[Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects

Andy Blunden ablunden@mira.net
Thu Jul 23 07:26:07 PDT 2015


Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity".
:( Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice again on 
> this list.
> I understand what you are saying. I will try to better 
> explain how I stand with A N Leontyev.
>
> I am a social theorist, that is I am interested in 
> changing societal arrangements (to put it very politely), 
> and I am one of few social theorists, properly so-called, 
> who base themselves on Vygotsky's theories, and use 
> Activity Theory as well. My position is a contradictory 
> one because Vygotsky and Leontyev were psychologists (like 
> you) and not social theorists. Social Theorists and 
> Psychologists generally live in different buildings on the 
> university campus, in different departments, publish in 
> different journals, refer to different founding theorists, 
> and altogether inhabit different universes. Social 
> theorists have ideas about psychology, but generally not 
> scientific ones, and vice versa.
> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an excellent 
> foundation for social theory because he introduced into 
> human development and every interaction between two 
> individuals a culturally produced sign. But he only went 
> so far. He showed how people acted and developed within 
> their social situation, but he did not tackle the problem 
> of how that situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of 
> the Activity as a macro-unity of activity, made an 
> epoch-making development which opened CHAT to become a 
> fully developed social-and-psychological theory. But what 
> he said himself on questions of social theory was of very 
> poor quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the sort of 
> ideas that would win any following among social theorists 
> today. But he was after all a Psychologist and not a 
> Social Theorist, so he is forgiven.
>
> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken "objective 
> meaning" is not a psychological category at all for 
> Leontyev. Yes? And personal sense is, as you eloquently 
> explain, a fundamental Psychological category. So if what 
> I said were to be interpreted to say that personal sense 
> is a subset of objective meaning, that would be quite 
> wrong. While I accept (as I must) a categorical difference 
> between material objects/processes and their reflection in 
> my mind, I do not at all understand societal processes as 
> nonpsychological processes. I try to conceive of them 
> together in one unit, and I think I am on my own there 
> (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside).
> There remains of course the distinction between the 
> individual (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein),  
> mediated by the particular (Besonder). A human individual 
> is something radically different from a number of 
> individuals. For the human individual and how they erleben 
> a social situation, I rely on my friends and 
> collaborator-psychologists. I am interested in how the 
> Activities go. In small part to avoid having arguments 
> with followers of Leontyev I call activities "projects." 
> So I reserve the right to say things about projects 
> without a follower of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is 
> not a mysterious or esoteric concept; every 
> English-speaker knows what a project is, and if there is 
> any confusion with projects as defined by Existentialists, 
> I call them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people 
> usually join them, not create them).  These include 
> capitalist firms, political parties, sporting clubs or 
> indeed whole sports, a family, a professional career - all 
> those things which gives our lives mening while we build 
> the world we and our children must live in, what Fedor 
> Vasilyuk called an отношение . A project is not a 
> collection of people, it is an aggregate of actions (like 
> an Activity) and the "logic" of projects is something 
> different from Psychology, but it is inclusive of 
> Psychology as well. A project is a kind of psychological 
> phenomenon, but it is also much more than psychology, 
> because, as you remind us, people regulate their own 
> behaviour using signs created in the world beyond their 
> ken. Projects are the material substance of Concepts, and 
> I rely on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK?
>
> Everything you said (except how you characterised my 
> ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?!
>
> Andy
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote:
>> Hi Andy,
>> with great interest, I follow the discussion and your 
>> interpretation of A N Leontyev's contradiction between 
>> subjective sense and objective meaning. As far as I 
>> interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the 
>> relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective 
>> sense is not a part or subset of objective meaning (as 
>> you seem to insinuate him), but a psychological quality 
>> that emerges when a person uses societal signs and their 
>> objective meanings in order to regulate his or her 
>> socially embedded activity.
