[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy
Haydi Zulfei
haydizulfei@rocketmail.com
Mon Dec 7 00:34:00 PST 2015
But all the words and all the
pictures in the world will not efface the
role of imagination in human experience.
Mike ,
In your previous posts , you said of goal-oriented joint activity which presupposes the existence of the "ideal" and we also have the example of the best of the bees and the worst of the architects to the effect that the architect has the plan of the building in his imagination before the building has been erected and we additionally have the above saying of yours . To what extent is there an overlap ? Is there a matter of will and conscious awareness in one but not in the other ?
Best
Haydi
--------------------------------------------
On Mon, 12/7/15, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Date: Monday, December 7, 2015, 4:35 AM
Larry. Precisely the
following point seems an important one to me.
*My question
is if (representation) looses a felt quality that
(imaging)
embodied and expressed as moving
(into the image) better captures.*
I think the answer is generally *yes.*
I venture that what is left
has lost some of its affective charge when "in
motion." Perhaps the loss of affect is
indexed by the fact that
representational
theories of mind tend strongly to be cognitive theories.
In moving from a process into a product, from
verbs to nouns, the prior
fusion of affect
and cognition are effaced.
However, to leave at "all is flux" is
not awfully useful. So, as I
understand
it, entifying, classifying, experimenting with the flow
of
experience seem to be essential to the
cultural mode of thought, as
characterized
for example by LSV. Spoken words and more generally
spoken
discourse is are saturated with past
cultural products constituting the
present
culturally mediated experience of the present.
But all the words and all the
pictures in the world will not efface the
role of imagination in human experience.
lots to think about
mike
On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at
12:53 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Ed,
> In mike's editorial notes introducing
Suvorov's article mike focuses and
>
draws our attention to a (gap) in American cognitive
psychology. This gap
> results in a
difficulty in translation of the term vo-obraz-zhenie.
> The suffix (zhenie) shifts the meaning
(into-image) to (imaging) as
>
process.
> Mike made a decision. Since he
was addressing an American audience he left
> this meaning (imaging) to one side and
replaced (imaging) with a substitute
>
word (representation).
> I am now drawing
attention to why American cognitive psychology is better
> able to understand and relate to
(representation) than (imaging)?
> I
suspect it is because of cultural historical circumstances
that
> denigrated (imaging).
> I am returning to vo-obraz-zenhie and
trying to honour (imaging) as
>
expressing qualities that include the sensory experience but
add other
> characteristics.
> Suvorov beliefs the fundamental act of
cognition is the (stepping back)
> from
the world, which WHEN RECOMBINED with original sensation,
yields
> thought.
> So
the place of (imaging) and mike's decision to replace
with the word
> (representation) has a
narrative to tell.
> My question is if
(representation) looses a felt quality that (imaging)
> embodied and expressed as moving (into
the image) better captures.
>
Presentation and (re)presentation may be resting on this
(imaging) that
> has a (felt) quality.
The movement of referring, indicating as
> intentionally denotative presentational
gestures may rest in a more
>
primordial moment of (felt) moving within the image.
> To say that the mom and infant move
mutually and call this process
> activity
(shared actions) is not questioned.
> My
question is if this activity is (imaginal) at this felt
level of mutual
> synchronization (always
marked but never identical) prior to being
> (presented).
> Are
there qualities of vo-obraz-zenhie that (imaging) images
better than
> (presentation) images?
>
>
>
-----Original Message-----
> From:
"Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
> Sent: 2015-12-06 10:43 AM
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,
Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or
Fantasy
>
> Larry
>
> As I think,
to an extent, that one can imagine taste, touch, sound,
> and smell (and, in a way, intellectually)
focusing on ‘image’ seems to
>
obscure. Thus, your question, doesn’t, in a way, make much
sense to me.
> That doesn’t mean that
it doesn’t to others. Also, I suspect you would, at
> least, need to take the baby and mother
back to -2 months to get at an
>
embryonic origin.
>
>
Ed
>
> > On Dec 6,
2015, at 10:42 AM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
wrote:
> >
> >
Ed, mike, Michael,
> > I will push my
question to an earlier time period.
>
> Age 2 months.
> > The baby
(perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own
activity .
> > Question
> > With this mutual activity is the baby
forming an image, moving into the
> image
and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature?
> > Will say more but where does (image)
have its embryonic origin?
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
> > Sent: 2015-12-05 4:48 PM
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,
Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or
Fantasy
> >
> >
Larry
> >
> >
I wan’t looking at the title, but, yes,
‘or’ can be inclusive or
>
exclusive.
> >
>
> I don’t think of it as a detour; that
doesn’t seem to make sense if
> I
understand Vygotsky correctly.
> >
> > I, personally,
don’t equate ‘physical' and ‘concrete’;’
perhaps I
> wasn’t clear. In any case,
I’ve never completely understood the tendency to
> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in
itself) as somehow extra-concrete.
> The
best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural
historical context
> and at a certain
stage of development people act as if certain things are
> ‘concrete.’ This includes the
'physical world' (whatever that is?).
> >
> >
I’m not quite sure where you are going with the
development of
> systems and
concrete-like or even cultural historical.
> >
> >
Fantasy is a complicated word so I don’t
know what you mean when
> you allude to
“assume that or let’ involving fantasy. My answer,
perhaps,
> would be neither is
necessarily imaginal or fantasy
> >
> > Since I have no
clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in
> your email, I can’t give a reasonable
answer to your final question. An
>
approximate answer might be “no”; however, I can imagine
other
> possibilities (smile).
> >
> > Ed
> >
> >> On Dec
4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
wrote:
> >>
>
>> Ed,
> >>
> >> The title imagination (or)
fantasy
> >> Is different from
> >> Imagination (equates) with
fantasy.
> >> To move from the
physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?)
> and return to the mathematical
concrete.
> >> Is the same word
(concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the
> physical to the mathematical?
> >> If mathematics is actually a
(system) that has emerged in historical
>
consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical
(concrete)
> which exists prior to the
human understanding and the mathematical
> (concrete) which is a cultural historical
system emerging within the
> imaginal are
both (concrete) in identical ways?
>
>> It seems that systems (develop) and become
concrete-like.
> >> Is this the
same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates
> as concrete.
> >>
To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and
fantasy.
> >> Is there a clear
demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one
> imply it does not (actually) exist while
the other implies the actual can
> be
mapped onto the physical with systems?
>
>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and
fantasy?
> >> Larry
> >>
> >>
-----Original Message-----
> >>
From: "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
> >> Sent: 2015-12-04 11:05
AM
> >> To: "eXtended Mind,
Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination
or Fantasy
> >>
> >> All
>
>>
> >> For various
reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination
> that might be subsumed under statements
like “assume that,” “let,” or
>
“Imagine that” (and these may be, in fact, very
different statements
> although, under
certain circumstances, might be the same.” In doing so
I
> came across something written by
Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in
> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: “It is
characteristic for imagination that
> it
does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is
only an
> intermediate link, only a stage
on the path of development, only a pass in
> the process of its movement to the
concrete. From our point of view,
>
imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed
from a given
> concrete toward a new
concrete.”
> >>
> >> I find this quote
very interesting in view of a previous discussion
> on the list regarding Davydov’s
mathematics curriculum in that I am
>
wondering whether part of what is going on is that children
are being asked
> to “imagine." I
have other mathematical examples of this join the
> elementary school that are possibly a
little more obvious (if somebody is
>
interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for
my wondering
> is that for so many people
mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no
> stepping from concrete to concrete; the
sort of get stuck, so to speak, in
> the
abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering
about and
> then a question.
> >>
> >>
My first example: It is possible that we would all agree
that to see
> a winged horse is imagine a
winged horse as there is no such thing. In a
> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that
the square root of two is not a
>
fraction begins with “Assume that the square root of two
is a fraction.”
> This is not so thus,
in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then
> look at the consequences (the square root
of -1 is perhaps another
> example). This
seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through
> imagination and this type of proof (a
proof through contradiction) seems to
>
be very hard for people to do.
>
>>
> >> My second example:
The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws
> something rather circular and says “This
is a circle.” She then draws a
> point
somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says,
"This is
> its center.” She then
says “Every point on this circle (waving her hand at
> the object on the blackboard) is
equidistant from the center.” None of this
> is true, but somehow we are meant to
behave as if it were. Each step here
>
seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the
concrete. (Hmm , I
> see that I am really
saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical
> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn’t
allow this?)
> >>
> >> [I note by the way Poul Anderson
took on the consequences of a winged
>
horse].
> >>
>
>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to
identify imagination with
> fantasy (this
may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky
have
> called my examples? A case of
sheer conceivability or something else? There
> is, I note, good reason to call it
imagination, but I’m interested in your
> take on what Vygotsky’s take might
be.
> >>
>
>> Ed Wall
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
>
>
>
--
It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
natural science with an
object that creates
history. Ernst Boesch
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