[Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
HENRY SHONERD
hshonerd@gmail.com
Sun Dec 21 09:48:00 PST 2014
It was actually from Oller that I leaned about cloze testing back in the 70s! Oller was and still is passionate about his religion. I helped arrange a round table at Univ of NM in the early 80s on L1 acquisition. There were three perspectives presented: Chomskian/lnnatist by Oller, empiricist/behaviorist by a fellow names Charlton, and interactionist by Vera John-Steiner. Though tangential to this metaphor thread, it seems relevant. Oller’s “expectancy grammar” was a pair to his “episode hypothesis” which argued that L2 teaching should be discourse based, through narratives and dialogs. This metaphor thread, I think, informs, and is informed by issues of development.
Henry
P.S. Oller also did a lot of research on dictation as a language assessment. A very interesting man. Brilliant and passionately Christian.
> On Dec 20, 2014, at 4:32 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Larry--
>
> (I'm afraid that the one screen rule is just going to result in multiple
> e-mails every day! But that in itself is instructive: when I am teaching I
> like to make a distinction between "tall and thin" threads of
> dialogue--that is, complex text that consists of many short turns, where
> the complexity is mostly inter-mental) and "short and fat" threads--where
> the complexity is mostly inside a turn of talk. So maybe Helena's
> one-screen rule is really a request for the inter-mental expansion of
> complexity, which is, after all, the essence of good instructional
> discourse!)
>
> In the 1970s, J.W. Oller had a beautiful and wrong hypothesis called
> "Unitary Competence". The idea is something like this: instead of "four
> skills" (reading, writing, speaking, and listening, derived from behavior)
> or "two knowledges" (grammar and vocabulary, or "words and rules", as
> cognitivists like Pinker like to say), human language ability is
> essentially unitary, and consists of something called expectancy grammar.
> Expectancy grammar is what you see on a cloze test--it's the ability to
> expect the next word in a clause.
>
> With children I sometimes play an amusing game called "INAW BICBAW" ("It's
> not a word, but it could be a word"). You demonstrate this fairly easily by
> putting up the letter "a" and saying you've lost, because "a" is a word,
> and therefore violates the INAW rule, which says that the result of a turn
> cannot be a word. So then you put up "b" and add "c", but you lose again
> because there is no word that begins with "bc" and so you've violated the
> BICBAW rule, which says that it could, someday, turn out to be a word. The
> children then realize that "be" violates the INAW rule and "bz" the
> "BICBAW" rule, but "bi" is a possible move, and "bik" is OK too, but the
> next move will either violate INAW or BICBAW.
>
> When the kids get bored, you take up to the next level, "INAS BICBAS"
> ("It's not a sentence, but it could be a sentence"). Here 'a" is a possible
> move, because although it's a word, it's not a sentence, and the next move
> might be "bike" or something like that, and then you seem to need a verb,
> but an intransitive verb (e.g. 'goes') will violate the INAS rule, so you
> go for a modal auxiliary ('can") etc.As you can see, the guiding principle
> of the game is Oller's Expectancy Grammar--what Chomsky dismissively calls
> Phrase Structure Grammar.
>
> Now, what about preps? Well, of course, preps do "predict" noun complements
> (although it's possible to put a prep in front of another prep, as in "look
> forward to" or "in front of"). But they do this CANONICALLY--that's what
> expectancy means. That is, we are led to expect, by the historicity of our
> language experience, certain prepositional complements and not others. The
> problem is, of course, creativity--we are also led to expect the
> unexpected, and one of the most obvious ways that has happened in English
> is through prepositional phrasal verbs ("bring up", "run down", "sweep
> off") where the prep can function as an adverb, and violate the INAS rule,
> leading to a sudden stop!
>
> And with that he swept off.....
>
> David Kellogg
> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>
> PS: Oh, about Oller! He was very beautiful and very wrong. I think he runs
> an institute for creation science somewhere in New Mexico now....
>
> dk
>
>
>
> , and there
>
> On 21 December 2014 at 02:43, <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Henry,
>>
>> So, what are we doing when we complete a cloze test? Are we reasoning.
