[Xmca-l] Re: The Ideological Footprint of Artifacts

[Andy Blunden]

https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/i/d.htm#ideology
andy
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
On 5/06/2015 1:51 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> Henry, Mike:
>
> The word "ideology" casts a very long shadow! I think that Saussure's
> notion of "l'arbitraire" is better understood in English as the
> "conventional". In Korean, by the way, it has the idea of "volitional",
> that is, something under human control. So the patterns of meaning that we
> find (e.g. the relationship between "ideal" and "ideology") are
> conventional; they are under human control by means of conventions and
> institutions, but they are not random in any sense (as Vygotsky says, you
> can't call a pigeon a "blackbird" without doing serious violence to the
> meaning of the word "black").
>
> So, to uptake Mike's dictionary definition, the meaning of "ideology" has
> come to mean socio-political assumptions or world view of a disagreeable
> nature. This ideological shadow is certainly conventional, and it is
> certainly not arbitrary--it has been carefully engineered by generations of
> cold warriors and has now been taken over by a party which conventionally
> calls itself "democratic", to hurl at a party which calls itself, quite
> randomly, "republican". But to me the word "ideology" only means what it
> meant to Volosinov: it is the study of ideas, and the study of the ideal in
> material life, i.e. of signs and their effects on social and psychological
> life.
>
> When we teach Korean children "science", we begin with a field of study
> called "wise life". This then becomes differentiated into "natural science"
> on the one hand "social studies" on the other. Only in middle school will
> the children differentiate natural science into chemistry, physics, and
> biology (and social studies will be differentiated into social studies
> proper and ethics). These distinctions are, of course, as thoroughly
> conventional as the distinction between sociology and psychology, or the
> distinction between vocabulary and grammar.
>
> Imagine, instead of "wise life" or "natural science" or even science, we
> had evolved something called "matter-ology", a field which studies matter
> in all of its forms: physical, biological, socio-cultural, and semiotic.
> Within "matterology", we might distinguish a science of matter that in some
> way indicates, suggests, represents or "stands for" other matter (other
> phenomena), or other matters (megaphenomena) or other matters of fact
> (metaphenomena). That's semiology, or as Volosinov would say, "ideology".
>
> David Kellogg
>
> On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 at 9:46 AM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> This is late in the game, so forgive me, but:
>>
>> Appropos David re: Saussure, my understanding is that sometime towards the
>> end of the 19th Century linguistics shifted its focus from the diachronic
>> (historical, longitudinal) to the synchronic (in a single point of time)
>> study of language. Apparently actual violence during meettings of linguists
>> over such things as an original language resulted in making historical
>> linguistics a taboo subject. Hence, Saussure’s sin, as David describes it:
>>
>>>> "Saussure, who did more than anyone to make the insights of the
>> Symbolists
>>>> into a coherent world view, said that thought and language, both
>> chaotic,
>>>> organize each other through decomposing each other, and of course that's
>>>> correct. Saussure's big mistake was to turn his back on the process by
>>>> which this happens. And the strangest thing about this mistake is that
>> it
>>>> was the very process in which he'd made his own career--historical
>> linguistics!”
>>
>> He threw the baby out with the bath water. Chomsky topped that by making a
>> single language a sufficient basis for getting at what makes language tick
>> and keep on ticking. (He could have included Hebrew in his writing, which
>> he knew a lot about through his father.) Leaving out BOTH forms of
>> variation, diachronic and synchronic, leaves out a lot, if you’re trying to
>> understand development of language, either ontogentically or
>> phylogenetically.
>>
>> Regarding what a symbol is, Saussure seems to have pushed l’arbitraire du
>> signe to its limit, that is the assumed arbitrary relationship between the
>> phonological (sound) and semantic (meaning) “poles” of symbols. (I take it
>> that any symbol is the unit formed by the pairing of a phonological and
>> sematic element. If I read Vygotsky right, he used “WORD” to capture this
>> pairing. Let me be clear that by the phonological, I mean strings of
>> language sounds from the shortest to longest: phoneme, morpheme, clause,
>> poem, etc.) Langacker is one of many who use the umbrella term “iconicity”
>> to capture the ways in which the material form of a language, its
>> "structure in sound" so to speak, is anything BUT arbitrary.
>>
>>  From Wikipedia:
>> "In functional-cognitive linguistics, as well as in semiotics, iconicity
>> is the conceived similarity or analogy between the form of a sign
>> (linguistic or otherwise) and its meaning, as opposed to arbitrariness.”
>>
>>  From this definition, iconicity is anything about the form of language
>> that is not arbitrary. This would include onomatopeia, but would also
>> include a looser sound symbolism, deixis or pointing, and what the
>> prototypical sign (sound) where there is no obvious connection between
>> sound and meaning, but where the choices made by a language community in
>> how they express themselves are influenced by factors internal to the
>> language and culture (e.g., the great vowel shift in the history of
>> English) AND language/culture contact (witness the massive borrowing into
>> English from other languages and the influence of English on other
>> languages).
