[Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness

[David Kellogg]

I certainly don't think we can say, surely or otherwise, that the last
words of "Thinking and Speech" put an end to the matter. After all, what
Vygotsky himself said, in the first words of the book, was that the
investigation was broken off at the threshold.

Mike's question is about where and when Vygotsky made a clear distinction
between consciousness and intellect. Even if we agree that what is meant by
"consciousness" is not dialogic consciousness but merely consciousness of
sensation, we still need a term for dialogic consciousness. I also think
that using the term "consciousness" to refer to consciousness of
sensation leaves a gap--we no longer have a clear, unambiguous term for
general consciousness of which consciousness of sensation, dialogic
consciousness and intellect are all parts.

David Kellogg
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies



On 21 May 2014 00:14, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Andy, David
>
> Mike's question is generating answers.
> Andy, you quoted:
>
>  "In consciousness, the word is what - in Feuerbach's words - is absolutely
> impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct
> manifestation of the historical nature of human
> consciousness. Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is
> reflected in a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness"
>
> The key seems to be the word is absolutely IMPOSSIBLE for one person but
> possible for two. [dialectical. AND dialogical]
>
> Volosinov wrote: "Language lives and historically evolves IN CONCRETE
> verbal communication/Intercourse, neither in the abstract/linquistic forms
> of language NOR in the individual psyche of the speakers."
>
> Bahktin wrote:  "Actual act-performing thinking is an emotional-volitional
> thinking, a thinking that INTONATES and THIS intonation permeates in an
> ESSENTIAL manner in moments of a thought's content."
>
> Vygotsky wrote:  "The one who begins by separating thinking from affect
> forever CLOSES the way to an explication of the causes of thinking .... and
> makes conversely also impossible the investigation of the reverse action of
> thought on the affective-volitive side of psychological life."
>
> Wolff-Miichael Roth wrote: "In a section of *Thought and Language* where
> the scholar focuses on the changes of signification IN THE LIVING PROCESS
> of verbal thinking, he provides a description of a continuous coming and
> going that relates two processes, thinking and speaking, themselves
> manifestations of a higher process, WORD-SIGNIFICATION. Vygotsky does NOT
> say that one of the processes constitutes a dialectical inversion of the
> other; instead he emphasizes the back and forth BETWEEN the processes. The
> back and forth IS a DEVELOPING [rather than] constant process As a result
> of the of THIS coming and going, a thought, which BEGINS as something VAGUE
> develops into a fully articulated idea. The word, for Vygotsky, is NOT an
> expression of thought; rather thought BECOMES fully itself ONLY IN
> SPEAKING, the voice NEVER is cut off from the idea."
>
> Wolf-Michael uses the metaphor [internal engine] in this statement:
> A speaker "is not just dumping the contents of his mind into the public
> forum, but that he [the speaker] is taking up and thefefore evaluating, the
> preceding locution(Bahktin 1978) which is in FACT the internal engine that
> DRIVES the development of speech activity generally AND its moments, the
> individual utterances (understood as an irreducuible social phenomenon
> specifically (Volosinov, 1930; Vygotskij, 2005) "
>
> I hope these quotes gesture to *the engine that drives* intonation and
> prosody [hearing and seeing as material processes] WITHIN dialectical and
> dialogical INTERNAL RELATIONS.
>
>
> larry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> > The last words of Thinking and Speech surely put an end to the matter
> >
> >    http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/Chapter7.pdf
> >
> >    "The /consciousness of sensation/ and /thinking/ are characterized
> >    by different modes of reflecting reality. They aredifferent types of
> >    consciousness."
> >
> > Immediate sensuous awareness and intellect are *different types of
> > consciousness*.
> >
> >    "Therefore, thinking and speech are the key to understanding the
> >    nature of human consciousness."
> >
> > Intellect is the *key* to understanding consciousness, because by
> > understanding just the one, the most developed type of consciousness in
> its
> > special formation, we unlock the whole ("the hand of man is the key to
> > anatomy of the ape")
> >
> > But if you equate the highest with the lowest and the microcosm with the
> > unit, then you may not read this the same way,
> >
> >    "If language is as ancient as consciousness itself, if language is
> >    consciousness that exists in practice for other people and therefore
> >    for myself, then it is not only the development of thought but the
> >    development of consciousness as a whole that is connected with the
> >    development of the word. Studies consistently demonstrate that the
> >    word plays a central role not in the isolated functions but the
> >    whole of consciousness. In consciousness, the word is what - in
> >    Feuerbach's words - is absolutely impossible for one person but
> >    possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the
> >    historical nature of human consciousness.