>> What happens is a transformation of societal meanings 
>> into the personal sense of those involved. The personal 
>> sense that an individual assigns to interactions, facts, 
>> and experiences through the use of signs can be 
>> conceptualized not as a subset of societal meanings but 
>> as a particular sphere of mind that is constituted by two 
>> psychological factors in particular (a) the relation to 
>> the motives of the person, and (b) the relation to the 
>> situated and sensorially mediated experiences of the 
>> individual within the process of internalization.
>> a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their 
>> meanings during social interactions in an impartial way. 
>> They interpret and use them in the light of their 
>> actually elicited motives along with
>> the motives they assign to the interaction partner. The 
>> societal meaning of the used signs does not have to match 
>> the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an 
>> outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a 
>> low-ranking bank employee toward his superior as an 
>> inexcusable violation of social etiquette. However, for 
>> the menial employee, it may well be a reassertion of 
>> self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive.
>> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by 
>> the situatedness and sensory mediation of the previous 
>> encounters in which the use of signs is (or was) 
>> embedded. Societal meanings are coded primarily not by 
>> propositional phrases (e.g., “a dog is a mammal” or 
>> “wide-open eyes signal fear”) but through their ties to 
>> sensorially mediated and situated perceptions—as complex 
>> as these interrelations may be (Leont’ev, 1978). For 
>> example, two persons can use propositional phrases to 
>> agree on the same definition of the term “dog” or “fear.” 
>> These terms, however, will be situated very differently 
>> and enriched with other sensory perceptions when one 
>> person grew up with a very likeable family dog and the 
>> other person experienced a highly dramatic episode with 
>> an overpoweringly large and aggressive dog.
>> Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to 
>> them are subject to an interpersonal process of 
>> interpretation and coordination that more or less 
>> successfully supports the embodiment
>> and expression of personal sense. People do not have a 
>> private “speech” at their disposal that they can 
>> construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, 
>> they depend on the appropriation
>> and use of conventionalized signs when they want to 
>> communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in 
>> social interactions.
>> By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize 
>> and to become aware of his personal relation and sense of 
>> the situation and the used signs, but also this 
>> reflection has to fall back on societal signs in order to 
>> express this personal relations. So, this is the overall 
>> tension between objective meaning of an event or an 
>> object and its personal sense for a specific person.
>> Best
>> Manfred
>>
>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
>> Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
>> Fliednerstr. 21
>> D-48149 Münster
>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311
>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat)
>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax)
>> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html 
>>
>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
>>
>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>> Von: 
>> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu 
>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] 
>> Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden
>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32
>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker
>> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects
>>
>> I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response 
>> to my post to take it from there, Mike, but I will try to 
>> respond as best I can to the question about subjectivism 
>> and objectivism.
>> When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought 
>> that A N Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten 
>> Nissen remarked that that was odd, because in Europe 
>> ATists thought he was too subjective. So there you are! 
>> Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of 
>> Psychology, and yet I want to use AT as a foundation for 
>> social theory, so my claim does seem anomalous.
>>
>> What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in 
>> interpreting contradictions between the "subjective sense"
>> and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of 
>> the social vs. the individual. This reduces subjectivity 
>> to a matter of the capriciousness of the individual mind 
>> or the underdevelopment of the child mind. This is hardly 
>> objectionable in the domain of child development, but in 
>> the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal position. 
>> Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints 
>> among which none have the right to claim unproblematic 
>> "objective truth"
>> for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL 
>> as giving too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other 
>> hand, is different, but people's intentions are relegated 
>> to "phenomenological investigation" which are preliminary 
>> to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's approach 
>> as a kind of social behaviourist approach in which change 
>> occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different 
>> levels in the "system." My aim in proposing to see the 
>> "system" as a "project" at one or another phase in its 
>> life cycle aims to restore the purposiveness of human 
>> action to Activity Theory. The interpretation of purposes 
>> and intentions in social science is a challenge, but I 
>> believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met.
>>
>> I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the 
>> Subject!" though I know nothing at all of his work.
>>
>> The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, 
>> Mike, is that though I knew nothing of them a little 
>> while ago, I can now see 3 different meanings of the 
>> term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best position to 
>> answer this question, and I look forward to his answer.
>>
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote:
>>> Andy/Lubomir--
>>>
>>> I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be 
>>> badly timed.
