[Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors

[larry smolucha]

Message from Francine:

Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result
of developing a written language based on an alphabet?

Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ
significantly. 

And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, 
Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience
differently.


> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu
> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
> 
> Hi Everyone,
> I appreciate this thread's emphasis on  the relativistic character of
> metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of
> the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and
> socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological
> determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways,
> language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of
> meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example  of early 20th century
> Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the present
> day that suggest ways that language can shape thought .
> 
> Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north
> Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to
> describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when
> requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say “move a bit
> to the east.” To tell you where exactly they left something in your house,
> they’ll say, “I left it on the southern edge of the western table.” (Deutscher,
> 2010, p. MM 42)
> 
> The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the
> speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that
> roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr  includes
> either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise  hand
> gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition
> involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the
> compass.  Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory
> is stored for the speakers of this language.  The story also serves as a
> clear example of Vygotsky’s notion of language as a mediating tool as a
> means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial
> kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation.
> 
> 
> 
> One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of how
> in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older person
> were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into
> the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to
> discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned at
> the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from
> the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it was
> remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the
> water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the
> boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the cardinal
> directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the
> same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The
> cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more
> remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story.
> For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in
> the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the speaker
> was facing in the two films (ibid).
> 
> 
> *Robert*
> 
> 
> Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? *The
> New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that
> > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is
> > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now
> > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that
> > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is
> > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major
> > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there
> > has to be some change in the nature of communication.
> >
> > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi
> > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of
> > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like
> > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce
> > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions,
> > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific
> > English possible?
> >
> > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of
> > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really
> > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity
> > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather
> > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So
> > how and above all why does it become an entity?
> >
> > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on
> > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost
> > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark
> > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this;
> > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in
> > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures
> > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble
> > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to
> > write his conclusion in the form of a law).
> >
> > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make
> > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields
> > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the
> > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The
> > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the
> > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be
> > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating
> > an imaginary entity.
> >
> > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a
> > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something
> > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We
> > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules.
> > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance",
> > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that
> > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is
> > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical
> > metaphor.
> >
> > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis
> > is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework
> > do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to
> > move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially
> > innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students
> > who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of
> > what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for
> > exchanges:
> >
> > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you?
> > Child: No.
> > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well?
> > Child: No.
> > Mother: You didn't do well?
> > Child: No.
> > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other
> > students do well?
> > Child: Some of them.
> > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well?
> >
> > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two
> > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function
> > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function
> > (discourse).
> >
> > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and
> > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind.
> > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and
> > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor
> > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the
> > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must
> > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!)
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >
> >
> >
> > , or "the
> >
> > . He
> >
> > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Helena and David,
> > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called
> > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to
> > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of
> > > "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion
> > of
> > > "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of
> > > meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English
> > has
> > > a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the
> > > first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first
> > > paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination").
> > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to?
> > > -greg
> > >
> > > Taken from:
> > >
> > >
> > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html
> > >
> > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are
> > with
> > > us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns.
> > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter"
> > just
> > > as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and
> > > numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought
> > > about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without
> > > objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e.
> > of
> > > the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase
> > > similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by
> > > imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in
> > > the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But
> > such
> > > is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic
> > phasing.
> > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g.,
> > "phasing."
> > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial
> > > formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for
> > > all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance,
> > > matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide
> > range
> > > of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our
> > > phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time."
> > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the
> > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the
> > > pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and
> > think
> > > "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point
> > > out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of
> > > cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually
> > contains
> > > or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time."
> > >
> > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not
> > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a
> > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even
> > > other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative
> > pattern,
> > > like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one
> > of
> > > "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while
> > > morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects
> > or
> > > objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or
> > > "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are
> > hot,
> > > WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or
> > > "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a
> > > quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about
> > > time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis
> > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." "
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com
> > >
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this:
> > > >
> > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton
> > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create
> > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive,
> > > > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and
> > thinking
> > > > today."