> >    Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is reflected in
> >    a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness,
> >    related to consciousness like a living cell is related to an
> >    organism, like an atom is related to the cosmos. The meaningful word
> >    is a microcosm of human consciousness."
> >
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> >
> >
> > David Kellogg wrote:
> >
> >> But I think Mike's specific question is a good one, and it cries out
> for a
> >> specific answer. Where exactly does Vygotsky speak of "consciousness" as
> >> distinct from "intellect"? He certainly discusses consciousness a lot;
> it
> >> is the "topic that will not speak its name" throughout the whole of
> >> "Thinking and Speech", and one can easily understand why Zavershneva
> >> thinks
> >> that "Thinking and Speech" is only the prologue of a much longer trilogy
> >> on
> >> consciousness. He also discusses intellect alot; it is the explicit
> topic
> >> of most of HDHMF, and part of his outrage over "intelligence" testing in
> >> Chapter Fourteen and "accelerated development" in his Lectures on
> Pedology
> >> is his anger that intellect could be reduced to a kind of ontogenetic
> >> speeding. But where does Vygotsky distinguish the one from the other?
> >>
> >> The best answer I can come up with is Chapter Six of "Thinking and
> >> Speech",
> >> where Vygotsky places inner speech at the extreme dialogic end of a
> >> continuum which has oral speech in the middle and written speech at the
> >> far
> >> monologic end. Of course, this assumes that "inner speech" is a
> >> realization
> >> of consciousness and that "written speech" is a realization of
> intellect,
> >> and that seems a leap too far for Kozulin: both are both. So perhaps the
> >> solution is to consider some mediating layer--some form of meaning
> >> potential which realizes consciousness and is realized as inner speech,
> >> and
> >> some other form of meaning potential that realizes intellect and is
> >> realized as writing. That's where, I think, Larry is going when he
> brings
> >> in Bakhtin and genre: dialogues at the end of consciousness and
> narratives
> >> at the end of intellect: the two modes of consciousness/intellect--the
> >> episodic and the narrativistic--discussed by Strawson in a paper
> discussed
> >> by xmca a few years ago.
> >>
> >> My graduate students are trying to write a version of Shakespeare's "The
> >> Tempest" for children. This morning one of them condensed the whole of
> Act
> >> One (except the actual tempest) into the following dialogue:
> >>
> >> Miranda: Father--soften the storm. Where is my lover?
> >> Prospero: Don't worry. No one died. Your lover's coming.
> >>
> >> (Miranda sleeps)
> >>
> >> Ariel: Great Master! I did what you asked.
> >> Prospero: Where are the king's ship and the passengers?
> >> Ariel: They are all safe. The king's ship is in the harbor.
> >>
> >> (Prospero goes to look.)
> >>
> >> Ariel: Come unto these yellow sands....!
> >> Ferdinand: Where does the music come from? It softens my fury....
> >>
> >> (Ferdinand finds the sleeping Miranda.)
> >>
> >> You can see--from the parenthetic stage directions, but above all from
> the
> >> missing intellectations--that dialogue cannot do it all. We need some
> >> narrative here as well! And when we go back to Shakespeare's original
> text
> >> we do find that most of Act One consists of Prospero's narrative to the
> >> distracted Miranda.
> >>
> >> David Kellogg
> >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 19 May 2014 22:42, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> Mike, Peter
> >>> Thanks for keeping this thread moving.
> >>>
> >>> Mike, your reflection on models of schooling *expanding beyond* the
> >>> ethnocentrism of Bibler's model seems to be an underlying *value* built
> >>> into the model.
> >>> The model seems to  presume multiple logics and rationalities [cultural
> >>> historical formations or schemas] and therefore Eurocentric formations
> >>> within this model must also be transfigured through dialogue.
> >>>
> >>> Bibler's approach focuses on learning multiple particular schemas
> through
> >>> an *immersion* experience at each grade level. The intent is to live
> >>> through the experience of *knowing* within each sociocultural schema
> >>> by the approach of reading the *primary documents* and developing the
> >>> unique *logic/value* of that particular schema. [various grades in
> school
> >>> offer immersion experiences in different logic formations]
> >>>
> >>> This approach would hopefully develop within each person a polylogical
> >>> sensibility that would situate the scientific logic of our current
> >>> sociocultural schema as only one particular formation which could be
> put
> >>> into dialogue with previous formations which are seen as equally valid
> >>> formations that continue to enter interplay with our scientific biases.
> >>>
> >>> To *extend* and *go beyond* the ethnocentrism of Bibler's model which
> is
> >>> biased toward *Eurocentric presuppositions* seems to be a natural
> >>> extension
> >>> of the model.
> >>>
> >>> Mike,
> >>> I read Alex Kozulin writings on Bibler's approach as an example of
> >>> Vygotsky's writings on *inner speech* being put into dialogue with
> >>> Bahktin's writings on *readings and genres* as formations of
> >>> consciousness.
> >>> The reciprocal movements of orientation moving towards *internal*
> speech*
> >>> AND the interplay with the movements of orientation moving towards
> >>> cultural
> >>> historical schemas. How these movements of orientation are linked
> >>> *hinges*
> >>> or *pivots* on this reciprocal interplay.
> >>>
> >>> This seems to offer a model of schooling AS reciprocal conversations
> >>> developing *thinking*, *speech*, and *readings* as mutually reciprocal
> >>> intersubjective experiences.
> >>>
> >>> The underlying movement of answerability as responding to emerging
> >>> questions that is moving *beyond* received knowledge formations/logics
> by
> >>> the process of *living through* and exploring the concealed logics
> within
> >>> each schema.
> >>> The centrality of *gaps* and *openings* emerging within all received
> >>> *knowings* which then *call us* into dialogue and re-search and
> >>> experiments
> >>> [as dialogical ways of orienting] which develop through dialogue and
> the
> >>> reciprocal engagement of self-reflection AND intersubjective
> reflection.
> >>>
> >>> The question Alex Kozulin leaves open is the notion of *higher forms*
> >>> *sublating* earlier formations OR if these earlier formations are
> >>> continually in dialogue with later formations.
> >>>
> >>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* is the notion Alex Kozulin explored
> >>> in
> >>> his book inviting us to re-engage this concept within a revitalized
> >>> *humanism*. Bibler's approach to schooling is one particular answer to
> >>> Kozulin's general question of how do we engage with *sociocultural
> >>> schemas*
> >>> as dialogically developing formations.
> >>> I read Kozulin's question as a movement of going beyond received
> >>> traditions
> >>> while honouring these traditions. Moving through *Eurocentrism* to go
> >>> *beyond* and embrace other sociocultural schemas in dialogue with
> >>> *Eurocentric* models is an approach of deepening our conversations
> >>> AS questions and answers. Conversations as gestures within genres. This
> >>> approach has the potential to develop polylogical ways of orienting as
> we
> >>> move forward within a new expanding humanism of communicative action.
> >>>
> >>> Alex may have more to contribute on this theme of sharing mutual
> dialogue
> >>> towards finding *common ground* within a new commons
> >>> Larry
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 6:34 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> Thank you for sending your overview of the papers based Bibler's ideas
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> and
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> their pedagogical implications, Peter. And thanks for the succinct
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> summary
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> from Alex Kozulin, Larry.
> >>>>
> >>>> To me it seems that the only way to overcome the ethnocentricism in
> the
> >>>> model is to make the conversation a global polylogue, Peter. Creating
> >>>> the
> >>>> conditions for such a polylogue within the structures of state or
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> business
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> scientific structure of power seems a real challenge, even for the
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> wealthy.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> What source(s) does one take as the purpose of education, as a social
> >>>> category and its related social institutions of implementation?
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> Constantly
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> posing the questions seems one source. Creating alternatives seems
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> another.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> One hopes that where there is a way there will also be a will!
> >>>>
> >>>> We'll see.
> >>>>
> >>>> Meantime, I had a question about the quotation from Alex's work, so I
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> will
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> include him the discussion, the contents of which he knows far better
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> than
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> I. The statement that caught my eye was this:
> >>>>
> >>>> At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction
> >>>> between
> >>>> consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM,
> >>>> scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while
> >>>> consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> NECESSARILY
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> dialogical.
> >>>>
> >>>> ​Here is my question: Where is this well known distinction between
> >>>> consciousness and intellect best represented in Vygotsky's writings?
> >>>>
> >>>> ((It seems important to suggest that a consciously organized system of
> >>>> senses
> >>>> (as in sense/meaning) would be polylogical, that is, ideally, global.
> >>>> Binary systems, in particular, seem to be unstable in ways that are
> not
> >>>> condusive to human develpment.))
> >>>>
> >>>> mike
> >>>>
> >>>> ​
> >>>>
> >>>> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 4:10 AM, Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> Here's my contribution.
> >>>>> Smagorinsky, P. (2011). A distant perspective on the School of the
> >>>>> Dialogue of Cultures pedagogical movement in Ukraine and Russia.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> Journal
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> of
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), 29-35. Available at
> >>>>> http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/JREEP/JREEP2011.pdf
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Peter Smagorinsky
> >>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education
> >>>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education
> >>>>> The University of Georgia
> >>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall
> >>>>> Athens, GA 30602
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> >>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:14 PM
> >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning"
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Thanks, Peter
> >>>>>
> >>>>> What year was volume 49 (2) ??
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to
> education
> >>>>> and its purpose as *humanistic*.  Seeing *reason* as developing
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> distinct
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> formations historically and these various formations continuing to be
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> in
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> *dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding.  The current
> >>>>> scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation
> expressing
> >>>>> particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> formations
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in
> Alex
> >>>>> Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> how
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's.
> >>>>>  Kozulin wrote:
> >>>>> "To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was developed
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> in
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> the 1970's and 1980's  I will concentrate on three directions. The
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> first
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> direction  included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of
> >>>>> *scientific* concepts and the development of  a new program for the
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> study
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> direction
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> of
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> research was associated with the fundamental epistemological critique
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>  of
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals for
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy.  The third direction
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> explored
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the
> work
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> of
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> came
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a
> >>>>> dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*"
> >>>>> Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> three
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> directions.
> >>>>> The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references
> Vasilyk's
> >>>>> book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> direction.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of
> *overcoming*
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> by
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> *living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> by
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual.
> At
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift the
> >>>>> requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> *authoring*.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> can
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book the
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> idea
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> schemas
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of
> MEDIATION
> >>>>> THROUGH THE  SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk
> is
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> an
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended
> within
> >>>>> humanistic psychology.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and
> >>>>> 1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature.
> >>>>> Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within
> >>>>> dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> SYSTEMS
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> OF LOGIC].
> >>>>> Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> *systems
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> of thought*.   Kozulin writes:
> >>>>> "The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as *encircled*
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> by
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is either
> >>>>> final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> long
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> as
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of
> human
> >>>>> thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> seventeenth
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> of
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new,
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> HIGHER
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly
> >>>>> dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of
> them
> >>>>> should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED
> one."
> >>>>> [page 270]
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> " While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the
> >>>>> psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> analysis
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the
> idea
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> of
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> dialogue
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> in
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a
> text,
> >>>>> EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> This
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the
> >>>>> essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment
> it
> >>>>> seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> and
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific reasoning,
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> are
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is
> ORGANIZED
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> by
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical.  That is why
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> language,
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness
> rather
> >>>>> than that of the intellect." [page 271]
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> from
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> Kozulin's *readings*.
> >>>>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore
> >>>>> DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> point
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in* to
> >>>>> contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> Bibler
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> students
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of reason.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> He
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> also
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific
> >>>>> reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> multiple
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing interplay.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into Vygotsky's
> >>>>> legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> legacy
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and
> >>>>> re-search?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> interpret
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> Larry
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> the
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> Psychology,
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> 49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Peter Smagorinsky
> >>>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of
> >>>>>> Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia
> >>>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall
> >>>>>> Athens, GA 30602
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry
> >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+Purss
> >>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM
> >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning"
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has
> >>>>>> participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures"
> >>>>>> which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> reasoning".
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas"
> >>>>>> Binswanger refers to "world designs"
> >>>>>> Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding"
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new
> >>>>>> *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of
> >>>>>> consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> dialogical
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning*
> >>>>>> Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING
> >>>>>> these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> world-designs.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and
> >>>>>> Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections.
> >>>>>> Larry
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
>