>>> But ....  I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered 
>>> on the
>>> subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT 
>>> theory that give
>>> everything to the object.
>>>
>>> Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev 
>>> schools'
>>> conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the 
>>> environment?
>>>
>>> Or?
>>>
>>> What is at stake here theoretically and practically?
>>> Mike
>>> PS.  I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted 
>>> discussion of
>>> boundary object.  I almost want to ask -- what forms of 
>>> joint mediated
>>> activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am 
>>> pretty sure that
>>> not knowing the answer to this question is a result of 
>>> the richness of
>>> the discussion.
>>>
>>> It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object??
>>> Mike
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden 
>>> <ablunden@mira.net
>>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>>
>>>      That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a
>>>      humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism,
>>>      structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory
>>>      which give everything to the Object.
>>>      Andy
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ 
>>>
>>>      *Andy Blunden*
>>>      http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>      <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>      On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote:
>>>
>>>          Here is a quote from the introduction of "The
>>>          Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic
>>>          of the subject.
>>>
>>>          "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early
>>>          1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and
>>>          "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more
>>>          than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE
>>>          conceiving of processes without subjects."
>>>
>>>          This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw
>>>          the failure of phenomenology and the residual
>>>          links between subjectivism and anthropology.
>>>
>>>          The force of Foucault's argument was tying the
>>>          philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an
>>>          outmoded humanism.
>>>
>>>          It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new 
>>> humanism.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ 
>>>
>>>          From: Lubomir Savov Popov 
>>> <mailto:lspopov@bgsu.edu>
>>>          Sent: ‎2015-‎07-‎22 8:55 AM
>>>          To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>          <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>; Andy Blunden
>>>          <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>>          Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary
>>>          Objects
>>>
>>>          Hi Alfredo,
>>>
>>>          The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and
>>>          the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on
>>>          the motive and purpose of activity, the object can
>>>          be approached in many different ways.
>>>
>>>          It is true that the relationship between the
>>>          object and the subject caries the
>>>          purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This
>>>          type of relationship might has several aspects and
>>>          the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually,
>>>          in AT, the teleological aspect is central one
>>>          among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships.
>>>
>>>          The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at
>>>          several levels with distinctive teleological
>>>          phenomena: motivation, goal, etc.
>>>
>>>          It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure
>>>          of activity with its three levels. I just tried to
>>>          do that and in most cases I got the famous
>>>          "triangle." The internet is dominated by English
>>>          language texts where the authors evidently use
>>>          that version of activity theory. The three
>>>          structural levels of activity might be found in t
>>>
>>>          Lubomir
>>>
>>>          -----Original Message-----
>>>          From:
>>>          xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu]
>>>          On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil
>>>          Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM
>>>          To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden
>>>          Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary
>>>          Objects
>>>
>>>          That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks!
>>>          I see that our treatment of object in the paper is
>>>          very much in line with the notion of
>>>          Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it.
>>>
>>>          I have many questions, most of which I should find
>>>          in the literature rather than bother here. But I
>>>          would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote
>>>          that the object "carries in itself the purpose and
>>>          motive of the activity." What does "in itself"
>>>          mean here?
>>>          Thanks again for a very informative post,
>>>          Alfredo
>>>          ________________________________________
>>>          From:
>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> <xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>          on behalf of Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>          Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31
>>>          To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>          Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary
>>>          Objects
>>>
>>>          If I could try to do my thing and draw attention
>>>          to some
>>>          distinctions in this field ... we have at least 
>>> three
>>>          different versions of Activity Theory involved
>>>          here plus
>>>          Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories
>>>          that have
>>>          spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is
>>>          using the
>>>          word "object" in a different way, all of them
>>>          legitimate
>>>          uses of the English word, but all indexing 
>>> different
>>>          concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I
>>>          will invent
>>>          some different terms.
>>>
>>>          The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the 
>>> object of
>>>          labour, the material which is to be worked 
>>> upon, the
>>>          blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may
>>>          be a nail
>>>          to a man with a hammer and waste material for a
>>>          man with a
>>>          broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand.
>>>          Engestrom
>>>          use the word "Object" in the middle of the left
>>>          side of the
>>>          triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it
>>>          has been
>>>          worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer 
>>> that the
>>>          blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now
>>>          "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether 
>>> implicit or
>>>          explicit, these are respectively the base and apex
>>>          of the
>>>          triangle.
>>>
>>>          Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the
>>>          purpose
>>>          and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or
>>>          motive" is
>>>          not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the
>>>          OBJECT.
>>>          This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he
>>>          talks about
>>>          "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a
>>>          complex notion,
>>>          because it is only *implicit* in the actions of 
>>> the
>>>          subject(s); it is not a material thing or process
>>>          as such.
>>>          Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But
>>>          this is what
>>>          is motivating all the members of the design team
>>>          when they
>>>          sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one
>>>          of the
>>>          team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into
>>>          the wood
>>>          and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the
>>>          Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs
>>>          change in
>>>          the course of collaboration and in the End an
>>>          OBJECT Is
>>>          *realised* which is the "truth" of the
>>>          collaboration, to use
>>>          Hegel's apt terminology here.
>>>
>>>          Surely it is important to recognise that while
>>>          everyone
>>>          shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up
>>>          with Outcome
>>>          as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe
>>>          the object
>>>          differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so
>>>          clearly in
>>>          Thinking and Speech. It is not the
>>>          Arbeitsgegenstand or some
>>>          problem carried within it alone which motivates
>>>          action, but
>>>          *the concept the subject makes of the
>>>          Arbeitsgegenstand*!
>>>
>>>          Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as
>>>          Lubomir astutely
>>>          notices) postmodern ideology critique to the
>>>          collaboration
>>>          within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that
>>>          is, in
>>>          Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are
>>>          naively
>>>          supposed to be there just to aid collaboration.
>>>          And Leigh
>>>          Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and
>>>          Instruments are in fact residues of past
>>>          collaborations
>>>          which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e.,
>>>          realised OBJECTs
>>>          of past collaborations. It is these one-time 
>>> OBJECTs,
>>>          now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary 
>>> Objects.
>>>
>>>          But it seems that other have grasped the
>>>          postmodern critique
>>>          elements of this idea, that apparently
>>>          ideologically neutral
>>>          obJects (in the expanded sense of socially 
>>> constructed
>>>          entities, usually far more than OBJects - as
>>>          things, or
>>>          artefacts, including institutions - fossilised
>>>          "systems of
>>>          activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a
>>>          Boundary
>>>          Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has 
>>> the same
>>>          concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved.
>>>
>>>          But what Engestrom has done, by placing the
>>>          Boundary Object
>>>          in the place of Object on his triangle, joining
>>>          two "systems
>>>          of activity," for the purpose of looking not at
>>>          cooperation
>>>          but rather the conflict within the broader
>>>          collaboration.
>>>          The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is
>>>          deliberate and
>>>          aimed to change the relation between Subject and
>>>          obJECT
>>>          (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually
>>>          rendered as
>>>          "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different
>>>          strand of
>>>          postmodern critique into the equation, namely
>>>          Foucault's
>>>          Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great 
>>> effect.
>>>
>>>          OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary
>>>          Object,
>>>          OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the
>>>          situation is
>>>          almost as bad in Russian and German,
>>>
>>>          Andy
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ 
>>>
>>>          *Andy Blunden*
>>>          http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>          <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>          On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
>>>          > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir.
