[Xmca-l] Re: is the mind a function of the brain?

[Martin John Packer]

I'm inclined to say that both mind and soul are aspects of folk psychology.

>From Charles Taylor's 'Sources of the Self':

We think of our thoughts, ideas, or feelings as being “within” us, while the objects in the world which these mental states bear on are “without”…. But as strong as this partitioning of the world appears to us, as solid as this location may seem, and anchored in the very nature of the human agent, it is in large part a feature of our world, the world of modern, Western people. The localization is not a universal one, which human beings recognize as a matter of course, as they do for instance that their heads are above their torsos. Rather it is a function of a historically limited mode of self interpretation, one which has become dominant in the modern West and which may indeed spread thence to other parts of the globe, but which had a beginning in time and space and may have an end. (Taylor, 1098, p. 111)

Martin

On Jan 15, 2014, at 1:04 PM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com> wrote:

> The mind might be a function of the brain but the soul is not.
> 
>> Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 10:35:39 +0200
>> From: jaana.pirkkalainen@kolumbus.fi
>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: is the mind a function of the brain?
>> 
>> Hi Jose,
>> 
>> more from a natural science perspective on the question of "the mind" I 
>> would recommend you works of Daniel C. Dennett.
>> 
>> - Jaana Pirkkalainen
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 15.01.2014 06:11, Larry Purss kirjoitti:
>>> The consensus seems to be that there is a long history and multiple
>>> *traditions* explaining what mind *is*. It may be that *mind* as an *is*
>>> object is an abstraction from the continually developing genres describing
>>> what mind *is*. By tracing the multiple explanations [and interpretations,
>>> and evaluations] of mind as an *is* we may gain a deeper perspective on
>>> this abstracting process itself that points beyond *mind* and extends
>>> *mind* into emerging sociohistorical figurations [and re-figurations] of
>>> what mind *is*.
>>> 
>>> The book [Between Ourselves] by Evan Thompson offers another alternative
>>> thesis explaining that mind as a scientific *object* is an abstraction from
>>> [and therefore presupposes] consciousness as implicitly an intersubjective
>>> phenomena. [second person perspective.]
>>> 
>>>  It may be that 1st person and 2nd person and 3rd person accounts are all
>>> abstractions from a process that extends beyond any of these reductions.
>>> Therefore, we return to *traditions* of mind as multiple genres and the
>>> modern scientific explanations of *mind* as needing to be re-figured in
>>> dialogue with these multiple genres that have become sedimented artifacts
>>> of what mind *is*
>>> 
>>> As Martin said,
>>> "you pays your money, you make your choice"
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Jose,
>>>> I've always thought a strength of SCT/CHAT has been the commitment to a
>>>> non-dualist ontology - meaning that mind and body (ideal and material) are
>>>> not split apart. In some ways this sounds similar to SFL, but I would also
>>>> suspect that the SFL approach is more of a materialist approach, but I may
>>>> be wrong about that. SCT's other great strength is that it isn't
>>>> reductively materialist. Rather, SCT/CHAT includes the social and
>>>> historical in the mind/brain.
>>>> 
>>>> But having said that, you could probably talk to 10 different SCT/CHAT
>>>> folks and get 10 different theories of mind.
>>>> 
>>>> One of my favorite explanations, though, can be found in Martin Packer's
>>>> book The Science of Qualitative Research. In it you will find an engagement
>>>> with the long history of dualist and non-dualist ontologies. There isn't as
>>>> much explicitly about mind in the book, but it's in there.
>>>> 
>>>> -greg
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 7:47 AM, jose david herazo <jherazo4@hotmail.com
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> Dear all,
>>>>> 
>>>>> I'm writing the final chapter of my PhD dissertation about the role of
>>>>> academic concepts in students' oral production and development of a
>>>> second
>>>>> language (L2 ). Since my study is grounded on both sociocultural theory
>>>> and
>>>>> systemic functional linguistics (SFL), one of my committee members
>>>>> suggested a possible contradiction in what each theory views as mind.
>>>>> SFLers, for instance, consider that there is no need for something called
>>>>> the mind that is different from the brain. They prefer to talk in terms
>>>> of
>>>>> 'higher order semiotic consciousness' (HAlliday, 2004: The language of
>>>>> science) rather than mind. On their terms, the mind is a function of the
>>>>> brain. What is the mind for SCT? Is it the inner plane, consciousness?
>>>> Has
>>>>> anybody discussed what this concept refers to in sociocultural theory?
>>>>> 
>>>>> Any suggestions and comments are welcome,
>>>>> 
>>>>> JOSE DAVID HERAZO RIVERA
>>>>> 
>>>>> Foreign Languages Department, Universidad de Córdoba
>>>>> (Montería - Colombia)
>>>>> 
>>>>> Carrera 6 No. 76-103. Tel:  7860500 - 7909800
>>>>> 
>>>>> www.unicordoba.edu.co
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> --
>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>>> Visiting Assistant Professor
>>>> Department of Anthropology
>>>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>>> Brigham Young University
>>>> Provo, UT 84602
>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>>> 
>> 
>