[Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds

Sun Sep 28 16:48:31 PDT 2014

Greg,
I encourage you to follow Mike's lead on *recombination* as the mediating
process of separating and reconnecting firstness. Mike's concept of the
*gap* and the question of what is happening within the gap also seems
important.

I have been reflecting on Peirce's secondness that posits *resistance*
[constraints] as also KEY to firstness and thirdness.

I wonder if  whenever we develop *theory* and *models* firstness is engaged
through secondness [what goes BEYOND [excess] to *all* theory*?

Grokking as a phenomena but also secondness and our way to groke firstness
and secondness as *significant signs*
Peirce also explored *sign phenomena* and suggested EVERY SIGN INCLUDES,
iconic, indexical, and symbolic significations. Not as discrete but as
simultaneous and never in pure forms. The same sign phenomena can be
reflected from the *angle* of iconic [pictures, images, resemblance] AND
indexical [pointing or *gesturing* to the PARTICULAR UNIQUE CASE] AND
symbolic [pointing or indicating the significance BEYOND the particular
towards the *general*.
What seems KEY is Peirce suggests all signs INCLUDE all three categories of
signification SIMULTANEOUSLY.
We can focus on one or the other *angle* of sign phenomena as more
significant [while the other aspects recede into the background] but all
three aspects are always *present* in ALL indicating actions.

To return to the exploration of *recombination* and *mediation* is it
possible to consider mediating phenomena as simultaneously iconic indexical
and symbolic.
Then the indicating *this* or *that* CASE becomes indexical and unique
examples recombined. The same phenomena can be considered iconic *This*
resembles *that* as recombination.
However from another angle this same phenomena can be significant of
*general* recombining interpretations. For example the separating from the
*field* and recombining as an example of a general aspect of human *nature*

Greg, I want to encourage you to follow your *hunch* and go further with
this loose thread of an *idea* exploring phenomena as recombinations as the
biological person *perceives* the encompassing surround [field, clearing
horizon]
Larry

