[Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances

[Larry Purss]

Helena,
Your comment:
"I think it's pretty obvious that whatever system us Westerners have
trusted is about to self-correct in a pretty violent way, leaving few of us
behind, including our grandchildren"
may be a central guiding *image* which gets to the *heart* of the subject
and object *matter*

Do we need a *new* guiding metaphor such as what am *I* or what are *we*
doing for our grandchildren. You are pointing to the need for a new
*guiding metaphor* that replaces the now dominant metaphor in the West of
the sovereign individual.

I do wonder if *knowledge* or *reason* alone will get us to a new
metaphor.  Michael's question of not trusting *control* [first order
cybernetics] can be included here. I do believe our preoccupation in the
West with the individuated *self* is implicated in the need for control
[and certainty.

Holding on to the image of our common responsibility for all
our grandchildren within *interpretive communities* is a "theme" [or some
would say a mytheme]

 *trust* [which is closely related to FAITH] extends beyond first order
cybernetics and *controlling systems* There is a dynamic beyond
"self-control" that points to the *heart* of the matter. To take the
perspective that we are *here* for our *grandchildren* is for me a
*generative* imaginal space to attempt to occupy and from which to guide my
actions and activities in the world.

Learning seems to be central to orienting to the *heart* of the matter. But
do we also need to hold an image of our grandchildren's needs at the
forefront of our attention [and shared metaphors]??
Larry

