[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination (seeing and believing)
HENRY SHONERD
hshonerd@gmail.com
Thu Dec 18 14:36:02 PST 2014
Rod,
Appropriate or not (though I think it is) your post has me asking why Martin (our Martin?) thinks that the use of that substance diminished the inference making. This will drive Mike crazy, but would a thread on imagination benefit from a discussion of what has been with the species from time immemorial: mind altering substances? We’re talking affordances here, culture, history, activity. Another thread?
Henry
> On Dec 18, 2014, at 12:41 PM, Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> I am not sure how appropriate it is to post this here as it is going back to an earlier theme in the discussion - the relationship between perception and imagination. I asked a friend who is on a masters psychology programme and she asked one of her tutors at Bristol University (Paul Howard-Jones http://www.bristol.ac.uk/education/people/person/93406/index.html ).
>
> I think his summary of the attached paper may be of interest to some - and the paper is way outside the xmca remit but I have attached in in case anyone is interested enough to want to read more.
>
> All the best,
>
> Rod
>
> This was what I asked:
>
> Are you aware of any articles which enumerate the ratio between sensory information (e.g. stimuli from the retinae) and visual memory in the process of seeing? I saw a claim somewhere that only about 10% of what we ‘see’ is from retinal information, with the rest made up by our interpretation of this information using what we have seen before but I can’t track down any evidence for this so am not confident about it! What I am particularly interested in is what happens when the bodily actions of thinking and perceiving are reduced to ‘things’ – ‘thoughts’ and ‘perceptions’ or ’images’. It seems important to me that the way we ACT on things is part of what we know about them or, more generally, that we are aware of our environment in terms of our experiences of interacting with it rather than in terms of lists of extracted ‘properties’ of phenomena
>
> And this is Paul's reply:
>
> Attached is a highly theoretical paper by a guy (Martin) who was privileged to borrow my wooden fMRI simulator for participants to take magic mushrooms in- fascinating study! It might be relevant to this query.
> I would summarise it as follows:
> The brain is thought to comprise hierarchical levels, with input arriving at the lowest levels (light, sound, touch, etc) and a representation of the world generated at the top that can direct our actions (e.g., rain is falling, so grab a coat). To achieve this, each level draws on past history to draw some basic conclusions and these inferences get passed to the level above. So, in the visual system, lower levels process activations of retinal neurons into inferred features (e.g. rain drops). A little further up in the same system, higher levels process the behaviour of features into inferred patterns of movement (e.g....are falling). When a layer forms an inference, it can use it to suppress the information coming from below that gave rise to it. This is good house-keeping, and reduces the amount of information the brain has to process. After all, once a pattern of incoming information is recognised and can be reduced to an inference, it can be filed under “business as usual” and that stream of information can be ignored - the inference is all we need to know. Information that can’t be turned into inferences – stuff that doesn’t fit previous history – deserves more special attention and, rather than getting suppressed, is passed up the levels for a different reason: it can be used to readjust expectations and teach the brain new tricks (i.e. how to make new inferences), so providing a mechanism for the brain to learn.
>
>
> But this essentially means very little of the original perceptual information ever reaches consciousness (unless you take magic mushrooms (not that i am recommending) which Martin thinks diminishes the efficiency of the inference-making.
>
>
> Merry Christmas everyone!
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole
> Sent: 18 December 2014 18:44
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>
> Dear Colleagues. Might it be appropriate to start another thread on metaphor?
>
> My basic starting point is the idea that basic perceptual processes ineluctably require imagination...... measured in milliseconds. Metaphor and linguistic mediation is for sure an essential topic here. I want to hold on to the Suvorov metaphor of imagination as lifting off from the world and returning to it again. (If the Suvorov reference is not familiar I will post relevant paper).
>
> A thought: Might it be possible to parse Francine's last message into subtopics while not discouraging cross subtopic conversations?
>
> Trying to hold all the threads in my hand.
> Slow in So Cal.
> mike
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> I’m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied,
>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics
>> (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on “lexicon”:
>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being
>> part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and
>> Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence,
>> lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to write
>> lexicon-grammar, adding the “n”. The traditions holds! Keep them
>> separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and
>> creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced?
>> Henry
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the
>>> metaphorical
>> use of prepositions like:
>>> - "there is some value IN your argument"
>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
>>>
>>> and so on.
>>> Andy
>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> ----
>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>
>>>
>>> larry smolucha wrote:
>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>
>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
>>>>
>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities:
>>>>
>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in
>>>> Thought and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated
>>>> into English
>> 1962]
>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive'
>>>> value
>> of the
>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization).
>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are
>> flammable
>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas.
>>>>
>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European
>> Developmental
>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence
>>>> the Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of
>>>> Piaget's
>> Genetic
>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
>>>>
>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis
>>>> based
>> on
>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's
>> example of H2O.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>
>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>>
>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic and
>>>>> produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts.
>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than
>>>>> the recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can
>>>>> ever be
>> imagined"
>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
>>>>>
>>>>> A couple things to consider:
>>>>>
>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the
>> brain has
>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest
>>>>> level
>> of the Gestalt
>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic.
>>>>>
>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to
>> accurately reproduce
>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the
>>>>> goal
>> of combinatory
>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams,
>> musings, and even
>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of
>>>>> objects
>> and symbols.
>>>>>
>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that
>> things and concepts can be
>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour.
>>>>> I can add water and it
>> dissolves a bit
>>>>> But adding heat changes
>>>>> the
>> combination into a pancake.
>>>>> [Is this synergistic?]
>>>>>
>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more
>>>>> examples
>> to put the discussion
>>>>> in the metaphysical realm.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case
>>>>>> for Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I
>>>>>> think it's
>> not
>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are
>> associationists who
>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism
>> exists and
>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation.
>> Vygotsky
>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion,
>>>>>> explain
>> the
>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for
>>>>>> its
>> own
>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian
>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity
>>>>>> as a species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more
>>>>>> to it than
>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate,
>>>>>> and
>> our
>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks
>>>>>> in
>> order
>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the
>>>>>> same
>> way as
>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for
>> language is
>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human
>> exceptionalism.
>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the
>> vanguard role
>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species,
>>>>>> prolonging childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking
>>>>>> after the sick
>> and the
>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs
>> (tools) and
>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our
>> species, it
>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these
>> "circuitous,
>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead
>>>>>> our development as a species. The wretched of the earth always
>>>>>> been short
>> on
>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material
>> culture
>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter:
>>>>>> verily,
>> here
>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is
>> simply the
>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are
>> only two
>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So
>>>>>> imagination
>> is
>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and
>> nothing
>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you
>>>>>> hear
>> the
>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be
>> able to
>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in
>>>>>> word
>> meaning.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was
>>>>>> given a crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been
>>>>>> mixed with
>> silver
>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold.
>> Well, we
>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not
>>>>>> possible to measure the differences in water displacement that
>>>>>> precisely. The
>> method
>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal
>>>>>> of buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a
>> velum on
>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other.
>>>>>> Because parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and
>>>>>> written over
>> every
>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the
>> pressure
>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when
>>>>>> the
>> old
>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only
>>>>>> known
>> Greek
>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their
>> relationship
>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are
>> related to
>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite
>>>>>> similar
>> to the
>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an
>>>>>>> associationist,
>> “sees
>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg
>>>>>>>> <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division
>> between
>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because
>> Ribot is
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of
>> attention.
>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition
>>>>>>>> from
>> forest
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division
>>>>>>>> between
>> the two
>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical
>> world of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic
>>>>>>>> uses
>> in life
>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative"
>> (that
>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> farm,where
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter
>> months are
>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to
>>>>>>>> encounter
>> talking
>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention
>>>>>>>> has
>> to be
>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very
>>>>>>>> clear understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism
>>>>>>>> that underpins
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ribot
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points
>>>>>>>> out
>> the
>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices
>> really
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of
>>>>>>>> imagination,
>> there
>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human
>>>>>>>> and
>> animal
>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> volitional
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans).
>>>>>>>> Without a
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for
>>>>>>>> Ribot's distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination,
>> thanks to
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential
>>>>>>>>> around
>> the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> time
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had
>>>>>>>>> seen
>> work
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal
>> reproductive?
>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of
>> development
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being
>>>>>>>>> a
>> relative
>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list.
>> This
>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from
>>>>>>>>>> some
>> weeks
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that
>> segmented the
>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”.
>>>>>>>>>> Puns, according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and
>>>>>>>>>>> they are
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his
>>>>>>>>>>> followers
>> as an
>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so
>>>>>>>>>>> its
>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> course
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in
>>>>>>>>>>> translation,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection"
>>>>>>>>>>> in
>> this
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> passage,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter
>>>>>>>>>>> distinction
>> to
>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary
>> discourse
>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian
>>>>>>>>>>> colleagues
>> have
>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from
>>>>>>>>>>> theorists
>> who
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was
>>>>>>>>>>> still
>> possible
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
>> interestingly
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> links
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary"
>> act.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Parts
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>> was
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of
>> creativity
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found
>>>>>>>>>>> himself
>> writing.
>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty
>>>>>>>>>>> old
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> approaches
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>>> <ablunden@mira.net
>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it
>>>>>>>>>>>> may
>> be
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> worth
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
>> Recollection and
>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
>> Imagination,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (2)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which
>>>>>>>>>>>> he
>> says
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> leads
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other
>> words,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is
>>>>>>>>>>>> accomplished
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> --
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and
>> Williams.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work
>>>>>>>>>>>>> i am
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> trying
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> productive imagination. The Russians write that productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> develops.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that
>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> must
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of imagination called UNproductive imagination. But
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I
>> learned
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>> linked
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of
>> anticipation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination
>> (starting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and
>> provides
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed.
>> This,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ground
>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> take
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian
>> Langacker on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> particularly
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> imagination
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of
>> temporality:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structure),
>> which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both
>> individual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
>> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *space*
>> and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion
>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explored
>> under
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of
>> modalities
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowing
>> that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how
>> jazzed up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as
>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various
>> triads,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> finally
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa’
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> fuera.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attached
>> are two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theorists
>> like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
>> imagination in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of
>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no
>> intention of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the
>> attached
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophers, I
>> came
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> upon
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> linked
>> at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> several
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ettienne
>> and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> access
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov.
>> Moreover,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relevance
>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Kris's
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerns
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps
>> they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
>> science
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
>>>>>>>>>>> science
>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>> with an
>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>
> --
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> ________________________________
> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]<http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass>
>
> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form.
> <1265 full.pdf>
More information about the xmca-l
mailing list