[Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion

Sat Oct 11 19:40:05 PDT 2014

Huw,
Can you give us a little more about the Nagel introduction? How does Nagel
make that error?

And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could say a bit
about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to being
made-as-such? I've been chatting elsewhere with Jay Lemke and others about
Bruno Latour's and Tim Ingold's separate uses of "correspondence" in ways
that go against the classical notions of "correspondence" as in
correspondence theory (i.e. the measure of the value of a science is the
extent to which it corresponds to reality).

I'm wondering how these views might be different from Dewey's take on the
matter (in a lot of ways, I'm sure, but also similar in others). But I
haven't read Dewey lately or with these ideas in mind and I could use a leg
up...

Thanks,
-greg

On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 5:05 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
wrote:

> My own excursion has been to explore writings relating to Dewey (simply
> something I had out off and found time to explore).  Which, it turns out,
> are (to my reading) another pithy way to express the logical problems I was
> reading in David's narrative.  But this might be because I already
> "understand" the problem.
>
> Anyway, the interesting writings were "A letter from Dewey" that is in the
> appendix of "Knowing and Known" and Ernest Nagel's introduction to Dewey's
> "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry".
>
> One of the rather interesting things about reading Nagel's introduction, is
> that he makes an ontological error that Dewey referred to in his letter (I
> believe).  The error was that an "object" (not its referent) is
> existentially existent beyond and before its social construction.
> Something that we CHAT enthusiasts should be familiar with.
>
> Nevertheless (as a psychologist) I am interested in the truth of errors,
> and Nagel's introduction was certainly helpful in enlivening the prospect
> of the 500 page volume (vol. 12 of the later works).  Of course, I could be
> naively wrong about it, but all the pieces line up for me here, including
> some passages that are remarkably aligned with DE / El'konin-Davydov
> theory.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
>
>
> On 11 October 2014 22:38, Henry G. Shonerd III <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Paul,
> > Let me think about it. I appreciate your reference to Derrida. I am
> > reading like crazy to keep up with you guys!
> > Henry
> > P.S. I am pretty dedicated to reading the references, links on the XMCA.
> > But I use Wikipedia constantly. Is this a bad thing?
> >
> >
> >
> > On Oct 11, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> pmocombe@mocombeian.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Henry,
> > >
> > > Clearly, your bike riding belongs to the perlocutionary category.  But
> > what is the syntax and semantics that gave rise to it?  The thinking that
> > it leads to, or is there another declarative or imperative statement,
> I.e.
> > You are an environmentalists?  This is where the searle/derrida debate
> > takes off.  The issues of intentionality, continuity,  discontinuity are
> > that not also an aspect of language.  Hence derrida ' s notion of the
> > potentiality for the deferment of meaning and why  jacques lacan posits
> the
> > unconscious to be structured like language...to account for the
> > discontinuity of both language and the unconscious, which although we can
> > think them apart are not.
> > >
> > >
> > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> > > President
> > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> > > www.mocombeian.com
> > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> > > www.paulcmocombe.info
> > >
> > > <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: "Henry G.
> > Shonerd III" <hshonerd@gmail.com> </div><div>Date:10/11/2014  4:14 PM
> > (GMT-05:00) </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to
> > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion </div><div>
> > > </div>Mike and Paul,
> > > Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to do with
> > your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the morning
> > sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. The same
> > thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia, very
> > popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is embodied is
> > typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the
> phonological
> > pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with all
> forms
> > of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a subset
> of
> > the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of language,
> > would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than
> discontinuous?
> > Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and writing),
> > wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension) of
> > meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making sense
> that
> > relates at all to the on-going dialog?
> > > Henry
> > >
> > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <
> > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >> Mike,
> > >>
> > >> My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca
> > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech
> act,
> > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing.  It is simply
> > background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the
> > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of
> > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way
> based
> > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct
> on
> > the argument).
> > >>
> > >> Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and
> > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and
> > perlocutionary categories.  This psychological act of thinking is the
> > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking.  However, in
> > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background,
> > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for
> > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act?
> > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the
> text.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> > >> President
> > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> > >> www.mocombeian.com
> > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> > >> www.paulcmocombe.info
> > >>
> > >> <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: mike cole <
> > mcole@ucsd.edu> </div><div>Date:10/11/2014  1:10 PM  (GMT-05:00)
> > </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca
> discussion
> > </div><div>
> > >> </div>Thanks Paul --
> > >>
> > >> Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same
> question:
> > >> How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ,
> Paul,
> > >> such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them?
> > >>
> > >> And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke?
> > >>
> > >> What are the major implications of the differences??
> > >>
> > >> mike
> > >>
> > >> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> > >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>> Martin,
> > >>>
> > >>> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of
> speech
> > >>> act, but not austin's.
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> > >>> President
> > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> > >>> www.mocombeian.com
> > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> > >>> www.paulcmocombe.info
> > >>>
> > >>> <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: mike cole <
> > >>> mcole@ucsd.edu> </div><div>Date:10/10/2014  7:48 PM  (GMT-05:00)
> > >>> </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > >>> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca
> > discussion
> > >>> </div><div>
> > >>> </div>Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about
> the
> > >>> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words,
> > but i
> > >>> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a
> > jumble
> > >>> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the
> belief
> > >>> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character?
> > >>> mike
> > >>>
> > >>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer <
> > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> > >>> wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing
> that
> > >>>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character?  Acting
> requires
> > >>>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the
> > world.
> > >>>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking
> > with
> > >>>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the
> > form
> > >>> of
> > >>>> new signs.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> ?
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Martin
> > >>>>
> > >>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > >>>>
> > >>>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by
> exploring
> > >>>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT
> that
> > >>> word
> > >>>>> meaning is BEST understood -
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> "as MODES  of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as
> > >>> operations,
> > >>>>> actions, and activities."
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings.
> > >>>>
> > >>>>
> > >>>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> --
> > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
> an
> > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> --
> > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > >>
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
>

-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson