[Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances

[Larry Purss]

Helena,
Thank you for this ebook. A wonderful resource which can be offered to
others working in learning environments. [in my case public school systems]

On the notion of using complex words. I find I have introduced simple
metaphors such as "shared brains" which can be imagined easily and can be
understood. when I lend my brain to the child we do *it* together and when
they are ready they can do *it* all by their self.

Bella, also thank you for introducing the new Cambridge book on Cultural
Historical Psychology. A wonderful resource on the complexity of this
theoretical approach or path.

Mike, the paper Natalia sent on the Luria-Vygotsky approach to
*neuro-psychology* also is a wonderful foundation for extending the Western
understanding of Vygotsky to a deeper understanding [and extension in the
West] of the *principle "of dynamic organization and localization of the
Higher Mental Functions"  I do wonder if this paper should be on the
archive list.

Martin's paper on Barsalou and Mike's paper on Kosslyn making the case for
*mental imagery* also are resources that are gesturing to a rich *cascade*
of  understandings.

I am like a kid in the candy store deciding which delight to try first as
they all seem to be sharing a *similar* perspective.

CHAT is a marvelous *interpretive community*  David K's caution that as we
generalize we can also loose focus is a struggle I encounter when
responding. Do I try to stay within the *cultural-historical* approach
[path] or take a more general *sociocultural approach*??

It all seems to lead back to *shared brain* which is what I bring to public
school settings.

The format of CHAT is unique.

Larry

On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 11:46 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
wrote:

