[Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Andy Blunden
ablunden@mira.net
Mon Sep 15 06:34:06 PDT 2014
Carol Macdonald wrote:
> Hi Andy,
>
> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at
> the same time purports to account for "everything". But are there
> really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of
> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this;
> - as yet potential understanding
> - a total lack of understanding.
That's the whole point, Carol! a given material artefact has a certain
*material* form which is universal, but it is subject to interpretation,
that is, meaning is ascribed to it by a person, and different people at
different times will ascribe different meanings to it. But the meaning
of the word "material" is what is outside of consciousness and
independent of activity. The independent existence of the material world
is what makes science possible.
> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so
> if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need
> to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be
> mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.)
> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your
> schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns.
By "unmediated sensation" I presume you mean that aspect of a sensation
which is unmediated. All sensations are both immediate and mediated.
This is what I take to be the core meaning of "dual-stimulation." Were
you to be subject to an unmediated sensation (maybe soon after you were
born) then it would have no meaning for you and would therefore be no
sensation at all. But if it has a meaning, that is because of the
mediation of the sensation by aspects of your consciousness.
Here of course the mediation being talked of is not artefact-mediation. :)
Andy
>
> Carol
>
> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>
> Ah! I see!
> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature
> or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both
> immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone
> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is
> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky,
> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially
> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in
> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with
> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost.
> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were
> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation."
>
> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do
> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or
> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my
> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever -
> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are
> products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can
> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce
> them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as
> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects,
> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So
> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through
> everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I
> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too
> mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So
> all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis
> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh?
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
>
> Huw Lloyd wrote:
>
> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study
> the history and production of the action. Under such
> circumstances, assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the
> production of) actions become more obviously false. If one
> has simplified, through "clarity", the action away from its
> genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept
> cannot mediate an action.
>
> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an
> elegant way to demonstrate this.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
>
>
>
> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>
> he, he, Huw!
> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very
> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I
> really
> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being
> used to
> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to
> separation.
> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and
> history. Perhaps you could explain?
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
>
> Huw Lloyd wrote:
>
> I agree about precision, but not with a call for
> "clarity". Reduction to clarity is a projection or
> reification of the
> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails
> typologies or
> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and
> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases
> such as
> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements
> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally
> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one
> needs to
> obfuscate (see darkly) too.
>
> I think it is this "need for simplification" which
> leads me to
> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why
> separate
> the act from its production and history? Of
> course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from
> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:
>
> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT
> tradition
> specifically, as opposed to the English language
> in general,
> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of
> course, every
> action
> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive
> contexts,
> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite
> legitimately,
> but with no special significant for the use of
> CHAT. In social
> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other
> activities
> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of
> actions by
> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if
> the topic is
> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so
> central, that I
> prefer to spell it out and use the term
> "artefact-mediated" rather
> than the vague term "mediated".
>
> I have come across usages like "mediated by
> such-and-such a
> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use
> words to
> mean what
> you like, but I find a formulation like this in
> the context of
> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of
> "mediation" in
> the most general sense in a way which obscures the
> fact that a
> concept is not immediately present in any act of
> communication or
> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*.
> Artefacts,
> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a
> concept, can of
> course mediate an act of communication. But the
> point is
> that a
> word is not universally and unproblematically a
> sign for
> any one
> concept. It means different things to different
> people.
> Concepts
> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their
> materiality,
> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a
> concept
> in mind
> when we use a word in communication, the
> communication is
> mediated
> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake
> not to be
> aware
> of that.
>
> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always
> used in
> qualified
> way so that its specific meaning is made clear.
>
> Andy
> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his
> comment, too.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
>
>
> Greg Thompson wrote:
>
> Does "mediation" only apply to language and
> culture?
>
> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we
> would need
> to include
> reflexes)
>
> And does it include our socio-contextual
> surround as in
> Bateson's man with
> the stick? (in which case, we would need to
> include
> newborns).
>
> Just wonderin'.
>
> -greg
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner
> <dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>> wrote:
>
> Thanks for replies.
> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno
> decided
> to stop
> talking about
> situated cognition because the pragmatics of
> adjectival
> use implies there
> has to be a contrasting non-situated
> cognition. He now
> speaks of
> situativity theory. It seems, with the
> exception of
> physical reflexes (and
> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity),
> all human
> action
> is mediated (and
> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as
> well). So, it's
> worth noting that
> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of
> action, but
> rather a
> theoretical assumption about all human
> action; though
> there seems to be
> some variation in interpretation of what that
> assumption
> entails.
> David
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
> Developmental psycholinguist
> Academic, Researcher, and Editor
> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa
>
>
>
>
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