> > > >
> > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when
> > > you
> > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity".
> > > >
> > > > Thank you,
> > > >
> > > > Helena
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Helena Worthen
> > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com
> > > >
> > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of
> > > what
> > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday
> > > calls
> > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have
> > three
> > > > > properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have:
> > > > >
> > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can,
> > > > actually,
> > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new
> > name
> > > > or a
> > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can).
> > > > >
> > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic
> > field
> > > > (the
> > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of
> > > linguistics)
> > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used.
> > > > >
> > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same
> > > effect,
> > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in"
> > > has
> > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in
> > > your
> > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands,
> > > > refer
> > > > > to a book or even a footnote.
> > > > >
> > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty
> > much
> > > > > define the difference between learning and development, at least as I
> > > > > understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions
> > > > > indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set
> > of
> > > > > functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill
> > specific
> > > > > and local, while development is quite global in its implications.
> > > > Learning
> > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems,
> > while
> > > > > development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it
> > > just
> > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away.
> > > > >
> > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that
> > > > people
> > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of
> > the
> > > > > lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete,
> > and
> > > > > vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that
> > > Newton
> > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create
> > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly
> > productive,
> > > > > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and
> > > thinking
> > > > > today.  For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the
> > > third
> > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue
> > > and
> > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work).
> > > > >
> > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies
> > zero
> > > > > dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on
> > a
> > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are
> > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time:
> > 'at
> > > a
> > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at
> > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in
> > > > > Christmas' (season).
> > > > >
> > > > > David Kellogg
> > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > > > >
> > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen <
> > helenaworthen@gmail.com>
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial
> > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual
> > > > >> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and
> > > > between 70
> > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" --
> > > > this
> > > > >> is according to
> > https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm
> > > ).
> > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in
> > > > >> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in
> > > parent
> > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like
> > the
> > > > >> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships
> > > > suggested
> > > > >> by contemporary prepositions.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Helena Worthen
> > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com
> > > > >>
> > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
> > > > >>
> > > > >>> I’m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly
> > > embodied,
> > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to
> > linguistics
> > > > (For
> > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on
> > > “lexicon”:
> > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions,
> > being
> > > > part
> > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday
> > > > see no
> > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence,
> > lexico-grammar.
> > > > (Lo
> > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar,
> > adding
> > > > the
> > > > >> “n”. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are
> > > great
> > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that?
> > In
> > > > >> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced?
> > > > >>> Henry
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > wrote:
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the
> > > metaphorical
> > > > >> use of prepositions like:
> > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument"
> > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
> > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
> > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> and so on.
> > > > >>>> Andy
> > > > >>>>
> > > >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden*
> > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote:
> > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic
> > > > possibilities:
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in
> > > > Thought
> > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into
> > > English
> > > > >> 1962]
> > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive'
> > > value
> > > > >> of the
> > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech
> > > > vocalization).
> > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that
> > are
> > > > >> flammable
> > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a
> > > gas.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European
> > > > >> Developmental
> > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental'
> > hence
> > > > the
> > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of
> > > Piaget's
> > > > >> Genetic
> > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis
> > > > >> based on
> > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's
> > > > >> example of H2O.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
> > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
> > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
> > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the
> > parts.
> > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than
> > > the
> > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever
> > > be
> > > > >> imagined"
> > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider:
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as
> > the
> > > > >> brain has
> > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest
> > > level
> > > > >> of the Gestalt
> > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
> > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just
> > > photographic.
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to
> > > > >> accurately reproduce
> > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas,
> > the
> > > > >> goal of combinatory
> > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams,
> > > > >> musings, and even
> > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of
> > > objects
> > > > >> and symbols.
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways
> > that
> > > > >> things and concepts can be
> > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and
> > > > flour.
> > > > >>>>>>                                         I can add water and it
> > > > >> dissolves a bit
> > > > >>>>>>                                         But adding heat changes
> > > the
> > > > >> combination into a pancake.
> > > > >>>>>>                      [Is this synergistic?]
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>            Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more
> > examples
> > > > >> to put the discussion
> > > > >>>>>>            in the metaphysical realm.
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
> > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
> > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the
> > case
> > > > for
> > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think
> > > it's
> > > > >> not
> > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are
> > > > >> associationists who
> > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary
> > associationism
> > > > >> exists and
> > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation.
> > > > >> Vygotsky
> > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion,
> > > explain
> > > > >> the
> > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for
> > > its
> > > > >> own
> > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a
> > Piagetian
> > > > >>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true
> > maturity
> > > > as a
> > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to
> > it
> > > > >> than
> > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of
> > primate,
> > > > and
> > > > >> our
> > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon
> > rocks
> > > > in
> > > > >> order
> > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the
> > > same
> > > > >> way as
> > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for
> > > > >> language is
> > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human
> > > > >> exceptionalism.
> > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the
> > > > >> vanguard role
> > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species,
> > > > prolonging
> > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the
> > > sick
> > > > >> and the
> > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs
> > > > >> (tools) and
> > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our
> > > > >> species, it
> > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these
> > > > >> "circuitous,
> > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead
> > > our
> > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been
> > > > >> short on
> > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material
> > > > >> culture
> > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter:
> > > > >> verily, here
> > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention
> > is
> > > > >> simply the
> > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there
> > are
> > > > >> only two
> > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So
> > > > >> imagination is
> > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences,
> > and
> > > > >> nothing
> > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you
> > > > hear
> > > > >> the
> > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to
> > be
> > > > >> able to
> > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in
> > > word
> > > > >> meaning.
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was
> > > > given
> > > > >> a
> > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed
> > > with
> > > > >> silver
> > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of
> > gold.
> > > > >> Well, we
> > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not
> > > possible
> > > > to
> > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely.
> > The
> > > > >> method
> > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal
> > > of
> > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest,
> > a
> > > > >> velum on
> > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other.
> > > > Because
> > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written
> > > over
> > > > >> every
> > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft,
> > the
> > > > >> pressure
> > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones
> > when
> > > > the
> > > > >> old
> > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only
> > > known
> > > > >> Greek
> > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their
> > > > >> relationship
> > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are
> > > > >> related to
> > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite
> > > > similar
> > > > >> to the
> > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg
> > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <
> > hshonerd@gmail.com>
> > > > >> wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an
> > > > associationist,
> > > > >> “sees
> > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
> > > > >>>>>>>> Henry
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <
> > > dkellogg60@gmail.com
> > > > >
> > > > >> wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division
> > > > >> between
> > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other,
> > because
> > > > >> Ribot is
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> an
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form
> > of
> > > > >> attention.
> > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition
> > > from
> > > > >> forest
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> to
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division
> > > between
> > > > >> the two
> > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and
> > commonsensical
> > > > >> world of
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic
> > > uses
> > > > >> in life
> > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more
> > > > "imaginative"
> > > > >> (that
> > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of
> > the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter
> > > > >> months are
> > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to
> > > encounter
> > > > >> talking
> > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here
> > attention
> > > > has
> > > > >> to be
> > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very
> > > clear
> > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that
> > > > >> underpins
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky
> > points
> > > > out
> > > > >> the
> > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive
> > practices
> > > > >> really
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> are
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of
> > > imagination,
> > > > >> there
> > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between
> > human
> > > > and
> > > > >> animal
> > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable
> > of
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> volitional
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans).
> > > > Without
> > > > >> a
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> theory
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for
> > > > Ribot's
> > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions
> > at
> > > > >> all.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > > wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination,
> > > > >> thanks to
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> all
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential
> > > > >> around the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> time
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I
> > had
> > > > >> seen work
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> on
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and reflective equal
> > > > >> reproductive?
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of
> > > > >> development
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> of
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of
> > being
> > > a
> > > > >> relative
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket
> > > list.
> > > > >> This
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from
> > > some
> > > > >> weeks
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> in
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that
> > > > >> segmented the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met
> > aphorizing”.
> > > > >> Puns,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > > > wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and
> > > they
> > > > >> are
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> doing
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his
> > > > >> followers as an
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel,
> > so
> > > > >> its of
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in
> > > > >> translation,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> seems
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection"
> > > in
> > > > >> this
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter
> > > > >> distinction to
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in
> > contemporary
> > > > >> discourse
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian
> > > > >> colleagues have
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from
> > > theorists
> > > > >> who
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was
> > > still
> > > > >> possible
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
> > > > >> interestingly
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> links
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a
> > > "voluntary"
> > > > >> act.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff
> > > > that
> > > > >> was
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> also
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of
> > > > >> creativity
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> and
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to
> > see
> > > > >> that the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> two
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found
> > > himself
> > > > >> writing.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which
> > pretty
> > > > old
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <
> > > > >> ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but
> > it
> > > > >> may be
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent
> > place
> > > to
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
> > > > >> Recollection and
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
> > > > >> Imagination,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> (2)
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which
> > > he
> > > > >> says
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In
> > other
> > > > >> words,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is
> > > > >> accomplished
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> through
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>
> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson
> > and
> > > > >> Williams.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose
> > > work i
> > > > >> am
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of
> > > > >> productive
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive
> > > imagination
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> develops.
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies
> > that
> > > > >> there
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> must
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ​imagination called UNproductive imagination.
> > But
> > > I
> > > > >> learned
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears
> > and
> > > is
> > > > >> linked
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of
> > > > >> anticipation
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                  wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on
> > imagination
> > > > >> (starting
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look,
> > and
> > > > >> provides
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> a
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as
> > > > fixed.
> > > > >> This,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a
> > > > ground
> > > > >> to
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> take
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian
> > > > >> Langacker on
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> particularly
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full
> > of
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> imagination
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of
> > > > >> temporality:
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic
> > > > >> structure), which
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for
> > both
> > > > >> individual
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
> > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third
> > > *space*
> > > > >> and the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his
> > > > >> notion of
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is
> > > > >> explored under
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of
> > > > >> modalities
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a form of
> > > knowing
> > > > >> that is
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt"
> > [perceived??]
> > > if
> > > > >> we
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> think
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the imaginal as
> > *style*
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say
> > how
> > > > >> jazzed up
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the
> > mind
> > > > as
> > > > >> Larry
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various
> > > > >> triads,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my
> > notebooks
> > > > of
> > > > >> the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro,
> > > luega
> > > > >> pa’
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <
> > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > > > >> wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread,
> > > attached
> > > > >> are two
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT
> > > > theorists
> > > > >> like
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
> > > > >> imagination in a
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of
> > > > >> productive
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no
> > > > >> intention of
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in
> > the
> > > > >> attached
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these
> > > philosophers,
> > > > I
> > > > >> came
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely
> > > > >> linked at
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete,
> > > > >> Ettienne and I
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a
> > > means
> > > > of
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> access
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander
> > Suvorov.
> > > > >> Moreover,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct
> > > > relevance
> > > > >> to
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to
> > > > >> concerns
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> about
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in
> > > development.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread.
> > > > Perhaps
> > > > >> they
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> will
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a
> > natural
> > > > >> science
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> --
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
> > > science
> > > > >> with an
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> --
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
> > science
> > > > >> with an
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > Assistant Professor
> > > Department of Anthropology
> > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > Brigham Young University
> > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > >
> >
> 
> 
> -- 
> 
> *Robert Lake  Ed.D.*Associate Professor
> Social Foundations of Education
> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
> Georgia Southern University
> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group
> P. O. Box 8144
> Phone: (912) 478-0355
> Fax: (912) 478-5382
> Statesboro, GA  30460