[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination

[mike cole]

The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. Thanks.

When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to take
in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it."

Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could see that
it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as phenomenology. It is
just a kind of intuitive reflection
on my experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled
introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that there
is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings.

I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have
unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no communication
with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. !!
mike

On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:

> Mike
>
>        There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre work on
> imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. Also it is a
> bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey’s web site: <
> http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on
> imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one’s appetite
> for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could pick one
> that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, a useful common,
> and modestly short reading source. I would, of course, recommend Casey’s
> book, but isn’t freely available.
>
> Ed
>
> > On Dec 7, 2015, at  9:44 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >
> > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed.
> >
> >
> http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phenomenological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf
> >
> > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >
> >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the way they
> >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of communication
> >> (which will require a lot of imagination!).
> >> mike
> >>
> >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Mike
> >>>
> >>>     I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The Imagination.
> >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on imagination.
> >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that of
> Edward
> >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will supplement
> that
> >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically preceded
> that of
> >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not see
> him
> >>> mentioned.
> >>>
> >>>      I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, the
> >>> same place. Only the questions seem to differ.
> >>>
> >>> Ed
> >>>
> >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at  7:42 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given that we
> >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I
> indicated
> >>> in
> >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life through my
> >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas drawn from
> >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and  activity-centered
> >>>> research practices. But here I am.
> >>>>
> >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my
> >>> understanding.
> >>>>
> >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the description of
> >>> the
> >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter a
> dozen!
> >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the
> abstractions
> >>> can
> >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by.
> >>>>
> >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by
> >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was offered
> >>> with
> >>>> that goal in mind.
> >>>>
> >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is about it.
> I
> >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination.
> >>>>
> >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6?
> >>>>
> >>>> etc?
> >>>>
> >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to the same
> >>> kinds
> >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the conclusions are
> >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, sometimes,
> in
> >>>> good teaching.
> >>>>
> >>>> mike
> >>>>
> >>>> mike
> >>>>
> >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Larry and Mike
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to both of
> >>> you
> >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a
> >>> conversation
> >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably good, but
> >>> it is
> >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little larger
> than
> >>> what
> >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I need
> to,
> >>> one
> >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear on
> the,
> >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>    Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread it). I
> >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a large
> grain
> >>> size
> >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at
> >>> things). A
> >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms and are
> >>> offered
> >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; however,
> >>>>> looking at how words are used (a philosophy of language, so to speak)
> >>> often
> >>>>> does a better job of opening things up.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>      2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not make
> >>> your
> >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to mention
> >>>>> Avicenna.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>      3. I have the impression you are using the term ‘stable’ as a
> >>>>> somewhat replacement of Vygotsky’s concrete; I like that as
> ‘concrete'
> >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I will
> try
> >>> to
> >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my
> replies
> >>>>> tooters.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>      4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen
> >>> Keller. I
> >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a thin gap
> is
> >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a suspicion
> >>> that
> >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am fairly
> >>> sure
> >>>>> Keller was.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>      5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too thin
> >>>>> although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable
> >>>>>
> >>>>>      6. In a way you don’t seem to quite come out and say it (or I
> >>>>> missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is not necessarily
> >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they occur.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Ed
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at  4:41 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present)
> our
> >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a metaphor
> >>> not
> >>>>> error.
> >>>>>> Ed,
> >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how
> >>>>> others use text.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Actually I don’t think image has some relation to how others use
> text.
> >>> I
> >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between how
> Mike
> >>> is
> >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this because
> I
> >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in
> >>> mathematics
> >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to problems
> >>> that
> >>>>> presently catch my attention.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other
> words
> >>>>> can we (read) mutual   shared movements as choreography. The physical
> >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters
> on
> >>> the
> >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the
> visual
> >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size is too
> >>> large.
> >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I now
