[Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness
Andy Blunden
ablunden@mira.net
Tue May 20 21:09:51 PDT 2014
"A" paradigmatic exemplar will do, Mike.
Vygotsky worked hard on the emotions, but my reading of his
work on the
emotions is that he did not bring his methodological work to a
conclusive outcome, but I think nonetheless, writers of our
time have
been able to write Vygotskyan studies of the emotions,
thanks to the
fact that Vygotsky gave us an exemplar with study of the
intellect. I
take Vygotsky's work on the development of the personality
through
perezhivanija as *another* exermplar he left us.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.mira.net/~andy/
mike cole wrote:
> Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on
> Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought this
> topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core
> Vygotskian concepts.
>
> I would prefer 2 or three potential paradigmatic exemplars of
> consciousness before I decided that one was THE paradigmatic exemplar,
> especially when that examplar is intellect. Also at the end of T&L is
> Spinoza and emotion.
>
> mike
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 7:21 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>
> David, there is terminology, categorical distinctions, and the
> content of the science.
> Almost self-evidently, Thinking and Speech broke off at the
> threshold of the content of the science, and regretably, being a
> pioneer meant that his terminology was also unstable and
> rudimentary. My claim was that T&S was decisive in relaiton to the
> categorical distinctions underlying the science, despite the
> terminological mess.
>
> I read Vygotsky as a Marxist, rather than as a linguist or a
> Phenomenologist or a teacher, all of which are I am sure
> legitimate standpoints for reading Vygotsky. But I think there is
> some basis for taking it that Vygotsky is using "consciousness" in
> line with Marxist terminology at the time indicating the entire
> class of phenomena encompassed by a general psychology, perhaps
> similar to what you mean by "general consciousness"?
> As to the distinction between "dialogical consciousness" and
> "intellect", if we are restricting "dialogic consciousnes"
> typologically to language use, then I think that that is too
> unstable and problematic for a categorical distinction. If on the
> other than we were to widen the meaning of "dialogical" to
> sign-use, then I would identify it with intellect. The spoken word
> is the *archetype* of sign-use, but not the only instance of sign-use.
>
> I remain of the view that T&S, and in particular thes closing
> lines, specify that he has devoted the book to a study of the
> *intellect* (the special) as a paradigmatic exemplar for
> psychological research into human *consciousness* (as a whole).
>
>
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
>
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