On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 12:52 PM, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Michael:
>
> Here is how I read your message:
>
> There are two (at least) ways of thinking about the world (meaning life,
> the universe, etc). One is the "exploration" perspective and the other is
> some overarching cybernetic (mathematical, engineering? designed?)
> perspective. The difference between the two that you want to draw attention
> to is that Bateson, who you name as someone associated with the second
> perspective, anticipated that any such system would self-correct eventually.
>
> Then you say that many educators do not trust a cybernetic system to
> self-correct. Is that right?
>
> I'm sure sure how what you call the "exploration" perspective differs from
> the cybernetic perspective.
>
> I think it's pretty obvious that whatever system us Westerners have
> trusted is about to self-correct in a pretty violent way, leaving few of us
> behind, including our grandchildren. Capitalism (I'm think of Picketty,
> here) doesn't self-correct, but the climate does and it is gearing up to
> pull a whopper on us.
>
> All of this is to say that while we toss ideas around there are real-world
> facts out there moving right along. I want to see people making use of
> these ideas. I want to know, "How is this word actually used in real life?"
>
> Helena Worthen
> helenaworthen@gmail.com
>
> On Dec 5, 2014, at 11:46 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote:
>
> > Hi Helena,
> >
> > I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those
> words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals were
> are teaching live and think within.  A little while ago I was reading
> Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded the
> idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would be
> self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any
> conscious human design.  We are a society obsessed with local control and
> the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in
> small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run).
> >
> > Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity
> often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become
> difficult to relate.
> >
> > A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education
> should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme
> cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is many
> educators don't trust that.  And then I stared at the sentence for a while
> and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever read
> it) would just pass it right over.
> >
> > So what do we do?  Hard to know.
> >
> > A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed
> cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson
> every some up?
> >
> > Michael
> > ________________________________________
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com]
> > Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances
> >
> > A voice from the margins, here:
> >
> > I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go
> quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out
> there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas
> intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years
> of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms
> that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a
> face as if they'd tasted something bad.
> >
> > Examples of terms like this are:
> >
> > affordance
> > mediate
> > activity
> > CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory)
> >
> > and:
> >
> > development
> >
> > For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term
> "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can
> use that.
> >
> > Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning
> theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same
> reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very
> different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists.
> >
> > theoristshttp://
> www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf
> >
> >
> > Helena Worthen
> > helenaworthen@gmail.com
> >
> > On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
> >
> >> Haydi,
> >> Thank you so much! Here’s how it is for me:
> >> I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in
> the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But
> I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher
> educator where research and publication wasn’t necessary for tenure and
> promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years
> back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in
> thrashing about I came to read Andy’s articles on "collaborative project"
> as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him
> one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering
> my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time
> for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe
> up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one
> of the papers for the book. I love them both. That’s how it is for me.
> >>
> >> Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning.
> Mike has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him
> asking him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the
> hardest thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between
> students. I have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a
> school where the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust
> abound. Where human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to
> rescue us. We have to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, “I’m
> still willin’” Let’s make this a creative project, which means no unethical
> use of power. We can’t afford it. In my humble opinion.
> >>
> >> In gratitude and hope,
> >> Henry
> >>
> >>> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Haydi--
> >>>
> >>> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people
> to
> >>> implement your demands may be more
> >>> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as
> >>> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing,
> >>> so who knows.
> >>>
> >>> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in
> the
> >>> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me.
> >>> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas,
> >>> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian.
> >>>
> >>> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various
> comments
> >>> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular
> threads. For
> >>> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic
> equipment vis
> >>> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc.,
> might
> >>> be be placed in that thread.
> >>>
> >>> etc.
> >>>
> >>> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments!
> >>> mike
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei <
> haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Hi
> >>>>
> >>>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return
> to
> >>>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this
> Forum .
> >>>>
> >>>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms ,
> >>>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as
> >>>> native speakers , etc.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've
> altogether put
> >>>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael ,
> the
> >>>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view .
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the
> "History of
> >>>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries
> . Andy
> >>>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all .
> >>>>
> >>>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of
> tools
> >>>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He
> >>>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just
> within the
> >>>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect
> much of
> >>>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx
> and
> >>>> Engels so as to prove his claims .
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture
> >>>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to
> >>>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets
> >>>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device
> gets to
> >>>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and
> >>>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked
> himself
> >>>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ??
> At
> >>>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No
> more
> >>>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some
> is to
> >>>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that
> >>>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather
> at
> >>>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present
> man of
> >>>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work
> activity
> >>>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the
> >>>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12
> >>>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically
> , that
> >>>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own
> and
> >>>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe
> through
> >>>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed
> ups and
> >>>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed !
> collective
> >>>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can
> distinguish
> >>>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of
> >>>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not
> ontogenetically
> >>>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to
> >>>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with
> >>>> whichone .
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the
> four
> >>>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important
> point
> >>>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction
> >>>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and
> the
> >>>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact'
> could be
> >>>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use
> artifacts and
> >>>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the
> domain
> >>>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal
> activity'
> >>>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one
> more
> >>>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V
> , if
> >>>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' .
> >>>>
> >>>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a
> tool
> >>>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine
> >>>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole
> activity
> >>>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign
> activity
> >>>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot
> generalize its
> >>>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech ,
> dialogue
> >>>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal
> >>>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral
> change
> >>>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold
> of the
> >>>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley
> rich
> >>>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for
> a
> >>>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic
> 'motive'
> >>>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of
> crossing) ,
> >>>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete
> action
> >>>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the
> ground
> >>>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material
> (object ,
> >>>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole
> thing
> >>>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on
> the
> >>>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no
> >>>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why
> taking
> >>>> affordance for a tool .
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Soooooooooo much for one post .
> >>>>
> >>>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works .
> >>>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying !
> >>>>
> >>>> Best
> >>>>
> >>>> Haydi
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>   From: mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46
> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances
> >>>>
> >>>> My view?
> >>>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On
> what
> >>>> grounds, or under what circumstances,  would you classify it
> otherwise?
> >>>> What's gained, what's lost?
> >>>> mike
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael <
> glassman.13@osu.edu>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I tend to  be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than
> >>>>> definitions.  I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to
> get
> >>>>> across.  You notice a plank across the stream.  It is wide enough
> for you
> >>>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using
> it
> >>>> you
> >>>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point.  It is the
> intersection of
> >>>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the
> >>>> activity
> >>>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance
> comes in
> >>>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither
> subjective
> >>>> or
> >>>>> objective).  It is also important that you have the abilities (the
> >>>> correct
> >>>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass
> the
> >>>>> plank by.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> As far as perceived affordance.  I think I have this right - the
> >>>> perceived
> >>>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are
> >>>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the
> >>>> design
> >>>>> of the object.  So I create a light switch with the intention of
> >>>> designing
> >>>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch
> on a
> >>>>> light.  As you can see different from the relationship to the plank,
> >>>> where
> >>>>> there is no prior design.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper)
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Michael
> >>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
> >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM
> >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that
> gibson
> >>>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret
> him)
> >>>> and
> >>>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they
> share
> >>>> the
> >>>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a
> located
> >>>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the
> phylgenetically
> >>>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove
> >>>> cognitive
> >>>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and
> then
> >>>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means.
> >>>>> mike
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances,
> >>>> which
> >>>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it
> is a
> >>>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of
> course
> >>>> the
> >>>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with
> >>>> regard
> >>>>> to
> >>>>>> understanding what they are.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting
> >>>>> outside
> >>>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to
> perezhivanie
> >>>> in
> >>>>>> some fashion.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to
> >>>> the
> >>>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what
> Norman
> >>>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water."
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I
> could
> >>>>>> find:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal,
> >>>> what
> >>>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to
> >>>>> afford"
> >>>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have
> made
> >>>> it
> >>>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and
> the
> >>>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the
> >>>>> complementarity
> >>>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986).
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> and
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? …Subject to revision, I suggest
> that
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties
> of
> >>>> its
> >>>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The
> >>>>> reference
> >>>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson,
> >>>>> 1977/1986).
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> and
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they
> are
> >>>>> in
> >>>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings,
> >>>> which
> >>>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But
> >>>>> actually,
> >>>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective
> >>>> property;
> >>>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy
> of
> >>>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It
> is
> >>>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both
> >>>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both
> ways, to
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986).
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very
> carefully
> >>>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this
> >>>> list
> >>>>>> value history, learning, and development.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Kind regards,
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Annalisa
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <
> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM
> >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I'd take a look.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit.  My equivalent
> of
> >>>>> your
> >>>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically
> >>>>>> manifest.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Huw
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu
> >
> >>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Michael
> >>>>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
> >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>> ]
> >>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
> >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM
> >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Interloper, Michael?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and
> >>>>> cognitive
> >>>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by
> Engestrom
> >>>>> on
> >>>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are
> >>>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be
> >>>>> gathered
> >>>>>>> up.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael <
> >>>> glassman.13@osu.edu
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea).
> >>>> He
> >>>>>>>> actually cops to both of them.  The first was not to distinguish
> >>>>>> between
> >>>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which
> >>>> are
> >>>>>>>> designed.  I think this is related to the issue of artifacts.
> >>>>> Meaning
> >>>>>>> are
> >>>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to
> >>>> be
> >>>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong
> >>>> word,
> >>>>> if
> >>>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances.  It is a
> >>>>>>> complex
> >>>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes
> >>>> based
> >>>>> on
> >>>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one
> >>>>> context
> >>>>>>> may
> >>>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is
> that
> >>>>> he
> >>>>>>> was
> >>>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and
> >>>>>>> constraints.
> >>>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances
> >>>> or
> >>>>>> are
> >>>>>>>> they designed to create constraints.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the
> >>>>>> mention
> >>>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up.  Hope I'm not being too much of
> >>>> an
> >>>>>>>> interloper.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Michael
> >>>>>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
> >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>> ]
> >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
> >>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM
> >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Annalisa-
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation
> >>>>> not
> >>>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of
> >>>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set
> >>>> against
> >>>>>>>> Gibson's ideas.  The change of views coincided with the advent of
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>> d-cog
> >>>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> No hidden  history i know of, but interesting connections among
> the
> >>>>>>> notion
> >>>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion
> of
> >>>>>> these
> >>>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engeström, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach
> >>>> to
> >>>>>>>> distributed*
> >>>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition:
> >>>>> Psychological
> >>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <
> annalisa@unm.edu
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Hi Mike,
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied
> >>>>> that
> >>>>>>>> wish!
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important
> >>>> connections.
> >>>>> I
> >>>>>>> was
> >>>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I
> >>>> learned
> >>>>>>> about
> >>>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science
> >>>>> (1985).
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story?
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity:
> >>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to
> >>>>>>> cognitive
> >>>>>>>>> artifacts?
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in
> >>>>> play,
> >>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>> even joy!
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however
> >>>>> until
> >>>>>>> then
> >>>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards,
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa
> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <
> >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> >>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM
> >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And,
> >>>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive
> >>>>>>> artifacts
> >>>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD.  If it were possible to find a
> >>>>> source
> >>>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it
> >>>>> might
> >>>>>>> be a
> >>>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of
> >>>>>> intro
> >>>>>>>> for
> >>>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a
> >>>>>>> newcomer's
> >>>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is
> >>>> seeking
> >>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>> sort
> >>>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am
> >>>>>>>> insuficiently
> >>>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted!
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many
> >>>>>> rocks,
> >>>>>>> so
> >>>>>>>>> little time"!
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Mike
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> A
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> >>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Martin!
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental
> >>>>>> representation"
> >>>>>>> is
> >>>>>>>>>> coming closer!
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's
> >>>>>> theory
> >>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>> affordances.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed
> >>>>> article.
> >>>>>>> But
> >>>>>>>> I
> >>>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is
> >>>>>>>> important
> >>>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a
> >>>>>>> grenade
> >>>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the
> >>>>> list.
> >>>>>>> If
> >>>>>>>>> you
> >>>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look
> >>>>> forward
> >>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>> your
> >>>>>>>>>> reply, Martin.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that
> >>>> being
> >>>>>> at
> >>>>>>>> UCSD
> >>>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that
> >>>>>> influences
> >>>>>>>> your
> >>>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find
> >>>>>>>> community
> >>>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more
> >>>> voluntary
> >>>>>>>> phrased
> >>>>>>>>>> that way).
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Kind regards,
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Annalisa
> >>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
> >>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of
> >>>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>>> John
> >>>>>>>>>> Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co <javascript:;>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM
> >>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is
> >>>>> interesting,
> >>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>> me
> >>>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not
> >>>> used,
> >>>>>>> even
> >>>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read"
> >>>> images
> >>>>> in
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to
> >>>>> define
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg <
> >>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >>>>>>>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa:
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight"
> >>>>> when
> >>>>>>> we
> >>>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of
> >>>>>>>> anything
> >>>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe
> >>>>>> available
> >>>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even
> >>>> remember
> >>>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as
> >>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental
> >>>> representations
> >>>>>> are
> >>>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth
> >>>> century.
> >>>>>> In
> >>>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against
> >>>>>>>> Titchener
> >>>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples,
> >>>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated
> >>>>> that
> >>>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically
> >>>>>>> anterior
> >>>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would
> >>>>> not
> >>>>>>> have
> >>>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that
> >>>> are
> >>>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more
> >>>>>>> reading
> >>>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read
> >>>> than
> >>>>> I
> >>>>>> am
> >>>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels
> >>>>> like
> >>>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do
> >>>>> NOT
> >>>>>>> read
> >>>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color
> >>>> structure
> >>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo’s painting to suggest images without using any
> >>>>>> actual
> >>>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural
> >>>>>>>> experience
> >>>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings.  Pepperell then
> >>>>>> deliberately
> >>>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any
> >>>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo’s Sistine
> >>>> Chapel
> >>>>>>> fresco
> >>>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation.
> >>>> He
> >>>>> or
> >>>>>>> she
> >>>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the
> >>>> painting
> >>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not
> >>>>>> notice
> >>>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful
> >>>> in
> >>>>>> it.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> >>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar <
> >>>>> annalisa@unm.edu
> >>>>>>>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in!
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are
> >>>>> at
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> root of all thinking.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently,
> >>>>> based
> >>>>>>> upon
> >>>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers,
> >>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a
> >>>>>> phrase
> >>>>>>> I
> >>>>>>>>> like
> >>>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on
> >>>> it
> >>>>>> by
> >>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know
> >>>> it.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think
> >>>> as
> >>>>>>>> Hackett
> >>>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have
> >>>>> you
> >>>>>>>>> already
> >>>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be
> >>>>>> willing
> >>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>> take a look.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is
> >>>>>>>> controversial.
> >>>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone
> >>>>>> says
> >>>>>>>>> "this
> >>>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble
> >>>>>>>> observation.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and
> >>>> whatever
> >>>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at
> >>>>>> hand?
> >>>>>>>>> Just a
> >>>>>>>>>> thought.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model,
> >>>>> metaphoricity?
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!)
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
> >>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of
> >>>>> Larry
> >>>>>>>>> Purss <
> >>>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com <javascript:;>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM
> >>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]  How *basic* are images?
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> David K
> >>>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce.
> >>>>> My
> >>>>>>>> reason
> >>>>>>>>>> for
> >>>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path
> >>>>>> pursuing a
> >>>>>>>>> basic
> >>>>>>>>>>>> question.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic
> >>>>>>> guiding
> >>>>>>>>>> images
> >>>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests"
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring
> >>>>>> appearances
> >>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new
> >>>>>> phenomenological
> >>>>>>>>> path
> >>>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names
> >>>>>> this
> >>>>>>>>>> process
> >>>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible
> >>>>>>> image-character
> >>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which
> >>>> he
> >>>>>>>>> brackets -
> >>>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> AND
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject*
> >>>>> finds
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
> >>>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion
> >>>> of
> >>>>>>>>> metaphor
> >>>>>>>>>> can
> >>>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is
> >>>> implicated
> >>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity*
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of
> >>>>>> itself
> >>>>>>>>> *in*
> >>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept
> >>>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding
> >>>>>> images
> >>>>>>>> has
> >>>>>>>>>> been
> >>>>>>>>>>>> established.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the
> >>>>> path
> >>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is
> >>>> derived
> >>>>>>> from
> >>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial
> >>>>> this
> >>>>>>>> topic
> >>>>>>>>>> may
> >>>>>>>>>>>> become [again]
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by
> >>>> this
> >>>>>>> basic
> >>>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these
> >>>>>> images
> >>>>>>> as
> >>>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images
> >>>>> emerge
> >>>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is
> >>>>>> transcendental]
> >>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>> is
> >>>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical].
> >>>>> It
> >>>>>>>> seems
> >>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in
> >>>>>> Vygotsky's
> >>>>>>>>>> writings
> >>>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of
> >>>>>> XMCA. I
> >>>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
> >>>> with
> >>>>>> an
> >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
> with
> >>>>> an
> >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
> >>>> an
> >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> --
> >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
> an
> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> --
> >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> --
> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>