On Sat, Sep 27, 2014 at 1:20 PM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Rod, seems like Mike's whispered idea of "recombination with" seems
> important to grasping the human relation to firstness. Here are Mike's
> whispered words:
>
> "the physiologically requisite conditions for sensing the world require
> that we separate from the world
> and recombine with it as an ongoing process or our sensory field fragments
> and
> eventually disappears."
>
> I take this to be a definition of "mediation" and of second/thirdness - the
> separation from the world. But, as with Peirce, this separation is not a
> Derrida-ian (following Saussure) split of the world into an ideal and
> material world, for in Mike's description the subject returns and
> recombines with the world "as an ongoing process" - in a sense returning to
> an apparent firstness (as well as a firstness for others).
>
> That was a bit abstract, but I'm happy to try and tease it out with an
> example if anyone is interested. But perhaps this is a bit too tedious...
> -greg
> p.s. "grok" seems important to this conversation about immediacy, following
> Wikipedia's quote from Heinlein's sci-fi book Stranger in a Strange Land:
> "
> Grok means to understand so thoroughly that the observer becomes a part of
> the observed—to merge, blend, intermarry, lose identity in group
> experience. It means almost everything that we mean by religion,
> philosophy, and science—and it means as little to us (because of our
> Earthling assumptions) as color means to a blind man."
> And btw, my initial contact with Michael Saler had to do with his interest
> in Heinlein's connection to General Semantics... Feeling grokked...
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 2:05 AM, Rod Parker-Rees <
> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > Sorry to step into a long and fascinating thread without having had time
> > to take in all of the arguments but I felt I had to respond to your
> > comment, Greg, ' since it is difficult to imagine knowing how to go on if
> > we really were immediately in the world - as in a kind of perpetual
> > Peircean firstness'.
> >
> > I would argue that it is one of the great advantages of the cycle of
> > generations that we don't have to imagine this because we (many of us)
> have
> > regular opportunities to SEE it in the lives of babies - who do, somehow
> > (and not least because of the support they get from others), manage to go
> > on in a Peircean firstness.
> >
> > All the best,
> >
> > Rod
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson
> > Sent: 25 September 2014 16:51
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds
> >
> > Larry, I really appreciate your descriptions of Peirce's 3 categories of
> > experience. From my reading of Peirce, this seems as close to the text
> as I
> > have seen.
> > But I wonder, now what? (or, perhaps a bit more bluntly "so what?").
> > What do you make of this way of introducing differences that are
> purported
> > to make a difference?
> > What can we do with these categories? Particularly as they related to the
> > imaginal, the imaginated, and the imagination.
> >
> > And lurking somewhere in the back of my head is Mike's voice shouting
> that
> > even the ontology of naturalism involves imagination (i.e. mediation or
> > "into image-making" - see Etienne Pelaprat and Mike's paper on Minding
> the
> > Gap) - and perhaps this is where there is much less of a difference
> > between the individual subscribing to a naturalist ontology and one who
> > lives in a world inhabited by spirits of dead ancestors and such - both
> > require a kind of meconnaissance, a mis-recognizing of the mediated
> nature
> > of the world and both FEEL that they know the world in its immediacy (or
> > perhaps just in a "more immediate, less mediated" way than the other).
> Just
> > as I feel that I am grasping a more immediate and unmediated truth by
> > making this very statement. We all imagine our hold on the world to be
> > immediate. And perhaps it is best that this is so since it is difficult
> to
> > imagine knowing how to go on if we really were immediately in the world -
> > as in a kind of perpetual Peircean firstness.
> >
> > Imagining that is to imagine the unimaginable.
> >
> > -greg
> >
> > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > This topic of types of ontologies was engaged with by Peirce who
> > > proposed his 3 categories of experience.
> > >
> > > Firstness: Is the category of bare immediacy. *is* Pure
> > > undiscriminated presence. Epistemologically firstness is immediate and
> > > VIVID BUT INDESCRIBABLE experience. Metaphysically firstness is
> > > *possibility* that could *become* qualities that are general.
> > > [redness, pain] Firstness is unorganized, unreflected, and uncognized.
> > > Yet general qualities can
> > > *emerge* in metaphysical firstness.
> > >
> > > SECONDNESS: Secondness is characterized by its RESISTANCE TO OUR
> > > INTENTIONS or expectations. Epistemolgically secondness is experienced
> > > as a shock to habitual patterns of awareness. Secondness is particular
> > and disruptive.
> > > Metaphysically secondness is characterized as NONEGO [what is other]
> > > That is it cannot be associated with the *self* since it actively
> > > contradicts the VOLITIONS of the self.
> > >
> > > THIRDNESS depends upon both firstness and secondness and functions as
> > > THEIR MEDIATION. Thirdness is conceptual and conscious. It is the
> > > realm of general repeatable habitual experiences AND [in general]
> > > thirdness is cognitive. All uniformities [in knowledge OR REALITY] are
> > > *modes* of thirdness insofar as they are general.
> > > Human ACTION is GOVERNED by the thirdness that IS cognitively present.
> > > Without thirdness we are left with the confusing and uncognizable
> > > world of immediacy [firstness] and resistance [secondness]
> > >
> > > Peirce seems to be playing in this realm of reality and imaginal Larry
> > >
> > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Greg, and David
> > > >
> > > > The questions generated by reflections considering  types of the
> > > > imaginal such as:
> > > >
> > > > # natural ontology that says something exists because the world just
> > > > *is* [nothing more, nothing less] in all its base materiality.
> > > >
> > > > # the imaginal *as* reality opening up an enchanted world of myth,
> > > > belief and religion.
> > > >
> > > > # the *intentionally* constructed [made] imaginal that brings into
> > > > *form* [structure] that are rational
> > > >
> > > > # the gestalt perception of multiple poly arrangements of the real
> > > > AND imaginal [*and* NOT as addition but as chiasm or binocular depth
> > > > perceiving/conceiving]
> > > >
> > > >  Greg SAYS he *feels* [intuits, speculates?] :
> > > >
> > > > "At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something
> > > > different about these two TYPES of imagined worlds, with the other
> > > > (rationalist)
> > > type
> > > > of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived,
> > > > more intentionally made."
> > > >
> > > > Then Greg makes a value observation that he notes is a difference
> > > > that makes a difference:
> > > > :
> > > > "But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to
> > > > say that  the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems
> > > > that this points to  differences in ontology."
> > > >
> > > > These various "types" when privileged are possibly "reductions" or
> > > > "abstractions" from the EXCESS which Merleau Ponty explores through
> > > > *expressive cognition* The notions of reversals, and transversals,
> > > > and
> > > the
> > > > personification of THIS movement of orientations [orientations in
> > > > sense] can be personified in the person of Hermes [the trickster].
> > > >
> > > > Hillman, who plays within the ontology suggesting the imaginal is
> > > > reality suggests the *I* [ego] is that personification [as imaginal]
> > > > that *takes* itself literally, not metaphorically. If we see
> > > > *through*  the myth of
> > > the
> > > > *I* as a literalization of the social actor [as intentional maker or
> > > > constructor] then we possibly open up the EXCESS [of *is*] to
> > > > explore relations between *is* [material, being, becoming] with the
> > > > imaginal *as
> > > > if* to create a *chiasm* or binocular vision in *depth* [which is
> > > > NOT a summation of the *is* and *and is*] but is a gestalt *type*
> > > > historically constituted through *expressive cognition* [Merleau
> > > > Ponty's term]
> > > >
> > > > Greg, this *feeling* as a way of orienting to make *sense* through
> > > *types*
> > > > seems like *interpretive musings* [Peirce]
> > > >
> > > > Just wondering
> > > > Larry
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 11:45 PM, Greg Thompson <
> > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> > > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> David,
> > > >> Thanks for this wonderfully thoughtful note.
> > > >> As I posted my note to the video, I was reading Max Gluckman's
> > > >> Rituals
> > > of
> > > >> Rebellion. In that book, Gluckman describes rituals in which people
> > > invert
> > > >> the norms of society for a period of time. This is clearly living
> > > >> in an imagined world (perhaps as much as living in the world full
> > > >> of upright norms), but this wouldn't make it onto Saler's radar. So
> > > >> I agree with
> > > your
> > > >> concern about ethnocentrism.
> > > >> At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something
> > > >> different about these two types of imagined worlds, with the other
> > > >> (rationalist) type of imagined worlds that, as you note, are
> > > >> perhaps more contrived, more intentionally made.
> > > >> But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to
> > > >> say
> > > that
> > > >> the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this
> > > >> points
> > > to
> > > >> differences in ontology. The intentionally made imaginary is a
> > > >> result
> > > of a
> > > >> naturalist ontology (here you see I am buying some of Saler's
> > > >> argument about a Weberian disenchantment with modernity). In a
> > > >> naturalist
> > > ontology,
> > > >> the world is just there in "all its base materiality." Nothing
> > > >> more, nothing less. There is no space for the rich imagined world
> > > >> of myth, belief, and religion (or so it is believed). In other
> > > >> worlds, there is space for something more.
> > > >> Anyway, I think there was too much for me to chew on in your post.
> > > >> Still thinking about it...
> > > >> -greg
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 10:22 PM, David Kellogg
> > > >> <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> > > >> wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >> > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped,
> > > >> > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary
> > > >> > worlds is.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of
> > > >> > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is
> > > >> > only with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately
> > > >> > "believe" in a fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual
> > > >> > creator. That is, adult play only begins with people who were the
> > > >> > peers of my grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also
> > > >> > be imaginary worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of
> > > >> > people, but they do not signify, because the effort of believing
> > > >> > in them in order to inhabit them is not differentiated from
> > > >> > believing in them because you think they are true.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional
> > > >> > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional
> > > >> > delusion is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote,
> > > >> > the old man's neighbors try their very best to convince Don
> > > >> > Quixote to go on inhabiting the novelistic world he has created
> > > >> > for them, and fail; there is no suggestion that they do this
> > > >> > because they believe the old man's world is real. There was a
> > > >> > spate of similar novels in English in eighteenth century (e.g.
> > > >> > Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and Jane Austen's first
> > > >> > novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a woman whose whole
> > > >> > attraction is that she actually assumes only the very best
> > > >> > motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with ill
> > > >> > will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a
> > > >> > genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time,
> > > >> > she imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane
> > > >> > and mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half
> > > >> > disenchantment of the heroine and half enchantment of the
> General's
> > son, both quite deliberately acts of metacognition.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much
> earlier.
> > > >> > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a
> > > >> > particular kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became
> > > >> > parodistsic. "Dream of the Red Chamber" is about a stone left
> > > >> > over from when the world was made, which is reincarnated by a
> > > >> > sensitive young man who falls in with one cousin and marries
> > > >> > another. It is also about a garden, built for a one day visit to
> > > >> > her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which eventually
> > > >> > bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are allowed
> to
> > run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies:
> > > >> > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel,
> > > >> > and even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds
> > > >> > of others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost
> > > >> > every fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather
> > > >> > as Jane Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and
> > > >> > "Dream of the Red Chamber" was probably finished by someone else
> > > >> > (the last third of it was written well after the death of the
> > > >> > author, but computer analysis has not definitively proven that it
> > was written by someone else).
> > > >> >
> > > >> > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is
> > > >> > that, like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we
> > > >> > keep thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and
> > > >> > the preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist
> > > >> > thinking (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and
> > > >> > wonder) are the last word and not merely latest one. I spend a
> > > >> > great deal of the time that I spend writing half-listening to
> > > >> > eighteenth century operas, which are in very obvious ways
> > > >> > imaginary worlds which we enter only by voluntarily checking our
> > > >> > linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In less obvious ways, it
> > > >> > seems to me, these imaginary worlds are interested in a clash
> > > >> > that we no longer take very seriously. It's the clash between a
> > > >> > form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because empirical,
> and
> > one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical.
> > > >> > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of
> > > >> > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro).
> > > >> > The strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness
> > > >> > by its very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don
> > > >> > Giovanni gets around this problem by making repentance a