> >>> realize
> >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to view
> >>>>> imagination. I don’t mean your perspective is lacking; it just seems
> to
> >>>>> result in  different questions than I would/do ask.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock,
> they
> >>>>> are the material.
> >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but as
> >>>>> having a deeper process,
> >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual
> perceptions
> >>>>> but rather having a deeper process.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> My initial reaction is “Why are you saying this?" If I ever thought
> the
> >>>>> contrary, I can’t remember. This is just common sense. The
> interesting
> >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to  using ‘imagine’ in a
> non
> >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with physically
> >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that
> >>> unifying
> >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. Also
> >>>>> physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too strong although
> >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of a sort
> on
> >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I don’t
> >>>>> physically experience a platonic circle.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the collated
> >>>>> pages of a  book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a
> dialogue,
> >>> to
> >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity)  may possibly have a
> >>>>> unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital animating
> >>>>> process lived (into).
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Here is where my example wasn’t helpful. I did not mean one ‘sees'
> the
> >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks is too
> >>> large a
> >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties consistent with
> >>> those
> >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a sort of
> >>> sense.
> >>>>> The teacher’s language seems to prove the imaging and the moving to
> new
> >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people don’t
> make
> >>> the
> >>>>> leaps.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the
> >>> visual
> >>>>> sense.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of the
> >>> sensory
> >>>>> modes
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process is also
> >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This doesn’t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, doesn’t
> >>> follow
> >>>>> for me.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable perspective. It is
> >>> just
> >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don’t share or seems to be the wrong
> >>> grain
> >>>>> size.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
> >>>>>> Sent: ‎2015-‎12-‎06 1:14 PM
> >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Mike
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>      My  wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and
> >>> my
> >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the
> >>> visual.
> >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn)
> is
> >>> a
> >>>>> ‘concrete’ platonic circle doesn’t seem to be visual or, at least, it
> >>> never
> >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In
> fact,
> >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can
> >>> imagine it
> >>>>> (smile).
> >>>>>>      On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ‘image’ in
> >>> the
> >>>>> way some use the word ‘text.’ That is, to take into account both
> >>> external
> >>>>> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you
> >>> say
> >>>>> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that
> >>>>> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Ed
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at  2:35 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of
> >>> Zinchenko's
> >>>>>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system
> >>> that
> >>>>>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the
> >>> image
> >>>>>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color,
> >>> thus
> >>>>>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions,
> eye
> >>>>>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as
> >>> if
> >>>>> it
> >>>>>>> were continuing to "feel it."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make
> >>> it
> >>>>>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according to
> >>> Suvorov,
> >>>>> of
> >>>>>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but
> >>> then he
> >>>>>>> was blind and deaf).
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized
> >>>>> stabilization
> >>>>>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the
> >>>>> always
> >>>>>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of
> >>>>> liberty.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first
> >>> encountered
> >>>>> it
> >>>>>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled
> >>>>> world
> >>>>>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. *
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses*
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some
> core
> >>>>> common
> >>>>>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage
> >>> for
> >>>>> me
> >>>>>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Mike
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>  As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging
> >>> of
> >>>>>>>> the ‘image’ in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although
> it
> >>>>> has
> >>>>>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don’t think it
> was
> >>>>> of the
> >>>>>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would
> >>>>> disagree
> >>>>>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics.
> >>>>>>>>  I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! -
> >>>>> and
> >>>>>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge
> >>> emphasis
> >>>>> in
> >>>>>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less
> about
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>>> ‘imaginal’ than you or Larry. That doesn’t mean that what you and
> >>>>> Larry are
> >>>>>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point
> >>> about
> >>>>>>>> joint, mediated, activity.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Ed
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at  11:11 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings
> >>> builds
> >>>>> off
> >>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as
> the
> >>>>>>>> sensory
> >>>>>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the
> >>> "simple"
> >>>>> act
> >>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car
> in
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal
> >>> and
> >>>>>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that
> >>> must
> >>>>> be
> >>>>>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of
> >>> image
> >>>>>>>>> formation ceases to function.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that
> >>>>> simplified
> >>>>>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets,
> >>>>> Zinchenko
> >>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive
> >>>>>>>>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated,
> >>>>>>>> activity
> >>>>>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function
> >>> and
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and
> >>>>>>>>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> in brief
> >>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael,
> >>>>>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period.
> >>>>>>>>>> Age 2 months.
> >>>>>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own
> >>> activity .
> >>>>>>>>>> Question
> >>>>>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving
> >>> into
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature?
