[Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances

[Haydi Zulfei]

Dear Annalisa,

"but I wonder if the assignment of affordances to the environment and the assignment of artefacts to the human mind is the way to think about this." 


This was the problem I explained with the support of V's clear text . Before going further , I very humbly ask you not to talk in a way that would supposedly or out of some passing confusion mean : to disagree is to be hostile ! 

In the above quote , if by 'artifact' , we could mean that aspect of the term which conveys 'tool' , this, V would not allow . Because psychological functions do need 'signs' not 'tools' . Stimuli , stimuli-devices and Tools (technofacts) initially signalize ; signs signify . Signs go inward ; tools go outward . 


What caused me to distinguish between tool and affordance MIGHT have come out of my ignorance , but the least I can say in this respect besides years of discussion of the ZPD phenomenon tied to the idea of affordance and the Diad , is the idea that with affordance some 'additiveness' is concerned while with tool this 'additiveness' is gone .


"because the artefact is the sense-meaning part of the interaction"


Maybe it's my fault that I can't see the 'personification' or 'particularization' trait that V attributes to 'sense' and not to artifact in both its aspects .

Kindest regards

Haydi
      From: Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
 To: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> 
 Sent: Wednesday, 3 December 2014, 18:26:02
 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances
   
Hi Andy,

Very eloquently put. 

I need to do a closer reading of the thread on affordances, it's been a busy day, but I wonder if the assignment of affordances to the environment and the assignment of artefacts to the human mind is the way to think about this. 

Believe it or not, I'm not attempting to be antagonistic here. I think it is the topic that possesses a sticky affordance rather than the people involved speaking about it. Certainly Gibson himself suffered in trying to explain what an affordance was, and this was to people much more hostile in temperament than on this list. :)

Unless the affordance/artefact construct is about layers and direction of movement perhaps? Points of genesis?

Still, I feel more at ease with the idea of the affordance pertaining to the environment and the subject in the way that there is no dichotomy. I could see that an artefact could arise in response within an individual to an affordance, but not as a distinct "side" of the interaction(objective vs subjective), but rather more of a prompted response, because the artefact is the sense-meaning part of the interaction, and an affordance is something somewhat passive, because if proffers an opportunity.

Thinking about it this way, I'd say the plank is both an affordance and an artefact at the same time.

Can one have an artefact present without an affordance? and... can one have an affordance present without an artefact? And when both are present how do they relate? These are questions that may tease things apart, perhaps.

Such is how it is for me. :)

Kind regards,

Annalisa





________________________________________
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Sent: Wednesday, December 3, 2014 6:41 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances

Haydi, sometimes for my own health and that of the list I need to take a
break.

As to the question of whether the plank across the creek is an artefact.
"Artefact" is meant to group together both tools and symbols, or rather
things used as tools or symbols, so we cannot counterpose artefact to
tool. An artefact can also be both a tool and a symbol, since the point
is only ever its functional role in human actions, not its properties,
and in this computer age, things can be playing both roles simultaneously.

At a trivial level of course the plank is an artefact. A plank is a
product of human art. But what is of interest is the psychological role
of the plank, that is what interests us. A constellation of stars is not
a product of human art strictly speaking, but because these
constellations have been identified and their shape, position and
significance passed on culturally for use in navigation and astrology,
we have to say that the constellations and the heavenly bodies
generally, insofar as they are known and identified by their place in
culture, are artefacts; and they figure as mediating artefact-symbols in
human actions. Reading the stars is a culturally-transmitted, learned
activity.

But what if we were talking about a tree which had accidentally fallen
across the creek only the night before and was discovered by the walker
for the first time? In crossing the creek using the fallen tree is the
walker doing an artefact-mediated action? In my opinion, this is a
question which can be resolved only by psychological investigation, not
philosophy. A squirrel could run across the fallen tree just as much as
a human, but does a human use the tree in just the same way as a
squirrel? That is the question of interest. Or is the human being's
knowledge of bridges and their function, and familiarity with stories
about fallen trees and the use of timber in building all contributing to
the decision to use the tree as a bridge and controlling the walker's
action in playing Friar Tuck and Little John?

Andy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/


Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> Hi
>
> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum .
>
> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as native speakers , etc.
>
>
> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view .
>
>
> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy , in time , sent the first two chapters to all .
>
> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and Engels so as to prove his claims .
>
>
> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity necessitating use of tools . It seems we can
 not take the idea to the uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish independent history of natural processes and independent history of cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with whichone .
>
>
> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if necessary , prefers just 'mediation' .
>
> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , with a conscious goal (reachi
 ng the other side) through a concrete action (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking affordance for a tool .
>
>
> Soooooooooo much for one post .
>
> I considered spaces but wonder if it works .
> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying !
>
> Best
>
> Haydi
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>      From: mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>  To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>  Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46
>  Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances
>
> My view?
> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what
> grounds, or under what circumstances,  would you classify it otherwise?
> What's gained, what's lost?
> mike
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> wrote:
>
>
>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw
>>
>> I tend to  be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than
>> definitions.  I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book,
>>
>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get
>> across.  You notice a plank across the stream.  It is wide enough for you
>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you
>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point.  It is the intersection of
>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity
>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in
>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or
>> objective).  It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct
>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the
>> plank by.
>>
>> As far as perceived affordance.  I think I have this right - the perceived
>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are
>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design
>> of the object.  So I create a light switch with the intention of designing
>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a
>> light.  As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where
>> there is no prior design.
>>
>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper)
>>
>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank?
>>
>> Michael
>> ________________________________________
>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances
>>
>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson
>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and
>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the
>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located
>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically
>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive
>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then
>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means.
>> mike
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which
>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images.
>>>
>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a
>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the
>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard
>>>
>> to
>>
>>> understanding what they are.
>>>
>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting
>>>
>> outside
>>
>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in
>>> some fashion.
>>>
>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the
>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman
>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water."
>>>
>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could
>>> find:
>>>
>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what
>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to
>>>
>> afford"
>>
>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it
>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the
>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the
>>>
>> complementarity
>>
>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986).
>>>
>>> and
>>>
>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? …Subject to revision, I suggest that
>>>
>> the
>>
>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its
>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The
>>>
>> reference
>>
>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson,
>>>
>> 1977/1986).
>>
>>> and
>>>
>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are
>>>
>> in
>>
>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which
>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But
>>>
>> actually,
>>
>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property;
>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of
>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is
>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both
>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to
>>>
>> the
>>
>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986).
>>>
>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help.
>>>
>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully
>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list
>>> value history, learning, and development.
>>>
>>> Kind regards,
>>>
>>> Annalisa
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ________________________________________
>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>
>>> I'd take a look.
>>>
>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit.  My equivalent of
>>>
>> your
>>
>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically
>>> manifest.
>>>
>>> Huw
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is.
>>>>
>>>> Michael
>>>> ________________________________________
>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>
>> ]
>>
>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM
>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>
>>>> Interloper, Michael?
>>>>
>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and
>>>>
>> cognitive
>>
>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom
>>>>
>> on
>>
>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are
>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be
>>>>
>> gathered
>>
>>>> up.
>>>>
>>>> mike
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu
>>>>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea).  He
>>>>> actually cops to both of them.  The first was not to distinguish
>>>>>
>>> between
>>>
>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are
>>>>> designed.  I think this is related to the issue of artifacts.
>>>>>
>> Meaning
>>
>>>> are
>>>>
>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be
>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word,
>>>>>
>> if
>>
>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances.  It is a
>>>>>
>>>> complex
>>>>
>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based
>>>>>
>> on
>>
>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one
>>>>>
>> context
>>
>>>> may
>>>>
>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context.
>>>>>
>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that
>>>>>
>> he
>>
>>>> was
>>>>
>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and
>>>>>
>>>> constraints.
>>>>
>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or
>>>>>
>>> are
>>>
>>>>> they designed to create constraints.
>>>>>
>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the
>>>>>
>>> mention
>>>
>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up.  Hope I'm not being too much of an
>>>>> interloper.
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael
>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
>>>>>
>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>
>>> ]
>>>
>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM
>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>>
>>>>> Annalisa-
>>>>>
>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation
>>>>>
>> not
>>
>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of
>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against
>>>>> Gibson's ideas.  The change of views coincided with the advent of the
>>>>>
>>>> d-cog
>>>>
>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat.
>>>>>
>>>>> No hidden  history i know of, but interesting connections among the
>>>>>
>>>> notion
>>>>
>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion  of
>>>>>
>>> these
>>>
>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in
>>>>>
>>>>>  Cole, M. & Engeström, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to
>>>>> distributed*
>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition:
>>>>>
>> Psychological
>>
>>>> and
>>>>
>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
>>>>>
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
>>>>>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Mike,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied
>>>>>>
>> that
>>
>>>>> wish!
>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections.
>>>>>>
>> I
>>
>>>> was
>>>>
>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned
>>>>>>
>>>> about
>>>>
>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science
>>>>>>
>> (1985).
>>
>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I looked here for clarity:
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to
>>>>>>
>>>> cognitive
>>>>
>>>>>> artifacts?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in
>>>>>>
>> play,
>>
>>>> and
>>>>
>>>>>> even joy!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however
>>>>>>
>> until
>>
>>>> then
>>>>
>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <
>>>>>>
>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM
>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And,
>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive
>>>>>>
>>>> artifacts
>>>>
>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD.  If it were possible to find a
>>>>>>
>> source
>>
>>>> that
>>>>
>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it
>>>>>>
>> might
>>
>>>> be a
>>>>
>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of
>>>>>>
>>> intro
>>>
>>>>> for
>>>>>
>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a
>>>>>>
>>>> newcomer's
>>>>
>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking
>>>>>>
>>> to
>>>
>>>>> sort
>>>>>
>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am
>>>>>>
>>>>> insuficiently
>>>>>
>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many
>>>>>>
>>> rocks,
>>>
>>>> so
>>>>
>>>>>> little time"!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Mike
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
>>>>>>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>>> Martin!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental
>>>>>>>
>>> representation"
>>>
>>>> is
>>>>
>>>>>>> coming closer!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's
>>>>>>>
>>> theory
>>>
>>>> of
>>>>
>>>>>>> affordances.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed
>>>>>>>
>> article.
>>
>>>> But
>>>>
>>>>> I
>>>>>
>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is
>>>>>>>
>>>>> important
>>>>>
>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a
>>>>>>>
>>>> grenade
>>>>
>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the
>>>>>>>
>> list.
>>
>>>> If
>>>>
>>>>>> you
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look
>>>>>>>
>> forward
>>
>>> to
>>>
>>>>>> your
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> reply, Martin.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being
>>>>>>>
>>> at
>>>
>>>>> UCSD
>>>>>
>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that
>>>>>>>
>>> influences
>>>
>>>>> your
>>>>>
>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find
>>>>>>>
>>>>> community
>>>>>
>>>>>> in
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary
>>>>>>>
>>>>> phrased
>>>>>
>>>>>>> that way).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of
>>>>>>>
>>> Martin
>>>
>>>>> John
>>>>>
>>>>>>> Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co <javascript:;>>
>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM
>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is
>>>>>>>
>> interesting,
>>
>>> to
>>>
>>>>> me
>>>>>
>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used,
>>>>>>>
>>>> even
>>>>
>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images
>>>>>>>
>> in
>>
>>>> the
>>>>
>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to
>>>>>>>
>> define
>>
>>>> the
>>>>
