[Xmca-l] Re: Understanding "functions" within the "zone" of proximal development

[Haydi Zulfei]

Francine,
I quite agree that it's the development of the word meaning and its influence upon the organic , natural functions that causes them to be conscious and get running on the right appropriate most helpful track , that is , when they are , as Vygotsky says , crowned . What causes me to go further is that this is not the end of a process which life requires . When functions become conscious , rich with benevolence of speech , there appears the domain of acts ; acts which formerly were carried out blindly because of the natural organic instincts but now are being carried out correspondingly as conscious , willful , volitional ones for which reason could be erected to transform . Words and broader conceptions , as in their nature , are defective to transform the world ; they could transform the mind and the psyche . Dialectics and interactions between the two are due , too .  
Regards    
      From: larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com>
 To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> 
 Sent: Friday, 27 February 2015, 21:19:33
 Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Understanding "functions" within the "zone" of proximal development
   
#yiv2080325588 #yiv2080325588 --.yiv2080325588hmmessage P{margin:0px;padding:0px;}#yiv2080325588 body.yiv2080325588hmmessage{font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri;}#yiv2080325588 Message from Francine:

Haydi,

Are you saying that the central concept in Vygotsky's theory is the development
of word meaning, and not the development of higher psychological functions?

My understanding of Vygotsky's writings does not exclude the importance of the
development of word meaning. Does you perspective disregard the development of
consciously directed higher psychological functions?



> Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2015 16:07:51 +0000
> From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Understanding "functions" within the "zone" of proximal development
> 
> Hi Francine !
> This is all brilliant , fantastic but just expressing the dominant province of Vygotsky's work the way I think which might be wrong . That dominant province is "word' and broader conceptions of "word" .
> Think of this please :
> "The experiment with the pictures indicates that a child of three sees separate objects and an older child thinks of the world as a system of effects. It develops that if one and the same picture (let us say, the prisoner in jail) is  shown to  a three-year-old, he will say, "a man, another man, a window, a mug, a bench," but for a preschool child it would be: '~ man is  sitting, another is  looking out the window and a mug is  on the bench," We know that the opposite is  true: both the three-year-old and the very young child resolve all the separate objects according to their functions, that is, they determine them through [actions]. For the child, it is [actions] that are primary. When we try to find the first, primary word, then we find that this is the name of an [action] and not an object; the child names a word that signifies an [action], then a word that signifies an object." 
> 
> "Summarizing the data, we come to this conclusion: a fatal contradiction has arisen between the development of thinking as presented by the story with the picture and everything that we know about the development of thinking from life. In both cases, the relations seem to be inverted. It is curious that all of these notions can be confirmed by experiments and facts. We can take a thousand children and show yet again that this is the case  with the picture. It is an incontrovertible fact, but it must be interpreted differently."
> 
> "Let us conduct an experiment because only experiments can give a definitive answer. There are several simple ways to do this that seem to me to be extremely clever. We will try to exclude the child's speech and we will try to get responses to the picture by some other means and not through words. If the proposition is true that the child does not think of the world as separate things but can say only separate words and cannot form their connections, then we will try to get along without words. We will ask two  children not to tell a story, but to perform what the picture shows. It develops that the children's play about the picture sometimes lasts 20 or 30 minutes, and primarily and most of all in  the play, those relations are captured that are in the picture. To put it more simply, if the child is  asked to dramatize the picture and not to tell its story, then, according to the experiments of Stern, the four- or five-year-old child dramatizes the prison picture the way a twelve-year-old tells it. The child understands very well that the people are in jail: here the complex narration about how the people were caught, how they were taken, that one looks out the window, and that he wants to be free is added. Here a very complex narration is  added about how the nanny was fined for not having a ticket on the trolley. In a word, we get a typical portrayal of what we see in the story of the twelve-year-old."
> 
> The one screen rule has been breaking down many times by the initiators themselves . However , I end this portion here .   
> From: larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com>
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> 
> Sent: Wednesday, 25 February 2015, 10:27:05
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Understanding "functions" within the "zone" of proximal development
> 
> Message from Francine"
> 
> Hi Larry,
> 
> Yes, I agree there is an way in which my perspective and Chaiklin's can
> be intertwined. First, my reading of Vygotsky is that higher functions are
> consciously directed, unlike elementary functions which are spontaneous.
> For Vygotsky all functions first exist (in animals, and in infants and preschoolers)
> as spontaneous processes of attention, perception, emotion, imagination, and
> realistic thinking. Through the process of the internalization of the verbal guidance
> of a more knowledgeable person, these functions become consciously directed
> attention, perception, emotions, imagination, and realistic thinking (i.e., become
> higher functions).
> 
> But, there is also a training in cultural traditions of thinking (what Chaiklin calls
> functions) - in particular, realistic thinking can develop into several disciplines
> of logical/ analytical thinking such as Aristotelian logic, dialectical thinking,
> mathematics, and thinking in scientific concepts. An interesting question arises:
> Can someone think in scientific concepts but not be able to consciously direct
> their own thinking in scientific concepts? Such a person would have acquired
> higher level thinking in Chaiklin's use of the term but not in Vygotsky's use of
> the term 'higher functions'. Such a person would lack metacogntive awareness
> of how their own thought processes proceed. This would be a high level
> practitioner in a form of disciplinary thinking, who just robotically follows a
> procedural way of thinking. I think there are people like that.
> 
> A second point to keep in mind, is that Vygotsky used the term higher psychological
> functions rather than higher mental functions. For the most part, the terms can be
> used inter-changeably. Higher psychological function is more appropriate when
> discussing consciously directed emotions. Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy is a practical application of Vygotsky and Luria's writings (by Donald Meichenbaum), that uses
> the verbal guidance of the therapist as a model for the client's self-talk to help the
> client control their own emotions and moods. Also, Vygotsky did say that different 
> higher psychological functions can function together as psychological systems.
> 
> I will look more closely at Gadamer's writings. If reciprocal interaction means
> that the cultural traditions are both internalized and changed by the individual -
> I agree. The latter part is the central point in my understanding of  Vygotsky's theory of creativity. Through both internal dialogues (dialectics) and external conversations
> new ideas, art forms, inventions,emerge.
> 
> Oh, one more point my understanding of the research on collaborative learning is that
> it is most effective when someone in the peer group knows something more than
> the others. That something more moves the group into the zone of proximal
> development. Peers might be at the same level in many areas, but as individuals
> they might have higher level skills that they can help the others acquire. For, example
> if a group is working on an original story, someone might be good at metaphorical
> thinking but not the best in grammar and spelling. Other people might be very good at grammar and/or spelling.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2015 07:54:25 -0800
> > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com
> > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Understanding "functions" within the "zone" of proximal development
> > 
> > Francine,
> > Your answer to my question moves me to return to the notion of "reciprocal
> > interaction" and my interest in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics.  Is
> > it possible that Chaiklin's understanding of "functions" [as expressing
> > "traditions"] and your elaboration of Vygotsky's "functions" such as
> > "imagination and analytic thinking" are intertwined and that we can imagine
> > the person " a if" a weaver of tapesties that INCLUDE both understandings
> > of "functions" [crystallized and open-ended]  The term "reciprocal
> > interaction" I am approaching as Simmel used this term.  Francine, your
> > statement:
> > 
> >  "Vygotsky introduced something very different. The dynamics of consciously