> >>>>>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin?
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
> >>>>>>>>>> Sent: ‎2015-‎12-‎05 4:48 PM
> >>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >
> >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Larry
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I wan’t looking at the title, but, yes, ‘or’ can be inclusive or
> >>>>>>>>>> exclusive.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I don’t think of it as a detour; that doesn’t seem to make sense
> >>> if
> >>>>>>>> I
> >>>>>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I, personally, don’t equate ‘physical' and ‘concrete’;’ perhaps
> I
> >>>>>>>>>> wasn’t clear. In any case, I’ve never completely understood the
> >>>>>>>> tendency to
> >>>>>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow
> >>>>>>>> extra-concrete.
> >>>>>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural
> historical
> >>>>>>>> context
> >>>>>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain
> >>> things
> >>>>>>>> are
> >>>>>>>>>> ‘concrete.’ This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that
> >>> is?).
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>  I’m not quite sure where you are going with the development of
> >>>>>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>   Fantasy is a complicated word so I don’t know what you mean
> >>> when
> >>>>>>>>>> you allude to “assume that or let’ involving fantasy. My answer,
> >>>>>>>> perhaps,
> >>>>>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>   Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy
> >>> in
> >>>>>>>>>> your email, I can’t give a reasonable answer to your final
> >>> question.
> >>>>> An
> >>>>>>>>>> approximate answer might be “no”; however, I can imagine other
> >>>>>>>>>> possibilities (smile).
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Ed
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at  4:04 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Ed,
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy
> >>>>>>>>>>> Is different from
> >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy.
> >>>>>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a
> >>>>> distanciation?)
> >>>>>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete.
> >>>>>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from
> >>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> physical to the mathematical?
> >>>>>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in
> >>> historical
> >>>>>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical
> >>>>> (concrete)
> >>>>>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the
> mathematical
> >>>>>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within
> >>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways?
> >>>>>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like.
> >>>>>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which
> >>>>> originates
> >>>>>>>> as
> >>>>>>>>>> concrete.
> >>>>>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy.
> >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy.
> >>> Does
> >>>>> one
> >>>>>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the
> >>> actual
> >>>>>>>> can
> >>>>>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems?
> >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy?
> >>>>>>>>>>> Larry
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: ‎2015-‎12-‎04 11:05 AM
> >>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Imagination or Fantasy
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> All
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of
> >>>>> imagination
> >>>>>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like “assume that,”
> >>> “let,” or
> >>>>>>>>>> “Imagine that” (and these may be, in fact, very different
> >>> statements
> >>>>>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.” In
> >>> doing
> >>>>> so I
> >>>>>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and
> >>>>> Creativity
> >>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: “It is characteristic for
> >>>>> imagination
> >>>>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only
> >>> an
> >>>>>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development,
> only a
> >>>>> pass
> >>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of
> >>> view,
> >>>>>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a
> >>>>> given
> >>>>>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.”
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous
> >>> discussion
> >>>>>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov’s mathematics curriculum in that I
> >>> am
> >>>>>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are
> >>> being
> >>>>>>>> asked
> >>>>>>>>>> to “imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join
> the
> >>>>>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if
> >>>>> somebody
> >>>>>>>> is
> >>>>>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my
> >>>>>>>> wondering
> >>>>>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e.
> there
> >>>>> is no
> >>>>>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to
> >>>>> speak,
> >>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering
> >>>>> about
> >>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>> then a question.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> My first example:  It is possible that we would all agree that
> to
> >>>>> see
> >>>>>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such
> >>> thing.
> >>>>> In a
> >>>>>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two
> >>> is
> >>>>> not
> >>>>>>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>> fraction begins with “Assume that the square root of two is a
> >>>>> fraction.”
> >>>>>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true
> >>> and
> >>>>> then
> >>>>>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps
> another
> >>>>>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete
> through
> >>>>>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through
> contradiction)
> >>>>>>>> seems to
> >>>>>>>>>> be very hard for people to do.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and
> >>> draws
> >>>>>>>>>> something rather circular and says “This is a circle.” She then
> >>>>> draws a
> >>>>>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says,
> >>>>> "This
> >>>>>>>> is
> >>>>>>>>>> its center.” She then says “Every point on this circle (waving
> her
> >>>>> hand
> >>>>>>>> at
> >>>>>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.”
> >>> None
> >>>>> of
> >>>>>>>> this
> >>>>>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each
> >>> step
> >>>>>>>> here
> >>>>>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the
> concrete.
> >>>>> (Hmm
> >>>>>>>> , I
> >>>>>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the
> >>>>>>>> mathematical
> >>>>>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn’t allow this?)
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a
> >>>>> winged
> >>>>>>>>>> horse].
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with
> >>>>>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would
> >>> Vygotsky
> >>>>>>>> have
> >>>>>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something
> >>> else?
> >>>>>>>> There
> >>>>>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I’m
> >>> interested in
> >>>>>>>> your
> >>>>>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky’s take might be.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Ed Wall
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with
> >>> an
> >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with
> an
> >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> --
> >>>>
> >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
> >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >>
> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
> >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>
>
>


-- 

It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch