[Xmca-l] Re: article request

[Peter Smagorinsky]

Excerpts at Problems of Developmental Teaching: The Experience of ...
books.google.com/.../Problems_of_Developmental_Teaching.html?id=Z...‎
Problems of Developmental Teaching: The Experience of Theoretical and Experimental Psychological Research : Excerpts. Front Cover. V. V.. Davydov.

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Kris Gutierrez
Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 9:09 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] article request

Does anyone have a pdf of
Problems of developmental teaching : the experience of theoretical and experimental psychological research

Davydov, V. V. 1988


I can't seem to find my copy.  thanks. 


Kris D. Gutiérrez, Ph.D.
Inaugural Provost's Chair
Professor of Learning Sciences and Literacy School of Education University of Colorado at Boulder Education Building
249 UCB
Boulder, CO 80309-0249

Professor Emerita
Social Research Methodology
GSE&IS
UCLA

On Sep 22, 2013, at 9:31 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> I have been waiting to hear further reflections on this months article.
> I have noticed that as I am reading other articles I hear Jennifer's 
> voice calling me to listen for distinctions within unities and not 
> reify these fluid distinctions into discrete dichotomies.
> I would like to offer further reflections on my musings.
> Dewey wrote a book titled "Experience AND Nature* as conductive concepts.
> I have read Vygotskian commentary suggesting *nature* does not capture 
> the centrality of tools and artifacts. Would the title "Experience AND 
> Artifacts" be a useful working title?
> Other titles that came to mind were "Experience AND Mediation" or 
> "Experience AND Activity".
> I am proposing that *experience* and the conjunctive concepts as 
> distinctions can be played with in our models of human nature.
> I am also aware that Dewey re-considered [analepsis] the choice of the 
> concept *experience* in his model. However, with the exploration of 
> the unity of cognition AND feeling I wonder if *experience* can still 
> be a concept which we can *live through* as a meaningfully shared 
> concept to explore analytical distinctions WITHIN unities?
> 
> The concept *word meaning* was proposed as a central concept used by 
> Vygotsky which as an aspect of experience unifies cognition and affect 
> WITHIN experience as situated.
> This insight is exploring the place of *concepts* within experience 
> [as situated].
> Calvin Schrag has explored Merleau-Ponty's  theme of the centrality of 
> the *visual FIELD* and proposes that M-P's insights exploring the 
> visual field within experience can be extended to other *fields* such 
> as the other perceptual fields [touch hearing, taste] AND conceptual 
> fields, and valuational fields.
> The key insight M-P offers is that these multiple fields [perceptual, 
> conceptual, valuational] WITHIN experience are neither "outer worlds* 
> of re-presented or re-constituted objective properties and relations 
> on the one hand, nor are these multiple fields [perceptual, 
> conceptual, valuational]  an "abstracted inner world" as transcendentally accessed.
> The experiential world [as situated] M-P describes as a *lived-through 
> world*.
> Consciousness, [the theme Vygotsky was turning towards before his 
> early death], is NEVER ENCLOSED WITHIN ITSELF. It is from the 
> beginning lodged within the world as an intentional unity with figures 
> [and con-figurations] positioned or located against backgrounds 
> [Gestalts]. Gestalt has also been proposed on this xmca site as where Vygotsky was turning.
> Schrag suggests M-P privileged the *visual field* but his key insight 
> can be expanded beyond the visual to multiple fields. Schrag suggests 
> the visual field is not *truer* or displays a *richer* structure than 
> do the other multiple fields. The visual field of sight does have the 
> advantage of providing more direct conditions for objectification. I 
> would add that the conceptual field also has this distinct benefit of 
> distanciation of figure and ground. Schrag points out that this 
> benefit however, by virtue of the distant and disembodied potential of 
> the visual sense [I would add conceptual field as sense] is prone to 
> become separated from the concrete
> *experiencer* and the dynamic fields [as Gestalts]
> 
> Schrag highlights a word [aisthesis] which points to the phenomena 
> which MEDIATES all the senses. THIS full bodied is most overtly 
> displayed and manifested particularly WITHIN the perceptual field of 
> touch AS tactile sensation.
> 
> This is Schrag's key point [and may also be put in conjunction with 
> the unity of cognition and affect].
> Full-bodied aisthesis CONTINUES TO BE OPERATIVE in the visual [and 
> conceptual] fields, and by virtue of aisthesis retains a unity WITHIN 
> experience.
> This insight not does mean an inversion of visual and conceptual 
> fields to the nonvisual tactile or auditory fields. Touch and hearing 
> are neither truer or richer in structure than sight or concepts. No 
> sense should be elevated above the others. Sight and concepts without 
> the full bodied aisthesis of the other senses divests *experience* of 
> its vibrancy, as the other senses without the visual and conceptual 
> which provide distance tend to enslave experience within immediacy.
> 
> Schrag and the current article are emphasizing unity and the 
> multidimensional texture of experience as cognition AND affect. As 
> Schrag writes, "The multidimensional texture of experience is 
> displayed not only in the plurality of perceptual fields, but also in 
> the variegated deployment of conceptual and valuational fields. 
> Conceiving and valuing, as assuredly as perceiving, occur WITHIN a 
> figure-ground context. Experience is always broader in its reach than 
> perceptual fields."
> 
> M-P's privileging the visual sense is not his central insight. His 
> central insight is that the multiple fields of sense DISPLAYS a 
> figure-ground relation AND an intentional structure REVEALING its 
> intended figures at EVERY level of experience.
> 
> Jennifer, I enjoyed crisscrossing your insights and extensions of the 
> unity of cognition AND affect with Schrag's descriptions within a 
> phenomenology of experience.
> 
> I apologize if this is going off topic but your article is *in my 
> mind* as I am  reading Schrag's  theme of unity of the senses.
> Larry