[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
HENRY SHONERD
hshonerd@gmail.com
Thu Dec 18 14:57:07 PST 2014
So sorry, I can’t find the David McNeill reference. A title? A link? I’ll just google for now.
Henry
> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:12 PM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> Message from Francine:
>
> We want to add these works to a bibliography on imagination.
> I.A. Richard's quote is right on the mark and interesting in regard to
> David McNeill's research on hand gestures (see my recent post).
>
> Seems to me that we have a Zeitgeist is emerging in our XMCA community.
>
>> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu
>> Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 10:57:36 -0500
>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>
>> Hi Francine,
>> I am so glad to see you sharing your insightful reading of Vygotsky on
>> imagination and metaphor. It was actually the connections between
>> imagination, inner speech and metaphor as
>> the means to personal agency that first drew me into Vygotsky studies.
>> Vera John-Steiner, Lois Holzman, Dot Robbins and you were the first people
>> I talked to about this work.
>> In 1936, I.A. Richards published his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, a work that
>> grew directly out of Vico’s thinking. His thesis was that "thought is
>> metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language
>> derive therefrom” (p. 94). In other words, he believed that at the base of
>> all thinking, there is a metaphoric relationship. Richards takes this one
>> step further when he suggests that metaphors are “cognitively irreducible”
>> (Johnson, 1981, p. 19) A metaphoric expression therefore becomes a newly
>> created vehicle of meaning which loses potency when seeking to make a
>> literal statement out of its component parts. In 2001, Maxine Greene wrote
>> something similar. "By means of making metaphors, imagination can reorient
>> consciousness through its disclosure of patterns, relationships, shadows,
>> and lights, and slivers of sound that are wholly unexpected, “new” in some
>> wonderful fashion” (Greene, 2001, p 154).
>>
>> For example,try reducing this back to literal meaning :-)
>>
>> The Road Not Taken
>> By Robert Frost <http://www.poetryfoundation.org/bio/robert-frost>
>> Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
>> And sorry I could not travel both
>> And be one traveler, long I stood
>> And looked down one as far as I could
>> To where it bent in the undergrowth;
>>
>> Then took the other, as just as fair,
>> And having perhaps the better claim,
>> Because it was grassy and wanted wear;
>> Though as for that the passing there
>> Had worn them really about the same,
>>
>> And both that morning equally lay
>> In leaves no step had trodden black.
>> Oh, I kept the first for another day!
>> Yet knowing how way leads on to way,
>> I doubted if I should ever come back.
>>
>> I shall be telling this with a sigh
>> Somewhere ages and ages hence:
>> Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
>> I took the one less traveled by,
>> And that has made all the difference.
>> Retrieved from : http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/173536
>>
>> References
>>
>> Greene, M. (2001). *Variations on a blue guitar*. New York, NY: Teachers
>> College Press.
>>
>> Johnson, M. (1981). *Philosophical perspectives on metaphor.* Minneapolis,
>> MN: University of Minnesota Press.
>>
>> Richards,I.A. (1936). *The philosophy of rhetoric. * Oxford, GB: Oxford
>> University Press.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 4:45 AM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>
>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
>>>
>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities:
>>>
>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought
>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962]
>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of
>>> the
>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization).
>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are
>>> flammable
>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas.
>>>
>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European
>>> Developmental
>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the
>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's
>>> Genetic
>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
>>>
>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on
>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example
>>> of H2O.
>>>
>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>
>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>
>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts.
>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the
>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be
>>> imagined"
>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
>>>>
>>>> A couple things to consider:
>>>>
>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain
>>> has
>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of
>>> the Gestalt
>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
>>>>
>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic.
>>>>
>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to
>>> accurately reproduce
>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal
>>> of combinatory
>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings,
>>> and even
>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and
>>> symbols.
>>>>
>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that
>>> things and concepts can be
>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour.
>>>> I can add water and it
>>> dissolves a bit
>>>> But adding heat changes the
>>> combination into a pancake.
>>>> [Is this synergistic?]
>>>>
>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to
>>> put the discussion
>>>> in the metaphysical realm.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>
>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for
>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not
>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists
>>> who
>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism
>>> exists and
>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation.
>>> Vygotsky
>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the
>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
>>>>>
>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own
>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian
>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a
>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than
>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and
>>> our
>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in
>>> order
>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way
>>> as
>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
>>>>>
>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for
>>> language is
>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human
>>> exceptionalism.