> Hi Helena,
>
> I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those
> words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals were
> are teaching live and think within.  A little while ago I was reading
> Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded the
> idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would be
> self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any
> conscious human design.  We are a society obsessed with local control and
> the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in
> small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run).
>
> Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity
> often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become
> difficult to relate.
>
> A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education
> should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme
> cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is many
> educators don't trust that.  And then I stared at the sentence for a while
> and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever read
> it) would just pass it right over.
>
> So what do we do?  Hard to know.
>
> A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed
> cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson
> every some up?
>
> Michael
> ________________________________________
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com]
> Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances
>
> A voice from the margins, here:
>
> I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go
> quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out
> there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas
> intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years
> of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms
> that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a
> face as if they'd tasted something bad.
>
> Examples of terms like this are:
>
> affordance
> mediate
> activity
> CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory)
>
> and:
>
> development
>
> For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term
> "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can
> use that.
>
> Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning
> theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same
> reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very
> different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists.
>
> theoristshttp://
> www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf
>
>
> Helena Worthen
> helenaworthen@gmail.com
>
> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
>
> > Haydi,
> > Thank you so much! Here’s how it is for me:
> > I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in
> the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But
> I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher
> educator where research and publication wasn’t necessary for tenure and
> promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years
> back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in
> thrashing about I came to read Andy’s articles on "collaborative project"
> as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him
> one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering
> my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time
> for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe
> up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one
> of the papers for the book. I love them both. That’s how it is for me.
> >
> > Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike
> has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking
> him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest
> thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I
> have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where
> the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where
> human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have
> to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, “I’m still willin’” Let’s
> make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We
> can’t afford it. In my humble opinion.
> >
> > In gratitude and hope,
> > Henry
> >
> >> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >>
> >> Haydi--
> >>
> >> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to
> >> implement your demands may be more
> >> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as
> >> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing,
> >> so who knows.
> >>
> >> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in
> the
> >> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me.
> >> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas,
> >> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian.
> >>
> >> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various
> comments
> >> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads.
> For
> >> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment
> vis
> >> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc.,
> might
> >> be be placed in that thread.
> >>
> >> etc.
> >>
> >> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments!
> >> mike
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei <
> haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Hi
> >>>
> >>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to
> >>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this
> Forum .
> >>>
> >>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms ,
> >>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as
> >>> native speakers , etc.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether
> put
> >>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the
> >>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view .
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the
> "History of
> >>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries .
> Andy
> >>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all .
> >>>
> >>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools
> >>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He
> >>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just
> within the
> >>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect
> much of
> >>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and
> >>> Engels so as to prove his claims .
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture
> >>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to
> >>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets
> >>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device
> gets to
> >>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and
> >>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself
> >>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ??
> At
> >>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No
> more
> >>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some
> is to
> >>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that
> >>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at
> >>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present
> man of
> >>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work
> activity
> >>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the
> >>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12
> >>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically ,
> that
> >>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and
> >>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through
> >>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups
> and
> >>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed !
> collective
> >>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can
> distinguish
> >>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of
> >>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not
> ontogenetically
> >>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to
> >>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with
> >>> whichone .
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the
> four
> >>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point
> >>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction
> >>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and
> the
> >>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could
> be
> >>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use
> artifacts and
> >>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the
> domain
> >>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal
> activity'
> >>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one
> more
> >>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V
> , if
> >>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' .
> >>>
> >>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool
> >>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine
> >>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole
> activity
> >>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign
> activity
> >>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize
> its
> >>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech ,
> dialogue
> >>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal
> >>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral
> change
> >>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold
> of the
> >>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley
> rich
> >>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a
> >>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic
> 'motive'
> >>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing)
> ,
> >>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete
> action
> >>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the
> ground
> >>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material
> (object ,
> >>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole
> thing
> >>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the
> >>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no
> >>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why
> taking
> >>> affordance for a tool .
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Soooooooooo much for one post .
> >>>
> >>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works .
> >>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying !
> >>>
> >>> Best
> >>>
> >>> Haydi