>> are we gap-filling, are we operating within grammatical metaphors? If I
>> understand what David Kellogg is pointing us to look at, this cloze test
>> shows what was operating “behind" the "scenes" in the unfolding drama of
>> science and faith. Our cultural way of operating oriented within a
>> "system" as profound as bodily orienting within a landscape.
>>
>> "knowing" [sensing] at all times where one is oriented in this concrete
>> situated place as embodied AND cultural historical.
>>
>> Through cultural synergy understanding how situated and specific is our
>> Western way of knowing
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Sent from Windows Mail
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> From: HENRY SHONERD
>> Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 9:22 AM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> One quick and dirty way to assess language is a cloze test, which
>> essentially requires the user to put lexical items into a grammatical
>> structure, as in the example David provides “distance from_____to ____”.
>> Henry
>>
>>> On Dec 19, 2014, at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>> The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the
>> groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on
>> account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct
>> faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black
>> English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses
>> about language deficiency.
>>>
>>> Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and
>> 1980s, who traced math difficulties of her African American students to
>> subtle grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard
>> English. Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis
>> that the meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the
>> grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the
>> meaning of “distance” is embedded in the grammatical structure “distance
>> from _________ to __________” where the place-holders hold locations; if
>> you don’t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic
>> environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to
>> be able to gain full access to the concept.
>>>
>>> The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd
>> like some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of
>> distance (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their
>> diagrams. Her approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced
>> by her African American students that she reads as collapsed versions of
>> standard English sentences, with differences in prepositional structure
>> being highlighted (but other grammatical elements also are indicated).
>>>
>>> This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics
>> education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic
>> concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with
>> the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with
>> respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated
>> syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding.
>>>
>>> This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my
>> 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely
>> impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the
>> conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the
>> semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it
>> occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like
>> “more” and “less” may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities.
>>>
>>> The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to
>> lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the
>> grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to
>> whether that further connection can be made.
>>>
>>> David Kirshner
>>>
>>> Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of
>> black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg
>>> Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
>>>
>>> Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that
>> brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is
>> essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now
>> rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that
>> communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is
>>> thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major
>> onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there
>> has to be some change in the nature of communication.
>>>
>>> So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi
>> applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of
>> Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like
>> "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce
>> off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions,
>> Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific
>> English possible?
>>>
>>> Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws
>> of gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he
>> really discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation".
>> Gravity is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but
>> rather a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps,
>> again!). So how and above all why does it become an entity?
>>>
>>> It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's
>> on the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost
>> instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark
>> room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this;
>> then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in
>> mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures
>> on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble
>> determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to
>> write his conclusion in the form of a law).
>>>
>>> In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make
>> sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields
>> a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the
>> glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The
>> curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the
>> eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be
>> realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating
>> an imaginary entity.
>>>
>>> That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by
>> a verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something
>> that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We
>> even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules.
>>> So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance",
>> all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that
>> Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is
>> realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical
>> metaphor.
>>>
>>> One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness
>> hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their
>> homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which
>> "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is
>> essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that
>> "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through
>> a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand
>> for
>>> exchanges:
>>>
>>> Mother: You did your homework, didn't you?
>>> Child: No.
>>> Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well?
>>> Child: No.
>>> Mother: You didn't do well?
>>> Child: No.
>>> Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other
>> students do well?
>>> Child: Some of them.
>>> Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well?
>>>
>>> And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two
>> functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function
>>> (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental
>> function (discourse).
>>>
>>> I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract
>> and unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind.
>>> But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and
>> far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor
>> that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the
>> grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must
>> stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!)
>>>
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> , or "the
>>>
>>> . He
>>>
>>> On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Helena and David,
>>>> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called
>>>> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition
>>>> to
>>>> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion
>>>> of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English)
>>>> notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different
>>>> affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual
>>>> understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified
>>>> sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow
>>>> than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old
>> friend "imagination").
>>>> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to?
>>>> -greg
>>>>
>>>> Taken from:
>>>>
>>>> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second
>>>> ary/Whorfframe2.html
>>>>
>>>> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are
>>>> with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other
>> nouns.
>>>> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter"
>>>> just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized
>>>> and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our
>>>> thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified.
>>>> Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real
>>>> time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply
>>>> a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming
>>>> duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside
>>>> another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually
>>>> perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy
>> that we do so objectify cyclic phasing.
>>>> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g.,
>> "phasing."
>>>> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting
>>>> binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is
>>>> implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items
>>>> like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an
>>>> enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite
>>>> generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns
>> we have made a formless item, "time."
>>>> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the
>>>> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in
>>>> the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say
>>>> and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me
>>>> again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk"
>>>> or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a
>>>> summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of
>> "time."
>>>>
>>>> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not
>>>> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a
>>>> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and
>>>> even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a
>>>> locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains
>>>> no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means
>>>> "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These
>>>> "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like
>>>> nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer
>>>> is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs.
>>>> One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently."
>>>> There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of
>>>> the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time
>>>> except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis
>> here for a formless item answering to our "time." "
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen
>>>> <helenaworthen@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this:
>>>>>
>>>>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton
>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create
>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly
>>>>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific
>>>>> writing and thinking today."
>>>>>
>>>>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you
>>>>> when
>>>> you
>>>>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity".
>>>>>
>>>>> Thank you,
>>>>>
>>>>> Helena
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Helena Worthen
>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
>>>>>
>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end
>>>>>> of
>>>> what
>>>>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what
>>>>>> Halliday
>>>> calls
>>>>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have
>>>>>> three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can,
>>>>> actually,
>>>>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new
>>>>>> name
>>>>> or a
>>>>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic
>>>>>> field
>>>>> (the
>>>>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of
>>>> linguistics)
>>>>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same
>>>> effect,
>>>>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in"
>>>> has
>>>>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly
>>>>>> in
>>>> your
>>>>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's
>>>>>> hands,
>>>>> refer
>>>>>> to a book or even a footnote.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty
>>>>>> much define the difference between learning and development, at
>>>>>> least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on
>>>>>> functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the
>>>>>> closed set of functions you already have into new systems.
>>>>>> Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite
>> global in its implications.
>>>>> Learning
>>>>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems,
>>>>>> while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and
>>>>>> forget it
>>>> just
>>>>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue
>>>>>> that
>>>>> people
>>>>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of
>>>>>> the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp,
>>>>>> concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the
>>>>>> nominalizations that
>>>> Newton
>>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to
>>>>>> create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly
>>>>>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific
>>>>>> writing and
>>>> thinking
>>>>>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the
>>>> third
>>>>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother
>>>>>> tongue
>>>> and
>>>>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies
>>>>>> zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a
>>>>>> line', 'on a
>>>>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are
>>>>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time:
>>>>>> 'at
>>>> a
>>>>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at
>>>>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and
>>>>>> "in Christmas' (season).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen
>>>>>> <helenaworthen@gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial
>>>>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the
>>>>>>> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common
>>>>>>> ones, and
>>>>> between 70
>>>>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as"
>>>>>>> --
>>>>> this
>>>>>>> is according to
>>>>>>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm
>>>> ).
>>>>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently,
>>>>>>> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections
>>>>>>> in
>>>> parent
>>>>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection
>>>>>>> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial
>>>>>>> relationships
>>>>> suggested
>>>>>>> by contemporary prepositions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Helena Worthen
>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I’m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly
>>>> embodied,
>>>>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to
>>>>>>> linguistics
>>>>> (For
>>>>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on
>>>> “lexicon”:
>>>>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions,
>>>>>>> being
>>>>> part
>>>>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and
>>>>>>> Halliday
>>>>> see no
>>>>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar.
>>>>> (Lo
>>>>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar,
>>>>>>> adding
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> “n”. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are
>>>> great
>>>>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of
>>>>>>> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced?
>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the
>>>> metaphorical
>>>>>>> use of prepositions like:
>>>>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument"
>>>>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
>>>>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
>>>>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> and so on.
>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic
>>>>> possibilities:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in
>>>>> Thought
>>>>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into
>>>> English
>>>>>>> 1962]
>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive'
>>>> value
>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech
>>>>> vocalization).
>>>>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that
>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>> flammable
>>>>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor
>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>> gas.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century
>>>>>>>>>> European
>>>>>>> Developmental
>>>>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental'
>>>>>>>>>> hence
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of
>>>> Piaget's
>>>>>>> Genetic
>>>>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and
>>>>>>>>>> synthesis
>>>>>>> based on
>>>>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in
>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's
>>>>>>> example of H2O.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
>>>>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts.
>>>>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more
>>>>>>>>>>> than
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can
>>>>>>>>>>> ever
>>>> be
>>>>>>> imagined"
>>>>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination
>>>>>>>>>>> as the
>>>>>>> brain has
>>>>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the
>>>>>>>>>>> simplest
>>>> level
>>>>>>> of the Gestalt
>>>>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
>>>>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just
>>>> photographic.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try
>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> accurately reproduce
>>>>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas,
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> goal of combinatory
>>>>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories,
>>>>>>>>>>> dreams,
>>>>>>> musings, and even
>>>>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of
>>>> objects
>>>>>>> and symbols.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> things and concepts can be
>>>>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>> flour.
>>>>>>>>>>> I can add water and
>>>>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>> dissolves a bit
>>>>>>>>>>> But adding heat
>>>>>>>>>>> changes
>>>> the
>>>>>>> combination into a pancake.
>>>>>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?]
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more
>>>>>>>>>>> examples
>>>>>>> to put the discussion
>>>>>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
>>>>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the
>>>>>>>>>>>> case
>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I
>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>> it's
>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are
>>>>>>> associationists who
>>>>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary
>>>>>>>>>>>> associationism
>>>>>>> exists and
>>>>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation.
>>>>>>> Vygotsky
>>>>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion,
>>>> explain
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels
>>>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>> its
>>>>>>> own
>>>>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a
>>>>>>>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian
>>>>>>>>>>>> one--true maturity
>>>>> as a
>>>>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more
>>>>>>>>>>>> to it
>>>>>>> than
>>>>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of
>>>>>>>>>>>> primate,
>>>>> and
>>>>>>> our
>>>>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon
>>>>>>>>>>>> rocks
>>>>> in
>>>>>>> order
>>>>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>> same
>>>>>>> way as
>>>>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and
>>>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>> language is
>>>>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human
>>>>>>> exceptionalism.
>>>>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> vanguard role
>>>>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species,
>>>>> prolonging
>>>>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>> sick
>>>>>>> and the
>>>>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial
>>>>>>>>>>>> organs
>>>>>>> (tools) and
>>>>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for
>>>>>>>>>>>> our
>>>>>>> species, it
>>>>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these
>>>>>>> "circuitous,
>>>>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that
>>>>>>>>>>>> lead
>>>> our
>>>>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always
>>>>>>>>>>>> been
>>>>>>> short on
>>>>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for
>>>>>>>>>>>> material
>>>>>>> culture
>>>>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter:
>>>>>>> verily, here
>>>>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of
>>>>>>>>>>>> attention is
>>>>>>> simply the
>>>>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says
>>>>>>>>>>>> there are
>>>>>>> only two
>>>>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So
>>>>>>> imagination is
>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> nothing
>>>>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when
>>>>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>> hear
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there
>>>>>>>>>>>> to be
>>>>>>> able to
>>>>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work
>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>> word
>>>>>>> meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who
>>>>>>>>>>>> was
>>>>> given
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been
>>>>>>>>>>>> mixed
>>>> with
>>>>>>> silver
>>>>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold.
>>>>>>> Well, we
>>>>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not
>>>> possible
>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that
>>>>>>>>>>>> precisely. The
>>>>>>> method
>>>>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the
>>>>>>>>>>>> "principal
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes
>>>>>>>>>>>> palimpsest, a
>>>>>>> velum on
>>>>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other.
>>>>> Because
>>>>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and
>>>>>>>>>>>> written
>>>> over
>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft,
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> pressure
>>>>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones
>>>>>>>>>>>> when
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> old
>>>>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only
>>>> known
>>>>>>> Greek
>>>>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their
>>>>>>> relationship
>>>>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they
>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>> related to
>>>>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite
>>>>> similar
>>>>>>> to the
>>>>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD
>>>>>>>>>>>> <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an
>>>>> associationist,
>>>>>>> “sees
>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <
>>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> division
>>>>>>> between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because
>>>>>>> Ribot is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> form of
>>>>>>> attention.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition
>>>> from
>>>>>>> forest
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division
>>>> between
>>>>>>> the two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> commonsensical
>>>>>>> world of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prosaic
>>>> uses
>>>>>>> in life
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more
>>>>> "imaginative"
>>>>>>> (that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm,where
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> winter
>>>>>>> months are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to
>>>> encounter
>>>>>>> talking
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attention
>>>>> has
>>>>>>> to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very
>>>> clear
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that
>>>>>>> underpins
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points
>>>>> out
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> practices
>>>>>>> really
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of
>>>> imagination,
>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> human
>>>>> and
>>>>>>> animal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> capable of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> volitional
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans).
>>>>> Without
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>> Ribot's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> functions at
>>>>>>> all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination,
>>>>>>> thanks to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influential
>>>>>>> around the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> time
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> had
>>>>>>> seen work
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equal
>>>>>>> reproductive?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> development
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being
>>>> a
>>>>>>> relative
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bucket
>>>> list.
>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from
>>>> some
>>>>>>> weeks
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> segmented the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”.
>>>>>>> Puns,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>> they
>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his
>>>>>>> followers as an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so
>>>>>>> its of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in
>>>>>>> translation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection"
>>>> in
>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter
>>>>>>> distinction to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary
>>>>>>> discourse
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian
>>>>>>> colleagues have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from
>>>> theorists
>>>>>>> who
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was
>>>> still
>>>>>>> possible
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
>>>>>>> interestingly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> links
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a
>>>> "voluntary"
>>>>>>> act.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stuff
>>>>> that
>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> creativity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see
>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found
>>>> himself
>>>>>>> writing.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pretty
>>>>> old
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <
>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but it
>>>>>>> may be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place
>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
>>>>>>> Recollection and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
>>>>>>> Imagination,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which
>>>> he
>>>>>>> says
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leads
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>> words,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is
>>>>>>> accomplished
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> Williams.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose
>>>> work i
>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of
>>>>>>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive
>>>> imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> develops.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> must
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of imagination called UNproductive imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But
>>>> I
>>>>>>> learned
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>> is
>>>>>>> linked
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> anticipation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination
>>>>>>> (starting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and
>>>>>>> provides
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>> fixed.
>>>>>>> This,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>> ground
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> take
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian
>>>>>>> Langacker on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> temporality:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic
>>>>>>> structure), which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both
>>>>>>> individual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third
>>>> *space*
>>>>>>> and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his
>>>>>>> notion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is
>>>>>>> explored under
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> modalities
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of
>>>> knowing
>>>>>>> that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??]
>>>> if
>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how
>>>>>>> jazzed up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind
>>>>> as
>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various
>>>>>>> triads,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks
>>>>> of
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro,
>>>> luega
>>>>>>> pa’
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <
>>>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread,
>>>> attached
>>>>>>> are two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT
>>>>> theorists
>>>>>>> like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
>>>>>>> imagination in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of
>>>>>>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no
>>>>>>> intention of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
>>>>>>> attached
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these
>>>> philosophers,
>>>>> I
>>>>>>> came
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> upon
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely
>>>>>>> linked at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> several
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete,
>>>>>>> Ettienne and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a
>>>> means
>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> access
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov.
>>>>>>> Moreover,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct
>>>>> relevance
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> concerns
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in
>>>> development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread.
>>>>> Perhaps
>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural
>>>>>>> science
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
>>>> science
>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> science
>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>>> Assistant Professor
>>>> Department of Anthropology
>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>>> Brigham Young University
>>>> Provo, UT 84602
>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>>>
>>> <OrrBEV.pdf>
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