> > > >> > precondition for forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly
> > > >> > damnable will never repent, not even as they are actually being
> > damned.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism
> > > >> > and merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching.
> > > >> > There is the humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary
> > > >> > negotiations of meaning between human beings--and the rationalist
> > > >> > belief in the inflexible, innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere
> > > >> > it seems to have been subsumed in the general opposition between
> > > >> > art and science that we find in Saler's talk. Part of the point
> > > >> > of my book is really to try to revive it--in the form of a
> > > >> > humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling versus a more
> > rationalizing narrativistic one.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > David Kellogg
> > > >> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > > >> >
> > > >> > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and
> > > >> > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two
> > > >> > chapters for free at....
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >>
> > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-pr
> > > axis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it
> > > >> > not as an interface between the virtual world and the real one,
> > > >> > but only as yet another interface between this virtual world and
> > > >> > the next one!)
> > > >> >
> > > >> > dk
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> > > >> > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the
> > > >> discussions,
> > > >> > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two
> > > >> > > others
> > > >> > suffer
> > > >> > > from the same difficulties.
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If
> > > >> > > that's
> > > a
> > > >> > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule,
> > > >> > > but
> > > when
> > > >> > they
> > > >> > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems
> > > >> > > like
> > > a
> > > >> > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants
> > > >> > > in the discussion are trying to communicate.
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*?  !! :-)))
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > Rockin chair mike
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > Thanks
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson <
> > > >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > > >> > > wrote:
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into
> "reality"
> > > >> more
> > > >> > than
> > > >> > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss
> > > >> > >> of
> > > an
> > > >> > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a
> > > >> > >> there
> > > >> > there?).
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike,
> > > >> > >> I
> > > know
> > > >> > that
> > > >> > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the
> > > >> > >> concrete" -
> > > >> which
> > > >> > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or
> > > >> something
> > > >> > >> else? A "made real"?).
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented
> > > >> > >> social constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word
> > > >> "ontological"?).
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was
> > > >> proposing:
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=
> > > >> en
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks
> > > >> > >> since
> > > it
> > > >> > can be
> > > >> > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and
> > > >> > >> they can
> > > >> be
> > > >> > hit
> > > >> > >> or miss.
> > > >> > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I
> > > >> > >> originally
> > > >> sent in
> > > >> > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it
> > > >> interesting
> > > >> > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David?
> > > >> > >> Others?
> > > >> > >> -greg
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > wrote:
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central
> > > >> component,
> > > >> > >> > Greg.
> > > >> > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the
> > > >> > >> > wrong
> > > >> > >> conversation
> > > >> > >> > here?).
> > > >> > >> >
> > > >> > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us?
> > > >> Perhaps
> > > >> > the
> > > >> > >> > two talks will aid the discussion.
> > > >> > >> > mike
> > > >> > >> >
> > > >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson <
> > > >> > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > > >> > >> > wrote:
> > > >> > >> >
> > > >> > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world"
> > > >> > >> > > discussions on
> > > >> the
> > > >> > >> other
> > > >> > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that
> > > >> > >> > > others
> > > >> > might
> > > >> > >> be
> > > >> > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in
> > > >> politics:
> > > >> > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo
> > > >> > >> > >
> > > >> > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the
> > otherwise"
> > > >> to
> > > >> > >> works
> > > >> > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and
> > Rabelais.
> > > >> > >> > >
> > > >> > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply
> > > >> political
> > > >> > >> act.
> > > >> > >> > >
> > > >> > >> > > -greg
> > > >> > >> > >
> > > >> > >> > > --
> > > >> > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > >> > >> > > Assistant Professor
> > > >> > >> > > Department of Anthropology
> > > >> > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University
> > > >> > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > >> > >> > >
> > > >> > >> >
> > > >> > >> >
> > > >> > >> >
> > > >> > >> > --
> > > >> > >> >
> > > >> > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of
> > > >> > >> > construction
> > > >> and
> > > >> > re-
> > > >> > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are
> > > >> > >> > contingently
> > > but
> > > >> > more
> > > >> > >> or
> > > >> > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama,
> > > Griffiths,
> > > >> and
> > > >> > >> > Gray, 2001]
> > > >> > >> >
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >> --
> > > >> > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > >> > >> Assistant Professor
> > > >> > >> Department of Anthropology
> > > >> > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > >> > >> Brigham Young University
> > > >> > >> Provo, UT 84602
> > > >> > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > >> > >>
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > --
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of
> > > >> > > construction
> > > and
> > > >> re-
> > > >> > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently
> > > >> > > but
> > > >> more
> > > >> > or
> > > >> > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama,
> > > >> > > Griffiths,
> > > and
> > > >> > > Gray, 2001]
> > > >> >
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> --
> > > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > >> Assistant Professor
> > > >> Department of Anthropology
> > > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > >> Brigham Young University
> > > >> Provo, UT 84602
> > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > >>
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > Assistant Professor
> > Department of Anthropology
> > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > Brigham Young University
> > Provo, UT 84602
> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > ________________________________
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> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>