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>    From: mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46
> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances
> >>>
> >>> My view?
> >>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On
> what
> >>> grounds, or under what circumstances,  would you classify it otherwise?
> >>> What's gained, what's lost?
> >>> mike
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael <
> glassman.13@osu.edu>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw
> >>>>
> >>>> I tend to  be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than
> >>>> definitions.  I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book,
> >>>>
> >>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to
> get
> >>>> across.  You notice a plank across the stream.  It is wide enough for
> you
> >>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it
> >>> you
> >>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point.  It is the intersection
> of
> >>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the
> >>> activity
> >>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes
> in
> >>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither
> subjective
> >>> or
> >>>> objective).  It is also important that you have the abilities (the
> >>> correct
> >>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass
> the
> >>>> plank by.
> >>>>
> >>>> As far as perceived affordance.  I think I have this right - the
> >>> perceived
> >>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are
> >>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the
> >>> design
> >>>> of the object.  So I create a light switch with the intention of
> >>> designing
> >>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch
> on a
> >>>> light.  As you can see different from the relationship to the plank,
> >>> where
> >>>> there is no prior design.
> >>>>
> >>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper)
> >>>>
> >>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank?
> >>>>
> >>>> Michael
> >>>> ________________________________________
> >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
> >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM
> >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances
> >>>>
> >>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that
> gibson
> >>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret
> him)
> >>> and
> >>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they
> share
> >>> the
> >>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a
> located
> >>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the
> phylgenetically
> >>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove
> >>> cognitive
> >>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then
> >>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means.
> >>>> mike
> >>>>
> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances,
> >>> which
> >>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is
> a
> >>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course
> >>> the
> >>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with
> >>> regard
> >>>> to
> >>>>> understanding what they are.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting
> >>>> outside
> >>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie
> >>> in
> >>>>> some fashion.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to
> >>> the
> >>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what
> Norman
> >>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water."
> >>>>>
> >>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I
> could
> >>>>> find:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal,
> >>> what
> >>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to
> >>>> afford"
> >>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made
> >>> it
> >>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and
> the
> >>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the
> >>>> complementarity
> >>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986).
> >>>>>
> >>>>> and
> >>>>>
> >>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? …Subject to revision, I suggest
> that
> >>>> the
> >>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of
> >>> its
> >>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The
> >>>> reference
> >>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson,
> >>>> 1977/1986).
> >>>>>
> >>>>> and
> >>>>>
> >>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they
> are
> >>>> in
> >>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings,
> >>> which
> >>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But
> >>>> actually,
> >>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective
> >>> property;
> >>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of
> >>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is
> >>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both
> >>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways,
> to
> >>>> the
> >>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986).
> >>>>>
> >>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very
> carefully
> >>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this
> >>> list
> >>>>> value history, learning, and development.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Kind regards,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Annalisa
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <
> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>
> >>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM
> >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I'd take a look.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit.  My equivalent of
> >>>> your
> >>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically
> >>>>> manifest.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Huw
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Michael
> >>>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
> >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>> ]
> >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
> >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM
> >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Interloper, Michael?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and
> >>>> cognitive
> >>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by
> Engestrom
> >>>> on
> >>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are
> >>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be
> >>>> gathered
> >>>>>> up.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael <
> >>> glassman.13@osu.edu
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea).
> >>> He
> >>>>>>> actually cops to both of them.  The first was not to distinguish
> >>>>> between
> >>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which
> >>> are
> >>>>>>> designed.  I think this is related to the issue of artifacts.
> >>>> Meaning
> >>>>>> are
> >>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to
> >>> be
> >>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong
> >>> word,
> >>>> if
> >>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances.  It is a
> >>>>>> complex
> >>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes
> >>> based
> >>>> on
> >>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one
> >>>> context
> >>>>>> may
> >>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that
> >>>> he
> >>>>>> was
> >>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and
> >>>>>> constraints.
> >>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances
> >>> or
> >>>>> are
> >>>>>>> they designed to create constraints.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the
> >>>>> mention
> >>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up.  Hope I'm not being too much of
> >>> an
> >>>>>>> interloper.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Michael
> >>>>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
> >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>> ]
> >>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
> >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM
> >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Annalisa-
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation
> >>>> not
> >>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of
> >>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set
> >>> against
> >>>>>>> Gibson's ideas.  The change of views coincided with the advent of
> >>> the
> >>>>>> d-cog
> >>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> No hidden  history i know of, but interesting connections among the
> >>>>>> notion
> >>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion  of
> >>>>> these
> >>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engeström, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach
> >>> to
> >>>>>>> distributed*
> >>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition:
> >>>> Psychological
> >>>>>> and
> >>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu
> >>>>
> >>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Hi Mike,
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied
> >>>> that
> >>>>>>> wish!
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important
> >>> connections.
> >>>> I
> >>>>>> was
> >>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I
> >>> learned
> >>>>>> about
> >>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science
> >>>> (1985).
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story?
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity:
> >>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to
> >>>>>> cognitive
> >>>>>>>> artifacts?
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in
> >>>> play,
> >>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>> even joy!
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however
> >>>> until
> >>>>>> then
> >>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Kind regards,
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Annalisa
> >>>>>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <
> >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> >>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM
> >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And,
> >>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive
> >>>>>> artifacts
