[Xmca-l] Re: Oliver Sacks/Romantic Science
Andy Blunden
ablunden@mira.net
Sun Sep 6 07:22:39 PDT 2015
Agreed, Haydi. We can talk off-line if you want, but the
matrix is not my thing. Someone else will have to explain it.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
On 7/09/2015 12:02 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:
>
> Andy ,
>
> I think you agree this be our last trial both for reasons
> of participation rules and the coming in of new threads .
>
> I said I don't know how the matrix and the Johari Window
> work . I came in when Peter gave his figure . I was
> partially known to that kind of matter . I resorted to
> Davydov's and Ilyenko's writings . I said I believed for
> some #unknown , now well-known reason , the vertical axis
> should be reversed Because all three categories before
> "true concept" somehow are defective . And you know it's
> just true scientific concepts which are , to the extent
> that and as long as they are workable in life , absolute .
>
>
> Now forgive me if I have to read your text in parts (below) :
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:* Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Sent:* Sunday, 6 September 2015, 5:07:10
> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Oliver Sacks/Romantic Science
>
> Haydi, you ask is it true that "All true concepts are both
> concrete and universal"?
> Vygotsky uses the expression "true concept" in a quite
> specific sense, namely a concept as it is first acquired
> purely through instruction. "Instruction" means in some
> institution.
>
> [[Acquisition of true concepts is not a matter of "where"
> , is a matter of how . Read about this please on Ilyenko .
> Davydov's reason for the specific type of teaching and
> generalization he suggests is that with discrete items
> learners even at post-puberty do not acquire
> logical-theoretical conceptions appropriately . And now
> you say what they get at school is a "concept" . Could we
> as academics exactly and precisely enumerate items of
> "furniture" . Because what we got was a table is something
> you get around for dinner , has four legs , etc. In a
> house , our learner groups according to the appearances :
> tables , chairs , sofas ; rugs , curtains , blankets ,
> etc. so on so forth . Then , when is the time to get the
> concept of furniture ? and as with double stimulation ,
> how can they find the commonalities between different
> items of "furniture" ? having a seat , getting-around-ness
> , succeptibility of being laid down , legged-ness?
> house-ware-ness , fetchablity , fixability ? That's why
> true workable concepts are absolute , concrete , and
> universal because they need deeper and deeper thinking and
> deeper and deeper analyses and deeper and deeper trials .]]
>
> In this case a "true concept" is not concrete, it is
> abstract. A "true concept" becomes concrete over time,
> through experiences, but at first it is abstract.
> Because it is acquired from an institution a "true concept"
> is universal, that is to say, it is part of an entire social
> formation.
>
> [[Please agree in this case we don't yet have a 'true
> concept" ; You're a scholar . please see what Davydov has
> to say about "notions" and "concepts" . And what between
> conceptions and concepts , maybe in Davydov . And did
> Vygotsky (PROCESSES of concept formation) say or did I say
> true concepts are there in that box . go take it ? At
> first , it may not be a concept altogether . A.A.Leontiev
> and Akhutina have worked on "production of speech" Those
> in the West as well . Motive , inner planning , inner
> speech , semantics (grammar) , external speech plus many
> details . Yes , it takes time until "word" comes into
> being and then word , that is , the cover for meaning
> stabilizes . But inside , the value or the meaning MOVES .
> A long way towards the end , the concept . In double
> stimulation , too , what is carved into the bottom of the
> blocks remains the same but though they're wooden , they
> seem to have in them a turbulent sea of rising-falling
> waves capable of ruining or erecting a world of values .
> "universality" for me , as I've read , means our whole
> (concept) in each case within typology has already been
> purified of non-essentials and non-necessaries , such that
> we have assigned the particulars in each phenomenon , then
> have weighed the particulars of that phenomenon against
> the particulars of other related phenomena to see if we
> can make a generalization , in the end we reach a
> 'concept" ; I'ts in that case we can say we can find the
> particular in the universal and the universal in the
> particular .]]
>
> These answers are given in the terms of Vygotsky's "Thinking
> and Speech," that is to say from the point of view of
> Psychology, yes, but Cultural Psychology, not positivist
> psychology.
