (stationary), before it can change or before change
>>>>>> can be detected.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I would say existence is the "center." I think Buddhists contest
>> that,
>>>>>> which is fine. I know that that is how they see it, that nothing
>> exists. As
>>>>>> in no thing.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> And in some ways they are right if you are talking about the apparent
>>>>>> world and the thingness that makes a thing a thing. But everything
>> that is
>>>>>> here has is-ness, not thing-ness. Otherwise it is not. Which means the
>>>>>> thing-ness that isn't thing-ness isn't present in time and space. It
>>>>>> doesn't present itself, whatever it is.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> How does one detect change of something (anything) that is not in
>> time
>>>>>> and space?
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> First, I'd say whatever this non-thing is, can't change, because only
>>>>>> things in time and in space change. On earth as we humans perceive it,
>>>>>> change appears to be dependent upon time and space. But then thanks to
>>>>>> Einstein, now we know that even time and space change. Which means
>> that the
>>>>>> change of time and space must be dependent upon some other stationary
>>>>>> "point" as-if outside of time and space. I say as-if because we are
>> dealing
>>>>>> with a container metaphor, but this metaphor doesn't work when trying
>> to
>>>>>> conceive something outside of time and space. Be we can use it
>> because we
>>>>>> are human and this is how we reason about things, using time and
>> space as
>>>>>> reference points.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Anyway, whatever that "point" is, it would have to be pretty
>> expansive
>>>>>> and eternal in all directions, in all time. It would have to be big to
>>>>>> cover all of space and time. But because it would be outside of space
>> and
>>>>>> time, it would also have to be formless and changeless.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Take away form (space) and change (time) and all that is left is
>>>>>> existence. Which is.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Right here right now. :)
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> P.S. I see that Rein post just now, so this is not in reply to that
>> post
>>>>>> of his.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson