[Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse
Andy Blunden
ablunden@mira.net
Mon Sep 15 08:22:32 PDT 2014
Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what David
would call "philosophical" discussion. :)
The Psychology of Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e.,
the "mainstream" do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and
surveys and so far as I can see have still haven't figured out what a
concept is.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote:
> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about
> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy
> leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again
> just talking aloud.
>
> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational
> Psychology and Counseling
> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey
> Education Complex
> IT Online Program Coordinator University
> of Tennessee
> http://itonline.utk.edu/
> Knoxville, TN 37996
> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone:
> 865-974-7712
>
> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>
> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have
> our specific research interests.
> But when we publish, most of us have something to report.
> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of
> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest.
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
>
> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote:
>
> Why is it that we came to what David stated as:
>
> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over
> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical
> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost
> completely detached from empirical specifics.
>
>
>
> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational
> Psychology and Counseling
> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532
> Bailey Education Complex
> IT Online Program Coordinator
> University of Tennessee
> http://itonline.utk.edu/
> Knoxville, TN 37996
> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone:
> 865-974-7712 <tel:865-974-7712>
>
> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner
> <dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>> wrote:
>
> Andy,
>
> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific
> project,
> though it might initially have been conceived as such.
> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over
> facts."
> We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations,
> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely
> detached from
> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even
> at the
> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game.
>
> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that
> claims be
> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the
> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical
> setting
> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In
> this case,
> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to
> separation of
> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement
> as a
> consequence.
>
> David
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>]
> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM
> To: David H Kirshner
> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse
>
> David,
> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must
> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are
> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which
> they
> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a
> system of
> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental
> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that
> claim. We
> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over
> facts;
> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share
> concepts.
> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal
> as it
> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is
> ill-conceived to
> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of
> research
> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological,
> I don't
> think that makes any difference.
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
>
> David H Kirshner wrote:
> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it
> seems
> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing
> efforts
> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to
> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In
> tandem, is
> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or
> philosophical
> discourse.
> >
> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of
> CHAT
> would not be better served by embedding theoretical
> discussion in
> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be
> to make
> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application
> (though that
> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation
> might
> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of
> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated
> into
> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by
> methodological
> strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical
> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community
> could
> look across these various schools to pursue broader
> philosophical
> problematics.
> >
> > David
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>] On Behalf Of Andy
> Blunden
> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM
> > To: Huw Lloyd
> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct
> perception
> >
> > Ah! I see!
> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in
> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally
> contain
> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem
> with anyone
> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is
> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of
> Vygotsky,
> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially
> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if
> mediation in
> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with
> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is
> lost.
> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point
> you were
> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation."
> >
> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I
> can do
> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or
> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my
> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or
> whatever -
> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are
> products of the history and culture into which I was born.
> I can
> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce
> them. So every action I take is essentially
> cultural-historical as
> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material
> objects,
> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is
> universal. So
> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through
> everyone interpreting the same material objects,
> artefacts, that I
> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too
> mediate their actions with the same set of universal
> artefacts! So
> all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis
> which is as objective as any branch of natural science.
> Wonderful, eh?
> >
> > Andy
> >
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > --
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >
> >
> > Huw Lloyd wrote:
> >
> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need
> to study the
> >> history and production of the action. Under such
> circumstances,
> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production
> of) actions
> >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified,
> through
> >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then
> it may seem
> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action.
> >>
> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume)
> are an elegant
> >> way to demonstrate this.
> >>
> >> Best,
> >> Huw
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> >> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:
> >>
> >> he, he, Huw!
> >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are
> the very
> >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification!
> and I
> really
> >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally
> being
> used to
> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is
> not equal to
> >> separation.
> >> I really don't know what you are referring to with
> product and
> >> history. Perhaps you could explain?
> >> Andy
> >>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> *Andy Blunden*
> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >>
> >>
> >> Huw Lloyd wrote:
> >>
> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call
> for "clarity".
> >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or
> reification of the
> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails
> typologies or
> >> other simplistic devices which prevent the
> conception and
> >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in
> cases such as
> >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the
> entanglements
> >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would
> be equally
> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one
> needs to
> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too.
> >>
> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which
> leads me to
> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example,
> why separate
> >> the act from its production and history?
> >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple
> clarity from
> >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the
> problem.
> >>
> >> Best,
> >> Huw
> >>
> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> >> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> >> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>>>
>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that
> in the CHAT
> >> tradition
> >> specifically, as opposed to the English
> language in
> general,
> >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of
> course, every
> >> action
> >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many
> discursive
> >> contexts,
> >> "mediation" is a concept which may be
> evoked quite
> >> legitimately,
> >> but with no special significant for the use of
> CHAT. In social
> >> theory, for example, mediation of
> activities by other
> >> activities
> >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as
> mediation of
> actions by
> >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology.
> But if
> the topic is
> >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so
> central, that I
> >> prefer to spell it out and use the term
> >> "artefact-mediated" rather
> >> than the vague term "mediated".
> >>
> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by
> such-and-such a
> >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can
> use words to
> >> mean what
> >> you like, but I find a formulation like
> this in the
> context of
> >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the
> idea of
> >> "mediation" in
> >> the most general sense in a way which
> obscures the
> fact that a
> >> concept is not immediately present in any
> act of
> >> communication or
> >> any other act, and therefore *cannot
> mediate actions*.
> >> Artefacts,
> >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a
> concept, can of
> >> course mediate an act of communication. But the
> point is
> >> that a
> >> word is not universally and unproblematically a
> sign for
> >> any one
> >> concept. It means different things to
> different people.
> >> Concepts
> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal
> in their
> >> materiality,
> >> but particular in their meaning. So when we
> have a
> concept
> >> in mind
> >> when we use a word in communication, the
> communication is
> >> mediated
> >> by the word not the concept, and it is a
> mistake
> not to be
> >> aware
> >> of that.
> >>
> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were
> always used in
> >> qualified
> >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear.
> >>
> >> Andy
> >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his
> comment, too.
> >>
> >>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> *Andy Blunden*
> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Greg Thompson wrote:
> >>
> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and
> culture?
> >>
> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in
> which case we
> >> would need
> >> to include
> >> reflexes)
> >>
> >> And does it include our socio-contextual
> surround as in
> >> Bateson's man with
> >> the stick? (in which case, we would
> need to include
> >> newborns).
> >>
> >> Just wonderin'.
> >>
> >> -greg
> >>
> >>
> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David
> H Kirshner
> >> <dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>
> >> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>>> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> Thanks for replies.
> >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim
> Greeno
> decided
> >> to stop
> >> talking about
> >> situated cognition because the
> pragmatics of
> >> adjectival
> >> use implies there
> >> has to be a contrasting non-situated
> cognition. He now
> >> speaks of
> >> situativity theory. It seems, with the
> exception of
> >> physical reflexes (and
> >> perhaps pre-conscious infant
> activity), all
> human
> >> action
> >> is mediated (and
> >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as
> well). So, it's
> >> worth noting that
> >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a
> kind of
> >> action, but
> >> rather a
> >> theoretical assumption about all human
> action; though
> >> there seems to be
> >> some variation in interpretation of
> what that
> >> assumption
> >> entails.
> >> David
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
>
>
>
>
>
>
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