[Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE

[Greg Thompson]

David Ki,
Thanks for the fantastic example.
And I'm in full support of your strong argument that Orr's work should not
be suppressed. Amen to that!
-greg

On Fri, Dec 26, 2014 at 9:30 PM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:
>
> Greg,
>
> Thanks for these two further posts, both loaded with useful references and
> links.
>
> Pidgin languages built up as a means of communication between groups that
> do not have a language in common do tend to be grammatically simplified,
> not full languages. But as I understand the scholarship, AAE is fully
> recognized as a bona fide Creole language, not a pidgin.
>
> BUT, the students with whom Eleanor Orr worked weren't speaking AAE in her
> classes. They were speaking a hybrid intended to enable them to 'get by' in
> the SE classroom. And this hybrid really wreaked havoc with their math
> learning, in ways that Orr documented.
>
> Of course, you're right, "Orr's work, in the wrong hands, can lead us down
> the path ... of deficit thinking about AAE speakers."
> On the other hand, the price of suppressing Orr's work, which some
> sociolinguists have done, is the virtual certainty that the problems AAE
> speakers face in SE classrooms will never be dealt with. This may serve to
> protect AAE from spurious criticisms, but it virtually ensures that AAE
> speakers will be considered intellectually incapable, even as it prevents
> any serious steps being taken to remedy the problems.
>
> I wonder, what is the real motive behind those who would sacrifice AAE
> speakers to real harm in order to protect AAE from the possibility of
> spurious criticism? Is it pride or cowardice--not wanting to have to fight
> for the integrity of AAE were it to be attacked? Is it concern that the
> likely solution (not the only one) would be to make sure AAE speakers learn
> SE, which might erode African American culture (in some essentialist
> sense)? Is it to work for the emasculation of African Americans to the
> point that they take up arms against the master?
>
> In any case, Greg, you asked for "positive articulations of what the
> linguistic forms that define AAE actually do for those who speak this
> English dialect (as compared to another dialect)." Here's a beautiful
> example--can't remember if I got it from Orr's book, or elsewhere--of what
> might happen to SE speakers in a calculus course if AAE were the language
> of instruction:
>
> For AAE speakers there are two grammatical forms
>         (A) The train'(s) traveling at 60 miles per hour, or
>         (B) The train be traveling at 60 miles per hour
>
> that can be used to express what is a single sentence in SE
>         (C) The train is traveling at 60 miles per hour.
>
> The AAE versions distinguish between average velocity and instantaneous
> velocity--key concepts of differential calculus.
>
> Roughly, (A) means 'the train is averaging 60 miles per hour' (over some
> time interval).
> (B) means 'the train's speed at this moment is 60 miles per hour.'
>
> I'm sure glad I didn't have to learn calculus from a teacher who assumed
> she/he was making a clear distinction that my dialect couldn't discern!
>
> David
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson
> Sent: Friday, December 26, 2014 8:43 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE
>
> One last post - this one is about the larger question of AAE and linguistic
> relativity and was provoked by a recent conversation I had with John Lucy
> (a key proponent of the LRH - http://home.uchicago.edu/~johnlucy/ ). He is
> has been having a conversation about AAE and the LRH with John McWhorter,
> one of the top scholars of AAE (
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McWhorter),
> and McWhorter is not a fan of the LRH. At least part of this seems to be
> b.c. of the fact that it far too easily leads down the road of deficit
> thinking about AAE speakers. The argument goes: if language affects thought
> then speaking AAE will have an effect on how one is able to think. From
> there it is a short jump to the assumption that AAE leads to ways of
> thinking that are not conducive to learning complex intellectual concepts.
>
> Hopefully that provides some background to my comment about potential
> concerns with Orr's work. The concerns are not with her work per se. My
> concerns are rather with the body of scholarship on AAE and the LRH and the
> fact that, other than Labov's early work, there are no positive
> articulations of what the linguistic forms that define AAE actually do for
> those who speak this English dialect (as compared to another dialect). (I
> should add that I've since recalled that Geneva Smitherman's work is shot
> through with positive articulations of what AAE linguistic forms can do -
> her book Talkin and Testifyin' is a classic in this regard, but I wonder if
> the demonstrative style may be too difficult for speakers of mainstream
> English and/or academic-ese to understand!).
>
> Orr's work, in the wrong hands, can lead us down the path that McWhorter is
> concerned about - right to the conclusion that AAE is an intellectually
> problematic language because it interferes with a student's ability to
> understand mathematics.
>
> Hopefully that pulls some of the context of the larger conversation of
> which my post was only a small part.
>
> Cheers to all,
> greg
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 26, 2014 at 7:25 PM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > A second response to the paper that Mike forwarded (and to Paul's post on
> > the previous thread).
> >
> > There is a sticky problem here that has not yet been dealt with
> > adequately, namely, if language forms do affect habitual thinking, then
> > what are the effects of the linguistic forms that come with AAE? I'm
> > thinking not just about pragmatics, but also about grammar (and perhaps
> > semantics as well).
> >
> > One thing that many have noted about AAE is that passive voice and
> > nominalizations are dispreferred by AAE speakers. The result is a way of
> > speaking that encourages the naming of actors and agents. Thus, in AAE,
> it
> > is difficult to carry on agent-less talk like:
> > 1. "Our neighborhood has been negatively affected in the past few years."
> > or, with nominalizations:
> > 2. "Negative affectings have happened in our neighborhood in the past few
> > years."
> >
> > Now these are perhaps terrible examples because although the first seems
> a
> > reasonable locution, I think most of us would disprefer the second.
> > Nonetheless, the second takes a form that is not uncommon in legal-ese
> and
> > academic-ese (!!) as a way of obfuscating potentially responsible agents
> > (one of the main tasks of the lawyer) and making processes into things
> (one
> > of the tasks of the scientific academic...).
> >
> > Instead the preference in AAE is for active sentences like:
> > "Somebody('s) been negatively affecting our neighborhood in the past few
> > years."
> >
> > With this locution (as with any form), you win some and you lose some.
> > On the one hand, the frequent use of active voice is a mark of good
> > writing (notwithstanding the various other AAE grammatical inflections
> that
> > are often understood as "bad grammar" by mainstream speakers - and I'll
> > admit that the example offered here is not a good one either...). On the
> > other hand, using predominately active voice can be marginalizing in
> > "high-theoretical" academic writing and in legal writing.
> >
> > That's the way that I tend to think of relativity effects - with any
> > language, you win some, you lose some. But I think attention to both
> sides,
> > winning and losing, is important. What I've sketched here in a somewhat
> > pathetic fashion is one answer to the question: "what do you "win" with
> > AAE?"
> >
> > -greg
> >
> > p.s., that seems like too many screens (I just adjusted my font size
> > bigger so maybe I can blame it on that...).
> >
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 9:33 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >>
> >> I am not in general following this thread, being waaaaaaaaaaaaaay behind
> >> on
> >> the imagination thread, but I tripped over the exchange regarding Orr
> and
> >> AAE. To keep it short, I attach two documents.
> >>
> >> The first is a draft segment from Cultural Psychology (1996) and the
> other
> >> an empirical report of even greater activity. For those who do not know
> >> the
> >> Labov work, the Word file might prove useful. for those of you for whom
> >> this topic is of continuing interest, perhaps the published paper is of
> >> more value.
> >>
> >> It is not true that no one followed up on Labov. It is probably true
> that
> >> no one followed up on the followup.
> >> mike
> >>
> >> On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 8:00 AM, Greg Thompson <
> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> >> >
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> > ​David Ki,
> >> > No worries. No offense taken. But thanks for the just-in-case note.
> >> > And yes, I agree to disagree.
> >> > Respectfully,
> >> > greg​
> >> >
> >> > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 6:24 AM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> >> wrote:
> >> > >
> >> > > Greg,
> >> > >
> >> > > I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more
> culturally
> >> > > sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in
> >> > > classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no
> wise
> >> > > intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among
> those
> >> who
> >> > > consider her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested
> >> > otherwise.
> >> > >
> >> > > David
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> > > -----Original Message-----
> >> > > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> >> > > xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg
> >> > Thompson
> >> > > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM
> >> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
> >> > >
> >> > > In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not
> to
> >> > > directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities
> >> (This
> >> > > makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also
> >> makes
> >> > > one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is
> beyond
> >> > the
> >> > > immediate context).
> >> > >
> >> > > In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I
> >> neither
> >> > > suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do
> >> intentions
> >> > > matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the
> >> > difficulties
> >> > > of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not
> >> forget
> >> > > the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that
> doesn't
> >> > mean
> >> > > that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely
> to
> >> be
> >> > > ignorant of many aspects of these issues.
> >> > >
> >> > > Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through
> >> > > education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to
> >> > trying
> >> > > to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with.
> And
> >> > > while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic
> >> relativity
> >> > > hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining
> influence
> >> in
> >> > > ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of
> >> > > thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language).
> That
> >> > means
> >> > > that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even
> >> come to
> >> > > understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular
> >> ways
> >> > of
> >> > > understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all
> >> > > about!).
> >> > >
> >> > > And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I
> >> think
> >> > it
> >> > > is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our
> >> > > research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could
> >> > easily
> >> > > take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic
> >> > > relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex
> >> > > mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is
> important
> >> to
> >> > > give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is
> >> > > certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one
> >> learn
> >> > > math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand
> >> what
> >> > > it CAN do.
> >> > >
> >> > > As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this.
> >> But
> >> > > note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought
> to
> >> > > replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives?
> >> > >
> >> > > -greg
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> > > -greg
> >> > >
> >> > > On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> >> > wrote:
> >> > >
> >> > > > Greg,
> >> > > >
> >> > > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's
> >> work.
> >> > > >
> >> > > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE
> speakers
> >> > > > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a
> >> native
> >> > > > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But
> >> I'm
> >> > not
> >> > > > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black
> >> English
> >> > > > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African
> >> > American
> >> > > > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English
> or
> >> > > Black
> >> > > > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their
> >> efforts
> >> > to
> >> > > > emulate standard English.
> >> > > >
> >> > > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole
> >> took
> >> > to
> >> > > > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as
> >> linguistic
> >> > and
> >> > > > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and
> >> > culture.
> >> > > > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do,
> namely
> >> > > > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom,
> and
> >> > the
> >> > > > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African
> >> > American
> >> > > > students.
> >> > > >
> >> > > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously
> >> attentive
> >> > > to
> >> > > > understanding her students' experience of distance and location
> >> given
> >> > the
> >> > > > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point
> to
> >> > the
> >> > > > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of
> instruction
> >> as
> >> > > the
> >> > > > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label
> >> this
> >> > > work
> >> > > > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust
> >> > > science
> >> > > > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is
> the
> >> > > > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this
> >> discussion,
> >> > we
> >> > > > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not
> >> that
> >> > > > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications.
> >> This
> >> > is
> >> > > > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are
> >> written
> >> > > into
> >> > > > grammatical form.