> >>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD.  If it were possible to find a
> >>>> source
> >>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it
> >>>> might
> >>>>>> be a
> >>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of
> >>>>> intro
> >>>>>>> for
> >>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a
> >>>>>> newcomer's
> >>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is
> >>> seeking
> >>>>> to
> >>>>>>> sort
> >>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am
> >>>>>>> insuficiently
> >>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted!
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many
> >>>>> rocks,
> >>>>>> so
> >>>>>>>> little time"!
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Mike
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> A
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> >>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Martin!
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental
> >>>>> representation"
> >>>>>> is
> >>>>>>>>> coming closer!
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's
> >>>>> theory
> >>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>> affordances.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed
> >>>> article.
> >>>>>> But
> >>>>>>> I
> >>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is
> >>>>>>> important
> >>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a
> >>>>>> grenade
> >>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the
> >>>> list.
> >>>>>> If
> >>>>>>>> you
> >>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look
> >>>> forward
> >>>>> to
> >>>>>>>> your
> >>>>>>>>> reply, Martin.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that
> >>> being
> >>>>> at
> >>>>>>> UCSD
> >>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that
> >>>>> influences
> >>>>>>> your
> >>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find
> >>>>>>> community
> >>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more
> >>> voluntary
> >>>>>>> phrased
> >>>>>>>>> that way).
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards,
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa
> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
> >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of
> >>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>> John
> >>>>>>>>> Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co <javascript:;>>
> >>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM
> >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is
> >>>> interesting,
> >>>>> to
> >>>>>>> me
> >>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not
> >>> used,
> >>>>>> even
> >>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read"
> >>> images
> >>>> in
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to
> >>>> define
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg <
> >>> dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >>>>>>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight"
> >>>> when
> >>>>>> we
> >>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of
> >>>>>>> anything
> >>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe
> >>>>> available
> >>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even
> >>> remember
> >>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was
> >>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as
> >>> a
> >>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental
> >>> representations
> >>>>> are
> >>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth
> >>> century.
> >>>>> In
> >>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against
> >>>>>>> Titchener
> >>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples,
> >>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated
> >>>> that
> >>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically
> >>>>>> anterior
> >>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would
> >>>> not
> >>>>>> have
> >>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that
> >>> are
> >>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more
> >>>>>> reading
> >>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read
> >>> than
> >>>> I
> >>>>> am
> >>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels
> >>>> like
> >>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do
> >>>> NOT
> >>>>>> read
> >>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color
> >>> structure
> >>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo’s painting to suggest images without using any
> >>>>> actual
> >>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural
> >>>>>>> experience
> >>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings.  Pepperell then
> >>>>> deliberately
> >>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any
> >>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo’s Sistine
> >>> Chapel
> >>>>>> fresco
> >>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation.
> >>> He
> >>>> or
> >>>>>> she
> >>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the
> >>> painting
> >>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not
> >>>>> notice
> >>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful
> >>> in
> >>>>> it.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar <
> >>>> annalisa@unm.edu
> >>>>>>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David,
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in!
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are
> >>>> at
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>> root of all thinking.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently,
> >>>> based
> >>>>>> upon
> >>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers,
> >>> in
> >>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a
> >>>>> phrase
> >>>>>> I
> >>>>>>>> like
> >>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on
> >>> it
> >>>>> by
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know
> >>> it.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think
> >>> as
> >>>>>>> Hackett
> >>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have
> >>>> you
> >>>>>>>> already
> >>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be
> >>>>> willing
> >>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>> take a look.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is
> >>>>>>> controversial.
> >>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone
> >>>>> says
> >>>>>>>> "this
> >>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble
> >>>>>>> observation.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and
> >>> whatever
> >>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at
> >>>>> hand?
> >>>>>>>> Just a
> >>>>>>>>> thought.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model,
> >>>> metaphoricity?
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!)
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards,
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
> >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of
> >>>> Larry
> >>>>>>>> Purss <
> >>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com <javascript:;>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM
> >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
> >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]  How *basic* are images?
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> David K
> >>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce.
> >>>> My
> >>>>>>> reason
> >>>>>>>>> for
> >>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path
> >>>>> pursuing a
> >>>>>>>> basic
> >>>>>>>>>>> question.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic
> >>>>>> guiding
> >>>>>>>>> images
> >>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests"
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring
> >>>>> appearances
> >>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new
> >>>>> phenomenological
> >>>>>>>> path
> >>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names
> >>>>> this
> >>>>>>>>> process
> >>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible
> >>>>>> image-character
> >>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which
> >>> he
> >>>>>>>> brackets -
> >>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> AND
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject*
> >>>> finds
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
> >>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion
> >>> of
> >>>>>>>> metaphor
> >>>>>>>>> can
> >>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is
> >>> implicated
> >>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity*
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of
> >>>>> itself
> >>>>>>>> *in*
> >>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept
> >>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding
> >>>>> images
> >>>>>>> has
> >>>>>>>>> been
> >>>>>>>>>>> established.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the
> >>>> path
> >>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is
> >>> derived
> >>>>>> from
> >>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial
> >>>> this
> >>>>>>> topic
> >>>>>>>>> may
> >>>>>>>>>>> become [again]
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by
> >>> this
> >>>>>> basic
> >>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these
> >>>>> images
> >>>>>> as
> >>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images
> >>>> emerge
> >>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is
> >>>>> transcendental]
> >>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>> is
> >>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical].
> >>>> It
> >>>>>>> seems
> >>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in
> >>>>> Vygotsky's
> >>>>>>>>> writings
> >>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of
> >>>>> XMCA. I
> >>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Larry
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
> >>> with
> >>>>> an
> >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
> >>>> an
> >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> --
> >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
> >>> an
> >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> --
> >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> --
> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >
> >
>
>
>
>