[Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion

Sun Oct 12 21:10:06 PDT 2014

Mike and Huw,
I have some fear that this will be a distraction from the main thread but
briefly, Huw, that is helpful as I inch toward an understanding of how we
might get out of coherence vs. correspondence dualism. Latour (sorry for
introducing outsiders here! He is an important social theorist, esp. in
anthropology, and has published in MCA, so there's that...) says that the
"real" is that which "pushes back." I feel like he is in some ways
paraphrasing Dewey here, but I haven't quite been able to find where we
might find something like that in Dewey. Perhaps you can keep an eye out as
you read?

Mike, I'm still processing/imagining your comments. Unknown whether they
will return to the hall of shadows or become a real object for me.

-greg

On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:19 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:

> Huw and Greg et al--
>
> Greg: And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could say
> a bit
> > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to being
> > made-as-such?
>
>
> Huw: Well, I haven't dug very far.  But its fairly clear from his letter
> that it
> is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects that
> one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the
> inquiry is based.
>
> Here is Mike's guess:
> In the process of inquiry, one is always imagining next moments. The object
> arises out of imagination, or the imagined turns out to be unembodied and
> returns to the hall of shadows.
>
> Quicker than a wink.
> mike
>
> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:16 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > On 12 October 2014 03:40, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Huw,
> > > Can you give us a little more about the Nagel introduction? How does
> > Nagel
> > > make that error?
> > >
> >
> > He critiques the predicate of the change (or difference) that Dewey
> asserts
> > in the process of investigation/inquiry.  Nagel's consideration of this
> > change was merely the instrumental imposition rather than recognising the
> > construal of the object as a construction and a difference.  From his
> > writing it was apparent to me that he misses this.  The peculiarity is
> that
> > this is the introduction to Dewey's volume on logic as inquiry.
> >
> >
> > >
> > > And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could say a
> > bit
> > > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to being
> > > made-as-such?
> >
> >
> > Well, I haven't dug very far.  But its fairly clear from his letter that
> it
> > is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects
> that
> > one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the
> > inquiry is based.
> >
> >
> > > I've been chatting elsewhere with Jay Lemke and others about
> > > Bruno Latour's and Tim Ingold's separate uses of "correspondence" in
> ways
> > > that go against the classical notions of "correspondence" as in
> > > correspondence theory (i.e. the measure of the value of a science is
> the
> > > extent to which it corresponds to reality).
> > >
> >
> > Well, in the little I've read Dewey argued that social science exceeds
> > natural science in certain dimensions of concreteness (if I remember
> > correctly).  But I think he was writing of a pre-quantum physics.  As a
> > mode of inquiry coherence would, I am surmising, be more valued than
> > "correspondence" -- afterall, correspondence with what?
> >
> >
> > >
> > > I'm wondering how these views might be different from Dewey's take on
> the
> > > matter (in a lot of ways, I'm sure, but also similar in others). But I
> > > haven't read Dewey lately or with these ideas in mind and I could use a
> > leg
> > > up...
> > >
> >
> > I don't know how they relate to your other theorists on correspondence.
> > But I do know you won't get very far by orientation alone.  By
> orientation,
> > all you get to do is shake and feel the parcel (paraphrasing Hector from
> > "The History Boys").  From what I can tell, Dewey would advocate getting
> > technical with your authentic problem (which you would absolutely have to
> > do to use it productively) and recognise that the problem of interest is
> > part of the root of your inquiry.  Perhaps not the "leg up" you were
> hoping
> > for!
> >
> > Best,
> > Huw
> >
> >
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > -greg
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 5:05 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > My own excursion has been to explore writings relating to Dewey
> (simply
> > > > something I had out off and found time to explore).  Which, it turns
> > out,
> > > > are (to my reading) another pithy way to express the logical
> problems I
> > > was
> > > > reading in David's narrative.  But this might be because I already
> > > > "understand" the problem.
> > > >
> > > > Anyway, the interesting writings were "A letter from Dewey" that is
> in
> > > the
> > > > appendix of "Knowing and Known" and Ernest Nagel's introduction to
> > > Dewey's
> > > > "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry".
> > > >
> > > > One of the rather interesting things about reading Nagel's
> > introduction,
> > > is
> > > > that he makes an ontological error that Dewey referred to in his
> letter
> > > (I
> > > > believe).  The error was that an "object" (not its referent) is
> > > > existentially existent beyond and before its social construction.
> > > > Something that we CHAT enthusiasts should be familiar with.
> > > >
> > > > Nevertheless (as a psychologist) I am interested in the truth of
> > errors,
> > > > and Nagel's introduction was certainly helpful in enlivening the
> > prospect
> > > > of the 500 page volume (vol. 12 of the later works).  Of course, I
> > could
> > > be
> > > > naively wrong about it, but all the pieces line up for me here,
> > including
> > > > some passages that are remarkably aligned with DE / El'konin-Davydov
> > > > theory.
> > > >
> > > > Best,
> > > > Huw
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On 11 October 2014 22:38, Henry G. Shonerd III <hshonerd@gmail.com>
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Paul,
> > > > > Let me think about it. I appreciate your reference to Derrida. I am
> > > > > reading like crazy to keep up with you guys!
> > > > > Henry
> > > > > P.S. I am pretty dedicated to reading the references, links on the
> > > XMCA.
> > > > > But I use Wikipedia constantly. Is this a bad thing?
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com>
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Henry,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Clearly, your bike riding belongs to the perlocutionary category.
> > > But
> > > > > what is the syntax and semantics that gave rise to it?  The
> thinking
> > > that
> > > > > it leads to, or is there another declarative or imperative
> statement,
> > > > I.e.
> > > > > You are an environmentalists?  This is where the searle/derrida
> > debate
> > > > > takes off.  The issues of intentionality, continuity,
> discontinuity
> > > are
> > > > > that not also an aspect of language.  Hence derrida ' s notion of
> the
> > > > > potentiality for the deferment of meaning and why  jacques lacan
> > posits
> > > > the
> > > > > unconscious to be structured like language...to account for the
> > > > > discontinuity of both language and the unconscious, which although
> we
> > > can
> > > > > think them apart are not.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> > > > > > President
> > > > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> > > > > > www.mocombeian.com
> > > > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> > > > > > www.paulcmocombe.info
> > > > > >
> > > > > > <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: "Henry G.
> > > > > Shonerd III" <hshonerd@gmail.com> </div><div>Date:10/11/2014  4:14
> > PM
> > > > > (GMT-05:00) </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to
> > > > > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion </div><div>
> > > > > > </div>Mike and Paul,
> > > > > > Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to
> do
> > > with
> > > > > your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the
> > > morning
> > > > > sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. The
> > same
> > > > > thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia,
> very
> > > > > popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is embodied
> is
> > > > > typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the
> > > > phonological
> > > > > pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with
> all
> > > > forms
> > > > > of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a
> > subset
> > > > of
> > > > > the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of
> > language,
> > > > > would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than
> > > > discontinuous?
> > > > > Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and writing),
> > > > > wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension)
> of
> > > > > meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making
> sense
> > > > that
> > > > > relates at all to the on-going dialog?
> > > > > > Henry
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <
> > > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > >> Mike,
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about
> the
> > > xmca
> > > > > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the
> speech
> > > > act,
> > > > > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing.  It is
> simply
> > > > > background information for us the reader (I am not going to
> reiterate
> > > the
> > > > > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue
> of
> > > > > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the
> way
> > > > based
> > > > > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is
> > correct
> > > > on
> > > > > the argument).
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological
> > and
> > > > > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary,
> > and
> > > > > perlocutionary categories.  This psychological act of thinking is
> the
> > > > > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking.
> > However,
> > > in
> > > > > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background,
> > > > > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private
> language,
> > > for
> > > > > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act?
> > > > > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside
> > the
> > > > text.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> > > > > >> President
> > > > > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> > > > > >> www.mocombeian.com
> > > > > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> > > > > >> www.paulcmocombe.info
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: mike
> cole
> > <
> > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> </div><div>Date:10/11/2014  1:10 PM  (GMT-05:00)
> > > > > </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca
> > > > discussion
> > > > > </div><div>
> > > > > >> </div>Thanks Paul --
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same
> > > > question:
> > > > > >> How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation
> differ,
> > > > Paul,
> > > > > >> such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them?
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views,
> David
> > > Ke?
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> What are the major implications of the differences??
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> mike
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> > > > > >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>> Martin,
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory
> of
> > > > speech
> > > > > >>> act, but not austin's.
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> > > > > >>> President
> > > > > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> > > > > >>> www.mocombeian.com
> > > > > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> > > > > >>> www.paulcmocombe.info
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>> <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: mike
> > cole <
> > > > > >>> mcole@ucsd.edu> </div><div>Date:10/10/2014  7:48 PM
> (GMT-05:00)
> > > > > >>> </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > >>> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the
> xmca
> > > > > discussion
> > > > > >>> </div><div>
> > > > > >>> </div>Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking
> > about
> > > > the
> > > > > >>> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with
> > > words,
> > > > > but i
> > > > > >>> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was
> > all a
> > > > > jumble
> > > > > >>> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with
> the
> > > > belief
> > > > > >>> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character?
> > > > > >>> mike
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer <
> > > > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> > > > > >>> wrote:
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by
> > recognizing
> > > > that
> > > > > >>>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character?  Acting
> > > > requires
> > > > > >>>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in
> the
> > > > > world.
> > > > > >>>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking
> > > (thinking
> > > > > with
> > > > > >>>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in
> > the
> > > > > form
> > > > > >>> of
> > > > > >>>> new signs.
> > > > > >>>>
> > > > > >>>> ?
> > > > > >>>>
> > > > > >>>> Martin
> > > > > >>>>
> > > > > >>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com
> >
> > > > wrote:
> > > > > >>>>
> > > > > >>>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by
> > > > exploring
> > > > > >>>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY
> INSIGHT
> > > > that
> > > > > >>> word
> > > > > >>>>> meaning is BEST understood -
> > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > >>>>> "as MODES  of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as
> > > > > >>> operations,
> > > > > >>>>> actions, and activities."
> > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > >>>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word
> > > meanings.
> > > > > >>>>
> > > > > >>>>
> > > > > >>>>
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>> --
> > > > > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
> > with
> > > > an
> > > > > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> --
> > > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
> > with
> > > an
> > > > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > Assistant Professor
> > > Department of Anthropology
> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > Brigham Young University
> > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > >
> >
>
>
>
> --
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>

-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson