[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
Martin John Packer
mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
Thu Dec 18 08:59:41 PST 2014
Lakoff and Johnson have lots about this, Andy.
Martin
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). The metaphorical structure of the human conceptual system. Cognitive Science, 4(2), 195-208.
On Dec 18, 2014, at 4:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like:
> - "there is some value IN your argument"
> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
>
> and so on.
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>
>
> larry smolucha wrote:
>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>
>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
>>
>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities:
>>
>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought
>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962]
>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the
>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization).
>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable
>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas.
>>
>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental
>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the
>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic
>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
>>
>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on
>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O.
>>
>>
>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>
>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>
>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts.
>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the
>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined"
>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
>>>
>>> A couple things to consider:
>>>
>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has
>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt
>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic.
>>>
>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce
>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory
>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even
>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols.
>>>
>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be
>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour.
>>> I can add water and it dissolves a bit
>>> But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake.
>>> [Is this synergistic?]
>>>
>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion
>>> in the metaphysical realm.
>>>
>>>
>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>
>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for
>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not
>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who
>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and
>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky
>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the
>>>> uniqueness of our species?
>>>>
>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own
>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian
>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a
>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than
>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our
>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order
>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as
>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
>>>>
>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is
>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism.
>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role
>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging
>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the
>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and
>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it
>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous,
>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our
>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on
>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture
>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here
>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
>>>>
>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the
>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two
>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is
>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing
>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the
>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to
>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning.
>>>>
>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a
>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver
>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we
>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to
>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method
>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of
>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
>>>>
>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on
>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because
>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every
>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure
>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old
>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek
>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
>>>>
>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship
>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to
>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the
>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
>>>>
>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
>>>>
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>
>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, “sees
>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
>>>>> Henry
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between
>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is
>>>>>>
>>>>> an
>>>>>
>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention.
>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest
>>>>>>
>>>>> to
>>>>>
>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two
>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of
>>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life
>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that
>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the
>>>>>>
>>>>> farm,where
>>>>>
>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are
>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking
>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be
>>>>>> more voluntary.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear
>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins
>>>>>>
>>>>> Ribot
>>>>>
>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the
>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really
>>>>>>
>>>>> are
>>>>>
>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there
>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal
>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of
>>>>>>
>>>>> volitional
>>>>>
>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a
>>>>>>
>>>>> theory
>>>>>
>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's
>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to
>>>>>>>
>>>>> all
>>>>>
>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the
>>>>>>>
>>>>> time
>>>>>
>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work
>>>>>>>
>>>>> on
>>>>>
>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive?
>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development
>>>>>>>
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative
>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This
>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> in
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the
>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”. Puns,
>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> doing
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an
>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> course
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> seems
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> passage,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to
>>>>>>>>> "memory."
>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse
>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have
>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> links
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Parts
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> and
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing.
>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> approaches
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> worth
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Imagination
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and
>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> (2)
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> leads
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> trying
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive
>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> develops.
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> must
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> kind of imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> a
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This,
>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> take
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on
>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> particularly
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> imagination
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality:
>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> think
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> finally
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa’
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> fuera.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> upon
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> several
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> access
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Kris's
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> about
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>
>
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