>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight"
>>>>>>>>
>> when
>>
>>>> we
>>>>
>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> anything
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe
>>>>>>>>
>>> available
>>>
>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember
>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the
>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a
>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations
>>>>>>>>
>>> are
>>>
>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century.
>>>>>>>>
>>> In
>>>
>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> Titchener
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples,
>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated
>>>>>>>>
>> that
>>
>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically
>>>>>>>>
>>>> anterior
>>>>
>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would
>>>>>>>>
>> not
>>
>>>> have
>>>>
>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are
>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more
>>>>>>>>
>>>> reading
>>>>
>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than
>>>>>>>>
>> I
>>
>>> am
>>>
>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels
>>>>>>>>
>> like
>>
>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do
>>>>>>>>
>> NOT
>>
>>>> read
>>>>
>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure
>>>>>>>>
>> of
>>
>>>>>>>> Michelangelo’s painting to suggest images without using any
>>>>>>>>
>>> actual
>>>
>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> experience
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings.  Pepperell then
>>>>>>>>
>>> deliberately
>>>
>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any
>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel
>>>>>>>>
>>>> fresco
>>>>
>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He
>>>>>>>>
>> or
>>
>>>> she
>>>>
>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting
>>>>>>>>
>>> and
>>>
>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not
>>>>>>>>
>>> notice
>>>
>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in
>>>>>>>>
>>> it.
>>>
>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar <
>>>>>>>>
>> annalisa@unm.edu
>>
>>>>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in!
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are
>>>>>>>>>
>> at
>>
>>>> the
>>>>
>>>>>>> root of all thinking.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently,
>>>>>>>>>
>> based
>>
>>>> upon
>>>>
>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in
>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a
>>>>>>>
>>> phrase
>>>
>>>> I
>>>>
>>>>>> like
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it
>>>>>>>
>>> by
>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> Hackett
>>>>>
>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have
>>>>>>>
>> you
>>
>>>>>> already
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be
>>>>>>>
>>> willing
>>>
>>>>> to
>>>>>
>>>>>>> take a look.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> controversial.
>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone
>>>>>>>
>>> says
>>>
>>>>>> "this
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble
>>>>>>>
>>>>> observation.
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> that
>>>>
>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at
>>>>>>>
>>> hand?
>>>
>>>>>> Just a
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thought.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model,
>>>>>>>>>
>> metaphoricity?
>>
>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of
>>>>>>>
>> Larry
>>
>>>>>> Purss <
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com <javascript:;>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM
>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]  How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> David K
>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce.
>>>>>>>>>
>> My
>>
>>>>> reason
>>>>>
>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path
>>>>>>>>>
>>> pursuing a
>>>
>>>>>> basic
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> question.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> guiding
>>>>
>>>>>>> images
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests"
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring
>>>>>>>>>
>>> appearances
>>>
>>>>> and
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new
>>>>>>>>>
>>> phenomenological
>>>
>>>>>> path
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names
>>>>>>>>>
>>> this
>>>
>>>>>>> process
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> image-character
>>>>
>>>>>> of
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> brackets -
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> AND
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject*
>>>>>>>>>
>> finds
>>
>>>> the
>>>>
>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> metaphor
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> can
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated
>>>>>>>>>
>>> in
>>>
>>>>>>>>> *objectivity*
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of
>>>>>>>>>
>>> itself
>>>
>>>>>> *in*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept
>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding
>>>>>>>>>
>>> images
>>>
>>>>> has
>>>>>
>>>>>>> been
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> established.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the
>>>>>>>>>
>> path
>>
>>> of
>>>
>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> from
>>>>
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial
>>>>>>>>>
>> this
>>
>>>>> topic
>>>>>
>>>>>>> may
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> become [again]
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> basic
>>>>
>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these
>>>>>>>>>
>>> images
>>>
>>>> as
>>>>
>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images
>>>>>>>>>
>> emerge
>>
>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is
>>>>>>>>>
>>> transcendental]
>>>
>>>>> and
>>>>>
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical].
>>>>>>>>>
>> It
>>
>>>>> seems
>>>>>
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in
>>>>>>>>>
>>> Vygotsky's
>>>
>>>>>>> writings
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of
>>>>>>>>>
>>> XMCA. I
>>>
>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
>>>>>>
>>> an
>>>
>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
>>>>>
>> an
>>
>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>> --
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>