>>
>> Henry
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Jun 2, 2015, at 4:02 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>> David- I do not have Jan's book, so cannot judge your comments overall,
>> but
>>> Zinchenko was almost certainly referring to Leontiev, not Vygotsky, in
>>> referring to the theory of activity and repeating the oft-repeated charge
>>> of "sign-o-centricism" versus "behaviorism" leveled against him, large by
>>> the followers of Rubenshtein.
>>>
>>> mike
>>>
>>> PS- Perhaps Jan can find a moment to comment.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jun 2, 2015 at 2:20 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>> Dear Larry:
>>>>
>>>> So Zinchenko says that if I go on a journey through the desert and
>> choose
>>>> to take a map instead of  an ice-axe I am being an idealist!
>>>>
>>>> Of course, I know that by choosing an ice-axe, I am confusing the error
>> of
>>>> taking a tool instead of a symbol with taking the WRONG tool instead of
>> the
>>>> RIGHT symbol. But I also think that by choosing an ice-axe I am drawing
>>>> some attention to the underlying dishonesty--the demagogy--of a lot of
>> the
>>>> criticisms made of Vygotsky--how they are reducible to name-calling
>>>> ("Idealist!" "Subjectivist!" "Word-Fetishist!")
>>>>
>>>> I suppose the real problem with Zinchenko is the one that Andy's already
>>>> pointed to. What makes humans human is that they don't live in an
>>>> "environment" that is oblivious to them to which they must adapt or die.
>>>> They have the ability to make the environment adapt to them and
>> sometimes
>>>> even die--as I am reminded by the potted plant withering on my window
>>>> sill. Our nature is really not the same as the nature that animals live
>> in.
>>>> It's quite literally a "human' nature; a society is nature humanized
>>>> by consciousness. Beyond the ficus dying on my window sill lies Seoul,
>> the
>>>> second largest city on earth. When I go out and do my grocery shopping,
>> I
>>>> don't take a tool or even a map; I take a mind full of symbols, and the
>>>> same thing is true when I go out to "earn" my daily bread. So, as Andy
>>>> says, the "environment" has to include an element of human
>> consciousness,
>>>> of my consciousness and the consciousness I must share with seventy-five
>>>> million other Koreans every time I use a Korean word. If this be
>> idealism,
>>>> make the most of it!
>>>>
>>>> There was a good review of my book in the journal "System" recently
>>>> (attached). When I got over the warm feeling brought about by
>>>> the (apparently heartfelt) praise, I felt slightly irked by the attempt
>> to
>>>> link Vygotsky's reading of Hamlet with that of Florensky, who really
>> WAS an
>>>> idealist. Florensky's "Hamlet" came out when Vygotsky was nine years
>> old!
>>>> But of course the author is right--Florensky, later a priest, a Russian
>>>> Orthodox theologian, and ultimately a victim of Stalin's goons, was one
>> of
>>>> the founders of the Symbolist movement, and Vygotsky could not help but
>>>> have felt his long cool shadow as he wrestled with the question of
>> whether
>>>> Hamlet is a psycho-drama (and all the characters but Hamlet are only
>>>> symbols) or a socio-drama (and all the characters--with the exception of
>>>> the players--are flesh and blood).
>>>>
>>>> Saussure, who did more than anyone to make the insights of the
>> Symbolists
>>>> into a coherent world view, said that thought and language, both
>> chaotic,
>>>> organize each other through decomposing each other, and of course that's
>>>> correct. Saussure's big mistake was to turn his back on the process by
>>>> which this happens. And the strangest thing about this mistake is that
>> it
>>>> was the very process in which he'd made his own career--historical
>>>> linguistics!
>>>>
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Jun 2, 2015 at 10:21 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>> David,
>>>>> A fascinating way to explore the long shadow that concepts entail back
>> to
>>>>> the sensory "ground" of concepts.
>>>>>
>>>>> I would like to ask how you situate a third term "symbol" in its
>>>>> relationship to the "sensory sound" and the "conceptual"
>>>>>
>>>>> Zinchenko offers one approach to symbols [to prime the pumps of this
>>>>> question]
>>>>>
>>>>> "The psychological theory of activity was concerned with the problem of
>>>>> real [i.e. concrete] tools and objects that humans, also in accordance
>>>> with
>>>>> Marxism, place between themselves and nature.  In other words, what
>>>> makes a
>>>>> human human? Symbol or thing? The crucifix or the hammer and sickle? If
>>>> it
>>>>> is the symbol then this is idealism. If it is the thing then this is
>>>>> materialism or perhaps dialectical materialism"
>>>>>
>>>>> "Reading" this question  through your response above I wonder if the
>>>> answer
>>>>> is unfinalizable and may depend on the "reciprocal" interpenetration of
>>>> the
>>>>> symbolic and sensory.  I am assuming the symbolic as "figurative" and
>>>>> "con/figurative" phenomena that expresses co-existence.
>>>>>
>>>>> I am Reading Jan Derry's 2013 book "Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education"
>>>> and
>>>>> Zinchenko's quote is on page 14.