> > directing
> > one's own thoughts, emotions, perceptions, and behaviors  allows for
> > creativity.
> > Vygotsky also said that consciously directed higher mental functions (such
> > as imagination
> > and analytic thinking) can be used in collaboration as psychological
> > systems"
> > 
> > I am asking if there is "space" or the possibility of opening a "zone"
> > where yours and Chaiklin's notions of "function" can mutually and
> > reciprocally enrich each "other" ?
> > 
> > I look forward to reading your chapter [and book]
> > 
> > Larry
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 11:24 PM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > 
> > > Message from Francine Smolucha:
> > >
> > > Larry,
> > >
> > > Seth Chaiklin in redefining Vygotsky's terminology (functions and zone of
> > > proximal
> > > development), creates a developmental model that is very static. Vygotsky,
> > > however,
> > > is very clear in describing a dynamic model of how elementary
> > > psychological functions
> > > develop into consciously directed higher psychological functions through
> > > the internalization
> > > of speech. This is very different from Chaiklin defining higher
> > > psychological (or mental)
> > > functions as higher level concepts involving more abstract thinking, such
> > > as scientific
> > > concepts - this is more like an cultural model of Piagetian concrete and
> > > formal operational
> > > thinking.
> > >
> > > I think you hit the mark when you said that Chaiklin's developmental model
> > > produces
> > > crystallized and sedimented psychological functions that are preordained
> > > by a particular
> > > culture. [This is different from Piaget's structuralist theory in which
> > > reasoning with scientific concepts naturally emerges at certain ages]. By
> > > making the term 'higher' simply refer to
> > > the higher skill level designated by a particular culture - it all becomes
> > > culturally relative.
> > >
> > > Vygotsky introduced something very different. The dynamics of consciously
> > > directing
> > > one's own thoughts, emotions, perceptions, and behaviors  allows for
> > > creativity.
> > > Vygotsky also said that consciously directed higher mental functions (such
> > > as imagination
> > > and analytic thinking) can be used in collaboration as psychological
> > > systems.
> > > This is exactly what contemporary neuroscience has found in its
> > > brain-imaging
> > > studies (fMRI) of the prefrontal neocortex.
> > >
> > > My husband (Larry Smolucha) and I are writing a chapter titled
> > > "Neuropsychological
> > > Systems of Cultural Creativity" for the 2nd edition of Vygotsky and
> > > Creativity.
> > > Cathrene, Vera, and Ana suggested to their acquisitions editor that Larry
> > > and I expand
> > > that chapter into a book. (So yes indeed, I can cite my sources including
> > > Vygotsky's
> > > works in Russian or contemporary neuroscience.)
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > > Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2015 21:08:35 -0800
> > > > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com
> > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Understanding "functions" within the "zone" of
> > > proximal    development
> > > >
> > > > Seth Chaiklin's article has me reflecting on the meaning of "functions".
> > > >
> > > > The article's concluding comment is:
> > > >
> > > > According to the analysis presented here, the zone of proximal
> > > development
> > > > refers to the maturing functions that are relevant to the next age period
> > > > and that enable performance in collaborative situations that could not be
> > > > achieved independently.  These *functions* are not created in
> > > interaction,
> > > > rather interaction provides conditions for identifying their existence
> > > and
> > > > the extent to which they have developed."
> > > >
> > > > I read this as indicating that the functions analyzed are "crystallized"
> > > or
> > > > "sedimented" forms that "objectively" exist as "generalized" structures.
> > > > Within "socially situated" settings individual persons will subjectively
> > > > move through a sequence of predictable "periods".  Within modern social
> > > > situations "school" is a predictable social situation and it is the goal
> > > or
> > > > desire to develop "scientific concepts" in school settings.
> > > >
> > > > Therefore functions described as "higher mental functions" exist in
> > > > particular historical social situations of development, not universally
> > > > applicable situations. To be more specific "scientific concepts function
> > > > within school situations of development. As  Chaiklin writes:
> > > >
> > > > "It is important to recognize that these periods are not reflecting a
> > > > biological necessity (because of genetic or other organic sources), even
> > > > though the development of higher psychological functions (e.g. ,
> > > > perception, voluntary memory, speech, thinking) are dependent on these
> > > > natural conditions. .... Similarly, none of the psychological functions
> > > are
> > > > 'pure' in the sense of a biologically given module or faculty."  [page 7]
> > > >
> > > > In other words there exists an "objective" zone [a general zone] which
> > > > Chaiklin clarifies as a tripartite constellation of "present age",
> > > > "maturing function", and "next age"  AS "the objective zone of proximal
> > > > development" [page 7] This zone is objective in the sense that it does
> > > not
> > > > refer to any individual child, but reflects [mirrors] the psychological
> > > > functions that need to be formed during a given age period of development
> > > > [and in particular the higher scientific or school concepts developed in
> > > > school situations.]  In order to approach the more abstract concepts
> > > [which
> > > > are going "higher"]  psychological functions need to develop first in
> > > order
> > > > to move to the next "period" or situation of concept development [verbal
> > > > thought].
> > > >
> > > > Chaiklin then makes a clear statement of the characteristic of this
> > > > objective zone:
> > > >
> > > > "The 'objective' zone is not defined a priori, but reflects the
> > > structural
> > > > relationships that are *historically-constructed and objectively
> > > > constituted* in the historical period in which the child lives. One can
> > > say
> > > > that the zone for a given age period is normative, in that it
> > > > *reflects *[LP-mirrors]
> > > > the institutionalized demands and expectations that developed
> > > historically
> > > > in a particular societal *tradition of practice*.  For example school age
> > > > children are expected to develop capabilities to reason with academic
> > > > (i.e., scientific) concepts. Individuals who do not develop this
> > > > *capability* can be said to *have* [LP - possess] a different
> > > intellectual
> > > > structure.... Reasoning with concepts is a specific manifestation of the
> > > > new-formations for this age ... " [page7]
> > > >
> > > > In other words functions which develop are "new" formations which are
> > > > normative [ "crystallized" or "sedimented"].
> > > >
> > > > The question that I am left with is the relation of these normative
> > > > functions existing within particular social situations of development
> > > when
> > > > the social situations that now exist become the object of deep
> > > questioning?
> > > > This type of reflection and speculation is entering the realm of "what
> > > > if".  What if the "objective" zone of proximal development and its "new"
> > > > formations [crystallized, sedimented] itself becomes the "object" of
> > > > inquiry?
> > > >
> > > > I hope my train of thought is coherent? Chaiklin's article brought
> > > clarity
> > > > to my understanding of "functions" as key concepts for understanding the
> > > > meaning and sense of ZPD.
> > > >
> > > > Larry
> > >
> > >
>                         
> 
>