> >> > > >
> >> > > > David
> >> > > >
> >> > > > Excerpt from Orr (1987):
> >> > > >
> >> > > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of
> mental
> >> > > images
> >> > > > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length,
> >> representing
> >> > > > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even
> the
> >> > > > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less
> >> > > incomprehensible
> >> > > > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the
> >> > information
> >> > > > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that
> >> length
> >> > be
> >> > > > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as
> >> > > possible
> >> > > > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to
> >> > > represent
> >> > > > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental
> >> images
> >> > one
> >> > > > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both
> >> > represented
> >> > > > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line
> segments)
> >> > > closer
> >> > > > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line
> >> > > > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal
> >> line
> >> > > > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city
> >> than
> >> > > the
> >> > > > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be
> >> > represented
> >> > > > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the
> >> third
> >> > > > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in
> reason
> >> as
> >> > > they
> >> > > > may initially have appeared to be.
> >> > > >
> >> > > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or
> symbols
> >> > are
> >> > > > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language
> of
> >> a
> >> > > > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or
> >> more
> >> > > can
> >> > > > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different
> mental
> >> > > > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a
> >> speaker
> >> > of
> >> > > > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem
> 14,
> >> the
> >> > > > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental
> construct
> >> at
> >> > > > all."  (p. 25)
> >> > > >
> >> > > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec.
> 19
> >> > that
> >> > > > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.]
> >> > > >
> >> > > >
> >> > > > -----Original Message-----
> >> > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> >> > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson
> >> > > > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM
> >> > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
> >> > > >
> >> > > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am
> a
> >> fan
> >> > > of
> >> > > > her work as it points to important differences in language usage
> >> among
> >> > > AAE
> >> > > > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for
> >> pointing
> >> > out
> >> > > > these differences (particularly considering how important it is
> for
> >> > > > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If
> >> you
> >> > > want
> >> > > > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests,
> then
> >> you
> >> > > > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences.
> >> > > >
> >> > > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of
> >> > deficit
> >> > > > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied"
> >> is
> >> > too
> >> > > > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence
> to
> >> > > > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is
> any
> >> > > > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use
> prepositions
> >> -
> >> > > e.g.,
> >> > > > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE
> >> speakers.
> >> > > > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math
> among
> >> > the
> >> > > > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see
> >> wiki
> >> > > for
> >> > > > more:  http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before
> >> they
> >> > > > showed
> >> > > > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia)
> >> > couldn't
> >> > > > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in
> the
> >> > ways
> >> > > > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic
> >> > > relativity
> >> > > > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck
> >> these
> >> > > > folks out of context and run them through various types of
> >> experiments,
> >> > > Gay
> >> > > > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that “we must know
> >> more
> >> > > > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective
> >> bridges
> >> > > to
> >> > > > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce”"
> >> > > > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high
> >> > > > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating
> >> > volumes).
> >> > > > As they write:
> >> > > > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of
> >> mathematical,
> >> > > > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of
> >> > mathematics
> >> > > > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment
> >> tasks
> >> > > were
> >> > > > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability
> >> could
> >> > > be
> >> > > > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling
> >> did
> >> > > > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used
> to
> >> > > > measure cognitive development."
> >> > > > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were
> >> to
> >> > > have
> >> > > > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and
> how
> >> > > > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers.
> >> > > >
> >> > > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some
> >> folks,
> >> > but
> >> > > > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is
> >> > > > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard
> >> > Average
> >> > > > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and
> a
> >> > > > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time,
> >> just
> >> > > that
> >> > > > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for
> >> > > > particular things and not for others.
> >> > > >
> >> > > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was
> >> just
> >> > > more
> >> > > > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!).
> >> > > >
> >> > > > -greg
> >> > > >
> >> > > >
> >> > > >
> >> > > >
> >> > > >
> >> > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu
> >> > > <mailto:
> >> > > > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote:
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to
> mind
> >> > the
> >> > > > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never
> >> heard
> >> > of
> >> > > > on
> >> > > > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a
> >> > > politically-correct
> >> > > > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her
> analysis
> >> of
> >> > > > Black
> >> > > > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist
> >> > > > discourses
> >> > > > > about language deficiency.
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s
> >> and
> >> > > > 1980s,
> >> > > > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to
> >> > subtle
> >> > > > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and
> standard
> >> > > > English.
> >> > > > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis
> >> that
> >> > > the
> >> > > > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the
> >> > > > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For
> >> instance,
> >> > > the
> >> > > > > meaning of “distance” is embedded in the grammatical structure
> >> > > “distance
> >> > > > > from _________ to __________” where the place-holders hold
> >> locations;
> >> > > if
> >> > > > > you don’t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a
> >> linguistic
> >> > > > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely
> not
> >> > going
> >> > > > to
> >> > > > > be able to gain full access to the concept.
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless
> >> you'd
> >> > > > like
> >> > > > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions
> of
> >> > > > distance
> >> > > > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their
> >> > diagrams.
> >> > > > Her
> >> > > > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by
> her
> >> > > > African
> >> > > > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of
> standard
> >> > > > English
> >> > > > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being
> >> > > highlighted
> >> > > > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated).
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in
> >> mathematics
> >> > > > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds
> that
> >> > > basic
> >> > > > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our
> >> engagement
> >> > > with
> >> > > > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's
> >> with
> >> > > > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever
> >> > > implicated
> >> > > > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding.
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with
> my
> >> > > > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function
> is
> >> > > > severely
> >> > > > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for
> >> the
> >> > > > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together
> >> how
> >> > the
> >> > > > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently
> >> that
> >> > > it
> >> > > > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative
> >> terms
> >> > > > like
> >> > > > > “more” and “less” may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities.
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with
> >> respect to
> >> > > > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that
> to
> >> > the
> >> > > > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very
> >> curious as
> >> > > to
> >> > > > > whether that further connection can be made.
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > David Kirshner
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the
> >> performance
> >> > of
> >> > > > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W.
> Norton
> >> &
> >> > > > Company.
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> >> > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> >> > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg
> >> > > > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM
> >> > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things
> >> that
> >> > > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky,
> who
> >> is
> >> > > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and
> >> who
> >> > now
> >> > > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says
> >> that
> >> > > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original
> >> purpose is
> >> > > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every
> >> major
> >> > > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in
> >> language
> >> > > > there
> >> > > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication.
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science
> in
> >> > Hopi
> >> > > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific
> >> > writings
> >> > > > of
> >> > > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like
> >> > > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words
> like
> >> > > > "bounce
> >> > > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of
> prepositions,
> >> > > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make
> >> > > > scientific
> >> > > > > English possible?
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered
> the
> >> > laws
> >> > > > of
> >> > > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that
> what
> >> he
> >> > > > really
> >> > > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like
> "gravitation".
> >> > > Gravity
> >> > > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity,
> >> but
> >> > > > rather
> >> > > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps,
> >> > again!).
> >> > > So
> >> > > > > how and above all why does it become an entity?
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with
> >> > Chaucer's
> >> > > on
> >> > > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we
> recognize
> >> > > almost
> >> > > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and
> the
> >> > dark
> >> > > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First,
> I
> >> did
> >> > > > this;
> >> > > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then
> formulates
> >> in
> >> > > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's
> >> > > lectures
> >> > > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some
> >> > trouble
> >> > > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the
> >> blackboard
> >> > to
> >> > > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law).
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to
> >> make
> >> > > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the
> >> lens
> >> > > > yields
> >> > > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light
> >> from
> >> > > the
> >> > > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass"
> >> "The
> >> > > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness
> of
> >> > the
> >> > > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would
> >> normally
> >> > be
> >> > > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a
> noun,
> >> > > > creating
> >> > > > > an imaginary entity.
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically"
> >> realized
> >> > > by
> >> > > > a
> >> > > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or
> >> > > something
> >> > > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally
> >> > ("redden").
> >> > > We
> >> > > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know
> the
> >> > > rules.
> >> > > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through
> >> > > ignorance",
> >> > > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law
> >> that
> >> > > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental
> >> > function
> >> > > > is
> >> > > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of
> >> > grammatical
> >> > > > > metaphor.
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness
> >> > > > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do
> >> not do
> >> > > > their
> >> > > > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I
> >> know
> >> > > > which
> >> > > > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge
> is
> >> > > > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can
> >> see
> >> > > that
> >> > > > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built
> >> up
> >> > > > through
> >> > > > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby
> >> clauses
> >> > > > stand
> >> > > > > for
> >> > > > > exchanges:
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you?
> >> > > > > Child: No.
> >> > > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well?
> >> > > > > Child: No.
> >> > > > > Mother: You didn't do well?
> >> > > > > Child: No.
> >> > > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the
> >> > other
> >> > > > > students do well?
> >> > > > > Child: Some of them.
> >> > > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework
> do
> >> > > well?
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why"
> have
> >> > two
> >> > > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an
> intra-mental
> >> > > > function
> >> > > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an
> inter-mental
> >> > > > function
> >> > > > > (discourse).
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and
> >> abstract
> >> > > and
> >> > > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the
> lexical
> >> > > kind.
> >> > > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more
> >> powerful
> >> > > and
> >> > > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the
> lexical
> >> > > > metaphor
> >> > > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world,
> >> > while
> >> > > > the
> >> > > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm
> >> afraid, I
> >> > > must
> >> > > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used
> >> up!)
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > David Kellogg
> >> > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > , or "the
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > . He
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson <
> >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> >> > > > <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>>
> >> > > > > wrote:
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > > Helena and David,
> >> > > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the
> >> > > so-called
> >> > > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred
> >> > tradition
> >> > > > > > to
> >> > > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi
> >> > notion
> >> > > > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including
> >> > English)
> >> > > > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers
> >> different
> >> > > > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more
> processual
> >> > > > > > understanding, English has a much more
> >> reified/objectified/entified
> >> > > > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to
> >> > follow
> >> > > > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our
> >> old
> >> > > > friend
> >> > > > > "imagination").
> >> > > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to?
> >> > > > > > -greg
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > > Taken from:
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > >
> >> > >
> >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second
> >> > > > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon,
> >> sunset"
> >> > > are
> >> > > > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference
> from
> >> > > other
> >> > > > > nouns.
> >> > > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in
> >> > > winter"
> >> > > > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are
> >> > pluralized
> >> > > > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen.
> >> Our
> >> > > > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes
> >> > objectified.
> >> > > > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience
> of
> >> > real
> >> > > > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and
> >> > later"--simply
> >> > > > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that
> >> > > ever-later-becoming
> >> > > > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set
> >> beside
> >> > > > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually
> >> > > > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic
> >> > > analogy
> >> > > > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing.
> >> > > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of
> e.g.,
> >> > > > > "phasing."
> >> > > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the
> resulting
> >> > > > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general
> that
> >> it
> >> > is
> >> > > > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized
> formless
> >> > items
> >> > > > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the
> binomial
> >> for
> >> > > an
> >> > > > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite
> >> > > > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the
> phase
> >> > nouns
> >> > > > we
> >> > > > > have made a formless item, "time."
> >> > > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a
> phase,
> >> in
> >> > > the
> >> > > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make
> >> "summer" in
> >> > > > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we
> >> can
> >> > say
> >> > > > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of
> time."
> >> Let
> >> > > me
> >> > > > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle
> of
> >> > milk"
> >> > > > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that
> "a
> >> > > > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a
> >> quantity
> >> > of
> >> > > > > "time."
