[Xmca-l] Re: Thought and language as oscillating and pulsing [or not]

[Larry Purss]

Henry,
I will share one more paragraph from Zinchenko's chapter to help explore
"inner form".

"If we use the customary division of mental processes, the substance of
sensory forms is important for perception, biodynamic substance is
important for action, and affective substance is important for feeling.
This is only partially true because all of these substances participate in
the formation of image, feeling, and action.  Similarly the word is also
characterized by the interweaving of substance of sensory forms, biodynamic
substance and affective substance. Psychology knows different ways to
thought: from action, from image, from word, from feeling.  All this
heteroglossia is explained by the fact that thought, *like a work of art,*
which, of course, is a thought as well, does not have the  'talking
footprints' (an expression of N. N. Volkov) that mark the artistic process
of creation." (p. 238-239)

The "inner form" is the phenomenology of the formation of image, feeling,
and action emerging in the "gap"

On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 7:36 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Henry
> I am referring to chapter 9 in the book "The Cambridge Companion to
> Vygotsky"
> Here is the link to google books
>
>
> https://books.google.ca/books?id=pn3S9TEjvUAC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Henry, what is "inner form" ? The answer to this is very complicated and
> includes exploring the relation of "sense and meaning"  II would recommend
> getting the book from a library as every chapter is interesting.
> Vladimir Zinchenko's chapter I found very informative as Vladimir puts
> Vygotsky and Shpet into dialogue in a way that offers a close reading of
> Vygotsky.
>
> Today Peter sent a page on this same topic. The sentence
> "in other words, we are dealing with signs that do not only refer to
> things but also express some MEANING." (Shpet, 1927)
>
> Inner form is the exploration of the "but also express some meaning"
>
> There is the external referring to things AND the "internal form" the
> aspect of sign that expresses the "living form" of word, image, and action.
>
> As Martin and Mike have mentioned we are exploring the phenomena that
> emerges from within the "gap" and does involve imaginal processes.
>
> This is my interpretation of "inner form" but I would invite others to
> correct my [mis]understanding on the way to more clarity
> Larry
>
> On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 9:49 AM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Larry,
>> Please help me:
>> 1) What is “inner form”?
>> 2) I can’t find the Zinchenko article in my emails. Was it sent out or a
>> link to it?
>> Thanks for your help.
>> Henry
>>
>> > On Jan 26, 2015, at 8:07 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > I would like to share a page from the Zinchenko article which puts in
>> play
>> > Vygotsky's and Shpet's understandings of the play of word and thought.
>> It
>> > may be going to the "heart of the matter" The quote is from page 237
>> >
>> > According to such logic, inner forms do not disappear,
>> >
>> > but rather continue to participate in perception, memory, thinking, and
>> >
>> > action.
>> >
>> > Action, image, word, feeling, thought, and will – in other words
>> everything
>> >
>> > that is united by the concepts “mental processes,” “mental acts,”
>> >
>> > or “forces of the soul” – are living forms. And because they are living,
>> >
>> > they are, therefore, active, meaningful, unfinalized, and restless *. .
>> . *
>> > Like
>> >
>> > a soul! Each one of them is not “pure culture.” One form contains in
>> >
>> > itself the others. The ancient principle of “All in one, one in all” is
>> at
>> >
>> > work, and this does not interfere with their relatively autonomous
>> > existence.
>> >
>> > But even while they maintain their autonomy, they “remember”
>> >
>> > their origins and remain heterogeneous forms.
>> >
>> > The heterogeneity of images, words, and actions is noted in various
>> >
>> > poetic metaphors: “eyes of the soul,” “poetic senses,” “organs of sense
>> as
>> >
>> > theoreticians,” “kinetic melody,” “picturesque idea,” “reasonable eye,”
>> >
>> > “sighted mind,” “soul in flight” (about ballet), “shame of sighted
>> fingers,”
>> >
>> > and so forth. The internal forms of action and image have their
>> >
>> > own dynamic forms subordinated to the sense of movement or perceptual
>> >
>> > (or perhaps thinking) tasks. We know that we can play out action
>> >
>> > before action, and after action (if it is not too late!), we can
>> manipulate
>> >
>> > an image, mentally rotate it, and so forth.
>> >
>> > The dynamic forms of words, images, and actions enrich each other.
>> >
>> > Images and actions, like words, perform operational functions, which, as
>> >
>> > in the case of word, may be separated from meaning. Shpet paid attention
>> >
>> > to meaning. The instantaneousness of thought may be related to
>> >
>> > the simultaneity of image, and perhaps the internal playback of action.
>> >
>> > Finally, the interchange of function is possible between word, image,
>> and
>> >
>> > action, perhaps, including intellectual functions. Don’t we talk about
>> >
>> > visual or musical thinking? Doesn’t the experienced conductor play the
>> >
>> > whole symphony in the internal plane in one or two minutes?
>> >
>> > I have said enough here to come back to the “wordless impulse,” or
>> >
>> > “unembodied intention,” to the situation, paradoxically presented by
>> >
>> > Potebnya and Bibikhin when they say: “there is word even where there
>> >
>> > is no word.” The word does not die in thought. More likely, thought dies
>> >
>> > by drowning in words. After all, truth may be born and regenerated in
>> >
>> > discussions, but it may degenerate as well. Perhaps, thought has its own
>> >
>> > internal form, and this has to become a subject of serious reflection.
>> It is
>> >
>> > no accident that the beginning of this chapter contains the whole gamut
>> >
>> > of answers on what stands behind thought. And if, for example, the
>> >
>> > internal form of thought contains images, the internal form of images
>> >
>> > contains the word."
>> > *The cornerstone of Zinchenko's insight is the notion that these
>> > forms exist and have inner form - "LIVING FORM". -*
>> > *He constructs [and discovers] that if we reduce or abstract this living
>> > form we "have" created [or discovered]specimens which we observe as
>> > spectators. In this move we cut out the living form and are left with a
>> > dead body*
>> > *Larry*
>> > :
>> >
>> > On Sun, Jan 25, 2015 at 6:15 PM, Martin John Packer <
>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
>> >> wrote:
>> >
>> >> This time, the BBC has come up with quite a good discussion of
>> >> phenomenology, from Husserl to Heidegger and onwards (though not to
>> Spet,
>> >> unfortunately)!
>> >>
>> >> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04ykk4m>
>> >>
>> >> Martin
>> >>
>> >> On Jan 24, 2015, at 10:19 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> Hi Martin,
>> >>>
>> >>> I would be interested in the "intro to Husserl" by Shpet, as I have
>> long
>> >> been curious how the Husserl got to LSV.
>> >>>
>> >>> Is it possible/doable to get some scans of chapter(s) from Appearance
>> &
>> >> Sense? you know, the ones you believe to be most juicy?
>> >>>
>> >>> You may at any time hermeneutically determine what is "most juicy."
>> >>>
>> >>> Kind regards,
>> >>>
>> >>> Annalisa
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>>
>>
>>
>