[Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception

[Andy Blunden]

he, he, Huw!
For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very problems 
that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really don't think 
obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to obscure the genesis 
of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to separation.
I really don't know what you are referring to with product and history. 
Perhaps you could explain?
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/


Huw Lloyd wrote:
> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity".  Reduction 
> to clarity is a projection or reification of the need for simplicity. 
>  Simplicity usually entails typologies or other simplistic devices 
> which prevent the conception and perception of genetic relations. 
>  Actually in cases such as these we are interested in (clarifying) the 
> entanglements between artefacts and mind.  I think It would be equally 
> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to obfuscate 
> (see darkly) too.
>
> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to 
> disagree with the 2nd paragraph.  For example, why separate the act 
> from its production and history?  
>
> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from modes 
> of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net 
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>
>     My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition
>     specifically, as opposed to the English language in general,
>     mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action
>     is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive contexts,
>     "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite legitimately,
>     but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social
>     theory, for example, mediation of activities by other activities
>     or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by
>     artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is
>     psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I
>     prefer to spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather
>     than the vague term "mediated".
>
>     I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a
>     concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what
>     you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of
>     CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of "mediation" in
>     the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a
>     concept is not immediately present in any act of communication or
>     any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. Artefacts,
>     such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of
>     course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a
>     word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for any one
>     concept. It means different things to different people. Concepts
>     are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their materiality,
>     but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept in mind
>     when we use a word in communication, the communication is mediated
>     by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be aware
>     of that.
>
>     So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified
>     way so that its specific meaning is made clear.
>
>     Andy
>     PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too.
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>     *Andy Blunden*
>     http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>     <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
>
>
>     Greg Thompson wrote:
>
>         Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture?
>
>         Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need
>         to include
>         reflexes)
>
>         And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in
>         Bateson's man with
>         the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns).
>
>         Just wonderin'.
>
>         -greg
>
>
>         On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner
>         <dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote:
>
>          
>
>             Thanks for replies.
>             I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop
>             talking about
>             situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival
>             use implies there
>             has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now
>             speaks of
>             situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of
>             physical reflexes (and
>             perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action
>             is mediated (and
>             perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's
>             worth noting that
>             "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but
>             rather a
>             theoretical assumption about all human action; though
>             there seems to be
>             some variation in interpretation of what that assumption
>             entails.
>             David
>
>                
>
>
>
>