>>>          >
>>>          > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I
>>>          wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the
>>>          distinction between object and tool in activity
>>>          theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we
>>>          were aware through the process, that what we
>>>          describe in the paper has to do with how the
>>>          object of design emerged and developed for the
>>>          team in and as they were dealing with, developing,
>>>          and resorting to particular means or tools. But I
>>>          guess we could say that in our analyses there is a
>>>          lack of a historical account of the object that
>>>          goes over and above the particular instances
>>>          analyzed. Although we provide with some
>>>          ethnographic contextualization of the team's
>>>          developmental trajectories, all of our discussion
>>>          is grounded on concrete events and their
>>>          transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the
>>>          distinction between object and means because it
>>>          seemed to be the same thing in the there and then
>>>          of the episodes analyzed, at least in what
>>>          participants' orientations concerned. If they ori
>>>          >   ented towards anything beyond what was there
>>>          in the meetings, it was in and through the
>>>          meetings' means. How would then the distinction
>>>          between means and object have added to our
>>>          understanding of the events? (And this is not to
>>>          doubt of the contribution from such a distinction,
>>>          I really mean to ask this question for the purpose
>>>          of growing and expanding; and as said before, part
>>>          of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al.
>>>          contribution).
>>>          >
>>>          > As to how we would position our contribution
>>>          with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate
>>>          what we said when introducing the paper for
>>>          discussion: we begun with the purpose of working
>>>          outside any particular framework and think, as we
>>>          think Star did, broadly, drawing from several
>>>          sources. These included cultural historical
>>>          psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse
>>>          analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in
>>>          the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the
>>>          topic in this discussion were in the background
>>>          all the time, but we did not operationalize them
>>>          in terms of any particular theory. This is not to
>>>          say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried
>>>          our best to keep internal coherence between what
>>>          we said about the data, and what the data was
>>>          exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add
>>>          to this.
>>>          >
>>>          > I think the questions you are rising about
>>>          activity theory are very much in the spirit of
>>>          what I am after, and I am not the best to answer
>>>          them; but this xmca list may be one of the best
>>>          places to be asking those questions.
>>>          >
>>>          > Alfredo
>>>          > ________________________________________
>>>          > From:
>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> <xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>          on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov 
>>> <lspopov@bgsu.edu>
>>>          > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16
>>>          > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>          > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary
>>>          Objects
>>>          >
>>>          > Dear Alfredo and Rolf,
>>>          >
>>>          > There are also a few other things that I would
>>>          like to bring to this discussion.
>>>          >
>>>          > First, you have a wonderful project and a great
>>>          article. It is a great example of an
>>>          interpretativist approach to everyday life
>>>          phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It
>>>          is all about our minds, culture, and activity.
>>>          >
>>>          > However, how is your approach related to classic
>>>          Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is
>>>          a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might
>>>          say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that
>>>          emerge right now or have emerged in the last
>>>          decades; still other people might look for
>>>          connections to ethnomethodology, discourse
>>>          analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a
>>>          template or categorize your methodology -- just
>>>          raising a question about its connection to
>>>          Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that
>>>          this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify
>>>          certain things for myself.
>>>          >
>>>          > For example: What are the limits and boundaries
>>>          of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity
>>>          Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we
>>>          gain when we infuse new methodological,
>>>          epistemological, and ontological realities into
>>>          Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the
>>>          threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore?
>>>          (I mean here Activity Theory as research
>>>          methodology.) Do we need to call something
>>>          Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new
>>>          approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need
>>>          to call it Activity Theory?
>>>          >
>>>          > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking,
>>>          Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your
>>>          paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses
>>>          and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and
>>>          Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can
>>>          borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but
>>>          after we assimilate them for use in our project,
>>>          they will "change hands" and will change their
>>>          particular discourse affiliation and will become
>>>          completely different components of a completely
>>>          different discourse. Mostly because the
>>>          epistemologies and ontologies are different; and
>>>          the concepts are very different despite of the
>>>          similarities in ideas and words used to name these
>>>          ideas.
>>>          >
>>>          > Just a few questions that I hope will help me
>>>          understand better what is going on in the realm of
>>>          CHAT.
>>>          >
>>>          > Thank you very much for this exciting 
>>> discussion,
>>>          >
>>>          > Lubomir
>>>          >
>>>          > -----Original Message-----
>>>          > From:
>>>          xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu]
>>>          On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil
>>>          > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM
>>>          > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy 
>>> Blunden
>>>          > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary
>>>          Objects
>>>          >
>>>          > Andy, all,
>>>          >   I just recently begun to read Engeström and
>>>          cols. contribution to the special issue, which is
>>>          very interesting. I have particular interest in
>>>          the difference that they point out between
>>>          boundary object on the one hand, and object and
>>>          instrumentality as different aspects of activity
>>>          theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this
>>>          distinction while writing our own paper. We
>>>          noticed that the museum space, through multiple
>>>          forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a
>>>          floor plan, performances of being in the room
>>>          while not being there, etc), was a means, an
>>>          instrument for achieving a final design product.
>>>          >
>>>          > At the same time, the museum space begun to
>>>          become the object of the designers' activity.
>>>          Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the
>>>          partners had multiple, sometimes opposite
>>>          interests, what seemed to be a common object for
>>>          all them was the museum as place. Thus, most
>>>          representations of it begun to be made in terms of
>>>          narratives about being there. That was the
>>>          orientation that seemed to stick them together.
>>>          >
>>>          > Thus, the museum space was both object and
>>>          instrument. We wondered whether we should do
>>>          connections to notions of object of activity and
>>>          tools, but we felt that that road would take us
>>>          away from the focus on body and experience. We
>>>          ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who
>>>          differentiate between object of design, the design
>>>          thing that work delivers, and the object's
>>>          constituents (or means of presentation before the
>>>          design thing is finished).
>>>          >
>>>          > When bringing the notion of boundary object into
>>>          the picture, we could discuss the history of
>>>          development of these relations between the
>>>          different forms of presentations of the museum
>>>          means towards the object without necessarily
>>>          articulating the differences between the two. One
>>>          advantage was that boundary objects focus on the
>>>          materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not
>>>          about materials in themselves, but about
>>>          consequences in action. From the point of view of
>>>          the persons implicated in the process, the museum
>>>          space as object of design was an issue in and
>>>          through the working with some material, some form
>>>          of presenting it or changing it. Both object and
>>>          instrument seemed to be moments of a same
>>>          experience. But I still want to learn what we may
>>>          get out of making the distinction between object
>>>          and tool, as Engeström and colleagues do (so I
>>>          should perhaps read more carefully their study
>>>          rather than be here thinking aloud).
>>>          > Any thoughts?
>>>          >
>>>          > Alfredo
>>>          >
>>>          >
>>>          > ________________________________________
>>>          > From:
>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> <xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>          on behalf of Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>          > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38
>>>          > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>          > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary
>>>          Objects
>>>          >
>>>          > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which
>>>          play some
>>>          > role in mediating the relation between subjects,
>>>          probably a
>>>          > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental
>>>          role, too, and
>>>          > one subject challenges that role and turns the
>>>          object into
>>>          > its opposite, and changes the terms of
>>>          collaboration.
>>>          > A number of examples spring to mind.
>>>          >
>>>          >    * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such
>>>          as Queer, are
>>>          >      embraced by a despised group who take
>>>          control of the
>>>          >      word and assertively embrace it;
>>>          >    * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who
>>>          deployed their
>>>          >      stereotype as housewives and mothers to
>>>          magnificant effect;
>>>          >    * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into
>>>          a weapon
>>>          >      against them by Kurdish women fighters
>>>          (ISIS flee before
>>>          >      them rather than in shame);
>>>          >    * The Chartists who turned the British govt's
>>>          stamp which
>>>          >      put newspapers out of reach of workers
>>>          against them by
>>>          >      printing the Northern Star as a stamped
>>>          newspaper and
>>>          >      obliging workers to club together in groups
>>>          to buy and
>>>          >      read it, thus making the paper into a 
>>> glorious
>>>          >      organising tool;
>>>          >    * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied
>>>          Territory /
>>>          >      Israel is the struggle over the meaning of
>>>          a shared
>>>          >      object (the land);
>>>          >    * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a
>>>          weapon and tool
>>>          >      for Indian independence and
>>>          self-sufficiency, raising it
>>>          >      from the status of obsolete and inferior
>>>          technology to a
>>>          >      symbol of India.
>>>          >
>>>          > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had
>>>          in mind when
>>>          > she introduced the term, but core point is 
>>> that the
>>>          > ideological construction placed upon an object
>>>          is subject to
>>>          > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking
>>>          of an
>>>          > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to
>>>          subjectivity.
>>>          >
>>>          > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary 
>>> object" a
>>>          > mediating artefact or the object of work
>>>          > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is
>>>          that in these
>>>          > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or
>>>          symbols according
>>>          > to context. In principle it is not the Object 
>>> in the
>>>          > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to 
>>> be.
>>>          >
>>>          > Andy
>>>          >
>>>          >
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ 
>>>
>>>          > *Andy Blunden*
>>>          > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>          <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>          > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
>>>          >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy,
>>>          >> I got to thinking about the photographs as
>>>          boundary objects. What about video?
>>>          >> Henry
>>>          >>
>>>          >>
>>>          >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden
>>>          <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>          >>>
>>>          >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to
>>>          see that it was the photographs that Thomas was
>>>          endeavouring to turn to use to recover his
>>>          humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was
>>>          using the idea in relation to the subsistence
>>>          farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn.
>>>          >>> Thanks Rolf!
>>>          >>> Andy
>>>          >>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ 
>>>
>>>          >>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>          >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>          <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>          >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote:
>>>          >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also
>>>          interpret the photographs as boundary objects as
>>>          they support the coordination of therapy
>>>          activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think
>>>          it depends on the aspect of activity one is
>>>          attempting to explore as opposed to the definite
>>>          identification of what may or may not be a
>>>          boundary object. This is only my opinion though!
>>>          >>>>
>>>          >>>>
>>>          >>>>
>>>          >>>>
>>>          >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden
>>>          <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> 
>>> wrote:
>>>          >>>>
>>>          >>>>      Or alternatively, the boundary object in
>>>          question is
>>>          >>>>      Thomas's aged body, which is subject 
>>> to an
>>>          >>>>      interpretation which Thomas contests by
>>>          showing
>>>          >>>>      photographs of far away places and
>>>          explaining how
>>>          >>>>      well-travelled he is, seeking an
>>>          interpretation of
>>>          >>>>      himself as a well-travelled and 
>>> experiences
>>>          >>>>      man-of-the-world.
>>>          >>>>      Does that make better sense?
>>>          >>>>      Andy
>>>          >>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ 
>>>
>>>          >>>>      *Andy Blunden*
>>>          >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>          <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>          >>>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>          >>>>      On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden 
>>> wrote:
>>>          >>>>
>>>          >>>>          Yes, I agree. My own interest is in
>>>          social theory
>>>          >>>>          and I'd never heard of "boundary
>>>          objects." It
>>>          >>>>          seems to me that what BOs do is
>>>          introduce some
>>>          >>>>          social theory into domains of
>>>          activity (scientific
>>>          >>>>          and work collaborations for example)
>>>          where the
>>>          >>>>          participants naively think they are
>>>          collaborating
>>>          >>>>          on neutral ground. So it is not just
>>>          granularity,
>>>          >>>>          but also the ideological context.
>>>          >>>>
>>>          >>>>          In Yjro Engestrom's article, the
>>>          home care workers
>>>          >>>>          collaborate with the old couple
>>>          according to rules
>>>          >>>>          and regulations, communications
>>>          resources,
>>>          >>>>          technology, finance and so on, which
>>>          in the
>>>          >>>>          unnamed country, the old couple are
>>>          apparently
>>>          >>>>          cast as "patients". Isn't it the
>>>          case that here it
>>>          >>>>          is those rules and regulations,
>>>          etc., which are
>>>          >>>>          the "boundary objects"?
>>>          >>>>
>>>          >>>>          Andy
>>>          >>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ 
>>>
>>>          >>>>          *Andy Blunden*
>>>          >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>          <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>          >>>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>          >>>>          On 20/07/2015 11:1
>>>
>>>          [The entire original message is not included.]
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -- 
>>>
>>> Both environment and species change in the course of 
>>> time, and thus
>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever 
>>> (Polotova & Storch,
>>> Ecological Niche, 2008)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>
>
>



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