>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard
>>> role
>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging
>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and
>>> the
>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs
>>> (tools) and
>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our
>>> species, it
>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous,
>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our
>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short
>>> on
>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture
>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily,
>>> here
>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is
>>> simply the
>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only
>>> two
>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination
>>> is
>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and
>>> nothing
>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear
>>> the
>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able
>>> to
>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word
>>> meaning.
>>>>>
>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a
>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with
>>> silver
>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well,
>>> we
>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to
>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The
>>> method
>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of
>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
>>>>>
>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum
>>> on
>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because
>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over
>>> every
>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the
>>> pressure
>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the
>>> old
>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known
>>> Greek
>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
>>>>>
>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their
>>> relationship
>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related
>>> to
>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar
>>> to the
>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
>>>>>
>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>
>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist,
>>> “sees
>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division
>>> between
>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because
>>> Ribot is
>>>>>> an
>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of
>>> attention.
>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from
>>> forest
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between
>>> the two
>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical
>>> world of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses
>>> in life
>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative"
>>> (that
>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the
>>>>>> farm,where
>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter
>>> months are
>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter
>>> talking
>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has
>>> to be
>>>>>>> more voluntary.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear
>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that
>>> underpins
>>>>>> Ribot
>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out
>>> the
>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices
>>> really
>>>>>> are
>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination,
>>> there
>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and
>>> animal
>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of
>>>>>> volitional
>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without
>>> a
>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's
>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at
>>> all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination,
>>> thanks to
>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential
>>> around the
>>>>>> time
>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had
>>> seen work
>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal
>>> reproductive?
>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of
>>> development
>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a
>>> relative
>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list.
>>> This
>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some
>>> weeks
>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that
>>> segmented the
>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”.
>>> Puns,
>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they
>>> are
>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his
>>> followers as an
>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so
>>> its of
>>>>>>>>> course
>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in
>>> translation,
>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in
>>> this
>>>>>>>>> passage,
>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter
>>> distinction to
>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary
>>> discourse
>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian
>>> colleagues have
>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists
>>> who
>>>>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still
>>> possible
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
>>> interestingly
>>>>>>>> links
>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary"
>>> act.
>>>>>>>> Parts
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that
>>> was
>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of
>>> creativity
>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see
>>> that the
>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself
>>> writing.
>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old
>>>>>>>>> approaches
>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <
>>> ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it
>>> may be
>>>>>>>> worth
>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to
>>>>>>>>> Imagination
>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
>>> Recollection and
>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
>>> Imagination,
>>>>>> (2)
>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he
>>> says
>>>>>>>> leads
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other
>>> words,
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is
>>> accomplished
>>>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and
>>> Williams.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i
>>> am
>>>>>>>> trying
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of
>>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination
>>>>>> develops.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that
>>> there
>>>>>> must
>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I
>>> learned
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is
>>> linked
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of
>>> anticipation
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination
>>> (starting
>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and
>>> provides
>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed.
>>> This,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground
>>> to
>>>>>> take
>>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian
>>> Langacker on
>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
>>>>>> particularly
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of
>>>>>> imagination
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of
>>> temporality:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic
>>> structure), which
>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both
>>> individual
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space*
>>> and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his
>>> notion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is
>>> explored under
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of
>>> modalities
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing
>>> that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if
>>> we
>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how
>>> jazzed up
>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as
>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various
>>> triads,
>>>>>>>>> finally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of
>>> the
>>>>>>>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega
>>> pa’
>>>>>>>> fuera.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached
>>> are two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists
>>> like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
>>> imagination in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of
>>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no
>>> intention of
>>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the
>>> attached
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I
>>> came
>>>>>>>> upon
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely
>>> linked at
>>>>>>>>> several
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete,
>>> Ettienne and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of
>>>>>> access
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov.
>>> Moreover,
>>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance
>>> to
>>>>>>>> Kris's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to
>>> concerns
>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps
>>> they
>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
>>> science
>>>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>> with an
>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor
>> Social Foundations of Education
>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
>> Georgia Southern University
>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group
>> P. O. Box 8144
>> Phone: (912) 478-0355
>> Fax: (912) 478-5382
>> Statesboro, GA 30460
>
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