>
>
>
> From a Hegelian point of view (not psychology), a true
> concept is abstract but also concrete, because it is the
> product and expression of an entire historical development.
>
> [[Nice and thanks as always for your co-operation . But I
> stressed that I'm talking within my assigned limits ; the
> least I can say is when Post-Hegelians freed the HEAD
> which had been stuck to the earth , feet were fixed
> instead and everything got upright .]]
>
> That's my answer to your first question. I can't deal with
> everything in this message. But ...
>
>
>
> About "fuzzy boundaries." The way you specify this question:
> 'to blend some "matter" with some "idea" and some idea with
> some matter' is ridiculed by Vygotsky. To talk of "fuzzy
> boundaries" implies that there are different kinds of stuff,
> i.e., existants, but by definition ideas are not existent.
> [[the idea of the table does not exist#the idea of table
> is not a BEING]]
> The way you pose the question reifies ideas. In the
> psychological sense, ideas are internal, psychological
> entities and it is absurd to think of blurring a "boundary"
> between consciousness and matter. No such boundary, fuzzy or
> firm, exists. I think the only consistent way to make sense
> of this is to accept that matter and consciousness are
> *relational* not absolute concepts. What you do, including
> what you think, is material (objective) from my point of
> view but from your point of view there is an absolute sharp
> distinction between your thoughts and your behaviour.
>
> [[Dear Andy , if you consider that I denied "fuzzy
> boundaries" within our context from the beginning , much
> of your accusations will be removed . You still argued the
> fuzzy boundaries is the revolutionary act which I now see
> which I now don't and again I explained that I had taken
> neither the fuzzy boundaries nor the revolutionary act as
> such . The beginning refers to when you , taking my
> "external transformables" as mere objective materials ,
> posed the idea that in recent decades both terms have gone
> further than the dimensions I had depicted . I took it
> for some idea indicating that ontology penetrates
> epistemology , vice versa . Then I referred you to my
> previous message to this one . Now again you say the way
> YOU specify . I've not specified and I'm not specifying .
> I attributed that idea to the way YOU had argued . Now you
> can say directly that I've been mistaken with your point
> and add that you've even been justified with Vygostky's
> ridicule . I remember Martin once telling me to be careful
> with my Farsi translation of the "Crisis" especially to
> the end when I reach the concepts of ontology and
> epistemology . The point is so delicate and intriguing ,
> you agree . And now it's my turn to tell you , but Andy ,
> "Now you argue ontology could talk even about the being of
> thoughts and ideas Now you say by definition ideas are not
> existent" . And if someone (other than me and within this
> context) tends to prove that there could be a fuzzy
> boundary between , say , thought and body , why should we
> not accept his argument ? As you say , the implication
> goes so far as to say thought is stuffy , consciousness is
> stuffy , word is stuffy , (established here time and
> again) and body is stuffy . I also say these are just
> relational ; they don't have their independent BEING#NOT
> BEING . But when you say 'stuffy' = existants and add the
> above are 'materials' , what remains to be discussed ? I
> see contradictions . The way I posed the question does not
> reify 'ideas' ; for me ideas and all such things emanate
> from a BEING in a societal context . I stress this was a
> thing I attributed to you . I just can apologize for the
> attribution . YOU say : " In the
> psychological sense, ideas are internal, psychological
> entities and it is absurd to think of blurring a 'boundary'
> between consciousness and matter. I have no doubt that
> Marx by saying "Behind consciousness is BEING" did by no
> means mean that these are two different things and there
> might be a probability of creating something in between
> them ; in the context , he meant the beginnings or
> precedence of one over the other (the word and the act and
> other stories you remember) . And I do remember the
> "highest property of matter" also . BTW , I've not heard
> you oppose those who believe in the 'materiaity' of
> thought and consciousness . How is it , then , that here
> you , maybe unknowingly , put an equal sign between 'idea'
> and 'consciousness' ? In a bright shining day , you say by
> definition , ideas do not exist though here you say of
> psychological ENTITIES which inevitably then, have to not
> exist and though whatever man has at his disposal as books
> , huge encys and dics , on computers , etc. SEEM to be
> just hallucinations and phantoms . I know where the
> problem lies . The first test you gave me was with the
> word 'exist' . Now It's time to replace it with some other
> term . Terminologically speaking , ideas exist but are not
> BEINGS . And , No , in my point of view , too , thoughts
> and behaviours are interactional or dialectical .]]
>
> And
> the movement of neurons is not thought, but merely the
> material substratum of thinking. Thinking is a function of
> the entire person. If I consider the activity of a person
> before me, there is both material behaviour (physical
> movements) and consciousness lying "behind" the behaviour.
> Thinking and behaving are united in activity, but they are
> not two different substances which are mixed or blurred,
> because you can (as an observer) make no distinction between
> them if you going to speak scientifically. Look at "Thinking
> and Speech." Does Vygotsky make a distinction between
> concepts and forms of action? I think not. These are just
> forms of abstraction from one integral, irreducible
> substance, activity.
>
>
> Please see if the following satisfies you with ontology
> and epistemology :
>
> There were many exchanges of thought among the audience .
>
> But one man's thought shone like a piece of diamond /
> crystal .
>
>
> We have transgressed the one / two page/s norm in each
> post . I personally give my apologies . If you agree , we
> continue offlist .
>
>
> Larry ! I'm indebted to you from time immemorial , I
> really like to talk with you as it were . I'll try !!
> Thanks !
>
> Haydi
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> On 6/09/2015 2:06 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> >
> > Dear Andy,
> >
> > The reason I came to you was Peg's authority and
> > personality and brilliance of research . Now again I put
> > my problem clearly : I have some supposition to the effect
> > that "All true concepts are both concrete and universal"
> > according to my previous explanation . If I'm mistaken ,
> > someone might be kind to justify the point . This is where
> > I was led to during discussions .
> >
> >
> >
> > P.S. What I wrote you as Marx's evaluation of Feuerbach
> > not being "revolutionary" is at hand but I have some more
> > important thing to say as to clarify what I meant by
> > "fuzzy boundaries" .
> >
> >
> > I said of ontology as tending towards "external
> > transformable/s [entities] . And you said of plurality of
> > both terms . Now I give more explanation .
> >
> >
> > By that , I wouldn't have meant just rocks and stones . In
> > this regard , in my personal correspondence I referred you
> > to the wrestling and involvement and therefrom to "man and
> > his world" . That is , man , the world , actions ,
> > interactions , processes , relations , relationships , so
> > on so forth . That is , to the extent where man still
> > remains "man" and "his world" remains "his world" . As I
> > understand it , this is the dimension and limits of
> > "ontology" .
> >
> >
> > But you're talking in a way that one might figure out that
> > it's possible to blend some "matter" with some "idea" and
> > some idea with some matter . This is what I meant by
> > "fuzzy bordering" .
> >
> >
> > If , as you say , the being of thought (spatially
> > temporally) is something and the knowing of thought
> > something else , the former ontological , the latter ,
> > epistemological , then what are the neuronal processes
> > taking place in the brain ? Wouldn't you agree that this
> > latter case might be closer to "ontology" . I say we are
> > either dealing with thought or with the thinking man ;
> > that is they related but distinctive . And it's when we
> > are dealing with the thinking man as "social being" that
> > the problem of being "revolutionary" or
> > "non-revolutionary" or "counter-revolutionary" occurs .
> >
> >
> > And it's O.K. for us to think over the well-known saying
> > that "behind consciousness is BEING" . Does not this BEING
> > , first of all , mean the Being who is born , who grows ,
> > lives , works , uses tools , acts , interacts , wrestles
> > with , involves , gets engaged , enters processes , joins
> > , communicates , socializes , fails , succeeds , dies ,
> etc. ?
> >
> >
> > Please first go to the first parag in full . Others are
> > deletable .
> >
> >
> > Best
> > Haydi
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------
> > *From:* Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> > *To:* Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com
> <mailto:haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>>;
> > "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
> > *Sent:* Saturday, 5 September 2015, 16:47:41
> > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Oliver Sacks/Romantic Science
> >
> > But Haydi, those "fuzzy foggy boundaries" are
> > revolutionary practice! Now you see it now you don't!
> >
> > Andy
> > ------------------------------------------------------------
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> > <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >
> >
> > On 5/09/2015 9:15 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> >> Andy,
> >>
> >> Thanks for the explanation !
> >>
> >> A large part of my personal debate was about the theses ,
> >> the first one in particular and you admitted that you'd
> >> seen nothing richer than them . Then , it was not a
> >> matter of recent decades , revisions , innovations or the
> >> other Marx or Marxes . To put it simply even today : The
> >> table exists and the idea of the table exists . Does
> >> creating fuzzy foggy boundaries in between help resolve
> >> our problems ? Now , that's not our main point of
> reference .
> >>
> >>
> >> What you're talking about was my Post-Script , an
> >> addendum to a major point . Shortly , within our bounds
> >> (Vygotsky Marxist School of the Time and beyond) , could
> >> we say : "All true concepts are both universal and
> >> concrete" ?
> >>
> >> I would not provide support for this because , I think ,
> >> David Kellog or Mike is able to locate if such a saying
> >> exists within Vygotsky's Collected works or some other
> >> Vygotskian's . My mind triggers blazingly though it's too
> >> old .
> >>
> >> Larry ! I'll read your post again and try to provide an
> >> answer . Many thanks !
> >>
> >> Best
> >>
> >> Haydi
> >>
> >>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> *From:* Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> >> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> >> *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> >> <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
> >> *Sent:* Saturday, 5 September 2015, 4:58:38
> >> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Oliver Sacks/Romantic Science
> >>
> >> Haydi, on the question of ontology and epistemology ...
> >> Ontology is the study of being. That does not mean that it
> >> is concerned only with independently existing entities. It
> >> is the study of what forms of being there are, such as
> >> "thoughts". In recent decades this has come to mean a
> person
> >> or a culture's belief in the array of different entities
> >> that may be talked of, e.g. gods, classes or
> individuals, so
> >> it is an aspect of cultural difference.
> >> Epistemology is the study of knowing, in particular the
> >> limits and validity of knowledge. It is not necessarily a
> >> study of reflection. In recent decades it has comes to mean
> >> a person or a culture's beliefs about the legitimate
> sources
> >> of knowledge, e.g. priests, books or experience, etc.
> >> It was Hegel who first proposed that these sciences were
> >> bankrupt and should be transcended, because every social
> >> formation had its own integral "epistemology" and
> "ontology"
> >> and there was no final answer to the question these
> sciences
> >> proposed, so Hegel's view leads us to the modern way of
> >> talking about epistemologies and ontologies in the plural
> >> and aspects of a way of thinking and acting in the world.
> >> Hegel's Ontology is the first Book of the Logic, and I can
> >> see a sense in which you could say that the Second Book is
> >> about epistemology, but I don't think this is accurate.
> >>
> >> Andy
> >>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> *Andy Blunden*
> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
>
>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 5/09/2015 7:08 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> >> > P.S. Many a time I've made efforts , asked others , to
> >> differentiate between ONTOLOGY and EPISTEMOLOGY ; yet
> >> I've stayed on the same spot . First thesis of Feuerbach
> >> tells us if it's the case that we imagine / conceive the
> >> objects there to themselves without any wrestling on our
> >> part to get involved with them , then science / genuine
> >> materialism would not present any meaning to us . All
> >> things arise from the wrestling and the involvement . On
> >> this point , too , in either case , our work and thinking
> >> power are involved except that with ontology , we try to
> >> conceive things as existent and trace them as external
> >> transformables in themselves while with epistemology we
> >> deal with the pertaining ideas as reflexions . Then , in
> >> the natural and physical sciences , by concrete we mean
> >> "of matter" , corporeal , while in philosophy and
> >> gnoseology which is the province of the second of our
> >> division , knowledge , concrete , of necessity , would
> >> mean conceptual , the highest and most valued categorial
> >> philosophical term .
> >> > In what ways am I completely mistaken ?
> >> > Best
> >> > Haydi
> >> >
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>
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