>>>>>
>>>>> Larry
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 5:38 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> The other day I was listening to Gounod's "Romeo et Juliette". It's
>> the
>>>>>> wedding night, and they got to bed. Because they have no alarm clock,
>>>>> they
>>>>>> must listen carefully for the sound of the lark, else Romeo will be
>>>>>> captured by the guards of Verona and hanged.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Romeo is sleeping with one ear open, and he is the first to awake.
>>>> Romeo
>>>>>> hears a bird and tells Juliette, and Juliette replies:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Non, ce n'est pas le jour.
>>>>>> Ce n'est pas l'allouette.
>>>>>> Dont le chant a frappe
>>>>>> Ton orielle inquiete
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (No, it is not the day
>>>>>> That is not the lark
>>>>>> Whose song has struck
>>>>>> Your sleepless ear)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But of course the song persists. Juliette reassures him:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> C'est le doux rossignol
>>>>>> Confidant d'amour!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (It's the sweet nightengale
>>>>>> The confidant of love!)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And Romeo decides, for probably just for the sake of being able to
>>>>> reverse
>>>>>> roles and sing the song himself, that he will go along with Juliette's
>>>>> idea
>>>>>> and go back to sleep. So then Juliette hears the sound and realizes
>>>> that
>>>>>> you must leave, helas! And Romeo sings, "Non, ce n'est pas le
>> jour...."
>>>>>> All of which reminded me of the crucial fact that in the sixteenth
>>>>> century
>>>>>> they did not yet have alarm clocks. But when you hear the woodwinds
>>>> come
>>>>> in
>>>>>> precisely at 1:47:35, what you hear, if you are a modern listener, is
>>>> an
>>>>>> electric alarm clock.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Now of course, in Gounod's time they no more had electric alarm clocks
>>>>> than
>>>>>> in Shakespeare's. But such is the ideological footprint of artifacts;
>>>>> they
>>>>>> heard the sound of the woodwinds as that of a nightengale, and we hear
>>>> it
>>>>>> as battery powered alarm clock.  Or is it the other way around, and
>> the
>>>>>> alarm is designed  to mimick a lark?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Last night we were working on ways of teaching vocabulary which are
>>>>>> GENERALIZABLE. It is of course the case, as Vygotsky points out, that
>>>>>> MEANINGS can be related easily to each other, in one way
>>>> (hierarchically)
>>>>>> when we teach scientific concepts and in another (sensually,
>>>>>> experientially) when we are not. It's also true that the WORDINGS are
>>>>>> related easily toe ach other, as nouns and verbs, as participants and
>>>>>> processes, and as circumstances. But what kids want are to be able to
>>>>> match
>>>>>> the soundings and the imagery. In most languages this seems arbitrary
>>>> and
>>>>>> so vocabulary seems a piecemeal affair.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It isn't. As Vygotsky points out, when you go back in time, you find
>>>> that
>>>>>> there are (at least) three kinds of associative links which must help
>>>> the
>>>>>> young vocabulary learner. We had the following list of Canadian
>> animals
>>>>> to
>>>>>> teach brought in by a hakweon teacher from Canada:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> moose, goose, badger, beaver, eagle, porcupine
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With "moose" and "goose' the link is sounding--try bellowing the first
>>>>> like
>>>>>> a moose, and hooting the second like a goose. With "badger" and
>>>> "beaver"
>>>>>> the link is wording--badgers badger grubs and bother birds, while
>>>> beavers
>>>>>> are always beavering around with dams and nests. Eagle somehow
>>>>> alliterates
>>>>>> with "eye" and "spy", and "porcupine" suggests a piney, spiney,
>>>>>> pineapple-pig.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Of course, none of these are concepts. All are forms of complex. But
>>>> all
>>>>> of
>>>>>> them are the ideological footprint, the long shadow, cast by an
>>>> artefact
>>>>>> down through history.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If you want to hear the lark, you will have to wait to the end of the
>>>>>> opera, where it takes on another meaning. As everybody knows, Romeo
>>>> dies
>>>>>> before Juliet awakes. But in Gounod's version, he drinks the poison,
>>>> she
>>>>>> awakes, and they are once again joyful in each other's arms, until he
>>>>>> remembers the poison (a minor detail!) and dies singing...you guessed
>>>>>> it...2:31:00.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "No, it is not the day
>>>>>> That is not the lark...
>>>>>> It's the sweet nightengale
>>>>>> The confidant of love!"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Of course it's absurd (although not quite as absurd as the moment that
>>>>> poor
>>>>>> Rolando Villazon has to wipe the sweat off the end of his nose before
>>>> he
>>>>>> kisses Nina Machaidze). But it's also somewhat terrifying, as a raw
>>>>>> demonstrating of the ideological footprint of artworks. A single sound
>>>>> has
>>>>>> the power to be a bird in one century, a piccolo in another, and a
>>>>> digital
>>>>>> alarm clock in our own. Artifacts cast a long shadow, even at night.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmNULK87lK0
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes
>>> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something
>>> that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it*
>>
>