[Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion

[Huw Lloyd]

On 11 October 2014 22:34, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>
wrote:

> The statement speaks to this overemphasis in psychology between
> continuity, culture, and the agent of culture.  I have not come across many
> writings in this group who celebrate and highlight the discontinuity as
> deleuze and guattari do.  I may be mistaken...hopes this help.
>

Paul,

Are you referring to a genetic discontinuity?  If so, can you point me to
paper/chapter?  Sorry if the pointing has already been done.

Best,
Huw

>
>
> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> President
> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> www.mocombeian.com
> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> www.paulcmocombe.info
>
> <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: mike cole <
> mcole@ucsd.edu> </div><div>Date:10/11/2014  5:11 PM  (GMT-05:00)
> </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
> </div><div>
> </div>Hi again, Paul. Briefly in response to this note. This time, I am
> stuck.
> Firstly, as I have said, I am too ignorant to follow you through the
> discussion of Derrida et al. That may explain why I also have trouble
> understanding the first sentence.
>
> "The problem with modern psychology as I read through some of the writings
> in this group is this very act of intentionality and the rational subject."
>
> Whose writing are you referring to? Which act of intentionality are you
> referring to? The problem may be one of terminology.  I googled lchc for
> "rational subject" and came up with 5 references, the most recent  of which
> in 2012 was in reference to Husserl. By contrast, the term mediation turns
> up in 45,000 places and "mediated action" in about 2100. Different
> discourse communities?
>
> mike
>
> On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 12:25 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
>
> > Mike,
> >
> > The problem with modern psychology as I read through some of the writings
> > in this group is this very act of intentionality and the rational
> subject.
> > Derrida is correct to point out that Austin and Searle assume the
> > aforementioned in their theory of speech act.  Although I do not
> subscribe
> > to derrida ' s decentered subject as the alternative to the rational
> > subject that experiences the world.  For me, as heidegger points out in
> his
> > critique of husserl, the latter subject is an analytic, present-at-hand,
> of
> > Dasein among its other analytics (very kantian), ready-to-hand and
> > unready-to-hand.  What psychology and speech act can not account for is
> the
> > origins of consciousness itself...artifical intelligence is not
> > consciousness!
> >
> >
> > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> > President
> > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> > www.mocombeian.com
> > www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> > www.paulcmocombe.info
> >
> > <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: "Dr. Paul C.
> > Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com> </div><div>Date:10/11/2014  2:59 PM
> > (GMT-05:00) </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to
> > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion </div><div>
> > </div>Mike,
> >
> > My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca
> > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech
> act,
> > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing.  It is simply
> > background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the
> > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of
> > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way
> based
> > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct
> on
> > the argument).
> >
> > Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and
> > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and
> > perlocutionary categories.  This psychological act of thinking is the
> > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking.  However, in
> > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background,
> > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for
> > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act?
> > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the
> text.
> >
> >
> > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> > President
> > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> > www.mocombeian.com
> > www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> > www.paulcmocombe.info
> >
> > <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: mike cole <
> > mcole@ucsd.edu> </div><div>Date:10/11/2014  1:10 PM  (GMT-05:00)
> > </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca
> discussion
> > </div><div>
> > </div>Thanks Paul --
> >
> > Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question:
> > How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul,
> > such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them?
> >
> > And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke?
> >
> > What are the major implications of the differences??
> >
> > mike
> >
> > On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Martin,
> > >
> > > I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech
> > > act, but not austin's.
> > >
> > >
> > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> > > President
> > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> > > www.mocombeian.com
> > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> > > www.paulcmocombe.info
> > >
> > > <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: mike cole <
> > > mcole@ucsd.edu> </div><div>Date:10/10/2014  7:48 PM  (GMT-05:00)
> > > </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > > </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca
> > discussion
> > > </div><div>
> > > </div>Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the
> > > conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words,
> but
> > i
> > > was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a
> > jumble
> > > of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief
> > > that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character?
> > > mike
> > >
> > > On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer <
> > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing
> that
> > > > both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character?  Acting
> requires
> > > > ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the
> world.
> > > > Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking
> > with
> > > > words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the
> form
> > > of
> > > > new signs.
> > > >
> > > > ?
> > > >
> > > > Martin
> > > >
> > > > On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by
> exploring
> > > > > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT
> that
> > > word
> > > > > meaning is BEST understood -
> > > > >
> > > > > "as MODES  of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as
> > > operations,
> > > > > actions, and activities."
> > > > >
> > > > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > --
> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>
>