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc.,
> >> are
> >> > > not
> >> > > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy.
> They
> >> > are
> >> > > a
> >> > > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns,
> verbs,
> >> > and
> >> > > > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a
> >> > > > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It
> >> > contains
> >> > > > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It
> >> means
> >> > > > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring."
> >> These
> >> > > > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all
> like
> >> > > > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is
> hot";
> >> > > summer
> >> > > > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat
> >> > occurs.
> >> > > > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer
> >> > > recently."
> >> > > > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a
> >> quantity, of
> >> > > > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about
> time
> >> > > > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no
> >> > basis
> >> > > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." "
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen
> >> > > > > > <helenaworthen@gmail.com<mailto:helenaworthen@gmail.com>>
> >> > > > > > wrote:
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to
> >> this:
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that
> >> > Newton
> >> > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and
> to
> >> > > create
> >> > > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly
> >> > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of
> >> scientific
> >> > > > > > > writing and thinking today."
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I
> lose
> >> you
> >> > > > > > > when
> >> > > > > > you
> >> > > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity".
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > Thank you,
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > Helena
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > Helena Worthen
> >> > > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com<mailto:helenaworthen@gmail.com>
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the
> >> "grammatical"
> >> > end
> >> > > > > > > > of
> >> > > > > > what
> >> > > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what
> >> > > > > > > > Halliday
> >> > > > > > calls
> >> > > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that
> they
> >> > have
> >> > > > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do
> >> not
> >> > > > have:
> >> > > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones.
> (You
> >> > can,
> >> > > > > > > actually,
> >> > > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you
> invent
> >> a
> >> > new
> >> > > > > > > > name
> >> > > > > > > or a
> >> > > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can).
> >> > > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific
> >> > semantic
> >> > > > > > > > field
> >> > > > > > > (the
> >> > > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area
> of
> >> > > > > > linguistics)
> >> > > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are
> >> used.
> >> > > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less
> the
> >> > same
> >> > > > > > effect,
> >> > > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your
> argument"
> >> the
> >> > > > "in"
> >> > > > > > has
> >> > > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in
> "there's
> >> a
> >> > fly
> >> > > > > > > > in
> >> > > > > > your
> >> > > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in
> >> Henry's
> >> > > > > > > > hands,
> >> > > > > > > refer
> >> > > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote.
> >> > > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties
> >> > pretty
> >> > > > > > > > much define the difference between learning and
> >> development, at
> >> > > > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding
> on
> >> > > > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by
> >> reorganizing
> >> > > the
> >> > > > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems.
> >> > > > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is
> >> > quite
> >> > > > > global in its implications.
> >> > > > > > > Learning
> >> > > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new
> >> > systems,
> >> > > > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn
> vocabulary
> >> > (and
> >> > > > > > > > forget it
> >> > > > > > just
> >> > > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never
> goes
> >> > away.
> >> > > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of
> >> blue
> >> > > > > > > > that
> >> > > > > > > people
> >> > > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the
> non-productive
> >> end
> >> > > of
> >> > > > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are
> >> crisp,
> >> > > > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as
> the
> >> > > > > > > > nominalizations that
> >> > > > > > Newton
> >> > > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and
> >> to
> >> > > > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations,
> are
> >> > > highly
> >> > > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of
> >> > scientific
> >> > > > > > > > writing and
> >> > > > > > thinking
> >> > > > > > > > today.  For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical
> metaphor
> >> is
> >> > > the
> >> > > > > > third
> >> > > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into
> >> mother
> >> > > > > > > > tongue
> >> > > > > > and
> >> > > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work).
> >> > > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at"
> >> > implies
> >> > > > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two
> >> ("on a
> >> > > > > > > > line', 'on a
> >> > > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because
> >> they
> >> > > are
> >> > > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them
> with
> >> > > time:
> >> > > > > > > > 'at
> >> > > > > > a
> >> > > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'.
> >> Compare:
> >> > "at
> >> > > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very
> day),
> >> > and
> >> > > > > > > > "in Christmas' (season).
> >> > > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > > David Kellogg
> >> > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >> > > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen
> >> > > > > > > > <helenaworthen@gmail.com<mailto:helenaworthen@gmail.com>>
> >> > > > > > > > wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>
> >> > > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across"
> >> spatial
> >> > > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the
> >> > > > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them
> (50
> >> > > common
> >> > > > > > > >> ones, and
> >> > > > > > > between 70
> >> > > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as
> >> far
> >> > > as"
> >> > > > > > > >> --
> >> > > > > > > this
> >> > > > > > > >> is according to
> >> > > > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm
> >> > > > > > ).
> >> > > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms.
> >> > Apparently,
> >> > > > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by
> >> > > inflections
> >> > > > > > > >> in
> >> > > > > > parent
> >> > > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses.
> >> > > > > > > >>
> >> > > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an
> >> inflection
> >> > > > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the
> >> spatial
> >> > > > > > > >> relationships
> >> > > > > > > suggested
> >> > > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions.
> >> > > > > > > >>
> >> > > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about
> >> > this.
> >> > > > > > > >>
> >> > > > > > > >> Helena Worthen
> >> > > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com<mailto:helenaworthen@gmail.com>
> >> > > > > > > >>
> >> > > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>
> >> > > > > > > >>> I’m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are
> >> clearly
> >> > > > > > embodied,
> >> > > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to
> >> > > > > > > >> linguistics
> >> > > > > > > (For
> >> > > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is
> focused
> >> on
> >> > > > > > “lexicon”:
> >> > > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of
> >> > prepositions,
> >> > > > > > > >> being
> >> > > > > > > part
> >> > > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker
> and
> >> > > > > > > >> Halliday
> >> > > > > > > see no
> >> > > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence,
> >> > > > > lexico-grammar.
> >> > > > > > > (Lo
> >> > > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write
> >> lexicon-grammar,
> >> > > > > > > >> adding
> >> > > > > > > the
> >> > > > > > > >> “n”. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word
> >> coinings
> >> > > are
> >> > > > > > great
> >> > > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much
> >> of
> >> > > > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever
> >> > > practiced?
> >> > > > > > > >>> Henry
> >> > > > > > > >>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden <
> >> > ablunden@mira.net
> >> > > > <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> >> > > > > > wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is
> the
> >> > > > > > metaphorical
> >> > > > > > > >> use of prepositions like:
> >> > > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument"
> >> > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
> >> > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
> >> > > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
> >> > > > > > > >>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>> and so on.
> >> > > > > > > >>>> Andy
> >> > > > > > > >>>>
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > --------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> > > > > > > ----
> >> > > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden*
> >> > > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> >> > > > > > > >>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the
> synergistic
> >> > > > > > > possibilities:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929)
> >> published
> >> > > in
> >> > > > > > > Thought
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as
> translated
> >> > into
> >> > > > > > English
> >> > > > > > > >> 1962]
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the
> >> > > 'additive'
> >> > > > > > value
> >> > > > > > > >> of the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the
> speech
> >> > > > > > > vocalization).
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical
> >> elements
> >> > > that
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> are
> >> > > > > > > >> flammable
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither
> >> flammable
> >> > > nor
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> a
> >> > > > > > gas.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> European
> >> > > > > > > >> Developmental
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean
> >> > 'developmental'
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> hence
> >> > > > > > > the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the
> >> case of
> >> > > > > > Piaget's
> >> > > > > > > >> Genetic
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis
> and
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> synthesis
> >> > > > > > > >> based on
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in
> >> > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's
> >> > > > > > > >> example of H2O.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be
> >> > > synergistic
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum
> of
> >> the
> >> > > > > parts.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing
> >> more
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> than
> >> > > > > > the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really
> new
> >> > can
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> ever
> >> > > > > > be
> >> > > > > > > >> imagined"
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of
> >> > imagination
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> as the
> >> > > > > > > >> brain has
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> simplest
> >> > > > > > level
> >> > > > > > > >> of the Gestalt
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not
> just
> >> > > > > > photographic.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is
> to
> >> > try
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> to
> >> > > > > > > >> accurately reproduce
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event.
> >> > > Whereas,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> the
> >> > > > > > > >> goal of combinatory
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of
> memories,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> dreams,
> >> > > > > > > >> musings, and even
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual
> >> manipulation
> >> > of
> >> > > > > > objects
> >> > > > > > > >> and symbols.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the
> >> different
> >> > > ways
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> that
> >> > > > > > > >> things and concepts can be
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and
> >> sugar
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> and
> >> > > > > > > flour.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>                                         I can add
> water
> >> > and
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> it
> >> > > > > > > >> dissolves a bit
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>                                         But adding
> heat
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> changes
> >> > > > > > the
> >> > > > > > > >> combination into a pancake.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>                      [Is this synergistic?]
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>            Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of
> >> more
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> examples
> >> > > > > > > >> to put the discussion
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>            in the metaphysical realm.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen
> >> limit--make
> >> > the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> case
> >> > > > > > > for
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting
> >> associationism. I
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> think
> >> > > > > > it's
> >> > > > > > > >> not
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there
> are
> >> > > > > > > >> associationists who
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> associationism
> >> > > > > > > >> exists and
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as
> >> > > > mediation.
> >> > > > > > > >> Vygotsky
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking
> >> > religion,
> >> > > > > > explain
> >> > > > > > > >> the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every
> species
> >> > feels
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> for
> >> > > > > > its
> >> > > > > > > >> own
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and
> from a
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict
> >> Darwinian
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity
> >> > > > > > > as a
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is
> nothing
> >> > more
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to it
> >> > > > > > > >> than
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety
> >> of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> primate,
> >> > > > > > > and
> >> > > > > > > >> our
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones
> piled
> >> > upon
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks
> >> > > > > > > in
> >> > > > > > > >> order
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be
> >> judged
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the
> >> > > > > > same
> >> > > > > > > >> way as
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological
> functions
> >> > and
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> for
> >> > > > > > > >> language is
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case
> >> human
> >> > > > > > > >> exceptionalism.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the
> case
> >> for
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the
> >> > > > > > > >> vanguard role
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other
> >> > species,
> >> > > > > > > prolonging
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking
> >> after
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the
> >> > > > > > sick
> >> > > > > > > >> and the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because
> >> artificial
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> organs
> >> > > > > > > >> (tools) and
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so
> important
> >> > for
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> our
> >> > > > > > > >> species, it
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where
> >> > these
> >> > > > > > > >> "circuitous,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced
> >> that
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> lead
> >> > > > > > our
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth
> >> > always
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> been
> >> > > > > > > >> short on
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal
> for
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> material
> >> > > > > > > >> culture
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite
> another
> >> > > matter:
> >> > > > > > > >> verily, here
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> attention is
> >> > > > > > > >> simply the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he
> >> says
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> there are
> >> > > > > > > >> only two
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and
> >> recombinative. So
> >> > > > > > > >> imagination is
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete
> >> > > experiences,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> and
> >> > > > > > > >> nothing
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky
> says,
> >> > when
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> you
> >> > > > > > > hear
> >> > > > > > > >> the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually
> been
> >> > there
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to be
> >> > > > > > > >> able to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory
> at
> >> > work
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> in
> >> > > > > > word
> >> > > > > > > >> meaning.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about
> Archimedes,
> >> > who
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> was
> >> > > > > > > given
> >> > > > > > > >> a
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had
> >> been
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> mixed
> >> > > > > > with
> >> > > > > > > >> silver
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent
> >> quantity
> >> > of
> >> > > > > gold.
> >> > > > > > > >> Well, we
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work:
> it's
> >> not
> >> > > > > > possible
> >> > > > > > > to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The
> >> > > > > > > >> method
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> "principal
> >> > > > > > of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a
> >> > > > > > > >> velum on
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to
> each
> >> > > other.
> >> > > > > > > Because
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped
> and
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> written
> >> > > > > > over
> >> > > > > > > >> every
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of
> was
> >> > > soft,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the
> >> > > > > > > >> pressure
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the
> new
> >> > ones
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> when
> >> > > > > > > the
> >> > > > > > > >> old
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is
> >> the
> >> > > only
> >> > > > > > known
> >> > > > > > > >> Greek
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning
> nor
> >> > > their
> >> > > > > > > >> relationship
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in
> fact
> >> > they
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> are
> >> > > > > > > >> related to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But
> it's
> >> > > quite
> >> > > > > > > similar
> >> > > > > > > >> to the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> <hshonerd@gmail.com<mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
> >> > > > > > > >> wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an
> >> > > > > > > associationist,
> >> > > > > > > >> “sees
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <
> >> > > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com<mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> >> > > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > >> wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for
> the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> division
> >> > > > > > > >> between
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the
> >> other,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> because
> >> > > > > > > >> Ribot is
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> an
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather
> >> distal
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of
> >> > > > > > > >> attention.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition
> >> > > > > > from
> >> > > > > > > >> forest
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the
> >> > division
> >> > > > > > between
> >> > > > > > > >> the two
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical
> >> > > > > > > >> world of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to
> fairly
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic
> >> > > > > > uses
> >> > > > > > > >> in life
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much
> more
> >> > > > > > > "imaginative"
> >> > > > > > > >> (that
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the
> >> > world
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where
> >> long
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter
> >> > > > > > > >> months are
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more
> likely
> >> to
> >> > > > > > encounter
> >> > > > > > > >> talking
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!).
> Here
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention
> >> > > > > > > has
> >> > > > > > > >> to be
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he
> >> has a
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> very
> >> > > > > > clear
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian
> >> romanticism
> >> > > that
> >> > > > > > > >> underpins
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism.
> >> Vygotsky
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> points
> >> > > > > > > out
> >> > > > > > > >> the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these
> >> productive
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices
> >> > > > > > > >> really
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> are
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus
> of
> >> > > > > > imagination,
> >> > > > > > > >> there
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference
> >> > between
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> human
> >> > > > > > > and
> >> > > > > > > >> animal
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are
> perfectly
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than
> >> > > humans).
> >> > > > > > > Without
> >> > > > > > > >> a
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any
> >> basis
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for
> >> > > > > > > Ribot's
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at
> >> > > > > > > >> all.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <
> >> > mcole@ucsd.edu
> >> > > > <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>>
> >> > > > > > wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination,
> >> > > > > > > >> thanks to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> all
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential
> >> > > > > > > >> around the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> time
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th
> >> > century.
> >> > > I
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had
> >> > > > > > > >> seen work
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> on
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and
> >> reflective
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal
> >> > > > > > > >> reproductive?
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical
> >> > studies
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of
> >> > > > > > > >> development
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The
> >> cost
> >> > of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being
> >> > > > > > a
> >> > > > > > > >> relative
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> >> > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com<mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on
> my
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket
> >> > > > > > list.
> >> > > > > > > >> This
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal
> >> musings
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from
> >> > > > > > some
> >> > > > > > > >> weeks
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> in
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell
> >> correct
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that
> >> > > > > > > >> segmented the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met
> >> > > > > aphorizing”.
> >> > > > > > > >> Puns,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor.
> >> :)
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> <mcole@ucsd.edu<mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>>
> >> > > > > > > wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward
> >> Kant
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and
> >> > > > > > they
> >> > > > > > > >> are
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky
> >> and
> >> > his
> >> > > > > > > >> followers as an
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced
> >> by
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so
> >> > > > > > > >> its of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories
> >> > emerge.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary,
> >> especially in
> >> > > > > > > >> translation,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word,
> >> > > > "recollection"
> >> > > > > > in
> >> > > > > > > >> this
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in
> >> counter
> >> > > > > > > >> distinction to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary
> >> > > > > > > >> discourse
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out
> >> > Russian
> >> > > > > > > >> colleagues have
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something
> >> from
> >> > > > > > theorists
> >> > > > > > > >> who
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology --
> when
> >> it
> >> > > was
> >> > > > > > still
> >> > > > > > > >> possible
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination"
> >> > which,
> >> > > > > > > >> interestingly
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning
> of a
> >> > > > > > "voluntary"
> >> > > > > > > >> act.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like
> >> children
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff
> >> > > > > > > that
> >> > > > > > > >> was
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the
> >> > concepts
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >> > > > > > > >> creativity
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> and
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its
> >> curious
> >> > > to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see
> >> > > > > > > >> that the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he
> >> > found
> >> > > > > > himself
> >> > > > > > > >> writing.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to
> >> > which
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty
> >> > > > > > > old
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <
> >> > > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively
> >> > contemporary,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it
> >> > > > > > > >> may be
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a
> >> > prominent
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place
> >> > > > > > to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating
> >> between
> >> > > > > > > >> Recollection and
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1)
> >> > Reproductive
> >> > > > > > > >> Imagination,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2)
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive
> >> Imagination,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which
> >> > > > > > he
> >> > > > > > > >> says
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive
> >> Memory.
> >> > In
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other
> >> > > > > > > >> words,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to
> >> Intellect is
> >> > > > > > > >> accomplished
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>
> >> > > > > >
> >> > >
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> > > > > > --
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading
> >> > > Strawson
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> >> > > > > > > >> Williams.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian
> developmentalists
> >> > > whose
> >> > > > > > work i
> >> > > > > > > >> am
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results)
> >> speak
> >> > of
> >> > > > > > > >> productive
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that
> productive
> >> > > > > > imagination
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive
> >> > > implies
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
> >> > > > > > > >> there
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> must
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ​imagination called UNproductive
> >> > > imagination.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But
> >> > > > > > I
> >> > > > > > > >> learned
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination
> >> > > appears
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> >> > > > > > is
> >> > > > > > > >> linked
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an
> ineluctable
> >> > part
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >> > > > > > > >> anticipation
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY
> >> SHONERD <
> >> > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com<mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                  wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically
> on
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination
> >> > > > > > > >> (starting
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more
> >> contemporaneous
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and
> >> > > > > > > >> provides
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> a
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the
> >> > socio-cultural
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as
> >> > > > > > > fixed.
> >> > > > > > > >> This,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination,
> >> gives
> >> > me
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
> >> > > > > > > ground
> >> > > > > > > >> to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> take
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I
> >> start
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian
> >> > > > > > > >> Langacker on
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and
> cognitive
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to
> me,
> >> is
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two
> >> > aspects
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >> > > > > > > >> temporality:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and
> >> rhythmic
> >> > > > > > > >> structure), which
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and
> >> creativity,
> >> > for
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both
> >> > > > > > > >> individual
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and
> >> feeling.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
> >> > > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com<mailto:lpscholar2@gmail.com>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this
> >> > topic.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of
> the
> >> > third
> >> > > > > > *space*
> >> > > > > > > >> and the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to
> >> internet.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond
> Williams
> >> > and
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his
> >> > > > > > > >> notion of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This
> >> notion
> >> > > is
> >> > > > > > > >> explored under
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist
> as a
> >> > > *set*
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >> > > > > > > >> modalities
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a
> >> form
> >> > of
> >> > > > > > knowing
> >> > > > > > > >> that is
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt"
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??]
> >> > > > > > if
> >> > > > > > > >> we
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> think
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the
> >> imaginal as
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38
> >> PM,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD <
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com<mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just
> >> want to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how
> >> > > > > > > >> jazzed up
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going
> >> wild,
> >> > > the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind
> >> > > > > > > as
> >> > > > > > > >> Larry
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad,
> >> actually
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various
> >> > > > > > > >> triads,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of
> >> my
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks
> >> > > > > > > of
> >> > > > > > > >> the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap
> >> > > adentro,
> >> > > > > > luega
> >> > > > > > > >> pa’
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <
> >> > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
> >> > > > > > > >> wrote:
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination
> >> > thread,
> >> > > > > > attached
> >> > > > > > > >> are two
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the
> >> > issue.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work
> of
> >> > CHAT
> >> > > > > > > theorists
> >> > > > > > > >> like
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the
> >> development
> >> > of
> >> > > > > > > >> imagination in a
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's
> >> notion
> >> > > of
> >> > > > > > > >> productive
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and
> >> have
> >> > > no
> >> > > > > > > >> intention of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as
> >> > explicated
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
> >> > > > > > > >> attached
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these
> >> > > > > > philosophers,
> >> > > > > > > I
> >> > > > > > > >> came
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are
> very
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely
> >> > > > > > > >> linked at
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our
> >> > > naivete,
> >> > > > > > > >> Ettienne and I
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around
> >> earlier
> >> > as
> >> > > a
> >> > > > > > means
> >> > > > > > > of
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> access
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist,
> >> Alexander
> >> > > > > Suvorov.
> >> > > > > > > >> Moreover,
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of
> >> the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have
> >> > direct
> >> > > > > > > relevance
> >> > > > > > > >> to
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also
> >> > speak
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >> > > > > > > >> concerns
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> about
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play
> in
> >> > > > > > development.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination
> >> > > thread.
> >> > > > > > > Perhaps
> >> > > > > > > >> they
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal
> >> with a
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural
> >> > > > > > > >> science
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst
> Boesch.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F.
> >> > > Strawson.pdf>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> --
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a
> >> > natural
> >> > > > > > science
> >> > > > > > > >> with an
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> --
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a
> >> natural
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science
> >> > > > > > > >> with an
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>>
> >> > > > > > > >>>
> >> > > > > > > >>
> >> > > > > > > >>
> >> > > > > > > >>
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > > --
> >> > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> >> > > > > > Assistant Professor
> >> > > > > > Department of Anthropology
> >> > > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> >> > > > > > Brigham Young University
> >> > > > > > Provo, UT 84602
> >> > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > >
> >> > > >
> >> > > >
> >> > > > --
> >> > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> >> > > > Assistant Professor
> >> > > > Department of Anthropology
> >> > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> >> > > > Brigham Young University
> >> > > > Provo, UT 84602
> >> > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >> > > >
> >> > > >
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> > > --
> >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> >> > > Assistant Professor
> >> > > Department of Anthropology
> >> > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> >> > > Brigham Young University
> >> > > Provo, UT 84602
> >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> >
> >> > --
> >> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> >> > Assistant Professor
> >> > Department of Anthropology
> >> > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> >> > Brigham Young University
> >> > Provo, UT 84602
> >> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>
> >
> >
> > --
> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > Assistant Professor
> > Department of Anthropology
> > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > Brigham Young University
> > Provo, UT 84602
> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>
>

-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson